Memorandum submitted by Christian Aid
AFGHANISTAN: FROM HUMANITARIAN RELIEF TOWARDS
RECONSTRUCTION
INTRODUCTION
Christian Aid welcomes the opportunity to present
evidence to the International Development Select Committee. Christian
Aid is the official development agency of 40 churches in Britain
and Ireland. In 1986 it began working with Afghan partner organisations
in north west Pakistan who were implementing cross-border development
projects in Afghanistan. It has worked directly with partner organisations
within Afghanistan since 1993 and opened a field office in Herat
in western Afghanistan in 1997. It has recently opened a sub-office
in Kabul.
Christian Aid's Afghan partner organisations
currently have 25 programmes operating in the provinces of Herat,
Ghor, Badghis, Farah and Faryab—some of the poorest regions
of Afghanistan (please see over for map). Since August 2001, Christian
Aid programmes have directly assisted over 500,000 people in western
Afghanistan in relief, emergency and development activities. Christian
Aid's DFID-funded programme for food assistance to vulnerable
families in Ghor (which provided food packs to 200,000 people)
and the EC-funded Sustainable Rural Livelihoods Programme in Ghor
and Badghis (which prioritises health, agricultural inputs, employment
and improved access through road reconstruction,) are examples
of these humanitarian and development activities.
SUMMARY
The main issues facing the people of Afghanistan
are the need for peace, meeting life's basic needs and making
a sustainable living. It is vital that Afghans at all levels are
involved in developing and implementing the strategies that will
meet these needs.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
ACTION BY
THE UK GOVERNMENT:
Food Security
1. The UK Government should, as a matter
of urgency, use its influence and financial assistance to ensure
that vital food aid is provided and in place to avoid acute food
shortages in some areas of Afghanistan during the coming winter.
The World Food Programme (WFP) has stated that 5.8 million Afghans
are highly vulnerable, and that it will have a shortfall of 80,000
tonnes of food for the months of November and December alone.
The provision of seeds, livestock and other inputs for spring
planting should also be made a priority, to help guarantee that
next year's harvest is adequate for the provision of food to the
region.
2. At the same time, the UK Government should
work with the WFP, ICRC, international agencies and NGOs in order
to ensure that supplies of wheat and other staples:
— are specifically targeted at only
the most vulnerable regions;
— are not over-extended to areas where
local agricultural production is already recovering to sustainable
levels; and
— do not flood local markets and depress
the price of staple foods to a level which harms the recovery
of the local agricultural economy.
Funding for immediate post-emergency Rehabilitation
and Reconstruction
3. The UK Government should use its influence
to ensure that donor countries honour the pledges that they made
in Bonn, Tokyo and other conferences. Christian Aid's partner
organisations report a growing feeling in Afghanistan that the
international community has failed the country over the past year,
and fear that this will contribute to renewed instability. While
the UK and the US have honoured the vast majority of their pledged
support, other countries have signally failed to do so. Of the
$1.8 billion pledged for this fiscal year alone, only $1 billion
has so far been received.
4. The UK Government should actively support
an increase in contributions from the international community
by a further $300 million for 2002-03 and should increase its
own contributions to the Transitional Government of Afghanistan
(TGA) accordingly.
5. Whilst the international donor community
has pledged $4.5 billion over the next five years to Afghanistan,
it is now widely agreed by financial and humanitarian experts
that aid in excess of $10 billion over the next five years is
a much more realistic figure[11].
The UK Government should therefore influence the international
community to make by the end of the financial year further commitments
to bring the five-year fund to at least $10 billion. This will
mean that :
— Afghans can meet their food needs,
even in the context of systemic drought.
— Afghans have viable economic alternatives
to soldiering and drug production.
— The basic infrastructure for national
economic development is provided.
Long term commitment to Afghanistan should be
reinforced with commitments in principle for the next 10-15 years
Security
6. The UK Government should openly and transparently
reconsider its position on the expansion of the International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mandate and to ensure that efforts
are made to stabilise the whole of Afghanistan through an expanded
ISAF force and not merely Kabul and its immediate hinterland.
Support for the Transitional Government of Afghanistan
7. The UK Government should make support
of the TGA a higher priority, to enable the TGA to plan, co-ordinate
and monitor the humanitarian, reconstruction and development effort.
A recent report from the TGA states that, of all the international
funds pledged or delivered, only $90 million has been given directly
to the government. The TGA now estimates that it will have a shortfall
of $1 million per day for the rest of the current fiscal year—even
for its current, limited operations. If Afghanistan is to continue
to develop towards a stable, functioning state, and the hopes
of the Afghan people are not to be disappointed yet again, then
the international community must help that state and its emerging
structures gain greater self-determination. Even if this requires
an act of faith.
