Memorandum submitted by Christian Aid
INTRODUCTION
Christian Aid is the official relief and development
agency of 40 British and Irish churches, working where we believe
the need is greatestin 60 countries worldwideand
helping communities of all religions (or none). Christian Aid
is also a key member of Action by Churches Together (ACT), a world
alliance of church-based humanitarian agencies.
Before the war this year Christian Aid's programme
in Iraq was confined to the autonomous Kurdish region of northern
Iraq. Since 1992, Christian Aid has supported local NGOs here
in a range of rehabilitation and development activities, and continues
to do so. The substantial REACH (Rehabilitation, Education and
Community Health) programme is co-funded by DFID, which has contributed
£1.2 million to date. Since the war Christian Aid has extended
its operations to provide humanitarian support in the central
and southern parts of the country, in fields including emergency
relief, water and sanitation supply, seed banks and nurseries,
landmine clearance, and community needs assessment. As well as
keeping in close touch with our Iraqi partners, several Christian
Aid staff have visited Iraq since the war, spending time principally
in Baghdad, Karbala, Basra, Kirkuk and the autonomous Kurdish
governorates.
Christian Aid has submitted written evidence
to the International Development Committee in May and June. This
submission updates and reemphasises Christian Aid's principal
concerns.
PRINCIPAL RECOMMENDATIONS
TO THE
BRITISH GOVERNMENT
In order to provide a secure environment
for the civilian population and meet its obligations under the
Geneva Conventions, the Coalition should prioritise the training
of Iraqi security personnel and if necessary provide additional
external troops. (Paragraph 1.4)
Christian Aid supports moves to broaden
the basis of the Coalition and upgrade the political responsibilities
of the United Nations in Iraq. (Paragraph 1.7)
The transfer of political authority
to Iraqi institutions should be accelerated wherever possible.
(Paragraph 2.9)
The Coalition needs to be exceptionally
alert to the need to contain conflicts which develop in Iraq on
ethnic and/or confessional lines (Paragraph 2.10)
The Coalition Provisional Authority
(CPA) should prioritise planning for the needs of internally displaced
Iraqis, particularly in the coming winter (Paragraphs 3.8/3.9)
Distribution of food rations, currently
undertaken under the Oil-for-Food programme, must continue after
the end of the Oil-for-Food programme in November. (Paragraphs
3.11/3.12)
Plans for the management of a successor
programme to Oil-for-Food must be developed as a matter of urgency.
Eventual phase down must be carefully calibrated if widespread
hardship and resentment is to be avoided. (Paragraphs 3.13/3.14)
The British Government should use
its influence to ensure maximum transparency in the management
of Iraqi oil revenues accruing to the Development Fund established
under UN Security Council Resolution 1483, and in the monitoring
of disbursements by the Fund. In particular, the British government
should ensure greater Iraqi participation in decisions relating
to the use of oil revenues and in the management of the Fund.
(Paragraphs 4.3-4.9)
Acronyms used in this submission
ACT | Action By Churches Together
|
CPA | Coalition Provisional Authority
|
DFID | Department for International Development
|
IAMB | International Advisory and Monitoring Board
|
ICC | International Coordination Council
|
IDP | Internally Displaced Person
|
IKNN | Iraqi Kurdish NGO Network
|
IMF | International Monetary Fund
|
INC | Iraqi National Congress
|
KDP | Kurdish Democratic Party
|
PRB | Programme Review Board
|
PUK | Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
|
REACH | Rehabilitation, Education and Community Health
|
SCIRIUN | Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq
|
UNHCR | United Nations High Commission for Refugees
|
UNSECOORD | United Nations Security Co-ordinator
|
| |
1. Security aspects
1.1 The Committee will be well aware of the deterioration
in the security situation in Iraq. American and British soldiers
continue to be killed and injured. The attack on the United Nations
was not only an appalling tragedy but has serious implications
for the future of neutral humanitarian intervention. Yet it is
Iraqis who suffer most of all from the escalating insecurity.
The carnage in Najaf on 29 August has undoubtedly contributed
to the destabilisation of Iraq. By the time the Committee meets,
more outrages are all too likely to have been perpetrated.
