House of Commons - International Development

Select Committee on International Development Memoranda

Memorandum submitted by Christian Aid

INTRODUCTION

Christian Aid is the official relief and development agency of 40 British and Irish churches, working where we believe the need is greatest—in 60 countries worldwide—and helping communities of all religions (or none). Christian Aid is also a key member of Action by Churches Together (ACT), a world alliance of church-based humanitarian agencies.

Before the war this year Christian Aid's programme in Iraq was confined to the autonomous Kurdish region of northern Iraq. Since 1992, Christian Aid has supported local NGOs here in a range of rehabilitation and development activities, and continues to do so. The substantial REACH (Rehabilitation, Education and Community Health) programme is co-funded by DFID, which has contributed £1.2 million to date. Since the war Christian Aid has extended its operations to provide humanitarian support in the central and southern parts of the country, in fields including emergency relief, water and sanitation supply, seed banks and nurseries, landmine clearance, and community needs assessment. As well as keeping in close touch with our Iraqi partners, several Christian Aid staff have visited Iraq since the war, spending time principally in Baghdad, Karbala, Basra, Kirkuk and the autonomous Kurdish governorates.

Christian Aid has submitted written evidence to the International Development Committee in May and June. This submission updates and reemphasises Christian Aid's principal concerns.

PRINCIPAL RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT

(Paragraph 1.4)

(Paragraph 1.7)

(Paragraph 2.9)

(Paragraph 2.10)

(Paragraphs 3.8/3.9)

(Paragraphs 3.11/3.12)

(Paragraphs 3.13/3.14)

(Paragraphs 4.3-4.9)

Acronyms used in this submission

ACT	Action By Churches Together
CPA	Coalition Provisional Authority
DFID	Department for International Development
IAMB	International Advisory and Monitoring Board
ICC	International Coordination Council
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IKNN	Iraqi Kurdish NGO Network
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INC	Iraqi National Congress
KDP	Kurdish Democratic Party
PRB	Programme Review Board
PUK	Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
REACH	Rehabilitation, Education and Community Health
SCIRIUN	Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNSECOORD	United Nations Security Co-ordinator

1. Security aspects

1.1 The Committee will be well aware of the deterioration in the security situation in Iraq. American and British soldiers continue to be killed and injured. The attack on the United Nations was not only an appalling tragedy but has serious implications for the future of neutral humanitarian intervention. Yet it is Iraqis who suffer most of all from the escalating insecurity. The carnage in Najaf on 29 August has undoubtedly contributed to the destabilisation of Iraq. By the time the Committee meets, more outrages are all too likely to have been perpetrated.

1.2 Lack of security is affecting the daily lives of Iraqis in many parts of the country, notably in Baghdad. Shootings, looting, rape, kidnapping, vehicle hijacks, and an upsurge in common criminality have increased alarmingly. The improvements we were able to report in June have gone into reverse. Widespread looting, including of strategic items essential for provision of water and electricity, continues apace. The wholesale pre-war release of criminal prisoners by Saddam Hussein added to the problems as has the near-universal availability of weapons. Additionally, half a million Iraqi soldiers were demobilised without attempting to find the majority alternative employment and they were allowed to keep their small arms (see Christian Aid submission in June).

1.3 IKNN is an umbrella agency for Iraqi (mostly Kurdish) NGOs which is supported by Christian Aid. Since the war, IKNN has begun to work in Baghdad. IKNN staff have reported a palpable increase in violence in poor areas of the city where they are conducting needs assessments. On one occasion, staff were unable to leave a house where they were conducting their survey because shooting had started outside. Communities visited by IKNN in July and August report an increase in the activities of criminal gangs, some linked to political groups or factions.

1.4 Under the Geneva Conventions, the occupying powers are responsible for providing security in Iraq. Recent UNSECOORD security bulletins show that the rate of lethal or potentially lethal attacks on Coalition troops is at least five times greater than two months ago. The more Coalition troops are themselves under threat, and the more they have to engage in counter-insurgency operations, the more difficult it is for them to meet their responsibilities of providing security for Iraqi civilians. British forces are to be commended for maintaining, where possible, foot patrols and face-to-face interaction with Iraqi civilians rather than retreating behind their armour. Yet Coalition soldiers face an increasingly difficult task for which they are inadequately equipped and prepared. The training of Iraqi security forces, though delayed by poor planning, is now recognised as being of the highest priority.

