WEDNESDAY 12 FEBRUARY 2003

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Members present:

Tony Baldry, in the Chair
John Battle
Hugh Bayley
Alistair Burt
Ann Clwyd
Mr Tony Colman
Chris McCafferty
Tony Worthington

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Memorandum submitted by Department for International Development

Examination of Witnesses

RT HON CLARE SHORT, a Member of the House, Secretary of State for International Development, MR ALISTAIR FERNIE, Head of Middle East and North Africa Department, and MR PETER TROY, Head of Humanitarian Programmes Team, Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department, Department for International Development, examined.

Chairman

Secretary of State, thank you very much for at really very short notice coming and giving evidence to the Committee and thank you very much also for the memorandum which members of the Committee received this morning which obviously will be published with the minutes of today's hearing and circulated. The Prime Minister said last week that there needed to be a humanitarian campaign as viable and as worked up in detail as the military campaign, and I think we are interested to try and understand what is happening on the humanitarian front. There are no value judgments inherent in us doing that, we collectively just want to try and have a better understanding of what is happening, although I think it is common ground, and I notice that the economists last week said that many aspects of the war hanging over Iraq are unpredictable but one is not; the unusual vulnerability of the civilian population. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, about 60 per cent of the population, or 16 million people, are 100 per cent dependent on central government for basic needs. They survive only because the government provides them with a food ration each month. Secondly, after two wars and decades of mis-government and 12 years of exacting sanctions there is no fat to rely on. I think we are all conscious that the background is pretty grim. What assessment has DFID made of the likely humanitarian consequences of an attack on Iraq? Of what has that assessment been made and are there lessons that can still be learned from what happened during the Gulf War?

(Clare Short) The most important point that we have been working to get all the potential actors to face is that there is not one scenario. The knee-jerk, the first approach of all was to talk about aftermath and day after, but if there is to be military action, how it comes about and is organised will affect massively the humanitarian considerations and anything that happens thereafter. It is not military over here in one box and humanitarian comes along afterwards, but that is the mind-set of commentators - we saw it in the debate in the Commons last week - and indeed of international systems. This is a new kind of conflict, it was true in Kosovo, it was true in Afghanistan, it is massively true here, and I think the British military are getting better at thinking in that way, but systems are bad at it, and it has taken us a lot of effort to get some of those engaged in contingency planning for military action to think about the humanitarian consequences of how they undertake the military action. So there are a lot of people predicting a short campaign where the people of Iraq welcome liberation from Saddam Hussain - that is the most optimistic scenario - they will fall away from his authority and things go quickly and then there will be a big effort to keep things moving, because of course 60 per cent of the population are dependent on Oil-for-Food, so there are big humanitarian consequences on that optimistic scenario. But clearly you cannot plan only on optimistic scenarios, and there are very considerable risks, as we indicate in the memorandum. The NGOs have highlighted that initial bombing to take out electronic capacity and so on could lead to destruction of a lot of basic infrastructure which is in bad shape anyway, and that will affect the population which is in very bad shape, and disruption of Oil-for-Food could leave a lot of people without the very basic necessities of life. There is a risk of the use of chemical and biological weapons, which is the most dreadfully serious scenario in which humanitarian organisations would not be present and the military would have to deal with it - what would it be and how many people and how do you do it. It is one of the worst scenarios. So this is a very complex emergency to try to plan for. We need to be as clear as we can, and get all actors, including the military, to think through the consequences for people and have a lot of flexibility in the preparations, and that is what we are trying do.

I will ask a very short machinery of government question following that. Clearly there is lots of military planning going on because the Secretary of State for Defence keeps coming to the House and telling us about more and more troop deployments and so on and so forth. How are DFID officials linked into the military planning? Who is talking to people in the MoD? How at the machinery of government level is that working?

(Clare Short) We are linked in but we had a bit of a struggle to get fully linked in, and we are linked in with other UK departments in discussions with the US but getting the US military to take on humanitarian considerations was very difficult in Afghanistan, where it was very apparent because we had 9 million people having to be fed by the World Food Programme before the crisis and throughout. So progress is being made but it is difficult and it is not just in this crisis that it has been difficult, it was difficult in Afghanistan we are making progress now and there is more and more facing up to some of the humanitarian risks. I would not say it is complete and it is fully in place but we have made some progress in recent weeks.

