I. INTRODUCTION
1. In December 2001, the Committee published a Report
on the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan and the surrounding
region.[1] That Report
examined the impact of September 11, and the conflict which followed,
on what was already a drought-related food crisis in Afghanistan.
At the time, the Committee stated its intention to return to the
subject and this report is the result, conceived as a snapshot
of where Afghanistan lies on the path from humanitarian relief
to reconstruction and development.
2. Our inquiry has focussed on the progress made
towards reconstruction and examined the shift from immediate food
assistance to strategies for long-term sustainable development.
While the situation in Afghanistan is not as bad as it was a year
ago, the World Food Programme (WFP) has estimated that six million
people remain vulnerable.[2]
Progress has been made since we reported on what was then a food
crisis compounded by conflict but, in terms of reconstruction,
work has only just begun. Those concerned have been anxious to
emphasise the need to ensure that the international community
does not "walk away from Afghanistan".[3]
3. As part of the inquiry, three Members of the Committee
visited Afghanistan in October 2002. Meetings were held in Kabul
with President Karzai, Ministers in the Afghan Transitional Administration,
United Nations Agencies and other major players working in the
field. The Committee's programme was heavily influenced by security
conditions. Nevertheless, we managed to travel beyond Kabul to
the Shomali Valley, and saw camps for refugees and internally
displaced people as well as visiting a girls' school and a family
planning clinic. The visit provided us with the opportunity to
see at first hand the progress made and to talk with those directly
involved in the rebuilding of Afghanistan. We also took oral evidence
in the UK from a range of witnesses including the Secretary of
State and Ministers of Finance and Planning from the Afghan Transitional
Administration.
4. We were struck by the devastation and poverty
of the country and saw little evidence that large scale reconstruction
had taken place. It was also apparent that the humanitarian crisis
was far from over. Many Afghans still have little or no easy access
to electricity or even water.[4]
Many people are in vulnerable positions which will be made worse
by the winter and the unexpectedly high rate of return of refugees
has further compounded the humanitarian situation.[5]
Although the WFP expects to be able to meet the requirements of
those facing food insecurity in areas that are inaccessible during
the winter, it is anticipating breaks in its food pipeline over
the coming months.[6] Because
of the severity of the humanitarian crisis of 2001 and its continuation,
the majority of the funding provided by the international community
has been absorbed by the humanitarian relief effort which has
left minimal funds for reconstruction work.[7]
But the humanitarian work has been essential. It has resulted
in lives being saved and what little reconstruction work has been
done has made a significant impact. As Chris Austin, Head of DFID's
Western Asia Department said in evidence:"The needs are massive.
Whatever you do is going to be of benefit in its own right".[8]
5. In June 2002 the Afghan Interim Authority (AIA)
gave way to the Afghan Transitional Administration. Hamid Karzai
was chosen as the interim head of state at the Loya Jirga,
a traditional assembly of representatives of different groups,
and he went on to nominate the members of his administration.
The Transitional Administration is due to serve until 2004 and
is tasked with the drafting of a constitution and preparation
for elections to be held before the end of its term. Shortly after
the Tokyo Conference, at which money was pledged to assist in
Afghanistan's reconstruction, the United Nations (UN) produced
its Immediate and Transitional Assistance Programme for the Afghan
People 2002 (ITAP).[9]
The ITAP sought to build a coherent vision for assistance and
was developed in consultation with a number of bodies including
international and Afghan Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs).
6. In the Afghan context of numerous donors, NGOs
and UN agencies, all with their own objectives and strategies,
it is necessary to identify the key development priorities. In
April 2002 the Afghan Interim Authority set out its priorities
in its National Development Framework and Budget (NDF), a working
document which has since been taken over and revised by the Transitional
Administration. The NDF sets out its objectives of developing
public administration capacity for good governance, reconstruction
of infrastructure and services, extending access to basic service
such as health and education, accelerating economic growth, improving
the economy's competitiveness and reducing its vulnerability to
economic shocks.[10]
From the very beginning, Lakhdar Brahimi, the UN Special Adviser
to the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, stressed
that the UN community should leave a "light footprint"
and that Afghans should take the lead in the development of Afghanistan.
The question of whose agenda, that of the Afghan people or the
international community, is being played out in Afghanistan has
been an important consideration in this inquiry.
7. This Report does not attempt to provide a comprehensive
analysis of Afghanistan's development needs. Rather, we have focussed
on what for us were the two glaringly obvious priorities: resources
and security. We begin, therefore, by examining the available
resources, whether they are adequate, how they have been disbursed
and the various way in which funding can be channelled. The second
section looks at the security situation and its impact on stability
and the prospects for development. The Report then moves on briefly
to discuss food aid and dependency, the problem of opium production
and the issues of gender, refugees, human rights and private sector
development.
8. We are grateful to Elizabeth Winter, our specialist
adviser on the inquiry, and all the people and organisations who
gave evidence, as well as those who assisted us during our visit
to Afghanistan. We would like to thank the following people who
gave oral evidence: the Rt Hon Clare Short, Secretary of State
for International Development; Dr Abdullah Abdullah, Minister
for Foreign Affairs, and Mr Hanif Atmar, Minister for Rural Development
and Reconstruction, Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan;
Mr Chris Austin, Head, Western Asia Department, Department for
International Development; Mr Tom Phillips, UK Special Representative
for Afghanistan, and Ms Jan Thompson, Head, Afghanistan Unit,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office; Mr Shirazuddin Siddiqi, Director,
Afghan Education, and Mr Stephen King, Director, BBC World Service
Trust; Mukesh Kapila, CBE, United Nations Assistance Mission in
Afghanistan (UNAMA); Mr Raja Jarrah, Programme Director, CARE
International UK; Mr Sakandar Ali, Country Representative for
Afghanistan, Islamic Relief; Ms Judith Randel and Dr Tasneem Mowjee,
Development Initiatives; Mr Roger Riddell, International Director,
Christian Aid; Mr Peter Marsden, Information Coordinator, and
Elizabeth Winter, Special Adviser, British Agencies Afghanistan
Group.
1 First Report, 2001-02, The Humanitarian Crisis
in Afghanistan and the Surrounding Region (HC 300-I) Back
2
Q182 Back
3
Q156 Back
4
Q182 Back
5
Ev 80 Back
6
Afghanistan: Monthly Review, British Agencies Afghanistan
Group, October 2002 Back
7
Ev 80 Back
8
Q35 Back
9
United Nations, January 2002 Back
10
It also identifies areas for priority donor engagement which includes
the following: National Solidarity Program, Emergency Public Works
Programme, Education Infrastructure Project, Urban Infrastructure
Project, Water Resource Investment project, National Governance
Infrastructure Projects and Transport Project (major roads and
airports). Plan and Budget for 1381-82 National Development
Programme, Ministries of Planning Reconstruction and Finance,
Transitional Government of Afghanistan, Kabul, October 10 2002 Back
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