1.2 Lack of security is affecting the daily lives of
Iraqis in many parts of the country, notably in Baghdad. Shootings,
looting, rape, kidnapping, vehicle hijacks, and an upsurge in
common criminality have increased alarmingly. The improvements
we were able to report in June have gone into reverse. Widespread
looting, including of strategic items essential for provision
of water and electricity, continues apace. The wholesale pre-war
release of criminal prisoners by Saddam Hussein added to the problems
as has the near-universal availability of weapons. Additionally,
half a million Iraqi soldiers were demobilised without attempting
to find the majority alternative employment and they were allowed
to keep their small arms (see Christian Aid submission in June).
1.3 IKNN is an umbrella agency for Iraqi (mostly Kurdish)
NGOs which is supported by Christian Aid. Since the war, IKNN
has begun to work in Baghdad. IKNN staff have reported a palpable
increase in violence in poor areas of the city where they are
conducting needs assessments. On one occasion, staff were unable
to leave a house where they were conducting their survey because
shooting had started outside. Communities visited by IKNN in July
and August report an increase in the activities of criminal gangs,
some linked to political groups or factions.
1.4 Under the Geneva Conventions, the occupying powers
are responsible for providing security in Iraq. Recent UNSECOORD
security bulletins show that the rate of lethal or potentially
lethal attacks on Coalition troops is at least five times greater
than two months ago. The more Coalition troops are themselves
under threat, and the more they have to engage in counter-insurgency
operations, the more difficult it is for them to meet their responsibilities
of providing security for Iraqi civilians. British forces are
to be commended for maintaining, where possible, foot patrols
and face-to-face interaction with Iraqi civilians rather than
retreating behind their armour. Yet Coalition soldiers face an
increasingly difficult task for which they are inadequately equipped
and prepared. The training of Iraqi security forces, though delayed
by poor planning, is now recognised as being of the highest priority.
Recommendation: In order to provide a secure environment
for the civilian population and meet its obligations under the
Geneva Conventions, the Coalition should prioritise the training
of Iraqi security personnel and if necessary provide additional
external troops.
1.5 To the extent that Coalition forces lose the confidence
of Iraqi people, their ability to establish security will be eroded.
Broadening the base of the international forces in Iraq, and establishing
a much stronger and more visible UN presence, would be likely
at least to enhance the long-term prospects for retaining such
confidence. The highest priority should be given to the development
of Iraqi security forces, especially police forcesas the
Coalition itself now increasingly realises.
1.6 The growing climate of insecurity does not provide
the context for developing democratic processes and institutions
in Iraq; indeed, it provides the best breeding-ground for the
nurturing and expansion of political and/or religious extremism.
Many Iraqisfairly or otherwiseblame Coalition forces
for failing to provide them with security, reducing the likelihood
of cooperation. We know that the British Government is desperately
concerned to promote security in Iraq. Doing so will not be easy,
and may not even prove possible. The threats of increasing anarchy,
a descent to prolonged conflict and civil war remain very real.
1.7 Reversing growing insecurity needs to be accompanied
by a fundamental change to the prevailing political authority.
Christian Aid believes that in the short term authority should
be transferred to the United Nations and its agencies, even if
popular perceptions of the UN amongst ordinary Iraqis are not
always positive. We believe that the international legitimacy
which the UN would bring to Iraq, the breadth of experience and
expertise the UN can offer with regard to managing political transitions,
combined with the possibilities greater UN involvement provide
for broadening international engagement in Iraq, outweigh other
options and would provide the best chance to improve the long-term
chances of resolving the crisis. Our calls for a greater political
role for the UN should be seen as complementary to the efforts
currently underway to broaden international military involvement
in the country.
Recommendation: Christian Aid supports moves to broaden
the basis of the Coalition and upgrade the political responsibilities
of the United Nations in Iraq.
2. Political dimensions
2.1 Christian Aid believes that an appreciation of the
political issues in contemporary Iraq are pivotal to understanding
the growing crisis there, and to its resolution.