Work through Afghans
8. The UK Government should insist on and
promote implementation of activities through local resources and
demand the involvement of all Afghans (especially women and poor
people) in planning, monitoring and judging success, through the
use of village councils for example. There should be a long term,
international commitment to build the local capacity of Afghanistan
to manage the development of the country at the national and regional
levels.
9. The UK Government should encourage other
members of the international community to insist on a local dimension
to planning and implementation and in particular local enterprises,
local NGOs and government structures should be used to implement
projects. The UK Government should use its influence to ensure
that the aid effort is co-ordinated through the TGA and that funding
is channelled through it.
Co-ordination between donors, NGOs and the TGA
10. National-scale projects cannot be conducted
by the UN, NGOs or the TGA alone. Coordination by the national
government is therefore essential. Christian Aid's partners have
requested that there should be strong coordinating mechanisms
between these three limbs. The different policies and approaches
of NGOs and the loss of government capacity and control during
the last two decades of conflict have resulted in limited co-ordination
abilities.
11. The UK Government should apply pressure
to the international community and use its own technological resources
for the building of the TGA's capacity immediately, if it wishes
to ensure the TGA is capable of fulfilling its mandate to the
Afghan people.
CONTEXT
1.1 Two themes dominate the recent history
of Afghanistan. One is the depth and extent of poverty, in terms
of people living in poverty (in rural areas income can be less
than $0.30 per day), high maternal and infant mortality rates
(1.7 per cent and 25 per cent respectively), high illiteracy rates
(64 per cent average), low access to health (30 per cent) and
schooling (39 per cent for primary school boys and only 3 per
cent for primary school girls), lack of legally raised revenues
and high unemployment[12].
In short, Afghanistan remains one of the poorest countries in
the world.
1.2 The second dominant theme is war and
conflict. Conflict and poverty are intricately linked. Afghanistan
cannot achieve sustainable development without the resolution
of conflict, while instability feeds on social and economic injustice.
Moreover, while conflict continues it is essential that development
and poverty-eradicating initiatives are always analysed within
the framework of conflict. It is possible that well-meaning development
initiatives may contribute to deepening conflict or contribute
to its continuation. The direction taken by the US and the UK
Governments will be central. The general view among Afghans is
that the role that the US and its Western allies played in overthrowing
the Taliban has been beneficial. However there is concern that
as their main focus is the war on terrorism, there is a real risk
that they will reduce their engagement and de-prioritise Afghanistan
before the country's long-term peace and security has been assured.
It is important therefore that the UK gives a clear lead by supporting
initiatives which build peace, meet basic needs and promote sustainable
livelihoods, and that it does this in consultation with local
people and by making maximum use of local resources.
1.3 Many states and donors pledged funds
in Tokyo, yet few have delivered on these pledges in their entirety
by disbursing funds to the Transitional Government of Afghanistan
(TGA). For example, Japan pledged US $250 million but to date
has only delivered on 40.8 per cent of this figure, Germany pledged
US $75 million but has only delivered 60 per cent of this and
the Asian Development Bank pledged US $50 million and has delivered
none of it, to date.
1.4 There is recognition from many Afghans
that external financial, technological, logistical and physical
support remains vital for the success of the future of Afghanistan.
Long-term commitment by the international community is essential
for the survival of Afghanistan.
WHAT ARE
THE ONGOING
HUMANITARIAN NEEDS,
HOW ADEQUATELY
ARE THEY
BEING ADDRESSED
AND FOR
HOW LONG
WILL HUMANITARIAN
ASSISTANCE BE
REQUIRED?
2.1 Christian Aid believes that the most
important issue is a long term focus on food security, building
household economies and ensuring that the voices of ordinary Afghans
are heard in determining the country's development needs. However,
we also acknowledge the pressing need for short term, humanitarian
assistance. Christian Aid considers that there are three key areas
of humanitarian assistance that need to be met. These are:
— Support for the return of refugees
and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).
The longer term needs and requirements are:
— Food Security and associated agricultural
production.
— Reintegration of refugees and IDPs.
— Transport infrastructure.
Short-term needs: Food Aid
2.2 The most immediate humanitarian need
in Afghanistan is for targeted, short-term food aid. The World
Food Programme (WFP) recently stated that there are 5.8 million[13]
vulnerable people in Afghanistan; in November 2001, this figure
was 5.1 million. This rise in vulnerable people is largely due
to the rapid and higher than expected return home of over 2 million
refugees and IDPs.
2.3 According to latest figures from the
WFP[14],
there is a shortfall in funding of some $64.1 million or 23 per
cent of their requirements for this year. As a result, the WFP
has announced that it is short of 80,000mt of food for the months
of November and December alone.
