House of Commons - International Development

Select Committee on International Development Memoranda

Memorandum to the International Development Select Committee

Development Assistance and the Occupied Palestinian Territories

August 2003

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. Oxfam GB has worked in the Palestinian Territories (West Bank and Gaza Strip) and Israel since 1949 with a variety of Palestinian organisations and NGOs. We work with five Israeli partner organisations in the Negev desert supporting the Bedouin people, the most disadvantaged of the Arab communities in Israel. We also support an Israeli organisation working to narrow social and economic gaps in Israeli Jewish society.

2. Oxfam GB receives one million euros per annum from the EU to carry out essential water and sanitation programmes with Palestinian communities and organisations in the West Bank. During the last three years, we have noted a dramatic deterioration in the humanitarian situation. Israeli policies of closure have prevented Palestinian communities, particularly those in remote rural areas, from accessing clean water that they need for their daily health and hygiene requirements.

3. Action taken by the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) and settlers has seriously damaged the water infrastructure in many communities, including projects funded by the EU. The system of road closures and curfews imposed on the West Bank prevents many rural Palestinians from reaching or maintaining their water sources. Roadblocks and checkpoints obstruct water and wastewater tankers from reaching vulnerable people. Additional transportation costs resulting from closure have also raised prices by as much as 80%. As a result, impoverished households can no longer afford to maintain adequate supplies of clean drinking water, leading to an increase in the prevalence of water-borne diseases.

4. Despite agreements under the Oslo peace process that Palestinians and Israelis take joint responsibility for the water resources in the Joint Water Committee (JWC), this has never worked. For any activity such as digging wells and repairing systems, the JWC needs to give permission. They rarely do so, and the result is that the Palestinian communities are not permitted to build new water infrastructure. Yet new Israeli settlements in the West Bank are immediately connected to the main water network supplied by Mekarot, the Israeli water company. Where there were Palestinian communities connected to the network, the water supply has been reduced in some places by up to 75%. On average, settlers in the West Bank consume up to five times more water than their Palestinian neighbours.

5. The impact of closure has been compounded by the construction of the new Israeli security wall and fence inside the West Bank. This physical barrier has already enclosed entire towns and villages, directly affecting over 200,000 people[1], separating them from their land, their water sources and each other. Fourteen thousand Palestinians living in 17 villages between the wall and the Green Line are now effectively trapped. A further 35,000 who are living close to the wall have been separated from their land and are losing their access to a livelihood, water and basic services such as health and education. The economy of Qalqilya, once the thriving agricultural centre of the West Bank, has been strangled by the wall, which has completely encircled the town and its 41,000 inhabitants.

6. The first phase of the wall has caused a large-scale confiscation and destruction of water resources and infrastructure, exacerbating an already critical situation. So far, 35,000 metres of domestic and agricultural water pipes have been damaged or destroyed by Israeli bulldozers, and many communities are now completely cut off from their water sources. According to the Palestinian Hydrology Group, Palestinians will lose nearly 18% of their share of the Western Groundwater Basin.

7. The closure of communities threatens public sanitation and health, as many people can no longer safely dispose of their household, human and animal waste. The building of the wall has also reduced access to medical services to a critical level. Before the construction of the wall, people were able to make expensive and risky journies via roadblocks and checkpoints to visit doctors and hospitals in nearby towns and cities. Now many people are trapped behind new fences and walls. Village clinics have assumed the full burden of emergency and chronic cases without having either the trained staff or equipment to cope.

8. The completion of the wall will seriously affect the viability of a future Palestinian state. The majority of the most fertile agricultural areas in the West Bank have been confiscated and lie outside the current route of the wall, effectively denying Palestinians the potential to develop a modern agricultural economy. If the wall aligns itself with the settlement blocs, then the state will consist of the Gaza Strip and two non-contiguous Palestinian areas in the north and south of the West Bank, with a third Palestinian island around Jericho within an expanded Israel.