Recommendation: In order to provide a secure environment for the civilian population and meet its obligations under the Geneva Conventions, the Coalition should prioritise the training of Iraqi security personnel and if necessary provide additional external troops.

1.5 To the extent that Coalition forces lose the confidence of Iraqi people, their ability to establish security will be eroded. Broadening the base of the international forces in Iraq, and establishing a much stronger and more visible UN presence, would be likely at least to enhance the long-term prospects for retaining such confidence. The highest priority should be given to the development of Iraqi security forces, especially police forces—as the Coalition itself now increasingly realises.

1.6 The growing climate of insecurity does not provide the context for developing democratic processes and institutions in Iraq; indeed, it provides the best breeding-ground for the nurturing and expansion of political and/or religious extremism. Many Iraqis—fairly or otherwise—blame Coalition forces for failing to provide them with security, reducing the likelihood of cooperation. We know that the British Government is desperately concerned to promote security in Iraq. Doing so will not be easy, and may not even prove possible. The threats of increasing anarchy, a descent to prolonged conflict and civil war remain very real.

1.7 Reversing growing insecurity needs to be accompanied by a fundamental change to the prevailing political authority. Christian Aid believes that in the short term authority should be transferred to the United Nations and its agencies, even if popular perceptions of the UN amongst ordinary Iraqis are not always positive. We believe that the international legitimacy which the UN would bring to Iraq, the breadth of experience and expertise the UN can offer with regard to managing political transitions, combined with the possibilities greater UN involvement provide for broadening international engagement in Iraq, outweigh other options and would provide the best chance to improve the long-term chances of resolving the crisis. Our calls for a greater political role for the UN should be seen as complementary to the efforts currently underway to broaden international military involvement in the country.

Recommendation: Christian Aid supports moves to broaden the basis of the Coalition and upgrade the political responsibilities of the United Nations in Iraq.

2. Political dimensions

2.1 Christian Aid believes that an appreciation of the political issues in contemporary Iraq are pivotal to understanding the growing crisis there, and to its resolution.

2.2 Disparate parties and groupings are competing for power in post-war Iraq. Significant political forces include the following:

— Coalition military forces

— The Coalition Provisional Authority (established by the US and British)

— The Iraqi Governing Council (appointed by the Coalition)

— The Iraqi cabinet (also appointed by the Coalition, on 2 September)

— Militias (KDP, PUK, al-Badr Corps, Jaysh al-Mehdi, tribal militias and more)

— Political parties and groupings (KDP, PUK, SCIRI, Da'wa Party, Sadr II Movement, al-Khoei Foundation, Iraqi Communist Party, and many more). Almost all the main parties are associated with one or other ethnic/confessional group.

— Opposition politicians returning from exile (many loosely grouped in the Iraqi National Congress)

— Traditional tribal/clan leaders (extremely significant in the Iraqi context; many, from all ethnic groups, profited under Saddam, but survive as the extant local authority)

— Shia clergy (also very significant; usually associated with particular parties and/or clans)

— Saddam/Baath Party loyalists

— Extremist Islamist groups or cells broadly following an Al Qaeda ideology and including many who have entered Iraq since the war from neighbouring countries, especially Saudi Arabia. These include some sizeable groupings such as Jund al-Islam/Ansar al-Islam who have been active in the north of the country since before the war.

— Technocrats returning from abroad, sometimes closely associated with the Coalition.

— Technocrats and professionals who have survived the de-Baathication purges.

2.3 Despite the widespread detestation of the Saddam regime, which is shared by almost all these groups and indeed the great majority of Iraqis, it has proved difficult to establish a credible political authority. Although there is a good deal of rhetorical commitment to unity and tolerance, differences in relation to issues such as the nature of self-determination and decentralisation, the role of Sharia law, and the form of a future constitution make it difficult to achieve a consensus. Coalition fears of Islamic forms of government and of alliances with Iran are also putting a brake on the transfer of political power to Iraqis.

