Memorandum submitted by Islamic Relief
INTRODUCTION TO
ISLAMIC RELIEF
1. Islamic Relief welcomes the opportunity
to present evidence to the Select Committee and hopes that the
Committee will find the following information useful and offers
our availability for oral evidence sessions should our participation
and contribution be required.
2. Islamic Relief is an international, non-political
relief and development charity, founded in 1984. It has its headquarters
in Birmingham UK and fundraising and field offices worldwide.
Islamic Relief is committed to reducing poverty in some of the
world's most deprived communities, through emergency aid distribution
and implementation of long-term economic and social development
projects.
3. Islamic Relief is a member of the UN
Economic and Social Council and British Overseas NGOs for Development
(BOND) and is signatory to the Code of Conduct for the International
Red Cross and Red Crescent Movements and NGOs in Disaster Relief.
4. Through its Pakistan Mission, Islamic
Relief has implemented emergency relief projects in Afghanistan
since 1992. In view of the magnitude of the crisis and the rapidly
deteriorating conditions of the Afghan people, sporadic interventions
were considered inadequate, leading to the inception of the Islamic
Relief Afghanistan Mission in April 2001.
ONGOING HUMANITARIAN
NEEDS, RESPONSES
AND FUTURE
ASSISTANCE NEEDS
5. The humanitarian needs in Afghanistan
are well known and need not be restated. They are essentially
the same needs as last year, the year before and the year before
that, and the same needs will continue for the foreseeable future.
Afghanistan was already facing a humanitarian crisis prior to
11 September 2001, and it is still facing a severe humanitarian
crisis.
6. In fact, the humanitarian needs in Afghanistan
are increasing and becoming more serious as the drought and its
impact continue to worsen and the humanitarian situation further
deteriorates. Particularly in the south of Afghanistan, where
Islamic Relief has most of its projects, still there has been
no rain since the first inquiry conducted by this Committee. The
drought is affecting more and larger areas and an increasing number
of people. Also contributing to the worsening humanitarian situation
are the two million refugees returning this year, lured by the
promise of a stable government and pledges of support from the
international community—promises that have failed to improve
the life of the common man, woman or child. As a result, potentially
more people are vulnerable this year than last year.
7. Food security continues to be a major
problem, especially as winter approaches. Most villages are already
facing food security problems, and people are leaving for towns
and IDP camps where they expect circumstances to be better or
at least to receive some assistance from the international community.
UNHCR estimates there are still around 926,000 IDPs scattered
throughout Afghanistan.
8. Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi reminded the United
Nations Security Council in his speech on 19 July 2002: "We
must not forget that there is still a humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan,
and that this crisis is likely to persist for some time."
9. He said: "We are facing funding
shortfalls, but refugees are returning in record numbers, and
the services that would allow them to resettle and reintegrate
in their own towns and villages, instead of flocking to already
overcrowded and overburdened urban centres, are mostly absent.
Meanwhile, the drought continues and household food security is
at risk. And a few months from now, millions of vulnerable Afghans
will face another hard winter."
10. Indeed, winter is a major concern this
year as it was last, perhaps even more so in light of the continuing
drought and the number of returnees contributing to the vulnerable
population. While efforts are under way to pre-place provisions
ahead of the onset of winter, already concerns are being raised
about the availability of funding to ensure sufficient supplies
and their distribution. As much as is possible, food and supplies
should be distributed in villages and rural areas (as well as
to Internally Displaced Persons) in order to prevent further displacement
to camps and cities. Longer-term development initiatives are also
essential in these areas. There is also evidence that some returning
refugees are again fleeing to Pakistan. By helping people to stay
in their places of origin, the expense and difficulty of repatriation
can be avoided and efforts can be focused on rebuilding an equitable
and stable society.
11. As for how long humanitarian needs will
persist, it is impossible to say with any degree of certainty.
