SUMMARY
Our previous report on Afghanistan dealt with a drought and conflict-related humanitarian crisis. In this report we investigate what progress has been made from dependence on humanitarian aid, to the reconstruction and development of a wrecked country with no institutions that work, no legitimate economy, no order or security and a serious lack of capacity within government.
We found that the funds available are simply not enough. International donors pledged around US$5 billion over a five year period for Afghanistan's reconstruction at the Tokyo Conference. This was less than half what preliminary estimates suggested would be needed. It should have allowed the reconstruction process to begin in earnest. Unfortunately, the continuing humanitarian crisis has meant that most of these resources have been used for humanitarian relief and some of the funds committed have been in the form of food aid in kind. A further round of pledging will be necessary with commitments designed to flow at a rate determined by the absorptive capacity of the Afghan Transitional Administration (ATA) and of the UN system.
Outside Kabul the Afghan Transitional Administration has little or no authority. The UN and NGO system is therefore the provider of services for the Afghan people and has come to operate as a parallel structure to the ATA. This situation has arisen out of necessity. The ATA lacks the capacity to absorb funds or spend them effectively. It is unable to deliver the services which people expect their government to deliver. A massive programme of institution building and capacity development is needed if an effective state is to emerge. There is a tension between the need to deliver services quickly, and the need to operate through the ATA and thereby enhance its authority. Elections are only eighteen months away. Donors need to have a clearer strategy for handing over responsibilities to the Afghan authorities. We have made suggestions about possible changes to the way resources are channelled which could assist in meeting these objectives.
The lack of security remains the most pressing problem. It presents a major obstacle to both humanitarian relief and reconstruction. The ATA's lack of control outside Kabul has left "warlords" as the de facto rulers in many provinces. Achieving a normal security climate in Afghanistan will require a reduction in the power of the warlords and an increase in the authority of central government. The absence of a working criminal justice system is barrier to stability; establishing a legal framework and the mechanisms to implement it will be the primary method of controlling warlords, preventing human rights abuses and delivering nationwide security and stability.
The international community has lacked the will to create security on the ground. It was an error not to have an ISAF presence in every city; the best that can be hoped for now is an expansion on the "ISAF effect". The newly created Joint Regional Teams, together with disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes for the armed militias will help. But security is best underpinned by economic development. A comprehensive programme of disarmament can only be successful in conjunction with provision of alternative and legitimate livelihoods for those who have survived either by soldiering or by poppy cultivation.
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