9. Without an alternative to Israeli occupation, it is difficult to see how British or European development assistance can help to achieve UN Millennium Development Goals relating to health, education, water and poverty reduction in the Palestinian Territories. The humanitarian situation is already bad and will not improve without a political solution that guarantees protection and justice for all the citizens of the region. The British government is an important donor in the region, an influential member of the EU, and a key partner of the US in the Middle East. It is therefore well placed to use its influence in order to bring about such a solution.

Oxfam GB's experience, sources and partners

2. Oxfam receives one million euros per annum from the EU to carry out its current programme in the West Bank. The programme focuses on emergency water, sanitation and public health in villages in the Nablus, Jenin, Jordan Valley (Jericho), Tulkarem, Qalqiliya and Hebron districts.

3. Oxfam works on two levels. First, we operate through local partners (including municipalities and local village councils) to construct water cisterns at household and community levels; replace damaged roof water storage tanks and rehabilitate damaged water networks, wells and springs; give technical training to other NGOS and local authorities on water recycling and sanitation systems in institutions and at household level; and conduct field water analysis training and monitor water and sanitation needs throughout the West Bank. We also conduct public health training in all communities where there is technical input.

4. Second, we coordinate with other organisations by chairing the Emergency, Water and Sanitation and Hygiene Co-ordination group (EWASH). EWASH is an open co-ordination forum that includes all of the large water and sanitation agencies working in the Palestinian Territories, including the Palestinian Water Authority (PWA) and USAID, the largest donor in the water and sanitation sector. It meets monthly to share information, prioritise community needs and coordinate responses.

5. The Palestinian Hydrology Group's (PHG) Oxfam-funded monitoring programme (WaSH MP) provides the EWASH agencies with a regularly updated picture of the water, sanitation, and hygiene situation across the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Since June 2002, the WaSH MP has surveyed 643 of the 708 communities in the West Bank and Gaza[2] enumerated by the Palestine Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS).

6. In this submission, we will address points 3 and 4 in the IDC terms of reference and specifically issues relating to water, livelihoods, land and the movement of persons and goods.

Current access to water for Palestinians

7. Water remains a critical issue for many West Bank villages and towns in terms of both quantity and quality. The unresolved political issues relating to the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Territories has meant a continuous degradation of the infrastructure over 36 years, preventing normal development.

8. The actions of both the Israeli army and settlers in the Territories during the second Intifada have seriously damaged the existing water infrastructure of many communities. In April 2002, Oxfam with the PWA and USAID-funded agencies established an Emergency Water Operations Centre to restore bulk water supply to municipalities that suffered heavily from Israeli army incursions.

9. The system of road closures and curfews has prevented many Palestinians from reaching and/or maintaining their water sources. Roadblocks and checkpoints have constituted a major obstruction to the passage of the water and wastewater tankers, and this has contributed to the deteriorating hygiene and health status in these communities.

10. The Government of Israel continues to maintain complete control over the water resources in the Palestinian Territories. At the June 2003 meeting of the Joint Water Committee (JWC), established under the interim agreement that Israel and the Palestinian Authority signed in September 1995 (Oslo II), the Technical Sub Committee refused to license or approve any new projects. Previously approved wells were even re-assessed. In real terms this means a prohibition on drilling any new wells, repairing water networks, or connecting local networks to the main supply.

11. The JWC is the body responsible for approving every new water and sewage project in the West Bank. The JWC comprises an equal number of representatives of the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority and all decisions have to be made by consensus. Unfortunately, where consensus cannot be attained, there is no mechanism for settling disputes. This means that the Government of Israel is able to veto any request by the Palestinian representatives to drill new wells or undertake new building projects.

12. In addition, even if the approval were to be granted by the JWC, if the site of the project is situated in Area C (an Oslo division of the West Bank which is solely under Israeli control and prohibited to Palestinians) the High Planning Committee of the Civil Administration must therefore also approve the project. In areas A and B of the West Bank where the JWC has approved a project, up to 13 different permits must be obtained for the project to proceed.

Water Quantity

13. In spite of an Oslo II agreement to increase the annual supply of water to the Occupied Territories by 28.6 million cubic meters (mcm/year), the amount of water allocated to Palestinians has remained little changed since Israel occupied the Palestinian Territories in 1967, and has not been increased to match population growth or meet the most basic needs of the Palestinian population.