2.4 Unless this gap is bridged urgently,
the WFP will face breaks in its food pipeline from October 2002
onwards. It has also confirmed that cereals will be unavailable
after December 2002[15].
2.5 WFP has identified the most vulnerable
areas for food security as Ghor, Badghis and Faryab provinces
(where Christian Aid works) and the province of Badakshan. In
these provinces, a significant part of the population remains
reliant on food aid.
2.6 Afghanistan has experienced a comparatively
successful harvest in 2002. The WFP have stated that the overall
agricultural production for Afghanistan is 82 per cent above its
yield on last year's drought affected crop[16].
This represents a yield of about 8 per cent down on 1998 harvest,
which is considered to be the last "average" harvest.
The improvement is far from uniform however, and varies between
highland, rainfed land and lowland irrigated areas. In those highland
areas where Christian Aid operates, our partners have suggested
that the agricultural yield for 2002 is only 30 per cent above
the 2001 harvest and well short of the levels necessary to sustain
the whole population.
2.7 These limited improvements on the 2002
crop are insufficient to provide adequate amounts of foodstuffs
because:
— only 60 per cent of annual food requirements
have been produced locally;
— the agricultural improvement must
be seen in the context of extreme drought over the past four years.
This drought had already exhausted Afghanistan's coping mechanisms;
people have spent their reserve savings, run down their asset
base by selling livestock and valuables and sent family members
away, sometimes abroad, in search of paid employment; and
— according to some of Christian Aid's
partners, there had already been a gradual deterioration of agricultural
sustainability over the last 30 year period; the ground water
table has fallen and declining yields have meant that less seed
has been available for planting.
Therefore, whilst Christian Aid acknowledges
that the 2002 harvest is a positive sign of improvement, there
remains a significant shortfall against food needs over the coming
winter in certain locations (referred to in point 2.5 above) and
large sections of the population remain vulnerable to the cyclical
and systematic drought conditions that have characterised recent
decades (see below).
2.8 Any food deficit must be:
— met by adequate and accurate targeting
of Afghan people's requirements;
— addressed either by the pre-positioning
of food stocks in forward locations before the winter months make
high altitude areas such as Ghor Province inaccessible, or alternatively
by keeping key roads and passes open throughout the winter; and
— followed up with provision of seeds,
livestock and other inputs for spring planting, to help guarantee
that next year's harvest is adequate for the provision of food
to the region.
Long term needs: Food Security and cautionary
note on extent of food aid
2.9 Any emergency food aid for this winter
must not adversely affect local agricultural recovery. Christian
Aid's partners have suggested that there is a tendency for wheat
to be stockpiled and that there are over-extended humanitarian
food distributions in areas of agricultural recovery. Such distribution
has a direct and negative impact on the sale of wheat by local
farmers. Local markets can be suppressed where local people are
accessing free wheat distributions. Doling out of free food in
this way is short-sighted. A longer term approach is needed to
ensure that Afghans do not become dependent on overseas food aid
and instead begin to sustain themselves through producing and
marketing food themselves. What is more the collapse of the local
food economy would increase the risk of individual farmers choosing
to grow poppy rather than wheat. Christian Aid believes strongly
that Afghanistan will best be served by developing a strong, healthy
and self-sustaining agricultural economy based on food production.
2.10 A balance must therefore be struck
by the WFP and other agencies between the provision of food aid
(ensuring that it is received by only the most vulnerable people
in Afghanistan and that dependency on food aid is not encouraged)
and the encouragement of local trade and agricultural sustainability.
Short term needs: Refugees and IDPs
2.11 The return of refugees and IDPs has
placed a heavy burden on local provinces. USAID figures show the
return of refugees since January 2002 at two million and a further
850,000 IDPs still displaced[17].
Refugees and IDPs were encouraged to return home on the basis
that food would be provided for them. WFP shortfalls have meant
that in many cases this provision has not been effected. There
is a real risk that some areas may not be able to support the
numbers that have returned.
2.12 The UNHCR is underfunded for this current
year by $47 million, which compounds and hampers the extent and
efficiency of its work.
2.13 There are concerns that unless adequate
assistance for refugees and IDPs is provided by the start of the
winter months (ie by the beginning of November) major cities (such
as Herat, Mazar, Jalalabad) will witness a new influx of people
to IDP camps. This will include those groups of IDPs that returned
to their villages in spring 2002 but who were unable to sustain
themselves due to harvest failure and lack of proper reintegration
assistance.
2.14 In addition there are about 400,000
Kuchi people (tribal nomads) who are either living as IDPs in
the camps or who are scattered in different villages along the
borders of Pakistan with Helmand, Kandahar, and Zabul Provinces.