2.2 Disparate parties and groupings are competing for
power in post-war Iraq. Significant political forces include the
following:
Coalition military forces
The Coalition Provisional Authority (established
by the US and British)
The Iraqi Governing Council (appointed by the
Coalition)
The Iraqi cabinet (also appointed by the Coalition,
on 2 September)
Militias (KDP, PUK, al-Badr Corps, Jaysh al-Mehdi,
tribal militias and more)
Political parties and groupings (KDP, PUK, SCIRI,
Da'wa Party, Sadr II Movement, al-Khoei Foundation, Iraqi Communist
Party, and many more). Almost all the main parties are associated
with one or other ethnic/confessional group.
Opposition politicians returning from exile (many
loosely grouped in the Iraqi National Congress)
Traditional tribal/clan leaders (extremely significant
in the Iraqi context; many, from all ethnic groups, profited under
Saddam, but survive as the extant local authority)
Shia clergy (also very significant; usually associated
with particular parties and/or clans)
Saddam/Baath Party loyalists
Extremist Islamist groups or cells broadly following
an Al Qaeda ideology and including many who have entered Iraq
since the war from neighbouring countries, especially Saudi Arabia.
These include some sizeable groupings such as Jund al-Islam/Ansar
al-Islam who have been active in the north of the country since
before the war.
Technocrats returning from abroad, sometimes closely
associated with the Coalition.
Technocrats and professionals who have survived
the de-Baathication purges.
2.3 Despite the widespread detestation of the Saddam
regime, which is shared by almost all these groups and indeed
the great majority of Iraqis, it has proved difficult to establish
a credible political authority. Although there is a good deal
of rhetorical commitment to unity and tolerance, differences in
relation to issues such as the nature of self-determination and
decentralisation, the role of Sharia law, and the form of a future
constitution make it difficult to achieve a consensus. Coalition
fears of Islamic forms of government and of alliances with Iran
are also putting a brake on the transfer of political power to
Iraqis.
2.4 Christian Aid's partners invariably comment on the
perceived isolation and detachment of the CPA and of some of the
Iraqis appointed by it. As one put it rather pointedly: `We need
security in the street, not behind a wall.' There has been very
limited CPA engagement with the structures that have emerged at
a local level, notably city councils. These are often credible
and effective (though only some have been elected). The `top-down
only' approach to establishing a new polity in Iraq appears inadequate
and has undoubtedly left many people feeling ignored or marginalised.
2.5 The same is true for the Governing Council, which
is perceived by many Iraqis as being equally out of touch. Liaison
between Baghdad and the regions appears weak. In many cases liaison
between Coalition forces and local institutions is good, but it
is still difficult, on occasions impossible, to obtain approval
to implement humanitarian programmes because of bottlenecks in
the CPA in Baghdad. Iraqi NGOs, in particular, often cannot locate
the authorities responsible for approving humanitarian and reconstruction
work. The United Nations has also failed sufficiently to use and
assert its authority in this area, and especially of failing to
engage with the full spectrum of agencies in Iraq (including women's
groups). However it should be noted that the current reputation
of the UN in Iraq is influenced by its association with the sanctions
regime, as well as a reputation for inefficiency; and this also
influences the perceptions many Iraqis have concerning its role
in the political realm.
2.6 In what is effectively a political vacuum, Iraqis
have increasingly looked to traditional tribal/clan leadersnot
necessarily out of great affection, but because they offer a degree
of protection, and because they see no realistic alternatives.
Shia Iraqis have also turned increasingly to their clergy, especially
in parts of Baghdad and in the areas around Najaf and Karbala.
Often an alliance between tribal and mosque leaders comprise the
de facto local authorities. Disenchantment with the exiled opposition
leaders is widespread, though the Coalition often puts them in
the centre of the frame.
2.7 In many parts of the country, notably in the north
but also in some parts of the south, relations between civil authorities
and Coalition forces remain quite good. However they are increasingly
coming under strain, sometimes very severe strain. Although current
views and attitudes towards the Coalition forces differ, even
amongst Christian Aid partners, the following quote from one of
them, the Iraqi Refugee Aid Council is we believe representative
of some widely held perspectives:
2.8 "Failure of the Coalition forces to provide
basic services (electricity, water, petrol, kerosene etc), and
more importantly, the absence of clear commitment to involve the
Iraqi people in a political process that will allow them to decide
their future and choose their government, has made the population
suspicious of the agenda of the Coalition. More and more Iraqis
are starting to look at the Coalition forces as an occupying force
rather than helpers to free them from the tyrannies of the previous
regime and rebuilding the country. This is making the population
unsympathetic towards the Coalition forces when they are attacked
and limited or no action is taken by the general public or community
leaders to stop or deter attacks on the Coalition forces . . .