14. According to the Palestinian Hydrology Group, Palestinians are currently using only 12% of the 1.8 billion cubic meters of water shared by the Palestinians and Israelis in the Jordan River Basin. Twenty five percent of the population of the Jordan River Basin is Palestinian. Political and physical restraints imposed by Israel mean that these Palestinians consume only 12% of the water and use less water per capita than any other population in the Basin.

15. In addition, Mekorot, the only Israeli company that supplies water to the Palestinians, reduced its flow rate into the Territories by 10% in 2002 and it remains at the same level in 2003. In some places it is actively diverting water out into Israel (e.g. Bardala, Jordan Valley). Mekorot supplies approximately 43% of the communities in the West Bank with water as either a primary or secondary source, i.e. those communities that possess a water, network[3]. It also supplies water to every new settlement. Each settler consumes five times as much water as a West Bank Palestinian.[4] By contrast, in some Palestinian villages surveyed by the WaSH monitoring project, the current supply has been reduced by as much as 75%. Since the start of the second Intifada, Palestinian communities that have been depending on Mekorot for part or all of their water have found that Mekorot is regularly stopping supply.

16. Mekorot's monopoly on water supply can also make difficult situations worse. The JWC had agreed to give the PWA six filling points from which water tankers can fill up before distributing water to villages. However, Mekorot located the six filling points in remote areas near checkpoints. The Ministry of Defence then prevented the PWA from using these filling points on security grounds.[5]

17. The amount of water available has been significantly reduced by other factors. There are leaks and blockages in the existing old network; and a sizeable number of water sources have been confiscated by Israel on the basis of so called 'security' actions such as the building of the wall, or rendered unreachable by political agreements, such as being placed in Area C which contains many water sources and is prohibited to Palestinians.

18. Although there is the impression that Mekorot reduces the water pressure because Palestinians cannot pay their water bills, all the water bills are paid from the taxes that Israel has been withholding from the Palestinian Authority. The reduction in flow therefore seems to be an arbitrary measure.

19. Where communities do not have a Mekorot supply, they have to rely on springs or production wells. Many communities and villages, especially in southern Hebron, lost access to their natural sources of water during the Oslo negotiations and thus are forced to rely solely on tankered water. Tankers fill up a 4m³ or 10m³ tank with water from a dedicated filling point, and then discharge it into a holding tank at a household.

20. The reduction in water quantity plus the increasing cost of transport to negotiate road blocks has pushed up the price of tankered water in some places by as much as 80%. Many Palestinians can no longer afford the water they need to survive. Oxfam encourages un-networked communities to build large water storage cisterns for rainwater collection that can sustain them for a few months into the dry season before they have to start paying high prices for water.

21. Many communities in south Hebron such as Al Bourj and Beit Mirsam are in such a predicament. They purchase water at approximately 200 NIS (GB£28) for 10m³. Many of these families lost their main source of income from work in Israel when the second Intifada broke out. They have had to sell off their assets to allow them to buy basics such as water. Many families in the West Bank survive on 9 litres per day (l/p/d) because that is all they can afford. The World Health Organisation recommends that the minimum amount of water for a person to maintain a healthy life is 30 l/person/day for rural areas.

Water Quality

22. A water quality analysis survey undertaken in July 2003 by Oxfam with the Jenin Municipality Water Department and the Ministry of Health Environmental Units for Jenin and Tubas produced alarming results. The survey revealed that 69% of all water samples taken from household water storage tanks, restaurants, bakeries, pharmacies and other local level institutions failed the WHO water standard for the Palestinian Territories and as such pose a health risk to the consumer.

23. As a result of the decrease in quantity and quality of water available we have documented a marked increase in water borne diseases in the West Bank. Regular surveys between June 2002 and January 2003 by the Oxfam Public Health Team reveal that water-borne diseases are becoming more prevalent throughout the West Bank where communities are forced to use contaminated water sources.

