House of Commons - International Development

Select Committee on International Development First Report

V. DRUGS

71. The Prime Minister has spoken of the need to eradicate the opium poppy harvest as part of the programme of action in support of coalition action against Afghanistan.[254] The UK has since taken a lead in developing a UN eradication programme. Last year the Afghan government estimated that about 25 per cent of the crop was eradicated in the eradication programme, a fairly substantial success. The amount of heroin destroyed was £5 billion at UK street prices, so it made quite a significant impact.[255] But the success of the eradication programme was soured when, in Kabul, Ashraf Ghani complained that the donor community had failed to honour what he saw as its side of the bargain by providing support for alternative livelihoods as a compensation package. He described it as the single issue which had lost him most credibility within the government and in the regions affected.

72. Despite the early successes in destroying poppy fields and the ban on opium poppy cultivation, new UN figures show that the eradication programme has had unforseen consequences. The UN crop survey, published in November 2002, showed that Afghanistan is set to resume its place as the source of 75 per cent of the world's and 90 per cent of the UK's heroin supply.[256] The UN estimate that 3,400 tonnes of opium will be produced in Afghanistan in 2002 is much higher than the estimated 185 tonnes produced in 2001, following a Taliban ban on poppy cultivation. Although this recent rise amounts to a twenty-fold increase in opium production, production had dramatically increased under the Taliban and it was only in the final year of the regime that poppy growing was banned. The ban had a limited effect since the regime did little to destroy stocks and laboratory facilities. Money was still being made but higher up the production chain.[257]

73. The reasons for this rise in production are varied but they include the increased incentive to grow poppies resulting from the higher price which the crop commanded due to shortages caused by the eradication policy. In addition, some farmers may well have grown poppies in the hope of receiving the compensation that was paid out to those whose crops were eradicated. High levels of debt pose a serious threat to the recovery of local communities.[258] When farmers grow opium, they borrow money from the traders. A lot of farmers found themselves significantly in debt because of the opium ban imposed by the Taliban and have needed to cultivate poppies again this year in order to repay.

74. None of the alternatives to poppy cultivation can compete with its profitability.[259] So the alternative crops approach of trying to persuade farmers to change what they grow is unlikely to win easy converts. Even DFID's Chris Austin said that: "I do not think experience elsewhere has shown that crop substitution is really going to work in Afghanistan".[260] Current policies aim to persuade farmers to move over to other high-value crops such as saffron and cumin, but an export market is necessary for these crops to be successful. This is perhaps less daunting than it may appear—at one time Afghanistan supplied forty per cent of the world's raisin market. But even so, other high-value crops have disadvantages compared with the poppy, which grows in very poor conditions and brings in large amounts of money. This policy may be more effective in areas where farmers have only recently started to grow poppy but if persuading Afghan farmers to grow alternative crops is not an effective policy, encouraging them towards alternative livelihoods may be more successful. Poppy cultivation is labour intensive and relies on the availability of cheap labour. If more Afghans were employed in construction work on road building and other infrastructure projects, this may reduce the supply of labour and the tendency to turn to poppy cultivation.[261] Peter Marsden of the British Agencies Afghanistan Group said: "I do not think it is realistic to look at alternative crops as a way forward. The only way forward is alternative livelihoods, perhaps through the urban economy".[262]

75. The UK has set a target of 70 per cent reduction of opium poppy crops by 2008 and 100 per cent elimination by 2013.[263] This is an ambitious goal and, as Tom Phillips recognised, success will depend on building up law enforcement capability and institution building.[264] This in turn will depend upon development of an effective judicial system. In our view the law enforcement approach may be best targeted on the traders who source their supplies from farmers, rather than on the farmers themselves. Tom Phillips cautioned against expecting immediate results, believing that reconstruction had not yet reached a level where one could be confident that there were sufficient alternative livelihoods available to a significant number of Afghan farmers.[265] Viewed on the basis of financial returns it is hard to see how progress with alternatives can be made. But there are other approaches. The gradual build-up of a law enforcement and judicial system will, we hope, marginalise the illegal activity of poppy production. There will then be a chance to offer farmers something which, while not as lucrative as poppy growing, will nevertheless have tangible benefits. The Secretary of State told us that although poppy farmers could not realistically be tempted away from poppy cultivation with the promise of equally valuable crops, they could and should be offered the alternative of "a better life that is a legitimate life" which would also allow them to reap the benefits of stability and provision of public services such as education for their children.[266] We commend this approach. Of course, none of this deflects from the UK's responsibility to address its own demand for the drug. As Clare Short pointed out, "if we get Afghanistan to the point where there is no drug production, it will come to the UK from somewhere else."[267]