Islamic Relief can only state that, as is well known, the humanitarian
situation in Afghanistan has been deteriorating—on a steep
downward slide—since the Russian invasion. Furthermore,
as early as the 1950s and 1960s, Afghanistan received subsidies
from the United States, mostly in the form of wheat, oil and ghee.
A lot of these subsidies were used as "top-ups" for
civil servants, government employees and teachers. The need for
"humanitarian top-up" is almost half a century-old.
It is impossible to calculate how much longer assistance will
be necessary, but it is certain to be for the longer-term, rather
than the shorter-term and is dependent to a large extent on the
amount of reconstruction and long-term development that takes
place.
12. A series of joint field missions were
undertaken by the Afghan Assistance Coordination Authority (AACA),
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and key
interested donor/diplomatic missions between 7 May and 11 July.
The missions made the following observations regarding the diversity
in terms of political/economic/security situations (balance of
actors, vulnerability and development issues, and current debates/priorities)
from place to place in Afghanistan:
12.1 Kandahar and southern Afghanistan
have high levels of humanitarian risk associated with poverty,
continued drought, human rights violations, and population displacement,
and poppy eradication remains a great challenge.
12.2 Herat and western Afghanistan
feel very far from Kabul's influence, and while Herat itself is
in relatively good condition, there are major pockets of vulnerability
and potential instability in outlying districts;
12.3 Bamyan and the central highlands
also are quite isolated, and must overcome severe poverty and
weak infrastructure as well as perceived ethnic barriers to their
reintegration into the recovering country;
12.4 Mazar-e-Sharif and northern Afghanistan
are facing continued militarised factionalism, which adds to human-rights
protection needs, impedes recovery, and creates a dangerous environment
for assistance activities; and
12.5 Northeastern Afghanistan (Badakshan,
Takhar, and Kunduz Provinces) is exceptional in the relatively
high level of administrative capacity and the absence of strong
mistrust, however travel is very difficult in some parts, which
complicates the coordination of humanitarian and recovery assistance.
13. The missions noted "This is a reminder
that generalities, including recommendations for follow-up, need
to be interpreted and tailored to the specific working environment
of each place in Afghanistan."
14. Besides immediate humanitarian needs,
other areas also need to be addressed. These include long-term
reconstruction and development objectives, such as reconstructing
the nation's destroyed infrastructure, creating employment through
labour-intensive projects, long-term initiatives to improve the
nation's food security and self-sufficiency, environmental programmes
to repair a natural environment devastated by four years of drought
and decades of neglect and abuse, developing a healthy and active
civil society with clear understanding of its role and limits,
of rights (especially of women, children and minorities), good
governance, tolerance and the rule of law.
AVAILABLE RESOURCES
FOR HUMANITARIAN
RESPONSES AND
RECONSTRUCTION
15. At the Tokyo Conference early this year
international donors were quick to pledge US $4.5 billion over
the next five years, US $1.8 billion of which was to be released
this year. But figures from the Afghan Assistance Coordination
Authority on 12 September 2002 showed that just half of this year's
money had been released.
16. In any case, as has been demonstrated
by CARE International in its Policy Brief, the amounts pledged
in Tokyo are far lower than what has been pledged in other post-conflict
settings. Nevertheless, Islamic Relief does not see itself entitled
to determine the adequacy of the resources available for Afghanistan.
This, we believe, is the Afghan Government's prerogative. However,
Islamic Relief is concerned at the slow pace of releasing pledged
funds, which has led to programme funding gaps for many NGOs and
has a direct impact on assistance delivery and thus the population.