2.15 Christian Aid remains concerned that
these Kuchi people, many of whom face ethnic discrimination on
their traditional grazing circuits, will be forced back into (or
be forced to remain longer at) the IDP camps in the main cities,
thus exacerbating the existing displacement problem.
2.16 Those Kuchis living around villages
face not only the same problems as settled villagers in relation
to food aid and security referred to above (paragraphs 2-10),
but also additional problems of ethnic discrimination, exhaustion
of coping mechanisms (particularly the loss of their livestock)
and the loss of access to their traditional pasture land. As a
result, the Kuchis are likely to face the brunt of the already
poor food resources in villages.
2.17 With refugees returning in thousands
to the major cities the question of providing adequate shelter
for them is becoming vital. Most of the returnees live in semi-destroyed
public buildings or abandoned houses that lack roofs, doors and
windows for protection against the elements. These people need
provision of food, shelter and heating during the winter.
Short term needs: Access
2.18 If access roads to some major towns
and villages in the central highlands, North-west, and North-eastern
parts of the country are not kept open during this coming winter,
about three to four million people will be cut off from outside
assistance.
2.19 Some two to three million people in
the most remote regions (of which approximately 500,000 live in
those areas where Christian Aid operates), are already suffering
from or are extremely susceptible to food shortage and are in
need of urgent humanitarian assistance.
2.20 The UK Government should urge the UN
Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) to co-ordinate an operation
that guarantees that the remotest parts of Afghanistan have access
to emergency assistance.
Long term needs: transport infrastructure
2.21 The international community has proposed
that one of the main planks of the reconstruction effort should
be the construction of transport links between major cities and
towns. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) and Japan were nominated
to take the lead in this. But to date no works have been commenced
and only limited consultation has taken place with groups representing
the interests of local people.
2.22 The US Government has also recently
pledged funds US $80 million for the purpose of building transport
links to major cities[18].
However, even with this and the earlier Japanese and ADB commitments,
only half of the Herat-Kabul road will be completed, let alone
any of the other transport infrastructure in Afghanistan[19].
With more than 4,000 kilometres of primary highway still in need
of repair (not to mention the 18,000 kilometres of secondary and
feeder roads), significant funding (some US $880 million on current
funding calculations) will be required for the reconstruction
of these main access roads.[20]
2.23 The UK Government should therefore
use its influence with the donor community to ensure that a quick
and effective programme is conducted for the implementation of
a comprehensive system of road networks, which is suitable for
the needs of Afghan people and prepared in concert with them.
Reasons for the continuation of the short term,
humanitarian situation
2.24 Emergency humanitarian assistance efforts
will be necessary on a targeted basis for another year. The need
for further assistance after that will depend on whether next
year's harvest will be adequate to sustain the population. That
in turn will depend on rural communities having access to land,
having the inputs (seeds, traction and stock) they need as well
as the volume of next year's rains. If these needs are not met,
then carefully targeted humanitarian aid will continue to be required
in the future. And there are parts of the country where, for decades,
rainfall has been consistently inadequate. The eventual solution
to food shortage in such places will involve long-term development
of farming methods and irrigation systems and successful diversification
of the household economies away from dependence on cereal cultivation.
ARE HUMANITARIAN
NEEDS AND
RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS
ADEQUATELY RESOURCED?
"To the Afghan people we make this commitment.
The conflict will not be the end. We will not walk away as the
outside world has done so many times before"—Tony Blair,
2 October 2001
"We would like to remind our friends that
the majority of the pledges made to Afghanistan in the Tokyo Conference
are still unfulfilled"—Hamid Karzai, Speech to the
UNGA, 12 September 2002
Funding and Resourcing Humanitarian Needs
3.1 The effectiveness of the WFP and UNHCR
programmes have been compromised due to shortfalls in funding
by the international community. The UK Government has honoured
75 per cent of its pledge to these programmes and the US State
Department has honoured 95 per cent of its pledge. However a number
of major donor countries have failed to honour their commitments.
Christian Aid would refer to the British Agencies in Afghanistan
Group's (BAAG's) Submission on this point detailing the amounts
of these shortfalls.
3.2 As indicated above, funding for the
humanitarian needs falls short of the required amounts for this
year. Without the funding for these requirements being met, it
is clear that people in Afghanistan will once again endure extended
and unnecessary suffering.
3.3 75 per cent of the UK Government's pledges
(£63.75 million) made at the Tokyo Conference have been disbursed.
The majority of this has been used for humanitarian assistance.
Recommendation
3.4 Christian Aid believes that the UK Government
should release the remainder of its pledged funding for this year
and apply pressure on the international community to ensure that
those countries deliver the monies that they have pledged at Tokyo
to the TGA immediately.