Hugh Bayley

Can I move on to the UN agencies. In the eventuality that a veto is used in the UN Security Council against a further resolution on Iraq, what would the legal position be in relation to UN agencies such as UNHCR, the World Food Programme, UNICEF and the WHO? Would they be able legally to provide humanitarian relief? More generally, how well prepared do you think UN agencies are, how well resourced are they, how well funded are they, and how willing are Iraq's neighbours to allow the humanitarian agencies to prepare for providing humanitarian assistance on their soil, in other words, to stockpile food and vehicles and so on in neighbouring countries?

(Clare Short) I am not aware of the legal position but I cannot believe for a second that any difference of view in the Security Council or anywhere else about UN authorisation for potential military action would affect the humanitarian duties and the humanitarian system because that duty lies there at all times for all people, whatever side of any conflict people are on. I think that is overwhelming and would be clear. The big question is how much authority would the UN system have in leading any recovery, and we all know the position in Afghanistan and the legitimacy of the new government flowing from the UN's legitimacy, and those issues have not been settled and they are very big, very important issues. If the UN is not the leading authority it would make the situation complex for UN agencies, but I think they would still take it as their duty to engage if they could reasonably engage. How well prepared? The contingency planning is very complicated because the different scenarios are very different and no-one can be certain. We have to prepare for the high risk although obviously the low risk is the easiest to be organised for. I think the UN system also had a lot of difficulty early on in starting preparations because it did not want to appear to be preparing for a war that it did not want, so there was a bit of slowness at the beginning but I think for some months now the UN system has said, "No, of course we have got to think of all eventualities and prepare for them and that does not pre-suppose military action", but of course their projections of need vary enormously. The possible numbers of refugees could be very high or much lower, that is one obvious example. They have put out some financial appeals and they are pre-positioning stocks. The financial appeals are fairly recent and have not been fulfilled. They put out a $37 million one and then a bigger one of $93 million. They are drawing down on some of their own resources to pre-position materials.

(Mr Troy) There has been some degree of confusion about the UN funding figures in terms of their appeal. Their original appeal was for about $37 million, which was based on one of their lower case scenarios. Subsequently, UNHCR increased their planning assumptions in terms of numbers of case load it would be called for them to deal with, so their figure went up from $11 million to $60 million in terms of requirements - this is adding in all of the UN agencies - and the current total requirement is about $93 million. There are figures used of $154 million which I have seen but that is based on calculations over a six month period. We are working on the basis of $93 million.

(Clare Short) The other thing to say is that some UN agencies are more accurate in their appeals than others. Some are well-known for (in any emergency) maximising their demand, so you have to take some sort of account of that. We fund all these agencies and have made a contribution recently to the preparations, but there is a real problem here of the enormous strains on the international humanitarian system, which are very considerable, we have got so many crises around the world, both in funding and in the capacity of people and institutions to provide food and reach people who are in need. I think there is also a problem of willingness to provide funding when the political situation is divisive. That is a further problem for the UN. As yet they are preparing and pre-positioning and not being prevented from taking preparatory action. The final question that Hugh asked was regarding neighbours allowing preparations. All the neighbouring countries have got great difficulties with their public opinion, which are very great indeed for them, and they do not want to be seen to be preparing for a conflict to which their public are overwhelmingly opposed. There is no problem with pre-positioning stocks. I have not heard of any problem and you would not expect that problem. In terms of preparations for potential refugee movements, there are problems. There are problems of experience from last time. I think the only country that has openly said it would open its borders is Syria, so contingency planning is complicated and some of the borders are desert areas. This is very difficult.

We will come to refugees later, but in relation to the role of the UN agencies, should there be a veto from some UN Member States, in other words should military action be taking place without an explicit UN Security Council mandate, there are of course circumstances when a conflict is going on when humanitarian agencies have to work with the military, for instance if there is believed to be a chemical attack you would want information from the military about what chemicals, over what area, and what the consequences are and what the casualties are in order to consider what the humanitarian response would be. In circumstances where the military campaign is not a UN-sanctioned military campaign, could that kind of co-operation nevertheless go on between UN agencies and any military leadership?