17. Incidentally, because of Islamic Relief's
own funding constituency, our programmes have not been directly
affected by these delays. However, as a UK-based NGO, we have
felt some dissatisfaction with DFID's apparently exclusive approach
to the dispersal of long-term development funds. DFID has been
keen to collaborate with Islamic Relief on Quick Impact Projects
(QUIPs) and to provide partial funding to the Kandahar Education
Project. However, it has been the experience of Islamic Relief
that we have not been informed of what funds are available with
DFID for what type of major long-term development projects and
how these funds can be accessed by NGOs. Rather, whenever we have
requested information about long-term funding opportunities available
with DFID, we have been informed simply that there is not enough
money and it has already been committed. This is in stark contrast
with ECHO's process of regular memos and briefings to inform all
NGOs (not only its partners) about progress, assessments, findings,
future plans and to invite proposals for available funds.
18. The Afghan Government too has expressed
its concern at the slow pace at which promised funds are released.
Afghan President Hamid Karzai on 12 September reminded the UN
General Assembly of the outstanding pledges and urged that they
urgently be turned into cash. He said, ". . . the level of
direct financial support provided to the Afghan Government can
be characterised as insufficient, considering the generosity of
donors at Tokyo Conference."
19. Concern can easily breed frustration
and resentment, as revealed by a comment made by Reconstruction
Minister Amin Fahang in early May: "The world community promises
a lot but pays out less."
20. Ahead of Mr. Brahimi's meeting with
the Security Council on 19 July, the NGO members of ACBAR (Agency
Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief) raised with him their "concern
at the failure of donor governments represented on the Security
Council to make available long-term reconstruction funding to
Afghanistan's Transitional Authority". They said: "Further
delays in direct disbursements to the ATA will compromise the
effectiveness, credibility and the long-term stability of the
new government."
21. Afghan Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah,
for example, has expressed his fear that Afghanistan's people,
especially the warlords, could turn against Karzai's government
if promises of peace, security and reconstruction are not met.
22. ACBAR said that while emergency funding
has been released (although not at the levels committed in Tokyo),
"there is a potentially disastrous short fall in longer-term
funding to the ATA for reconstruction and to support the ATA's
recurrent budget."
23. Indeed, Mr. Brahimi told the Security
Council that "the Transitional Administration anticipates
a serious crisis with respect to its ability to cover recurrent
expenditures beyond the next four to six months". He stressed,
". . . continued engagement and the urgent translation of
pledges into commitments are essential".
24. One can see really wonderful proposals
stemming from the Tokyo Conference and the really wonderful plans
of various ministries. But the impact of these plans and pledged
resources is not yet seen on the streets. For example, there is
no visible effort to improve the roads, either within or between
cities. Electricity, rather than improving, has been becoming
more and more of a problem. In Kabul, for example, we are now
facing 12-hour power blackouts, which wasn't the case a year ago.
The water supply is getting worse. Even the general appearance
of buildings is not improving, and most remain in decaying and
shabby condition.
25. So, pledges have been made, but they
are insufficient, slow to be released and have made no impact
to people on the ground. Frustration levels, meanwhile, are mounting,
as promises appear to be empty. The common man, woman and child
are still waiting for promises to be delivered and are no better
(if not worse) off now than last year. There may be no B-52s flying
overhead this year, but there is no more bread on the table than
there was a year ago, nor opportunities for employment, shelter
or personal security.
26. As Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi told the UN Security
Council: "Recovery and reconstruction have been slow to materialize
and the pledges made in Tokyo have not yet translated into concrete
improvements in the lives of ordinary people."
27. The government has expressed its desire
for balance in meeting reconstruction and humanitarian needs.
President Karzai in his speech to the UN General Assembly requested
the international community "to focus more on reconstruction,
to support long-term recovery efforts, and to treat the causes
of poverty, not its symptoms".
28. Pledges and reconstruction aside, humanitarian
needs are very real and very urgent: a large number of people
in Afghanistan are facing severe hunger this winter. WFP is expecting
breaks in the cereal pipeline from October onwards, with cereals
unavailable after December 2002, exactly when food needs to be
pre-positioned. WFP is expecting a shortfall of 84,500 MT of cereals,
while non-cereals (pulses, vegetable oil, sugar, corn soya blend
and wheat soya blend) are covered through the end of the year.