Funding and Resourcing Long Term Reconstruction
Needs
3.5 Weaknesses in the international community's
approach to Afghanistan's reconstruction can be seen in that:
— financial and humanitarian experts
indicate that at least $10 billion is required over the next five
years in order to give Afghanistan a real chance of reconstruction.
Only $4.5 billion was pledged in Tokyo;
— the monies pledged by the international
community amount to only $75 per person in Afghanistan for 2002
and only $42 per person over the next five years. In the Bosnian
conflict, the aid per person amounted to $326, in Kosovo aid amounted
to $288 per person and in East Timor it amounted to $195 per person.
3.6 The Afghan Finance Minister, Ashraf
Ghani recently confirmed that of the $1.8 billion pledged at the
Tokyo Conference in April for the fiscal year 2002-03, only $1
billion (or 55 per cent of the total monies pledged) has been
received to date[21].
The vast majority of this has been given directly to international
agencies and has been spent on meeting humanitarian needs. Little
has been spent on reconstruction and rebuilding. Whilst this aid
has been valuable, it treats the symptoms and not the structural
causes of poverty. In a recent briefing paper by the TGA[22],
it was noted that there is an urgent need for donors to turn Tokyo
pledges into cash for reconstruction activities.
3.7 Mukesh Kapila, special adviser to Lakhdar
Brahimi (Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary
General to Afghanistan), recently indicated that the TGA will
require a further $300 million (over and above those monies pledged
by the international community) for this year alone in order to
commence reconstruction works[23].
The money pledged at Tokyo is insufficient to cover the costs
for this year alone and the UK Government should therefore be
taking a lead by increasing its assistance pledges and pressuring
other donors to do the same.
3.8 The donor community must be encouraged
to contribute their pledges in a co-ordinated effort, to build
the capacity of the TGA. The TGA is likely to be undermined the
more donors promote individual aid projects or give money directly
to international agencies without sufficient consultation with
the TGA. Prior consultation will also ensure that there are nationally
co-ordinated programmes in health, education, agriculture, transport
etc. It is also important that the processes of the TGA are seen
to be transparent and accountable.
3.9 Agencies such as DFID can play a vital
role in developing the economy and the TGA. They can do this by
working with central and provincial government to ensure that
transparent and accountable mechanisms are put in place so that
management of reconstruction and development projects at regional,
provincial and district levels can be delegated to provincial
governments.
3.10 Even after the Loya Jirga, many donors
released resources for the direct implementation of programmes
by NGOs and the UN agencies. This trend has created a certain
degree of mistrust between the government and aid agencies making
co-ordination even more difficult.
3.11 It is also very important for the international
community to ensure that their commitment to the reconstruction
of Afghanistan is long term. Christian Aid's partners fear that
the eyes of the world have moved from Afghanistan to Iraq, that
pledges are not being met and longer term promises will be broken.
Our partner's concerns are perhaps understandable, as Afghanistan
has a long and rueful experience of the self-interested involvement
of neighbouring states and world powers in their affairs.
Recommendation
3.12 The UK Government should ensure that:
— International donors agencies deliver
on and double their five-year pledges to Afghanistan in order
to address the reconstruction and development requirements.
— Long term commitment to Afghanistan
is reinforced with commitments in principle for the next 10-15
years.
— Humanitarian, reconstruction and
long-term development efforts are co-ordinated by Afghan bodies.
— There is a long term, international
commitment to build the local capacity of Afghanistan to manage
the development of the country at the national and regional levels.
Effect of Reconstruction Funding Requirements
Not Being Met
3.13 Should the international community's
pledges not be honoured (and honoured soon), the TGA may either
be forced to finance its operating budget by taking out loans
(to which it has publicly stated its opposition) or the TGA may
simply not do the reconstruction works required.
3.14 The TGA has said that it would be impossible
to explain to the Afghan people why loans were necessary when
so much was pledged to Afghanistan at Tokyo[24].
A very well respected authority on Afghanistan, Ahmed Rashid,
recently commented that "the international community has
failed Afghanistan over the past one year. The pledges and promises
made at the Bonn Conference have not been fulfilled. Afghans themselves
feel very let down"[25].
3.15 The TGA must reach a position soon
where it is able to deliver essential services to its people.
Otherwise it will not only lose the fragile popularity that it
now enjoys, but will also be in a weaker position in relation
to the regional powerholders, thus making the country once more
prone to civil war and conflict. This was highlighted most recently
by Mukesh Kapila, who said, "There should be no complacency.
Afghanistan is a pivot of stability in the region, but could easily
revert to war and instability if donor countries do not stay involved
in its reconstruction"[26].
3.16 Christian Aid believes that the issues
of funding and security are interdependent. The international
community is nervous of committing resources to a fragile new
state and administration that does not fully control its territories.