(Clare Short) As I have said, I think the UN's humanitarian mandates are an obligation whatever, but the complications of the actual situation might be very great. For example, the possible use of chemical and biological weapons is enormously complicated. Most agencies would remove their staff. They have no way of protecting them so there would not be humanitarian operators there. I think it is highly likely, if that were to happen and civilians were to be hurt that the military would have to provide help and support for people who had been hurt. It is very likely that many humanitarian agencies in the practicalities of these agencies would not be able to protect their own staff, and of course in certain scenarios in military conflict one of the risks is a lot of disorder and then, being such a tyrannised country, you could get a lot of fighting and disorder and then it would be very difficult for humanitarians to operate. So you could get order breaking down, which is very difficult for humanitarian systems to operate in. Those are some of the very difficult scenarios where again you would expect military personnel, whatever military personnel they were, to be the first providers of basic food and order and care for people. You will remember that in Afghanistan humanitarian practice and the law wants very clear rules about the role of the military and the separate role of the humanitarians. I think if there were military rule without UN authority, in good humanitarian practice - and I will ask Peter to come in on this - that will create a lot of strains and trouble for humanitarians who want to do their proper job but not be agents of the military. Of course if the military action is seen as less legitimate in terms of UN authorisation, I think that complication would be greater.

(Mr Troy) If I may just add to that. Clearly you will be talking to the NGOs later and they will have their view to represent, which they have a right to give. As far as UN agencies are concerned, the humanitarian principle that they would tend to apply is that they would not want to use the assets of what you might call belligerence in any event, so they would be looking to utilise assets from non-combatant nations. That pre-supposes, of course, that those assets are available to use. That is the position that UN OCHA would state as its humanitarian principle.

Alistair Burt

I would like to stay in the same area briefly, if I may. You referred at the start of your answer just now to the fact that should there be action then the humanitarian issues and the military action will not be in separate departments but they will be rather messed about together. What is your understanding at the moment of the degree of co-ordination between international agencies and NGOs and the military in terms of their planning for this, and in particular the fears that NGOs and others raise about the blurring of the lines between humanitarian and military boundaries? How well prepared are you for that? As far as our own military is concerned, who is taking the lead in deciding what our own army will be involved in should it come to the bit in terms of their humanitarian work? Will this be left to the military side or is your Department closely involved in that? Lastly, what assessment have you made of the effectiveness of the UN Disaster Group and the disaster management teams?

(Clare Short) I think myself that the significant role for NGOs will not be in the first phases if there is military action. Because of the complications and because of the risks, it is unlikely that it will be so orderly that there will be a big NGO role during that very complex phase and, of course, in terms of preparations for all of that, there are great difficulties because the military are not willing - any military - to talk openly about their plans, so for NGOs to plan, which would need to be alongside what scenarios there might be, is very difficult indeed. I understand the US has been meeting with their NGOs but I do not know what their meetings have been like. With the struggle - although we had made progress - for my Department to get into detailed discussion with the military, it would not be possible to open that up to British NGOs. What we say in the submission is that we will be as open as we can be as things develop and on whatever scenario NGOs will be properly briefed when the time comes. The other thing to remember is that, unlike Afghanistan, there are very few NGOs operating in Baghdad-controlled Iraq so the number of people out there already is very limited in number. So there is some liaison with NGOs and we have liaison with the ones we already fund and we will have some more liaison, but what can be talked about in some of the detail about the risk of military action is really very limited currently. In terms of the military and the UN system, I do not know what the current arrangements are. In the case of Afghanistan, we had the whole international system, we had lots of humanitarians represented at CENTCOM, the co-ordinating headquarters for the US, but they were all on the fringes. There is not yet anything like that, is there?

(Mr Fernie) UN agencies are in contact with the UK government and the US government. They are very keen not to presume anything and to preserve their independence and neutrality but there are also discussions about learning lessons from Afghanistan and ensuring that humanitarian agencies, including UN agencies, can play their proper role, not necessarily co-operating with the military but working alongside doing distinct functions. Those discussions are taking place.