There is an urgent need for a clear commitment and a "road
map" that will allow the Iraqi people to take part in the
political process . . . Without such a road map the Iraqis would
not be assured that they will end up with a democratic system
and lack of progress on this front is creating fertile grounds
for those who want to destabilise the country (Saddam loyalists
and others) to recruit zealot youth to carry out terrorist acts."
2.9 Against the backdrop of growing disaffection from
or sometimes resentment towards Coalition forces, some political
progress can be made by focusing on accelerating the devolution
of real authority to the Governing Council and the newly appointed
ministers. A substantial shift in the pace of transferring authority
to Iraqi individuals and institutions also represents a key building-block
in improving security.
Recommendation: The transfer of political authority to
Iraqi institutions should be accelerated wherever possible.
2.10 The dangers of disintegration of the Iraqi nation
are very real. This is not because of sectarian attitudes on the
part of Iraqis, but because in the political vacuum caused by
the absence of a functioning state it is all too easy for people
to be mobilised on sectarian lines. (Lebanese history provides
a striking and relevant example.) Kirkuk has already witnessed
inter-ethnic violence, and the situation there remains very tense.
Christian Aid partners have reported cases of ethnic discrimination
less likely to hit the headlines, e.g. of the Kurdish village
of Khanaqin being denied water supplies by Arab authorities in
Baquba, and of Arabs in Hawija failing to obtain water from the
Kurdish authorities in Kirkuk. Such developments may be unsurprising,
and will doubtless take years to resolve, but higher authorities
must do what they can to prevent their occurrence.
Recommendation: The Coalition needs to be exceptionally
alert to the need to contain conflicts which develop in Iraq on
ethnic and/or confessional lines.
2.11 Different communities in Iraq have very different
aspirations which will not be easy to reconcile. Yet unless these
diverse aspirations are acknowledged and somehow accommodated,
the consequences will be tragic. Christian Aid believes that the
best chance for these aspirations to be reconciled lies within
the ambit of a strongly decentralised political dispensation,
with clear accountability to the local community for political
leaders. Unless this happens, Iraq is unlikely to escape the heritage
of political violence to which its people have been subjected
for the best part of a century.
3. Humanitarian dimensions and the future of the Oil-for-Food
programme
3.1 The humanitarian situation in Iraq is not so much
acute as precarious. It is closely linked to the security situation.
Deteriorating security provides the greatest threat to progress
in meeting humanitarian needs. Moreover, lack of progress in meeting
humanitarian needs contributes to disillusion and dissatisfaction,
which in turn hinders progress towards greater security. Meeting
humanitarian needs remains a high priority.
3.2 Since the attack on the United Nations, humanitarian
agencies have faced severe constraints. Many international staff
working for humanitarian agencies have left the country, and those
remaining face restrictions on their movements and on their ability
to operate. This is significant in a country whose government
has been overthrown and where civil society (outside the former
Kurdish enclave) is almost non-existent. Because of security concerns,
in recent days, Christian Aid has introduced a temporary travel
ban to Iraq which is regularly reviewed and which we hope will
soon be lifted.
3.3 Improvements in water supply have been offset
by disruption caused by sabotagefor example in August when
300,000 people in Baghdad had their supplies cut off for several
days.
3.4 Electricity supplies are currently estimated
to be meeting just over half of current demandcompared
with two thirds immediately before the war. Water supply and sanitation
in urban areas depend on electricity; when the pumps stop, supplies
can be contaminated. Although there has recently been some progress,
the permanent restoration of electricity supply has proceeded
far more slowly than had been hoped and expected by both Iraqis
and the Coalition. The south of the country is worst affected,
the northern areas least; Baghdad is said to be operating at 50%
capacity. Sabotage and looting have been frequent. The US chief
administrator, Paul Bremer, has revised the estimated cost of
restoring Iraq's antiquated electricity grid from $1 billion to
be spent in a year to $13 billion to be spent over five years.