Yet if the international community continues to hold off, the
state will never have the opportunity or the ability to oversee
Afghanistan's recovery and long term development. This is because
the TGA's legitimacy rests not just on security apparatus but
on its capacity to deliver essential services and to oversee the
rebuilding of institutions. An act of faith is now required of
the international community in order for them to deliver on their
promises of funding, albeit with careful monitoring of funds through
the TGA.
IS THE
COORDINATION BETWEEN
DONORS, NON-GOVERNMENTAL
ORGANISATIONS AND
THE NEW
ADMINISTRATION HELPING
TO ENSURE
THAT HUMANITARIAN
NEEDS AND
RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS
ARE CARRIED
OUT EFFICIENTLY
AND EFFECTIVELY?
4.1 Christian Aid's partners have indicated
that there are few effective coordination mechanisms between the
donor community and the TGA. While most of the TGA departments
lack the capacity to ensure co-ordination, donors are unsure of
how to deal with the new realities on the ground.
4.2 For the sake of creating an efficient
co-ordination mechanism, the donor community as well as the international
NGOs, need to focus on a well-targeted and collaborative approach
to Afghanistan. While ample consideration should be given to the
national priorities the needs of the individual communities within
the country must take priority. It is essential that the donor
community contributes in a unified and strategic effort rather
than focus on partial forms of assistance. A priority should be
assistance to the TGA to promote nationally coordinated programmes
in each sector; the more individual donors try to promote individual
aid projects the greater the risk that the "whole" will
be undermined. This implies a major effort by donors to rebuild
government institutions and ensure that Afghans rapidly acquire
the skills necessary to run an efficient administration.
4.3 It is not just financial support that
is required from the international community, but also technical,
personnel, training and logistical support in order to be able
to build the capacity of the TGA infrastructure. This capacity
will help to ensure proper coordination and therefore tangible
results for the majority of Afghans.
4.4 Donors should therefore work on transferring
strategic leadership to the TGA through technical, training and
logistical support. One way of strengthening capacity, would be
to increase the pay of civil servants from $30 per month, in order
that qualified Afghan men and women may be willing to work for
the TGA.
4.5 It is perhaps understandable that some
donors wish to invest their monies in specific projects (particularly
"softer" areas of work, such as education and gender
programmes). However, the TGA has recently released a report that
indicates that it will cost $1 million per day to fund salaries
of civil servants alone[27].
Without commitment and coordination from the international community
to underwrite these more mundane but absolutely essential commitments
(until the TGA has revenues of its own), the TGA is likely to
have to break its fiscal commitments and accept credit facilities
in order to service their liabilities.
4.6 There has been a significant increase
in the "headhunting" of staff from local NGOs by the
UN and other international agencies and rapid salary inflation.
Some local NGOs have been forced to hike salaries by 50 per cent
in two months in order to keep staff An associated problem is
the rapid rise in rent levels for domestic and office accommodation
in urban areas. This not only leaves local organisations without
the space they need. It also puts housing beyond the means of
people attempting to return from refugee asylum or internal displacement.
Recommendation
4.7 National-scale projects cannot be conducted
by the UN, NGOs or the TGA alone. Christian Aid's partners have
requested that there should be strong coordinating mechanisms
between these three limbs, with a leading role for the national
government. But the different policies and approaches of NGOs
and the loss of government capacity and control during the last
two decades of conflict have left the TGA unable to fill the co-ordination
role.
4.8 The UK Government should apply pressure
to the international community and make technical resources available
for the building of the TGA's capacity immediately, if it wishes
to ensure the TGA is capable of fulfilling its mandate to the
Afghan people.
4.9 The UK Government should work with other
members of the international community to ensure that international
agencies pay salaries and rents that do not inflate local markets
unreasonably. Such restraint will allow local organisations to
access the human and material resources they need.
WHAT CONSTRAINTS
DOES THE
DIFFICULT OPERATING
ENVIRONMENT PLACE
ON DEVELOPMENT
WORK? HOW
DOES THIS
AFFECT THE
EXPECTATIONS OF
WHAT CAN
BE ACHIEVED
IN THE
NEXT FIVE
TO TEN
YEARS IN
AFGHANISTAN?
Security
5.1 The lack of security within Afghanistan
(including within Kabul where the International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) mandate operates) is well known and the situation
remains precarious. The distinct cultural differences and biases
within the country (mainly between Tajiks and Pashtuns) have resulted
in the Afghan people becoming "normalised" to the threat
and actuality of insecurity. Christian Aid remains deeply concerned
that this "normalisation" of violence and insecurity
may negatively impact upon some Afghans' tolerance of cultural
differences, accentuate existing factionalism and lead to long
term problems and conflict within the TGA.