(Clare Short) They are a bit general in the nature of these things because of course the role of the UN post any potential conflict is not settled, and that is a further complication obviously, as to where the leadership lies and therefore what any co-ordination might be or might not be, given the humanitarian principle of not being dependent on military assets. In terms of my own Department and USAID and so on, within our governments we are talking and liaising and, as I said at the beginning, that talk is improving. In terms of the UK there has to be clear agreement on what the objectives of any military intervention might be, and we are talking very seriously with our own military about ensuring that humanitarian considerations are fully inserted into any proposals for the purposes of any action.

One of the agonies for you here must be that you make the point about no-one making any presumptions about what will happen, and that must surely be the case, but action could follow a UN resolution (or not) terribly quickly and what you are describing is so many things that are not being done now and cannot be done now because no-one wants to make a presumption but that is going to mean a very short period of time in which those key decisions and deployment have to take place. Will there be enough time?

(Clare Short) Indeed, but there has been a speeding up in the last weeks in terms of pre-positioning, thinking through scenarios, being ready to act, and there has been a speeding up in getting the military to think about humanitarian risks. It is not as full or as complete as I would like it to be but it is intensifying very deeply. The danger is that there is not full preparation for the risks. There is preparation for what is the hopeful scenario but that is not good enough - what happens if something goes wrong and we need more effort? You are holding this inquiry and I welcome it and that is why I welcomed the debate on the floor of the House. The mind of the world regarding when there is going to be a military action is still on very old-fashioned military action and the humanitarian angle is a totally separate thing that happens afterwards. With the complex emergencies we get now, that is not so, and we have trouble each time, but we have made progress and I think this inquiry will help again.

Tony Worthington

Could I follow on from that because I am finding this very useful. The Secretary General of Amnesty International held a press conference yesterday urging that the Security Council of the United Nations should be discussing the humanitarian consequences, and South Africa has said it is willing to put that forward. Personally I think it is utterly irresponsible to embark on action without thinking about the consequences on an international scale. What would the British response be to a request for discussion at the United Nations on the humanitarian consequences of this action?

(Clare Short) I cannot speak for the Foreign Office who lead on giving instructions to our mission in the Security Council, but there is a genuine commitment in our Government to think through and try to have the humanitarian considerations fully taken on board, and my own view is if there is to be a second resolution it is massively desirable for the world, and indeed for the people of Iraq, that there is united and considered UN-authorised action, if there is to be action, and that any such authorisation would have to take account of the needs of the people. 60 per cent of the population need Oil-for-Food for pure survival and the people are in very bad shape, children are very malnourished and any military action is likely to disrupt that. I do not see how the UN could think of authorising without considering things such as who is going to have the authority to keep things running, what is going is going to happen if there is no oil, and how is food going to be purchased. That has not been taken forward very much up to now but I think there is going to be serious consideration in the second resolution, and humanitarian considerations simply have to be taken into account.

You mention that 60 per cent are dependent for food already on outside resources. We have had discussions recently with James Morris of the World Food Programme and we know about the situation in Southern Africa and in Angola and in Ethiopia and Eritrea and so on. The issue is about, firstly, can sufficient food be delivered to meet the needs of any war in Iraq, and secondly, can it be delivered without damaging other needs, because what James Morris was saying to us was perhaps for the first time in food issues it was not about clearing the pipeline to get the food through, it was about whether the food was there.

(Clare Short) I saw James Morris recently in Addis Ababa and I really admire the World Food Programme's achievements in Kosovo and Afghanistan. I really thought the pipeline was going to break in Southern Africa. We worked very hard to help there and they have done extremely well in my view, but they are very constrained in money and pure resources because of the number of crises we have got in the world. There is that problem. There is a funding strain on the organisation. They are pre-positioning stocks, but there are all sorts of potential problems because if Oil-for-Food can keep working that is one scenario but if it were to completely break down then where is the food coming from? It would have to be procured and if there is a lot of military activity you get blockages of ports and so on. It will be a very complex problem with very great dangers and it will require enormous concentration and resources to make sure food gets through.

(Mr Troy) We do understand that there is quite a degree of stockpiling going on within Centre South Iraq. I have heard figures of three months' supplies being stockpiled by families. Whether that is verifiable and correct remains to be seen.