COORDINATION BETWEEN
DONORS, NGOS
AND THE
AFGHAN GOVERNMENT
29. There appears not to be coordination
as such, but there is definitely information sharing, which may
lead to a voluntary lack of duplication. There are many meetings
held by NGOs and UN agencies and sectoral coordination bodies.
There has been relative success in avoiding duplication, but it
is not apparent whether this is due to concerted coordination
efforts or simply the enormous amount of work to be done and vast
areas to be covered.
30. In the view of Islamic Relief's Country
Director in Afghanistan, NGOs, especially international NGOs,
"do not like to be coordinated, particularly by local governments,
because it may compromise on their impartiality and neutrality".
To date, to Islamic Relief's knowledge there has been no Memorandum
of Understanding between the international community and the Transitional
Authority regarding responsibilities, who does what, who decides
about what. Thus, there is very clear antagonism between NGOs
and government ongoing since last year.
31. The lack of coordination has been raised
by Rural Reconstruction and Development Minister Mr. Hanif Asmar,
who has said there is need for better coordination and greater
transparency, especially regarding NGO activities and there is
a need to decide on whose policies/objectives must be met.
32. Islamic Relief as a policy promotes
close coordination with local authorities. In Afghanistan context
particularly, we acknowledge that there is a legitimate, internationally
recognised government endeavouring to take responsibility for
running the country, for serving the people. We therefore should
facilitate the government in its endeavour by way of close coordination,
information sharing and most importantly acknowledging that the
government has long-term development and reconstructions plans
of its own and should have the privilege of having final say on
any Islamic Relief project, provided that the humanitarian principals
(as laid out in the Islamic Relief Country Strategy document)
are not compromised in any way.
33. This does not imply that an organisation's
funds are channelled through government departments or that its
principles of objectivity and impartiality are compromised. But
as an organisation we ensure that we do not implement projects
that are outside of the government's National Development Framework.
This way we believe we avoid setting up parallel structures that
have often been seen in many other reconstruction programmes around
the world. Afghanistan may also be in danger of the same situation.
34. More recently, concern has been raised
about the negative public perception of international agencies
in Afghanistan, largely due to excessive spending by the UN. Because
NGOs and UN agencies are largely indistinguishable in the general
public's mind, NGOs too are being accused of spending disproportionate
amounts of money on themselves and not enough on beneficiaries.
The image is prevalent among the Afghan public and has even reached
the Cabinet level, where the issue has been discussed.
35. The Afghan government, meanwhile, is
setting up a commission to look into the work and contribution
of NGOs. While acknowledging the important role played by NGOs,
new policies will be prepared with respect to NGO operations in
the country, in line with the government's legitimate demand for
transparency, accountability, and information sharing.
36. For example, the Afghan government is
reviewing proposed legislation that would regulate NGO operations.
Currently there is no such law, but the government continues in
the absence of a new law to refer back to restrictive legislation
prepared by the Taleban regime.
37. Islamic Relief welcomes such legislation
provided it does not hamper operations for the benefit of the
people of Afghanistan, as it will clear up many of the frustrations
experienced by NGOs and the Afghan Government alike. NGOs have
complained, for example, that there is no focal point in government
with whom they are to coordinate and that they receive repeated,
duplicate, sometimes contradictory or unjustified requests for
information. The government protests that they are not kept informed
of what NGOs are doing or consulted in planning stages and that
there is poor accountability for money being spent.
38. It has also been pointed out that the
government doesn't have sufficient or technically competent staff
to monitor and evaluate NGO projects. Ironically, this is because
the best people are taken by the donor agencies, the next layer
by the UN, the next by international NGOs and because the government
cannot compete with the huge salary packages offered especially
by donor agencies and the UN, they ultimately are left with the
least competent people in their departments. Incidentally, the
ability and willingness of donor agencies and the UN to pay higher
rent and, to a lesser extent, the influx of NGOs and returning
refugees, has resulted in skyrocketing rents and a housing crisis
in Kabul.