24. Poor water quality is the result of a combination of circumstances. Many of the villages and towns we work in have experienced damage to all types of water sources by IDF military action and from vandalism by Israeli citizens living in the surrounding settlements. Deteriorating sewage systems and the lack of chlorination have caused wells, cisterns and springs to become contaminated. Furthermore, closures and curfews often make it impossible for the Palestinian Ministry of Health and municipalities to collect and analyse samples and monitor water quality or make repairs.

How settlements affect water supply

25. Settlements pose grave danger for Palestinian villagers trying to gain access to their sources of water. In some cases where settlers have deliberately committed acts of sabotage to their water supply, Palestinians have been left with limited access or without potable water.

26. Oxfam started working in Madama village close to Nablus in June 2002. Madama has a population of 1,239 (Palestinian Central Bureau for Statistics) and one water source, which is a spring, located halfway up the hill from the village. Settlers from Yizhar settlement on top of the hill have repeatedly attacked and damaged the spring and destroyed the water pipe that carries the water down the hill to the main storage tank in the village. Oxfam interviewed many people in this village who had tried to repair the pipe. Many had been shot at, three had received direct bullet wounds as settlers opened fire on them while they were carrying out repairs to the pipeline, and two donkeys used to carry bags of cement and other materials up the hill had been killed.

27. In response to a request by the head of the village council, Oxfam undertook to repair the pipes by coordinating with the IDF to ensure the safety of our staff and the community members who would carry out the repair work. On one occasion, the settlers opened fire when an international Oxfam staff member was with the team of labourers (September 2002). No one was killed, although several community members, and the international staff member, were lightly injured while trying to get out of the direct line of fire. The IDF were immediately informed but claimed they were not able to control the settlers.

28. After the repair of the pipe for the third time (April 2003), the settlers came the same day and used the fresh concrete to re-block the pipe. At the time of writing, Madama's residents still do not have water from this spring.

29. In the dry summer months some settlements will sell water to Palestinians. Settlers near the Palestinian village of Ar Ramadin in South Hebron have constructed a reservoir inside their settlement using the main Mekorot water pipe line. They store water in this way, and then sell it at a profit to Palestinians in Ar Ramadin whose water supply runs out. Many West Bank communities have no alternative water source so agree to pay[6].

30. The existence of settlements in the Territories severely inhibits Palestinian development by dictating many of the security arrangements by which most Palestinians are bound. The clearest example of this is the way in which settlements are dictating the line of the wall being built by the Israeli government within the West Bank to stop Palestinian militants from entering Israel.

The impact of the wall on water

31. The 'wall' is in fact a complex series of trenches, barbed wire, electrified fences, 8m high concrete blocks, armed concrete turrets, cameras, infrared sensors and security patrol roads, spanning between 30 and 100 metres. Private property is being requisitioned under the 1949 Land Seizure in Emergency Times Act. Property owners have one week in which to file an appeal for review by an Israeli Army Appeals Committee.[7] Many do not see the notification in time, and when they have done and can afford a lawyer, the majority of appeals have been rejected.

32. The construction of the wall entails the large-scale confiscation and destruction of water resources and infrastructure, exacerbating the already critical situation described. According to the Local Aid Coordination Committee, 35,000 metres of water pipes that were used for both domestic and agricultural purposes have been damaged or destroyed by Israeli bulldozers in preparing the ground for Phase I of the wall.

33. Households trapped on the west side of the wall now depend entirely on tankered water. This has a severe impact on levels of household debt, for example, one family of 18 members in Ras Tira village south of Qalqiliya ran out of collected rainwater at the end of May this year. They have a natural spring on their land from which they used to collect water through the summer months, supplementing it with tankered water. This year the spring was confiscated for the wall's construction. When they have tried to access it they have been shot at and told it is part of a closed military zone. They have to buy 10 cubic meters of tankered water at a cost of $23 every 10 days. With no income for over a year, the family's debts are insurmountable.