(Clare Short) Hang on, so many people are so poor, I think that would be wealthy people. Given the poverty and hunger of children, those families whose children are so chronically malnourished, what we read in the newspapers about stockpiling, it cannot be everyone, it is just impossible.

(Mr Troy) The Secretary of State is correct of course.

(Clare Short) Of course!

(Mr Troy) Just some figures of what the World Food Programme are planning on. They have an initial case load of something between 4.9 million to 9.6 million people but that includes Iran, Turkey, Syria and Jordan as well. For those figures we are talking about a six-month programme of food assistance over $300 million to $578 million, so there are pipeline and funding issues and potentially difficulties over delivery issues as well.

There are issues related to the temperature in the area. They say troops cannot function adequately when it is over 40 degrees centigrade. Are there any aid issues and food supply issues or non-food supply issues that are affected by the terrain and the temperature?

(Clare Short) There is a very serious issue of potential refugee movements in desert type areas with not enough water that have been thought about, and I am not sure anyone has got solutions in place. That could be very serious.

(Mr Troy) The delivery mechanisms and systems that exist are primarily run by national staff who are obviously more familiar and able to cope with the extremes of temperatures. On the assumption that those national staff remain and are able to continue in their work, there is at least a resource base to continue food deliveries.

(Clare Short) You remember in Afghanistan there were Afghans doing the delivery at the end of the line, Afghan lorry drivers too. If you can possibly keep the local networks they are much the best because they know the people and know how to operate. The aim ought to be even if the top of whoever runs Oil-for-Food is not there any more, the networks stay in place so that the basic medical supplies and food can get through to families right across the country.

This is a lorry network?

(Mr Fernie) It is worth emphasising the immense scale and superb organisation of the Org food system. It is the biggest food distribution system in the world. It is bigger than the whole of WFP operations elsewhere in the world and it is largely run by Iraqis. There are 50,000 Iraqis who are running warehouses and running delivery systems with lorries. They have got an incredibly complicated and well functioning computerised database system to inventorise what they have got, where it is coming from the port, and how it is getting distributed. They have got rationing systems. They have eliminated a lot of the problems with food distribution systems elsewhere in the world. On top of that, you have got a relatively small number of people from the UN in the Centre South who are monitoring it. The key issue is to minimise and, if possible, avoid completely, and that might not be possible, the disruption period when that Iraqi system is not operating. There may be a need for WFP and other elements of the international community to fill in some gap. The key priority is to try and make sure the Oil-for-Food in the short and medium term continues to operate in some system and the Iraqi people know how to operate it and make sure there is a managing and financing system in place so they can continue to operate it until something else can be put in place.

(Clare Short) There are a lot of educated Iraqis, there is a lot of institutional competence in the country and it would be great to try and preserve that and use those Iraqi systems to make sure people are being cared for in the short-term, otherwise we could have terrible disruption and disaster.

Tony Worthington

Who commands the distribution system, Saddam Hussein?

(Clare Short) It is under the UN, it is under World for Food. There are rules about that, there might be relatively few in terms of who delivers but there are quite a lot of UN people round the system trying to keep it going. There has been some improvement in the sort of allegations there have been over the years.

It is difficult to believe in the middle of a war that Saddam Hussein is going to allow people to distribute food.

(Clare Short) Indeed. Of course if areas of the country were to fall away from his control and not welcome or be loyal to him you would not expect any central authority to wish to be helpful to them. You could imagine that all of the Iraqis working in the network would want the food and basic medicine to still get through to the people who lived in their part of the country and the job would be to try to keep the mechanisms working that deliver to people across the country working. It would be complex but that would be the thing to go for.

Mr Colman

Secretary of State, you spoke at the beginning about a scenario that the bombing would take out the infrastructure, are you confident that the hospitals, residential areas, vital energy sources will not be bombed even if the Iraqi troops are near by? Do you think there is a role for DFID in terms of the joint planning of potential targets? Is there a way that military options can be refined to minimise humanitarian consequences?