3.5 Domestic availability of fuel has improved
somewhat since mid-August, though exports have been badly hit
by sabotage of the pipeline through Turkey. However shortages
of petrol and diesel remain chronic, with reports of people typically
queuing for up to 5 hours for 20 litres of petrol. The problem
appears to be that fuel intended for local consumption is often
sold outside the country. Current shortages are likely to worsen
in November when the Baiji refinery, the largest in the country,
closes for essential maintenance..
3.6 Although production of kerosene has improved
recently, much of this is being hoarded against the increased
needs of winter, leading to price increases of up to 2,000%. Yet
it seems that in spite of this it is unlikely that winter demand
will be adequately met. Shortages of bottled liquid gas,
widely used for cooking, are set to continue, with the country's
main production facility (the Southern Gas Plant) now unlikely
to come into production before October.
3.7 Iraqis often cite unemployment as the biggest
socio-economic problem facing the country. Even before the war,
unemployment rates were estimated at more than 50%. In spite of
informal support networks, generally based on family ties, in
the short to medium term, millions of Iraqis will remain economically
vulnerable.
3.8 Christian Aid raised concerns about internally
displaced people (IDPs) in earlier submissions to the Select
Committee. These concerns remain the return of mainly Kurdish
refugees to their former homes in areas, which used to be controlled
by the Iraqi government, many of which are now occupied by Arabs.
This continues to be a potential flashpoint. REACH, a partner
of Christian Aid, has been actively involved in trying to ensure
just solutions to this problem. Greater clarity about the role
of UNHCR has been welcome, as well as efforts to postpone the
return of IDPs pending the development of acceptable mechanisms
for adjudicating disputes. However the lack of planning and priority
given to this issue mean that many IDPs are likely to remain displaced
this winter, including those in camps or collective centres. It
is important that the CPA makes every effort to ensure that their
needs are met, and that disputes are equitably resolved.
3.9 Over half a million people were displaced from the
Iraqi marshes following the 1991 insurrection and the ongoing
draining of the marshes. Some fled to Iran; many others live in
shanty towns in south and central Iraq. Christian Aid staff visited
extremely poor communities on the outskirts of Karbala, who fled
their homes in the southern Marshes following the uprising and
repression of 1991. They have no fresh water supply, no electricity,
and are 20 km from the nearest hospital. The local water supply
comprises a stagnant swamp. The needs of people displaced in southern
Iraq have a lower profile than those of the Kurdish IDPs in the
north, but must not be neglected. A smaller group, about 300 displaced
families, unlikely to receive much attention or sympathy, comprise
Palestinian refugees in Baghdad, who were granted favoured status
by the Baathist regime, which was often resented. Many are reported
to be facing hardship, often following eviction by their landlords.
Recommendation: The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)
should prioritise planning for the needs of internally displaced
Iraqis, particularly in the coming winter.
3.10 Coordination of humanitarian aid remains
poor. Christian Aid's partners report minimal engagement between
the Coalition Provisional Authority and Iraqi institutions, especially
at local levels.
3.11 Food remains a major concern for Christian
Aid's concern. Although food supplies for most Iraqis currently
appear to be meeting immediate needs (mainly because of the Oil-for-Food
programme), the situation remains precarious. The legacy of sanctions
means that maintenance of adequate food supplies can be seen as
a particularly pressing responsibility for the international community,
and in particular for the occupying authorities. In the near to
medium-term future, it is not possible for the market to replace
the current food distribution system. This is a major concern
for Christian Aid, and is covered in the final section of this
report.
3.12 As we highlighted in June, Christian Aid is particularly
concerned about the future of the Oil-for-Food programme on which
millions of Iraqis are heavily dependent. Iraq has long been a
net importer of food, and food subsidies predated the first Gulf
War and the imposition of sanctions. The Oil-for-Food programme
(dating from 1996) helped further to institutionalise subsidized
food distribution on which people have become extremely dependent,
particularly since this period also witnessed declining agricultural
production and growing impoverishment. The costs of the programme
since it was set up in 1996 have amounted to more than $13 billion.