2.4 Christian Aid's partners invariably comment on the perceived isolation and detachment of the CPA and of some of the Iraqis appointed by it. As one put it rather pointedly: `We need security in the street, not behind a wall.' There has been very limited CPA engagement with the structures that have emerged at a local level, notably city councils. These are often credible and effective (though only some have been elected). The `top-down only' approach to establishing a new polity in Iraq appears inadequate and has undoubtedly left many people feeling ignored or marginalised.

2.5 The same is true for the Governing Council, which is perceived by many Iraqis as being equally out of touch. Liaison between Baghdad and the regions appears weak. In many cases liaison between Coalition forces and local institutions is good, but it is still difficult, on occasions impossible, to obtain approval to implement humanitarian programmes because of bottlenecks in the CPA in Baghdad. Iraqi NGOs, in particular, often cannot locate the authorities responsible for approving humanitarian and reconstruction work. The United Nations has also failed sufficiently to use and assert its authority in this area, and especially of failing to engage with the full spectrum of agencies in Iraq (including women's groups). However it should be noted that the current reputation of the UN in Iraq is influenced by its association with the sanctions regime, as well as a reputation for inefficiency; and this also influences the perceptions many Iraqis have concerning its role in the political realm.

2.6 In what is effectively a political vacuum, Iraqis have increasingly looked to traditional tribal/clan leaders—not necessarily out of great affection, but because they offer a degree of protection, and because they see no realistic alternatives. Shia Iraqis have also turned increasingly to their clergy, especially in parts of Baghdad and in the areas around Najaf and Karbala. Often an alliance between tribal and mosque leaders comprise the de facto local authorities. Disenchantment with the exiled opposition leaders is widespread, though the Coalition often puts them in the centre of the frame.

2.7 In many parts of the country, notably in the north but also in some parts of the south, relations between civil authorities and Coalition forces remain quite good. However they are increasingly coming under strain, sometimes very severe strain. Although current views and attitudes towards the Coalition forces differ, even amongst Christian Aid partners, the following quote from one of them, the Iraqi Refugee Aid Council is we believe representative of some widely held perspectives:

2.8 "Failure of the Coalition forces to provide basic services (electricity, water, petrol, kerosene etc), and more importantly, the absence of clear commitment to involve the Iraqi people in a political process that will allow them to decide their future and choose their government, has made the population suspicious of the agenda of the Coalition. More and more Iraqis are starting to look at the Coalition forces as an occupying force rather than helpers to free them from the tyrannies of the previous regime and rebuilding the country. This is making the population unsympathetic towards the Coalition forces when they are attacked and limited or no action is taken by the general public or community leaders to stop or deter attacks on the Coalition forces . . . There is an urgent need for a clear commitment and a "road map" that will allow the Iraqi people to take part in the political process . . . Without such a road map the Iraqis would not be assured that they will end up with a democratic system and lack of progress on this front is creating fertile grounds for those who want to destabilise the country (Saddam loyalists and others) to recruit zealot youth to carry out terrorist acts."

2.9 Against the backdrop of growing disaffection from or sometimes resentment towards Coalition forces, some political progress can be made by focusing on accelerating the devolution of real authority to the Governing Council and the newly appointed ministers. A substantial shift in the pace of transferring authority to Iraqi individuals and institutions also represents a key building-block in improving security.

Recommendation: The transfer of political authority to Iraqi institutions should be accelerated wherever possible.

2.10 The dangers of disintegration of the Iraqi nation are very real. This is not because of sectarian attitudes on the part of Iraqis, but because in the political vacuum caused by the absence of a functioning state it is all too easy for people to be mobilised on sectarian lines. (Lebanese history provides a striking and relevant example.) Kirkuk has already witnessed inter-ethnic violence, and the situation there remains very tense. Christian Aid partners have reported cases of ethnic discrimination less likely to hit the headlines, e.g. of the Kurdish village of Khanaqin being denied water supplies by Arab authorities in Baquba, and of Arabs in Hawija failing to obtain water from the Kurdish authorities in Kirkuk. Such developments may be unsurprising, and will doubtless take years to resolve, but higher authorities must do what they can to prevent their occurrence.