5.2 Between November 2001 and June 2002,
NGOs recorded in excess of 70 violent attacks on local and international
NGO staff and ordinary Afghans. The peace within Afghanistan is
fragile due to the lack of effective security guarantees beyond
Kabul and its surrounding area. As a result, humanitarian aid
and development programmes are constantly under threat.
5.3 The limited ISAF mandate has meant that
the regional power holders have consolidated their power and many
act autonomously outside of Kabul. This has (reportedly) led to
friction between the power holders and the TGA.
5.4 The National Development Framework's
emphasis on building up a national army and police force is important.
However, this proposal will only be effective if there is sufficient
international support (financial, technical and training) for
such programmes as well as sufficient regional support. In any
event, the establishment of such projects will take a considerable
amount of time; given the small size (600 soldiers in total) of
the first battalion of the Afghan National Army, the process of
mobilising a professional Afghan Army will take at least five
to 10 years even with the international community providing assistance.
5.5 The constant threat of insecurity may
have had a significant impact on the levels of monies that international
donor agencies have delivered on.
5.6 The problem of security in Afghanistan
is likely to be one of the main stumbling blocks to long term
reconstruction and recovery. Indeed, human rights experts have
commented that without security, there can be no reconstruction
or human rights infrastructures. Regional power holders are unlikely
to simply surrender the power they have fought for, without a
compromise and compensation for political "buy-in" on
some long-term commitment to national unity through reconstructive
programmes. Indeed there is an important role for legitimate and
accountable provincial government to play in the national reconstruction
and development project. Regional power holders should be encouraged
to take a stake in peace and long-term stability.
5.7 The international community should support
the TGA in a search for a balance between strong central government
and hearing the representations of local interests.
5.8 There is often extreme tension between
different ethnic groups. Minority Pashtun communities in the north
and west are particularly at risk. The already difficult operating
environment will be exacerbated without support for concerted
reconciliation and peace building initiatives.
HOW DO
LOCAL POLITICS
INFLUENCE THE
PRIORITIES AND
TARGETING OF
DEVELOPMENT WORK
AND ARE
LOCAL PEOPLE,
PARTICULARLY WOMEN,
BEING GIVEN
SUFFICIENT OPPORTUNITY
TO PLAY
A SIGNIFICANT
PART IN
THE FUTURE
DEVELOPMENT OF
THEIR COUNTRY
AND ARE
THEY BEING
EMPOWERED TO
DO THIS
EFFECTIVELY?
6.1 Christian Aid works in the west of Afghanistan,
which is largely governed by or under the influence of Ismail
Khan. Ismail Khan's influence stretches far in the west, due to
his local tax and customs revenues, the 30,000 soldiers that he
reportedly has at his command and his historical support from
political and economic backers in Iran.
6.2 Political considerations by government
and security considerations by the aid community have impacted
on the distribution of benefits to some communities. Our partners
have suggested that some areas being controlled by "friendly
warlords" have received more assistance than other parts
of the country.
6.3 Rivalries between local power holders
create insecurity that hinders relief and development work. The
power struggle between national government and regional power
holders is impeding the development of administrative systems
to manage the recovery effort.
6.4 Society in Western Afghanistan is usually,
although not universally, organised on the basis of shuras.
These traditional councils are focal points for decision-making
and common action. They are an effective mechanism and are the
usual means for the village to engage with its external environment.
Local participation in the shura is high (although not
universal) and the voice of the shura is generally accepted
as the voice of the village. While Christian Aid acknowledges
that the shura model is not an absolute ideal, we encourage
other agencies, including the UK Government, to involve local
shuras in the design, implementation and monitoring of
emergency and development activities, as it remains the most appropriate
form of consultation with local people in many areas of Afghanistan.
6.5 However the shuras, like the
society that they reflect, are patriarchal. They are made up almost
exclusively of men. Christian Aid recognises the need to encourage
women to make their voices heard at local and national level and
the need to encourage Afghan men to listen to women's voices.
This process will not happen without an improvement in women's
and girls' skills, knowledge and economic position. Such improvements
however are dependent on women taking a greater role in decision-making.
The UK Government should ensure that its development assistance
both directly promotes participation of women in planning and
decision-making and indirectly encourages women's participation
by improving their access to learning and skills and to economic
opportunity.
6.6 Though there appears to have been some
improvement for women since the collapse of the Taliban (for example
in access to education), no substantial change in their socio-economic
position has taken place yet; there is little evidence that women's
voices are being heard more in local or national debates.