3.13 In the long term, of course, such a system should
be phased out, so that Iraqis end their dependence on food aid.
Ultimately adequate food supplies should be accessible through
normal market mechanisms, underpinned by the rehabilitation and
expansion of Iraqi agriculture. However this remains a long way
off. It is very important that subsidized food distribution is
not phased out or radically reduced before people have the capacity
to support themselves. Any phase down needs to be properly monitored
if serious hardshipnot to mention further disillusionis
to be avoided.
3.14 It is unclear whether the CPA plans to continue
the subsidized food rations through the Development Fund, and
if so how this will be managed. Despite their new constraints,
only the UN agencies currently have the capacity and experience
to oversee and manage the continuation of this programme, and
should do so even if it were to be financed via a new Development
Fund route. (Please see below for a description of the Development
Fund.) This issue needs to be addressed as a matter of urgency.
Recommendation: Distribution of food rations, currently
undertaken under the Oil-for-Food programme, must continue after
the end of the Oil-for-Food programme in November.
Recommendation: Plans for the management of a successor
programme to Oil-for-Food must be developed as a matter of urgency.
Eventual phase down must be carefully planned and monitored if
widespread hardship and resentment are to be avoided.
4. Reconstruction, oil revenues and the Iraqi Development
Fund
4.1 The costs of reconstruction and rehabilitation in
Iraq, even if not seriously undermined by sabotage, are going
to be very much greater than anticipated, and cannot (and should
not) be funded from oil revenues alone. Moreover direct investment
in the country, notably by oil companies, is dependent not only
on the implementation of a new constitution and a legal framework
for investment, but on the establishment of security.
4.2 Christian Aid is currently undertaking further research
into reconstruction and development needs and use of oil revenues
in Iraq. As is shown below, our more immediate concerns relate
to the management of the Iraqi Development Fund. However it is
worth quoting some figures which graphically illustrate at least
the scale of the responsibilities faced by the Coalition and the
international community:
Estimated overall costs of war : $138 billion[1]
Estimated overall costs of reconstruction in Iraq:
$75 billion[2]
Estimated Iraqi external debt: $200-$400 billion[3]
Projected oil revenues July-December 2003: $3.4
billion[4]
Projected oil revenues in 2004: $14 billion[5]
Projected oil revenues in 2005: $20 billion[6]
Potential annual oil revenues post rehabilitation:
$27-$50 billion[7]
NB estimates re oil revenues assume that sabotage declines,
and that oil prices are stable.
Estimated military costs of war for US to mid-August:
$48 billion[8]
Current monthly costs of US military: $3.9 billion[9]
US allocations for humanitarian & reconstruction
costs to 1 October 2003: $2.5 billion[10]
Ministry of Defence allocation for Iraq war in
April budget: £3 billion[11]
Estimated military costs of war for UK to mid-July:
over £1 billion[12]
Current estimated monthly costs of UK military:
£200 million[13]
DFID allocations for humanitarian and reconstruction
costs: £270 million[14]
Home Office allocations for war related costs:
£332 million[15]
UN appeal in March for humanitarian needs in Iraq:
$2.2 billion[16]
UN appeal in June to cover outstanding humanitarian
needs to end 2003: $259 million[17]
Cost of food under Oil-for-Food programme to date:
over $2 billion per year[18]
CPA estimated expenditure 2003: $6.1 billion[19]
CPA budget deficit 2003: $2.2 billion[20]
Investment required by end 2005 towards rehabilitation
of oil industry: $4.5 billion[21]
4.3 In the Commons debate of 18 March Tony Blair said:
The oil revenues, which people falsely claim the US and UK
governments want, should be put in a trust fund for the Iraqi
people, administered through the UN. That sentiment must have
attracted approval across a wide spectrum of opinion at the time.
But six months later, direct UN administration of oil revenues
now appears to be off the agenda, at least in the short term,
while important questions surrounding the management and use of
Iraqi oil revenues have still to be resolved.
4.4 The Oil-for-Food programme managed by the UN since
1996-97 is scheduled to end in November. It is still funded from
oil revenues which had accrued before the war. Since the war,
oil revenues have accrued to the Development Fund, as set out
in Security Council Resolution 1483. However plans for the operation
of the Development Fund are unclear, and current indications are
discouraging.