34. In Phase I of the wall alone, PHG reports that approximately 36 groundwater wells with an approximate total discharge of 4 million cubic metres per year are now located on the western side of the wall and thereby separated from the communities and farmers who depend on them. A further 14 wells are now located in the buffer zone near the wall and are rendered inaccessible. "As a result, Palestinians will lose nearly 18% of their share of the Western Groundwater Basin"[8].

Sanitation and Health

35. Many of the communities with whom Oxfam works perceive their most common public health problem to be the need for the provision of containment and disposal of household, human and animal waste. Many families cannot afford to pay for sewage evacuation tankers. As a result the risks to health are increased. Oxfam has established women's groups and recruited volunteer community public health promoters in these communities.

36. Oxfam has observed that there is a correlation between school attendance by teenage girls and clean toilets. In schools where there are inadequate sanitary facilities, the attendance rate of girls drops significantly.

37. Deir Sharaf village near Nablus has been unable to dispose of its waste since the start of the second Intifada. The dump they use is in Silat al Dahar a few kilometres away, but they are unable to cross Shave Shomron checkpoint to reach it. The garbage tractor they use is also beyond reach behind another checkpoint - Beit Iba. While Oxfam was able to negotiate with the Israeli authorities to rectify this situation, aid organisations cannot negotiate on behalf of every village. People must be allowed to move freely in order to carry out everyday tasks.

38. Before the wall was built, Ras Tira village south of Qalqiliya, used to share one rubbish collection truck belonging to villages in the surrounding area. The rubbish was taken to the landfill site in Kufr Thuluth, a few kilometres east. No one in the five villages encircled by the wall owns a sewage truck, so the villages may have to resort to using a donkey to carry the garbage to the edge of the enclave near the wall where solid waste can be burnt.

39. The wall has reduced the Palestinians' access to medical services to a critical level. Whereas villagers could make a risky and expensive trek via roadblocks and checkpoints to doctors in nearby towns, now they cannot get beyond the wall. Village clinics have assumed the full burden of emergency and chronic cases without having either the trained staff or equipment to cope.[9] Many villages are serviced only by a mobile clinic/doctor visiting once every two weeks and those beyond the wall now face the prospect of losing this one remaining facility.

40. A UN Millennium Development Goal and DFID policy is to increase the number of people worldwide with access to safe water and sanitation by the year 2015. However, access to both is being seriously reduced in the Palestinian Territories.

A better use of donor money

41. There are many instances where Oxfam is unable to make the best use of donor money due to external constraints.

42. Mekorot, the Israeli water company, have pipelines that feed settlements but bypass Palestinian villages. Mekarot would be better placed than other agencies to supply Palestinian communities with clean drinking water at an affordable price nearby the settlement. In the meantime, Oxfam has to install a less cost-effective system in order to meet urgent needs.

43. Oxfam has built household water storage tanks in some villages that are not connected to the network. A more cost-effective and less discriminatory system would be to build communal village cisterns to catch rainwater, but Oxfam has not been granted permission by the Israeli authorities for this. As Oxfam is unable to supply every household in the community with a private tank, this has inevitably created some tensions in the communities where we work.

44. As described above, many villages possess a water source yet are unable to gain access to or use it due to curfews, road closures, the actions of settlers or the security wall. Using tankers is the only way to supply these villages with water. This is costly and much less efficient.

45. In the village of Falamia, the largest producer of citrus fruits in the West Bank, Oxfam, through PHG, reconnected a water pipe that had been damaged by the Israeli contractor building the wall. As it is the Israeli contractors' legal responsibility to repair what they damage, NGOs who want to enable people to access their water resources are put in a difficult position when the contractor does not fulfil his obligations. By carrying out vital work to provide humanitarian assistance, their work effectively diverts donor funds to subsidise the building of the wall.

Land, livelihoods and the movement of people and goods

46. The World Bank reports that by the end of 2002, 92,000 Palestinians out of 128,000 employed in Israel before the Intifada had lost their jobs as a result of closures[10]. The majority of those who still manage clandestinely to cross the Green Line to find work are now also losing their jobs through the construction of the wall. Without freedom of movement, these closures have effectively imprisoned 2 million Palestinians in the West Bank.