(Clare Short) As you know in the Gulf War that took place bombing destroyed masses of the infrastructure. We are discussing and trying to ensure that targeting takes account of the frailty of the infrastructure and the needs of the people of Iraq, the weakness of the sanitation and the water systems and the dangers. People are just about keeping going through what basic systems there are there, that they are not destroyed or if there is any destruction that there are pretty quick repairs is essential otherwise we could have sewage, a lack of clean water and then terrible illness, and those crises could develop rapidly. We are trying hard to get them to listen I cannot guarantee our success but we are engaging with those issues.

Are you involved in an assessment of the humanitarian consequences of targeting electricity supplies or taking out roads and bridges?

(Clare Short) We are making the humanitarian points and being listened to by our manager

Mr Battle

Could I ask questions about potential refugees, in the last Gulf conflict there was an estimated 1.8 million displaced people from a population in Iraq of 26.5 million, and unlike Afghanistan most are living in urban centres. The UNHCR estimates that there could be 900,000 refugees, 100,000 in need of immediate assistance, and they also go on to estimate there could be half a million in camps on the borders, that may be in those desert areas to which you referred. What is your Department's estimate of displacement refugees as a result of the crisis?

(Clare Short) You are right that UNHCR has scenarios, and it needs to. It seems to me there is no way anyone can predict how many refugees there could be because there are so many different scenarios. The most optimistic scenario is that the region would persuade Saddam Hussein to go into exile, that could be one scenario, and he would agree to have all of his chemical, biological and nuclear efforts dismantled by the inspectors then one would expect very few refugees. The worse kind of complicated military scenario, say with the use of chemical and biological weapons, is you might get very large numbers of displaced people - 8 million people live in Baghdad. UNHCR has to prepare for a range of possibilities and has some scenarios on numbers. My point is that it has to be flexible planning, you have to try and minimise the disruption that leads to vast movements of people, because that probably means they are moving away from pretty awful things, but you have to prepare for the danger.

I think you said that only Syria said it would open its borders. Turkey is taking completely the opposite view, that it will protect its borders and not let anybody move across. Is it likely that people will move to Iran? Have there been conversations with the authorities in Iran to plan for border camps or great transitions of movement across that border? Are there plans to have people in camps in Iraq?

(Clare Short) There are still refugees from the Gulf War in Iran and we are involved in supporting them. It is UNHCR that talks with the neighbouring countries about these plans. There is a sensitivity, which I referred to earlier, about making public statements about neighbouring countries' plans. Have neighbouring countries apart from Sierra made their position public?

(Mr Troy) The High Commissioner for refugees has written to all of the neighbouring countries to remind them of their responsibilities with regard to refugees and potential refugees. It is there responsibility.

(Clare Short) I think some of them are not planning to have open borders. You will remember we had that in Afghanistan too because Pakistan already had a lot of refugees and they said they did not want any and they did not want to open their borders. That was an issue in that crisis and it is likely to be similar here.

It just strikes me that we never manage refugee crises well, particularly when we mix it with a conflict. For example in Afghanistan there were camps in Pakistan, then post the conflict people were moving back and there were views that they were being moved back too quickly and it would have been better to hold camps in Afghanistan. The Islamic republic in Iran is saying they want to persuade refugees to remain within Iraqi territory in safe areas, are those part of the planning for safe areas in Iraq?

(Clare Short) It is UNHCR who are making the plans. I am in some difficulty here because I do not want to say things that governments in surrounding countries do not want said. There is some planning and contingencies of camps near borders, but not over borders, and countries are reminded of their international obligations. All of those things are being prepared for, and they need to be. I think the handling of the refugee crisis in Kosovo after the disaster at the border when the Macedonian Government would not let people through was pretty good. People came out, settled and have gone back home. It was a big effort but I think it was pretty good and the Kosovans were amazing and got home and rebuilt for themselves, so it is not always disastrous.

Mr Battle: Fair point.