4.5 The Development Fund is to be held under the control
of the Administrator of the CPA. An International Advisory and
Monitoring Board (IAMB) is responsible for auditing oil sales
and Development Fund expenditure. The IAMB has four voting representatives,
from the UN, IMF, World Bank and Arab fund for Social Development.
This quartet appoints 3-5 non-voting members, and the CPA appoints
a similar number. There is no stipulation that any members should
be Iraqis or represent Iraqi institutions.
4.6 Recommendations for disbursements from the fund are
made by a Programme Review Board PRB). Of its planned 21 representatives,
seven of whom are non-voting, a maximum of only six positions
appear to be open to Iraqis. Indeed it seems quite possible that
there could only be one or two Iraqi members (the Minister of
Finance and perhaps the Chairman). US dominance seems set to be
overwhelming, though there is provision for one British and one
Australian representative, and representatives of the World Bank,
IMF, the IAMB and the UN. All non-American members become non-voting
on matters relating to US Congressional funds. At an initial meeting
of the Board on 12 August it appears that no Iraqis were present,
though it is also clear that membership of the PRB has not yet
been finalised. There is also provision for the establishment
of a CPA International Coordination Council (ICC), which will
be made up of representatives of the Coalition and supporting
countries, with a representative of the UN observing.
4.7 It would appear essential, for both legitimacy and
effectiveness, that members of the Governing Council and of the
recently appointed Cabinet Ministers are properly represented
and involved in the management of the Development Fund.
4.8 It is also essential that the affairs of the Development
Fund are conducted in a transparent and accountable manner. This
is particularly important given widespread Iraqi suspicions of
Coalition intentions, especially as regards oil revenues. There
are indications that transparency is currently limitedfor
example no details of revenues already accrued to the fund are
available on its website, and there is no up-to-date information
on Development Fund expenditure (which has already begun). There
also needs to be credible and independent monitoring of the programmes
supported by the Development Fund.
4.9 The British Government has championed transparency
in relation to oil revenues under the Extractive Industries Trading
Initiative. It should be able to use its position within the CPA
to ensure maximum clarity and transparency over the use of Iraqi
oil revenues.
Recommendation: The British Government should use its
influence to ensure maximum transparency in the management of
Iraqi oil revenues accruing to the Development Fund established
under UN Security Council Resolution 1483, and in the monitoring
of disbursements by the Fund. In particular, the British government
should ensure greater Iraqi participation in decisions relating
to the use of oil revenues and in the management of the Fund.
Christian Aid, 11 September 2003
1
Financial Times, 9 September 2003. This figure includes both
military and reconstruction costs. On the same day the Guardian
quoted a figure of $150 million. Back
2
Financial Times, 9 September 2003. Back
3
Iraq Revenue Watch, http://www.iraqrevenuewatch.org/faq/ Back
4
CPA website and Financial Times 20 Augusst 2003. Back
5
Financial Times 20 August 2003. Back
6
Iraq Revenue Watch http://www.iraqrevenuewatch.org/faq/ Back
7
Financial Times, 2 September 2003. Back
8
Financial Times 6 August 2003. Back
9
Economist.com 27 August 2003. Back
10
Iraq Revenue Watch http://www.iraqrevenuewatch.org/faq/ Back
11
Financial Times, 9 September 2003. Back
12
Evening Standard, 13 July 2003. Commentators complain of the
difficulty of getting figures for UK costs. Back
13
Financial Times, 9 September 2003. This figure takes into account
recent and planned increases in troop numbers. Back
14
DFID website. Includes £60 million set aside by Treasury
which will not necessarily be spent by DFID. Budget figures. Back
15
Financial Times, 9 September 2003. Back
16
UN press release, 23 June 2003. $1.1 billion of this has been
met from pre-war oil revenues under the `Oil-for-Food' programme. Back
17
UN press release, 23 June 2003. This effectively represents the
unmet balance from the March appeal. Back
18
UN website. Back
19
CPA website. Back
20
CPA website. Back
21
Financial Times 20 August 2003. Back
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