Recommendation: The Coalition needs to be exceptionally alert to the need to contain conflicts which develop in Iraq on ethnic and/or confessional lines.

2.11 Different communities in Iraq have very different aspirations which will not be easy to reconcile. Yet unless these diverse aspirations are acknowledged and somehow accommodated, the consequences will be tragic. Christian Aid believes that the best chance for these aspirations to be reconciled lies within the ambit of a strongly decentralised political dispensation, with clear accountability to the local community for political leaders. Unless this happens, Iraq is unlikely to escape the heritage of political violence to which its people have been subjected for the best part of a century.

3. Humanitarian dimensions and the future of the Oil-for-Food programme

3.1 The humanitarian situation in Iraq is not so much acute as precarious. It is closely linked to the security situation. Deteriorating security provides the greatest threat to progress in meeting humanitarian needs. Moreover, lack of progress in meeting humanitarian needs contributes to disillusion and dissatisfaction, which in turn hinders progress towards greater security. Meeting humanitarian needs remains a high priority.

3.2 Since the attack on the United Nations, humanitarian agencies have faced severe constraints. Many international staff working for humanitarian agencies have left the country, and those remaining face restrictions on their movements and on their ability to operate. This is significant in a country whose government has been overthrown and where civil society (outside the former Kurdish enclave) is almost non-existent. Because of security concerns, in recent days, Christian Aid has introduced a temporary travel ban to Iraq which is regularly reviewed and which we hope will soon be lifted.

3.3 Improvements in water supply have been offset by disruption caused by sabotage—for example in August when 300,000 people in Baghdad had their supplies cut off for several days.

3.4 Electricity supplies are currently estimated to be meeting just over half of current demand—compared with two thirds immediately before the war. Water supply and sanitation in urban areas depend on electricity; when the pumps stop, supplies can be contaminated. Although there has recently been some progress, the permanent restoration of electricity supply has proceeded far more slowly than had been hoped and expected by both Iraqis and the Coalition. The south of the country is worst affected, the northern areas least; Baghdad is said to be operating at 50% capacity. Sabotage and looting have been frequent. The US chief administrator, Paul Bremer, has revised the estimated cost of restoring Iraq's antiquated electricity grid from $1 billion to be spent in a year to $13 billion to be spent over five years.

3.5 Domestic availability of fuel has improved somewhat since mid-August, though exports have been badly hit by sabotage of the pipeline through Turkey. However shortages of petrol and diesel remain chronic, with reports of people typically queuing for up to 5 hours for 20 litres of petrol. The problem appears to be that fuel intended for local consumption is often sold outside the country. Current shortages are likely to worsen in November when the Baiji refinery, the largest in the country, closes for essential maintenance..

3.6 Although production of kerosene has improved recently, much of this is being hoarded against the increased needs of winter, leading to price increases of up to 2,000%. Yet it seems that in spite of this it is unlikely that winter demand will be adequately met. Shortages of bottled liquid gas, widely used for cooking, are set to continue, with the country's main production facility (the Southern Gas Plant) now unlikely to come into production before October.

3.7 Iraqis often cite unemployment as the biggest socio-economic problem facing the country. Even before the war, unemployment rates were estimated at more than 50%. In spite of informal support networks, generally based on family ties, in the short to medium term, millions of Iraqis will remain economically vulnerable.

3.8 Christian Aid raised concerns about internally displaced people (IDPs) in earlier submissions to the Select Committee. These concerns remain the return of mainly Kurdish refugees to their former homes in areas, which used to be controlled by the Iraqi government, many of which are now occupied by Arabs. This continues to be a potential flashpoint. REACH, a partner of Christian Aid, has been actively involved in trying to ensure just solutions to this problem. Greater clarity about the role of UNHCR has been welcome, as well as efforts to postpone the return of IDPs pending the development of acceptable mechanisms for adjudicating disputes. However the lack of planning and priority given to this issue mean that many IDPs are likely to remain displaced this winter, including those in camps or collective centres. It is important that the CPA makes every effort to ensure that their needs are met, and that disputes are equitably resolved.