Ann Clwyd

As one of the few people who saw what happened when the refugees fled over the borders of Iraq in 1991 in the direction of Iran I hope I never see what happened on that occasion again, when they were not ready to receive them, although Iran was better than most other countries because it did keep its borders open. The chaos that ensued on the mountain tops as the Kurds were fleeing in particular was a dreadful sight and many people died unnecessarily because the assistance was not there to receive them. I would hope that all the bordering countries can be persuaded to keep their borders open because Turkey, as you know, in 1991 brought its borders down very quickly and stopped refugees fleeing across there. I do not think Iran was ever properly appreciated for what it did for the Kurdish refugees in 1991. I saw the very well leaked UN Report and they estimate about 900,000 refugees. There is also some concern about the heavily mined border areas and the belief that people will be fleeing all over the place, or they could be, in one scenario, and there will be a lot of wounding because of unexploded ordinance. I wonder how much account had been taken of that and what preparation is being made to show where people can exit to without causing too much damage?

(Clare Short) I am going to comment generally and then bring Peter in particularly on the mines question. I think these considerations underline the overwhelming case for a Security Council resolution if there is to be action. The complexity of all of this if there is not a unity internationally will be dreadful and the possibility of things being well prepared will be much more difficult. Although these contingency plans are being made, and I have made the point about the best possible scenario having a very limited number of refugees, but military action got complicated and went wrong are, to a degree, likely to lead to high numbers of refugees and if there is not pretty strong united support for military action then dealing with some of the consequences in terms of who is willing to contribute to it will be even more complicated.

(Mr Troy) Perhaps I might initially comment that I concur that the Iranian Government has an excellent record in hosting refugees in enormous numbers. As far as mines are concerned there is a very serious potential difficulty with mines along the borders, whether Kuwait or else where. At the moment there is no United Nations mine entry service programme within Iraq. They are geared up and ready to respond as needed but the thing about mine clearance is it can be a rather slow process, so the threat to fleeing displaced refugees is something that we will have to confront and deal with. This is something that we have raised in our discussions with the Ministry of Defence as part of refining the military options, ensuring they do address the fact that there is a serious risk to civilian populations, and no doubt to themselves as well. We would expect the military to do initial mine clearance but their standards of military mine clearance are not the same as humanitarian mine clearance, so there will need to be some fuller programme on that.

Alistair Burt

We have spoken about refugees but in addition there are about 1 million odd internally displaced people in Iran and UNHCR does not have a remit for them. Who will have a remit for internally displaced persons in the event of conflict?

(Mr Troy) We would presume that UNHCR would be given that responsibility. I do not think that is determined at the moment. One thing I did not mention earlier is there is a conference to be held in Geneva this weekend hosted by the Swiss Government where all of the UN agencies, a good number of the donor countries as well, we will be represented, and some of the neighbouring countries of Iraq will also be there. This is a unique, very helpful and useful opportunity to raise a number of points that we have been discussing here today.

(Clare Short) Let me repeat, the question of if there is an action and afterwards and if the present regime falls or is removed in some way how will the country be managed and where will the leadership be if the UN is not settled. We have talked about the UN agencies engaging anyway but I think the complexity of them engaging if there is military leadership will be very difficult.

Chris McCafferty

Secretary of State, can I ask you to give the Committee your view on the longer term humanitarian implications of military action? I am thinking particularly of how do you see the danger of other states perhaps hoping for territorial gain in the land currently occupied by the state known as Iraq? Do you see internal conflict amongst the many ethnic groups, and the Kurds are an obvious, very large ethnic minority group that may have an interest in a separate state and the Turkmens, who really are very close to the Turkish in terms of culture and history? Which areas do you see as being at risk and what things can the international community do to try and alleviate those potential problems?

(Clare Short) It is absolutely essential, and I think this is agreed across the international system, that Iraq remains united as a country on its existing borders. It would be a nightmare if different groups started breaking it up and the national borders in the surrounding area might be changed, that would lead to chaos and very, very great dangers of terrible humanitarian suffering. Everyone is clear that Iraq must remain a country within its existing borders and that the military have to prepare to prevent the outbreak of ethnic conflict. This is a country that has been grossly misgoverned and repressed and some of the ethnic groups that are seen as not being supportive of the Baghdad regime have been deeply repressed. The danger is if current structures of authority break down an outbreak of conflict between some of those groupings is very great and could lead to chaos. With 60 per cent of people depending on Oil-for-Food if you get fighting and chaos we could get a disastrous humanitarian situation. Keeping order in order to be able to prevent people killing each other but also to keep basic food supplies coming through to people is very, very important indeed. There is the other danger, I have talked about the danger of the use of chemical and biological weapons, the danger of oil wells being booby-trapped and fired, which happened in the Kuwait War, could disrupt sources of food in their own way but there are humanitarian risks for that.