39. The joint field missions by AACA, UNAMA
and donors between May and July made the following five findings
regarding coordination between local government authorities and
assistance partners:
39.1 assistance agencies (both international
and Afghan) are most often "doing their own thing,"
with very little advance consultation with local authorities or
even with each other;
39.2 local authorities, lacking tools and
in some cases qualified personnel, are not currently in a position
to lead project planning and implementation;
39.3 trust/confidence among the various
stakeholders needs to be built from a very low starting point.
39.4 local authorities feel isolated from
Kabul, and generally the information flow between Kabul and the
provinces needs improvement; and
39.5 there are uneven relations between
regional and provincial centres on the one hand and districts
or local communities on the other.
DIFFICULT OPERATING
ENVIRONMENT AND
EXPECTATIONS OF
ACHIEVEMENTS
40. A difficult operating environment always
puts constraints on development work. But "difficult operating
environment" is not limited to security concerns or restrictions
on freedom of movement. These factors also contribute to a sense
of uncertainty, which has perhaps an even more significant impact
on development and reconstruction efforts.
41. Development projects tend to be long-term.
In an uncertain environment, it is difficult to have confidence
to invest large amounts of money. It is difficult to analyse and
plan very far ahead, even beyond 24 months. For example, an Islamic
Relief country strategy is usually for three to five years, but
in Afghanistan it is difficult to strategise beyond two years
due to uncertainty. As a result Islamic Relief's country strategy
for Afghanistan is for only two years. This means programs may
not be longer than two years in duration, which limits the number
and type of programs that can be implemented. It is necessary
to assess and re-evaluate every two years.
42. Afghanistan presents enormous logistic
challenge. For example, transportation is difficult, as roads
are in terrible condition or non-existent. Air service provided
by UNHAS has greatly improved opportunities for transportation
between field offices, though it too has its limitations and can
in no way be compared to the ease and convenience of air travel
within a normal environment. It is necessary to allow a great
deal of flexibility in all activity plans, because anything can
happen at anytime to throw off plans.
43. Communication is another major challenge,
especially between offices. Within a city, especially in Kandahar,
it is usually necessary to go directly to the person with whom
you wish to speak, rather than trying to reach them by telephone.
Communication options come at a high price in Afghanistan—Thuraya
satellite phones, cell phones, Internet, high frequency radio
(installation) all come at exorbitant rates.
INFLUENCE OF
LOCAL POLITICS
ON DEVELOPMENT
WORK
44. In Islamic Relief's experience, local
politics has played a negligible, if any, role in determining
priorities. But local politicians, especially ministers, rightly
so are keen to ensure that international funding is channelled
through appropriate ministries.
45. As Mr Lakhdar Brahimi told the UN Security
Council in July, "The Transitional Authority is concerned
that donors remain reluctant to contribute significant financial
resources directly to the national budget, while they continue
to channel much of their assistance through the UN and NGOs."
46. It is not the case, however, that the
government is saying, "this is a priority and this is not".
If by allowing ministries to channel international funding there
is potential for them to dictate priorities, it has yet to be
seen—this has not been Islamic Relief's experience. Rather
Islamic Relief has found the ministries to be very cooperative,
while ensuring that development projects remain within the government's
plan and meets its requirements.
47. The AACA-UNAMA-donor joint missions
recommended that the government conduct information campaigns
to advise UN agencies, NGOs, and local authorities of its priorities,
sharing in particular the National Development Framework and the
Development Budget process.
48. There have been, however, cases where
local politicians and commanders have interfered at the time of
project implementation, for example, in free food distributions
and demanded favours such as food for their village or soldiers
or extra food against fake beneficiary names. In Islamic Relief's
experience, interference is more common in the field than in Kandahar
or Kabul cities.