47. At the end July 2003, the Palestinian Ministry of Planning reported the existence of 133 permanent military checkpoints in the West Bank. In the North West Bank, there were also 29 iron gates, 222 earth mounds, 52 roadblocks plus 22,000 metres of ditches and trenches sealing off roads and tracks around villages and towns. In addition there are always 'flying' or mobile checkpoints erected at random on a daily basis.

48. The cumulative effect of these external and internal closures has been enormous. In broad terms, the majority of over 3 million Palestinians have been kept from their places of work, education, health and recreation for the last three years. Agriculture, which has been the main source of income for the majority in the face of massive unemployment, has been seriously affected by the presence of settlements that prevent Palestinians from harvesting their yearly olive crop. Now, vast swathes of the most fertile West Bank land are being destroyed or rendered inaccessible by the wall.

The impact of the wall on land, livelihoods and movement of people

49. In the words of one man who supports a family of eight in a village now encircled by the wall, "The wall has stolen the last hope which I have which is the land". Having lost his job in Israel as a construction worker when the Intifada started, he had become totally dependent on his olive groves. He has exhausted all his savings, and even sold his wife's jewellery in order to make ends meet. The 70m wide wall now cuts through his land leaving 80% of it inaccessible on the other side. He reports that the only option now is to smuggle himself into Israel in unauthorised ways, and at risk to his own life, in order to search for work and income.

50. The wall, in its completed Phase I stage alone, is having a disastrous impact on the movement of 14,000 Palestinians who are trapped in 17 villages between the Wall and the Green Line. It is also affecting a further 35,000 people[11] living just meters away from where the wall has been built who, in being separated from their land, are losing their livelihoods and their access to water and basic services such as health and education.

51. Of particular concern is the fate of Palestinian villages caught between the Wall and the Green Line. For example, Mugharat al Dabr and Ras Tira are two out of five Palestinian villages trapped by a loop in the wall south of the Palestinian town of Qalqiliya. The reason is that they are situated close to the 20-year-old settlement of Alfe Menashe, 4km east of the Green Line. The wall will keep Alfe Menashe within a de facto enlarged Israel demarcated by the wall to its east, and prevent it from becoming an island within a future Palestinian state (see attached map).

52. The Israeli State Attorney has declared before the High Court of Justice that the no-mans land between the Green Line and the wall will be declared 'a closed military area'[12]. This means that whereas the 3,000 settlers of Alfe Menashe can freely come and go into Israel on settler roads, the approximately 800 Palestinians trapped in the five villages can go nowhere - neither East beyond the wall further into the West Bank nor west into Israel. No one has, as yet, addressed the grave problems they are facing in terms of access to employment, markets and medical care as a result of the wall.

53. Economically, Ras Tira village is dying: 80 of the 100 workers in the village are now unable to find or reach employment; the majority of the village depends on food aid[13] and a small amount of agricultural produce from the remaining accessible land in the village. Ras Tira has an electricity generator, but the diesel oil and the maintenance of the network come from outside the village. When the wall finally encircles them, they will lose all physical contact with the outside world.

54. There are reportedly three different types of gates planned for the wall for the passage of persons, agricultural vehicles and goods, transported through a back-to-back system[14]. However the arrangements for crossing the wall have not been published, many of the gates have not been built, apparently due to budget shortfalls, and access for farmers has mostly been lost. Where farmers have been able to get through they are not allowed to bring produce back with them.

55. The wall and further walls to protect the 'wall' surround Qalqiliya on all sides. The town of 41,600 residents, which services a catchment area of 90,700 people, has only a single narrow entrance and exit, controlled by an Israeli checkpoint. "Once a thriving commercial center for its entire region, our city has been reduced to destitution," said Qalqiliya Mayor Ma'aruf Zaharan in a recent speech.[15] As a result, 600 shops have closed and 4,000 residents, largely traders, have left the city[16].

