House of Commons - International Development

Select Committee on International Development First Report

IV. CONTINUING HUMANITARIAN NEEDS—FOOD AID AND

FOOD DEPENDENCY

68. At least 60 per cent of the money pledged to Afghanistan has been spent on humanitarian relief, much of it in the form of food aid. The USA, the single largest funder has provided 38 per cent of its total disbursement as food.[235] India has also provided a large percentage of its contribution in kind rather than in cash. The most immediate need is for targeted short-term food aid for the estimated 5.8 million vulnerable people.[236] There have been major improvements since our last report when the WFP's Regional Emergency Operation was targeting seven and a half million beneficiaries.[237] UNAMA estimates that the numbers needing food aid in 2003 will be 4.1 million.[238] Evidence suggests that the agricultural harvests in 2002 have improved by as much as 80 per cent .[239] Unfortunately this improvement has been uneven across Afghanistan and some areas have only seen increases of 30 per cent.[240] The situation is compounded by the return of refugees, which has occurred at a faster rate than expected.[241] The onset of winter has further increased the vulnerability of many Afghans as their needs for adequate shelter become more pressing. Winter has also brought with it access problems as communities are cut off and isolated for the outside world by extreme weather conditions. Programmes are in place providing temporary shelters, tents and blankets and the UN is providing 115 snowploughs to help address access problems.[242] Christian Aid was amongst those who told us that the WFP is experiencing funding shortfalls and this could be preventing some Afghans from getting much needed assistance with food and shelter.[243] Oxfam stated that "In the central highlands the WFP has been slow in delivering food to Oxfam as a result of funding shortages".[244]

69. Humanitarian assistance in the form of food aid and the provision of temporary shelters remains vital in helping Afghans with basic survival needs. But humanitarian relief must begin to focus on the longer-term. A strategy is needed for how Afghanistan is to move from keeping people alive to providing them with livelihoods. Clare Short told us that "you cannot turn away from the humanitarian needs while you are trying to build up the structures".[245] We agree, but would also say that you cannot ignore the need to build structures and institutions if you are ever to move beyond providing humanitarian relief. Christian Aid has stressed the importance of "provision of seeds, livestock and other inputs for spring planting, to help guarantee that next year's harvest is adequate for the provision of food to the region".[246] The provision of food aid is hampering the development of local agricultural recovery and may in some cases be creating dependency.[247] Afghanistan's Finance Minister was especially concerned about the impact that food aid in kind had on food prices and on cultivation.[248] The provision and stockpiling of wheat has the potential to have a direct, negative impact of the sale of wheat by local farmers. As Christian Aid noted: "local markets can be suppressed where local people are accessing free wheat distributions. Doling out of free food in this way is short sighted".[249] If the price that local farmers can get for their wheat is reduced, there is less incentive for them to grow wheat and more incentive for them to grow poppies which provide very high cash returns. Christian Aid's Roger Riddell told us that: "the local price of wheat has fallen from about 20 new Afghanis to about 4 new Afghanis, about 30 cents a kg" and that 20 to 40 times this amount can be reaped from opium production.[250]

70. A lack of cash in the Afghan economy is leading to "increased vulnerability of the landless and of small landowners who are dependent on seasonal casual labour to cover basic family needs such as food, clothing and medicines".[251] Injecting more cash into the economy should aid its development at both local and national level. And in doing so, have a positive impact on Afghanistan's long-term stability and future dependence on food aid. The Transitional Administration has been critical of programmes such as those run by the WFP in the Shomali Valley which distribute food to Afghans in return for work. Food for work programmes address the issue of availability of food. But often the food is available, the problem is that people do not have the money to buy it. In light of the desperate need for cash in the economy, a system of giving cash for work would be more likely to stimulate local economies. The Afghan Minister for Rural Development and Reconstruction told us: "Our preferred instrument is cash for work. Food aid will not address the causes of the poverty of our people. Therefore we should like to engage constructively with the donors and explore reconstruction aid to strengthen the cash-starved economy of our country".[252] Afghanistan is the victim of a chronic rather than an acute food shortage. Food aid in Afghanistan is now the wrong response, as it is in other parts of the world where it has also failed to address food shortages. What is needed is an improvement in food security. DFID took a different view, arguing that as access to food continued to be a problem for many communities, it was not practical to offer solely cash for work.[253] There are still vulnerable communities inside Afghanistan but, by and large, we endorse a move from food to cash for work. We understand the difficulties of such a transition in an fragile economy but the response has to be to build the economy rather than persist in policies which undermine food production.