49. Politics can also affect NGO coordination
and collaboration with the Government. For example, politically
motivated transfers and appointments sometimes make it difficult
to identify who is the responsible authority, to keep that individual
informed and to develop long-term working relationships, especially
when political aspirations take priority over genuine development.
INVOLVEMENT OF
LOCAL PEOPLE,
PARTICULARLY WOMEN
50. Islamic Relief is building a primary
health care clinic in Paghman, just outside of Kabul. The local
community was involved in every stage of the decision-making process,
along with the Ministry of Public Health, which donated land and
provided standard building plans. Extensive community consultations
are also being undertaken in connection with agriculture-based
projects in Paghman that are in their very early stages.
51. In the Kandahar Education Project, a
partnership between Islamic Relief and the Department for International
Development, community committees have been set up to oversee
the repair and reconstruction of 27 schools as well as to discuss
other school issues. These committees are entirely responsible
for determining repair priorities and issues for discussion. Special
care is being taken to include women in the committees, or where
that is not possible, to set up "shadow committees"
of women so they can be involved in the decision-making process.
About 50 per cent of the 26 Master Trainers trained by Islamic
Relief to train teachers were women.
52. As is prevalent in many underdeveloped
countries, especially in conservative cultures, women in Afghanistan
face many problems. It is essential that particular attention
be paid to the needs of women and that they have opportunity to
contribute to the development process.
53. There are very few programs, however,
especially in the south, that target specifically women. The Kandahar
Women's Bakery Project, a joint project by Islamic Relief and
the World Food Programme (WFP), is an effort to improve the food
security of Kandahar's most vulnerable women at the same time
providing women an opportunity for employment. Through this project
vulnerable women are selected to bake breads for sale at a subsidised
rate to other vulnerable women of the city. Most women had been
surviving by begging and could barely make ends meet. Now they
have a chance to feed their family and free their limited resources
to meet other needs.
54. The project is headed by an Afghan woman,
and the women workers at each bakery are supervised by a woman,
further evidence of the importance Islamic Relief places in providing
meaningful employment to Afghan women, particularly at the management
(decision-making) level. The women of Afghanistan have been sidelined
for so many years and disadvantaged in their education and employment
opportunities. The international community should provide leadership
by actively seeking women employees, especially for decision-making
positions, and investing in their training and professional development.
55. More needs to be done at all levels
to include women in the decision-making process and to provide
them the opportunity to play an active role in the country's reconstruction.
For example, women in Afghanistan have the legal right to vote,
but few would be aware of this right and what it entails. Women's
representation in government needs to be ensured. At the Loya
Jirga, 200 of the representatives were women, 25 of them coming
from the south. To prepare women for the elections and an active
role in government, there need to be workshops and awareness campaigns.
56. Local people should not be viewed merely
as beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance, reconstruction and
development, but should also be consulted as decision-makers and
architects of their futures.
RECOMMENDATIONS
57. Pledges made by the international community
must be translated into cash to be used both to meet continued
humanitarian needs and also for longer-term reconstruction and
development initiatives.
58. Funds should be made available to support
reconstruction efforts over the next five years.
59. Greater effort must be made to include
local people, especially women, not only as beneficiaries of humanitarian
assistance, reconstruction and development, but also as decision-makers
and architects of their futures.
60. Efforts must be made to boost the effectiveness,
credibility and the long term stability of the new government,
though capacity-building, provision of funds for both immediate
and long-term reconstruction projects.
61. Projects that have an immediate and
tangible impact on the common man, woman and child are necessary
to avert any resentment and backlash towards the Afghan government
or the international community.
62. Better coordination mechanisms, as opposed
to mere information-sharing, between NGOs, UN, donors and the
Afghan government should be developed to ensure that the Afghan
Government leads the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan,
that all development efforts are within the National Development
Framework, that there is not duplication and that parallel structures
to the Government do not emerge.
Islamic Relief
October 2002
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