56. There is evidence that the wall may be bringing about changes that could affect Palestinians' identity and place of residence and thus their right of access to land and villages of origin. Israeli officials have been conducting surveys of the residents of the villages that will end up on the west side of the wall. Using old lists, they score off the names of those who have died and register new residents. Anyone who is not there at the time is not registered. Those who have moved out to nearby towns are regarded as absentee landowners. They still own their land and property, but are no longer allowed back, nor registered as belonging to their village.

57. There is also some evidence that those who do live in the village are also slowly being registered elsewhere. Although Ras Tira is registered and coded within the Israeli computer system, some villagers have found that when they take their ID cards to be renewed, their registered address has been changed to another village further east in the West Bank. Palestinians fear that if they leave their village they will not be able to return.

58. "The wall has tied our lives to permits. That's why we are afraid. Those who are registered outside this address will not be able to go and come back," said one village council member. The residents of Ras Tira are convinced that these measures amount to an organised transfer of the villagers, which serves the Israeli aim of having the land without the people. The wall is certainly forcing Palestinians to move out of their original homes to areas where life is more economically viable.[17]

59. An obvious consequence of the wall and its impact on livelihoods, access to water and the movement of people and goods is on the economic viability of a future Palestinian state. The majority of the most fertile agricultural areas in the West Bank have been confiscated and lie outside the current route of the wall, denying a future Palestinian state the potential for developing a modern agricultural economy. If the wall aligns itself with the settlement blocs then the state will consist of the Gaza Strip and two non-contiguous Palestinian areas in the north and south of the West Bank, with Jericho as a third Palestinian island within an expanded Israel (see map).

Conclusions

1. Our submission relates to points 3 and 4 of the IDC terms of reference and specifically to the issues of water, livelihoods, land and the movement of persons and goods. In summary our conclusions are:

That the impact of the occupation of the Palestinian Territories on the daily lives of ordinary Palestinians is severe, with high levels of household debt, unemployment, lack of access to key services leading to increased incidence of poverty and deteriorating health indicators.
That the mechanisms established under Oslo II for the delivery of vital public services and development assistance are not working and therefore Millennium Development Goals will not be met.
That the work of aid agencies is severely restricted and the effectiveness of EU development aid is undermined.
That the building of the security fence by the Government of Israel in response to the deteriorating security situation is having a devastating and negative impact on the livelihoods and health of Palestinians whose land is affected by the building of the wall.

2. We are also deeply concerned that the current humanitarian situation is not conducive to creating conditions for peace. The hardship and difficulties faced by ordinary Palestinians attempting to go about their daily lives is breeding disillusionment in the peace process and loss of hope. The impact of security measures taken by the Government of Israel also appear to threaten the economic viability of any future Palestinian State - a critical part of the Road Map for peace. Without peace, security and stability there can be no long term resolution of the humanitarian crisis. As detailed in our submission prime agricultural land and key water resources are being confiscated for the building of the wall. The wall will also leave thousands of Palestinians isolated in non-contiguous enclaves.

3. The humanitarian situation is critical and will not improve without a political solution that guarantees protection and justice for all the citizens of the region. Only a comprehensive settlement that takes into account all of the final status issues - borders, water rights, settlements, refugees and Jerusalem - will achieve peace. The UK government is an important donor in the region, an influential member of the EU and a key partner of the US in the Middle East. It is therefore well placed to use its influence in order to bring about such a negotiated solution.

4. Without an alternative to Israeli occupation, it is difficult to see how British or EU Development assistance can achieve the UN Millennium Development Goals relating to health, education water and poverty reduction in the Palestinian Territories. We believe that for humanitarian reasons assistance to NGOs such as Oxfam should continue to be provided but it should be recognised that current assistance is being used in the form of an emergency response rather than a long-term development tool.

Recommendations

We would like the International Development Committee to consider the following recommendations for inclusion in its report to the House:

1. In order to bring about an immediate improvement in the humanitarian situation, and in particular Palestinians' access to water and land, and freedom of movement, the British government should use its influence with the governments of Israel and the US to immediately ease the closure policies in force in the West Bank.