3.9 Over half a million people were displaced from the Iraqi marshes following the 1991 insurrection and the ongoing draining of the marshes. Some fled to Iran; many others live in shanty towns in south and central Iraq. Christian Aid staff visited extremely poor communities on the outskirts of Karbala, who fled their homes in the southern Marshes following the uprising and repression of 1991. They have no fresh water supply, no electricity, and are 20 km from the nearest hospital. The local water supply comprises a stagnant swamp. The needs of people displaced in southern Iraq have a lower profile than those of the Kurdish IDPs in the north, but must not be neglected. A smaller group, about 300 displaced families, unlikely to receive much attention or sympathy, comprise Palestinian refugees in Baghdad, who were granted favoured status by the Baathist regime, which was often resented. Many are reported to be facing hardship, often following eviction by their landlords.

Recommendation: The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) should prioritise planning for the needs of internally displaced Iraqis, particularly in the coming winter.

3.10 Coordination of humanitarian aid remains poor. Christian Aid's partners report minimal engagement between the Coalition Provisional Authority and Iraqi institutions, especially at local levels.

3.11 Food remains a major concern for Christian Aid's concern. Although food supplies for most Iraqis currently appear to be meeting immediate needs (mainly because of the Oil-for-Food programme), the situation remains precarious. The legacy of sanctions means that maintenance of adequate food supplies can be seen as a particularly pressing responsibility for the international community, and in particular for the occupying authorities. In the near to medium-term future, it is not possible for the market to replace the current food distribution system. This is a major concern for Christian Aid, and is covered in the final section of this report.

3.12 As we highlighted in June, Christian Aid is particularly concerned about the future of the Oil-for-Food programme on which millions of Iraqis are heavily dependent. Iraq has long been a net importer of food, and food subsidies predated the first Gulf War and the imposition of sanctions. The Oil-for-Food programme (dating from 1996) helped further to institutionalise subsidized food distribution on which people have become extremely dependent, particularly since this period also witnessed declining agricultural production and growing impoverishment. The costs of the programme since it was set up in 1996 have amounted to more than $13 billion.

3.13 In the long term, of course, such a system should be phased out, so that Iraqis end their dependence on food aid. Ultimately adequate food supplies should be accessible through normal market mechanisms, underpinned by the rehabilitation and expansion of Iraqi agriculture. However this remains a long way off. It is very important that subsidized food distribution is not phased out or radically reduced before people have the capacity to support themselves. Any phase down needs to be properly monitored if serious hardship—not to mention further disillusion—is to be avoided.

3.14 It is unclear whether the CPA plans to continue the subsidized food rations through the Development Fund, and if so how this will be managed. Despite their new constraints, only the UN agencies currently have the capacity and experience to oversee and manage the continuation of this programme, and should do so even if it were to be financed via a new Development Fund route. (Please see below for a description of the Development Fund.) This issue needs to be addressed as a matter of urgency.

Recommendation: Distribution of food rations, currently undertaken under the Oil-for-Food programme, must continue after the end of the Oil-for-Food programme in November.

Recommendation: Plans for the management of a successor programme to Oil-for-Food must be developed as a matter of urgency. Eventual phase down must be carefully planned and monitored if widespread hardship and resentment are to be avoided.

4. Reconstruction, oil revenues and the Iraqi Development Fund

4.1 The costs of reconstruction and rehabilitation in Iraq, even if not seriously undermined by sabotage, are going to be very much greater than anticipated, and cannot (and should not) be funded from oil revenues alone. Moreover direct investment in the country, notably by oil companies, is dependent not only on the implementation of a new constitution and a legal framework for investment, but on the establishment of security.

4.2 Christian Aid is currently undertaking further research into reconstruction and development needs and use of oil revenues in Iraq. As is shown below, our more immediate concerns relate to the management of the Iraqi Development Fund. However it is worth quoting some figures which graphically illustrate at least the scale of the responsibilities faced by the Coalition and the international community:

NB estimates re oil revenues assume that sabotage declines, and that oil prices are stable.