6.7 Christian Aid partners have indicated
that more money should go to the new Afghan Ministry for Education,
as it is only through the educative process that attitudes and
practice will change towards women and their role in society and
the household. Christian Aid partners have suggested that there
needs to be significant improvement for women within the family
unit, particularly through providing opportunities for them to
play a leading role in the household economy. The UK Government
can assist by providing education and training, which is one way
that the situation can improve.
6.8 According to Christian Aid's partners,
the large influx of new NGOs with their limited experience of
running long-term development programmes in the Afghan environment,
has meant that many programmes have been emergency, short-term
or small projects, with limited impact. Some have failed to involve
local people in the design and implementation of projects and
have imported solutions that are at best inappropriate and at
worst harmful. The UK Government should be encouraged to support
interventions that build up Afghan NGOs and should support the
TGA's efforts to regulate and co-ordinate NGO activities.
6.9 When bilateral donors do work through
international NGOs they should steer them appropriately to ensure
that long term development work is conducted in concert with the
aims, objectives and needs of the local community, established
through community consultation and co-ordination with the TGA.
Donor agencies should ensure that the organisations that they
fund adhere to recognized codes of conduct such as those of the
Red Cross and SPHERE.
6.10 Christian Aid partners have also suggested
that the overall policy of the new administration confuses "reconstruction"
with "development" work. They have argued that the TGA
strongly supports and encourages physical and visible reconstruction
programmes but that it is difficult for government officials to
see the benefit and impact of participatory development programmes
over the longer period.
CONCLUSION
International Community Support
7.1 The international community has a real
opportunity to provide stability in Afghanistan. The opportunity
to improve living standards, national unity and peace for a population
that has suffered from hardship, civil unrest and drought for
the past 23 years should not be missed. The international community
has a duty to provide support to people who have been let down
so many times before by the international community. Currently
there is a real sense of hope amongst Afghan's that their "lot"
is about to improve.
7.2 However, this optimism is constantly
being tempered by the doubt that the TGA and Afghans have in relation
to the international community's commitments to them. This erosion
of hope is likely to have a negative impact on recovery and reconciliation.
Honouring of existing pledges and further contributions to Afghanistan
are essential for its long term stability and survival as a legitimate
and participatory government.
Food aid and security
7.3 Christian Aid remains concerned that
there will be insufficient food for some Afghans this winter,
particularly in the most remote areas. The WFP is due to release
a Vulnerability Assessment Mission (VAM) report this month and
this should highlight those areas where specific targeting of
vulnerable groups is required.
7.4 Christian Aid remains extremely concerned
that there is inappropriate use of food aid in some areas which
may result in a depression of local markets. Active encouragement
should be provided to local traders to allow their businesses
to thrive on the basis of a recovering local economy.
Christian Aid
October 2002
11 World Bank Preliminary Assessment, January 2002;
Senator Joseph Biden, Boston Globe, 28 June 2002; Koffi Annan,
Tokyo Conference, March 2002. Back
12
All figures from World Bank, Transitional Support Strategy for
Afghanistan, Annex 4, 12 March 2002, except figure relating to
income, which were located at page 30 of World Bank Preliminary
Assessment, January 2002. Back
13
WFP Vulnerability Assessment Mission, October 2002. Back
14
WFP Emergency Report, 13 August 2002. Back
15
WFP Afghanistan, Pipeline News, 7 September 2002. Back
16
Alejandro Chicheri, WFP Spokesman, 21 August 2002. Back
17
USAID, Complex Emergency Situation Report, 30 September 2002. Back
18
Afghanistan: No Room For Donor Complacency, Says UNAMA Official,
Scott Hartmann, UN Wire, 19 September 2002. Back
19
Infrastructure Development Institute, Japan, Afghanistan: Present
State of Transport Infrastructure, August 2002. Back
20
Development Institute, Japan (IDIJ): Afghanistan: Present State
of Transport Infrastructure, August 2002. Back
21
Ashraf Ghani, "Donors pledge more Money", Agence France
Presse, 26 September 2002. Back
22
Estimates of Aid Pledged and Aid Delivered-Briefing Paper, Government
of Afghanistan, undated but received at Christian Aid's offices
on 20 August 2002. Back
23
No Room For Donor Complacency, Says UNAMA Official, Scott Hartmann,
UN Wire, 19 September 2002. Back
24
Estimates of Aid Pledged and Aid Delivered-Briefing Paper, Government
of Afghanistan, undated but received at Christian Aid's offices
on 20 August 2002. Back
25
United Nations' Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
interview with Ahmed Rashid, 17 September 2002. Back
26
Mukesh Kapila, UNAMA official, "No room for complacency",
Scott Harmann, UN Wire, 19 September 2002. Back
27
Afghan Interim Authority Brief to the Implementation Group in
Kabul on the Afghanistan Ordinary Budget, 9 August 2002. Back
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