2. While recognising the seriousness of Israel's security concerns, the British government should press the governments of Israel and the US to bring an immediate halt to the construction of the wall inside the West Bank and around Jerusalem. Those sections that have already been built should also come down. There is no consensus within Israel that the wall will guarentee security but Oxfam's experience demonstrates that it will further impoverish the Palestinian population. By further confiscating Palestinian land and water resources it is also a direct threat to the viability of a future Palestinian state and makes even more remote the possibility of a negotiated settlement.

3. In the light of evidence that the construction of the wall may lead to the forced migration of some Palestinians from their land and villages of origin, we urge the Committee to investigate this aspect of the building of the wall further as part of their inquiry.

4. In order to achieve real change, the British government should use its influence with the Quartet for Peace to explore alternatives to Israeli occupation. Development aid should be accompanied by international mechanisms for protection capable of upholding impartially the rights of both Israeli and Palestinian civilians under international humanitarian law. Only such an arrangement can ensure an immediate cessation of violence, the restoration of economic activity, and help foster the trust and goodwill that will be needed to reach a final settlement.

1. Annex 1 - water and human rights

This note is based almost entirely on Thirsty for a Solution: The Water Crisis in the Occupied Territories and its Resolution in the Final-Status Agreement, Yehezkel Lein, Jerusalem: B'Tselem 2000.

Three different systems of international law are relevant to Palestinian water rights.

1. International water law, in particular the UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Water Courses (henceforward the UN Water Course Convention, adopted 1997). Aquifers in the Palestinian territories are all shared with Israel, although one sub-aquifer is almost entirely in occupied Palestinian territory. Shared aquifers are governed by this convention and customary international water law, based on the principle of equitable and reasonable use. The UN Water Courses Convention lists the factors needed to be considered in negotiations between states on the division of shared aquifers and surface water. These factors include social, economic and demographic needs, the geography of watercourses, and existing and potential uses of watercourses. The convention prohibits states from causing significant harm to the interests of other watercourse states.

2. International humanitarian law, in particular the Hague Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (The Hague Regulations, 1907), and the fourth Geneva Convention (GC4, 1949), and its first additional protocol (AP1, 1977). The Hague regulations severely limit the rights of an occupying power to use the natural resources of an occupied territory, and to change the laws of an occupied territory, including those relating to water. GC4 obliges an occupying power to maintain public health, and not to discriminate on grounds of race, religion or political opinion. AP1 prohibits attacks on objects indispensable to the survival of civilian population such as drinking water installations and irrigation works (Article 54).

3. International human rights law, in particular the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC 1989), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW, 1979) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESR, 1966). The CRC obliges states party to ensure the provision of clean drinking water for all children. CEDAW obliges states party to ensure adequate water supplies for rural women. The ICESCR gives peoples rights to their natural resources and obliges states party to ensure an adequate standard of living for citizens. In 2002, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) issued a Draft General Comment on the Right to Water, which stated that the right to an adequate standard of living includes the right to clean drinking water.

Annex 2: West Bank Separation Barrier: Qalqilya and Environs - Impact on land and water resources

Courtesy of JFF-NAD

1 The total population affected by the wall is 224,760; UN OCHA Update, June 14-30, 2003. Back

2 666 in West Bank and 42 in Gaza Back

3 PHG surveyed 643 communities in the West Bank and Gaza up to May 2003. Of the 601 surveyed in the West Bank, 261 have some kind of supply from Mekorot (43%); of the 42 surveyed in Gaza, 11 have a Mekorot supply (26%) (42% overall) Back

4 Stop the Wall, PENGON report, June 2003, p 54 Back

5 Operational Coordination Group, minutes 26 June 2003 Back

6 Basema Bashir at PHG, confirmed by phone research 12^th August 2003. Back

7 The Impact of Israel's Separation Barrier on Affected West Bank Communities - report of the mission to the Humanitarian and Emergency Policy Group of the Local Aid Coordination Committee, 4 May 2003 Back

8 see the PHG 'water for life' campaign website - http://www.phg.org/campaign/emergency/wall.html Back

9 Forgotten Villages, OI #28 Briefing Paper, p23 Back

10 Twenty-seven months - Intifada, closures and Palestinian Economic crisis, March 2003, p12 Back