4.3 In the Commons debate of 18 March Tony Blair said: The oil revenues, which people falsely claim the US and UK governments want, should be put in a trust fund for the Iraqi people, administered through the UN. That sentiment must have attracted approval across a wide spectrum of opinion at the time. But six months later, direct UN administration of oil revenues now appears to be off the agenda, at least in the short term, while important questions surrounding the management and use of Iraqi oil revenues have still to be resolved.

4.4 The Oil-for-Food programme managed by the UN since 1996-97 is scheduled to end in November. It is still funded from oil revenues which had accrued before the war. Since the war, oil revenues have accrued to the Development Fund, as set out in Security Council Resolution 1483. However plans for the operation of the Development Fund are unclear, and current indications are discouraging.

4.5 The Development Fund is to be held under the control of the Administrator of the CPA. An International Advisory and Monitoring Board (IAMB) is responsible for auditing oil sales and Development Fund expenditure. The IAMB has four voting representatives, from the UN, IMF, World Bank and Arab fund for Social Development. This quartet appoints 3-5 non-voting members, and the CPA appoints a similar number. There is no stipulation that any members should be Iraqis or represent Iraqi institutions.

4.6 Recommendations for disbursements from the fund are made by a Programme Review Board PRB). Of its planned 21 representatives, seven of whom are non-voting, a maximum of only six positions appear to be open to Iraqis. Indeed it seems quite possible that there could only be one or two Iraqi members (the Minister of Finance and perhaps the Chairman). US dominance seems set to be overwhelming, though there is provision for one British and one Australian representative, and representatives of the World Bank, IMF, the IAMB and the UN. All non-American members become non-voting on matters relating to US Congressional funds. At an initial meeting of the Board on 12 August it appears that no Iraqis were present, though it is also clear that membership of the PRB has not yet been finalised. There is also provision for the establishment of a CPA International Coordination Council (ICC), which will be made up of representatives of the Coalition and supporting countries, with a representative of the UN observing.

4.7 It would appear essential, for both legitimacy and effectiveness, that members of the Governing Council and of the recently appointed Cabinet Ministers are properly represented and involved in the management of the Development Fund.

4.8 It is also essential that the affairs of the Development Fund are conducted in a transparent and accountable manner. This is particularly important given widespread Iraqi suspicions of Coalition intentions, especially as regards oil revenues. There are indications that transparency is currently limited—for example no details of revenues already accrued to the fund are available on its website, and there is no up-to-date information on Development Fund expenditure (which has already begun). There also needs to be credible and independent monitoring of the programmes supported by the Development Fund.

4.9 The British Government has championed transparency in relation to oil revenues under the Extractive Industries Trading Initiative. It should be able to use its position within the CPA to ensure maximum clarity and transparency over the use of Iraqi oil revenues.

Recommendation: The British Government should use its influence to ensure maximum transparency in the management of Iraqi oil revenues accruing to the Development Fund established under UN Security Council Resolution 1483, and in the monitoring of disbursements by the Fund. In particular, the British government should ensure greater Iraqi participation in decisions relating to the use of oil revenues and in the management of the Fund.

Christian Aid, 11 September 2003

1 Financial Times, 9 September 2003. This figure includes both military and reconstruction costs. On the same day the Guardian quoted a figure of $150 million. Back

2 Financial Times, 9 September 2003. Back

3 Iraq Revenue Watch, http://www.iraqrevenuewatch.org/faq/ Back

4 CPA website and Financial Times 20 Augusst 2003. Back

5 Financial Times 20 August 2003. Back

6 Iraq Revenue Watch http://www.iraqrevenuewatch.org/faq/ Back

7 Financial Times, 2 September 2003. Back

8 Financial Times 6 August 2003. Back

9 Economist.com 27 August 2003. Back

10 Iraq Revenue Watch http://www.iraqrevenuewatch.org/faq/ Back

11 Financial Times, 9 September 2003. Back