(Mr Fernie) I think it is well known there are public health dangers if oil wells are set on fire, they vary depending on the nature of the oil well and the quality of the crude oil. Some of the worse case scenarios are very grim.

(Clare Short) I should repeat there are a lot of military people who think if there is military action it will all be over very quickly and people will be pleased, that is one scenario but there are other risks there. I am not saying all these are inevitable but they need to be thought through and prevented.

Very briefly, you did say earlier you saw a risk of IDPs going into desert areas where there is not enough water. Potentially there could be fighting simply because there is not enough water and there is not enough food. Do you see that as a particular problem as well within ordinary Iraqi groups?

(Clare Short) That is what I said. If Oil-for-Food broke down, if there was so much disorder food and basic medical supplies could not be kept going and given to people who are very badly malnourished as it is then we would have chaos and terrible suffering. There is no doubt that is a very serious risk that needs to be avoided.

Tony Worthington

About Oil-for-Food again and how it works, at the moment Iraq receives revenue that it is supposed to use for food but the criticism is that it does not fully. Is the realistic assumption that there is going to be no Oil-for-Food Programme because what would be the interest of the Iraqi Government in maintaining it?

(Clare Short) Somebody made this point before, Oil-for-Food, and it is not generous food, it is not generous supplies, people are not given the basic things they need, that is why there is so much ill-health. Even on an optimistic scenario, a limited amount of military action that is relatively successful Oil-for-Food could be disrupted, that is a very high risk. We need to be planning, as we said before, that if the current regime leadership falls that new structures are very rapidly put in place using those delivery mechanisms. We are talking about it, trying to prepare for it but that would need to be accomplished to stop people going hungry.

The most realistic assumption one would have to make, given that you do not think the system will persist, is that the whole nation needs feeding, is 60 per cent at the moment.

(Clare Short) Indeed. One would expect it to increase but 60 per cent is a heck of a lot already. This is a very serious problem and it needs thinking through and making preparations for. I think military planners are aware of it.

(Mr Fernie) I think they are very aware of it. There are informal discussions going on in New York looking at ways in which Oil-for-Food can be continued or disrupted for as short a period as possible. I am not sure I want to start a sentence with, "In fairness to Saddam", but Saddam has increased rations and Oil-for-Food recently. He has an interest in continuing to feed his people to maintain their morale for as long as he can. If we are in a situation, which I think is what you are referring to, where conflict is underway and part of the country is controlled by Saddam and part of it is not the UN will need to think carefully about the existing mechanism it has in place whereby oil is sold, money goes into a UN controlled escrow account and contracts are then left for the delivery of food. That is fine if there are ways whereby some form of that system can be modified in a way to continue to operate as soon as possible.

(Clare Short) If oil production is disrupted that will complicate things. I have been party to discussions about if parts of the country fall away from the authority of Baghdad how very, very important it will be that people are well treated very quickly and there is order so that other parts of the country are more likely to fall away quickly to minimise military conflict. There is an enormous military imperative as well as a humanitarian imperative to make arrangements to look after people very well in areas that might fall away from the control of Baghdad. That is very clear to everyone, but it has to be done in practice.

Mr Battle

Can I be clear, in the event of a conflict who will be in charge of, who will run the Oil-for-Food Programme? In some conversations it has simply been said that the military will control the oil fields so they will run the Oil-for-Food Programme. I cannot see UNHCR running oil fields. What scenarios does the Government have in those circumstances?

(Clare Short) Oil-for-Food is a UN authorised programme. I have seen suggestions that there be a need to give authority to the Secretary General of the UN to make flexible decisions. That is a question to be considered, it has not been decided. Say the oil fields were all set on fire, so there is no income coming in from oil, which is a possible scenario because it did happen to a degree before, then food would have to be got from elsewhere, it would not be Oil-for-Food anymore, you might want to use the distribution networks, it would cease to be Oil-for-Food and it would have to be big, urgent, large scale humanitarian supplies being distributed.

(Mr Fernie) The key point is that at the moment the Oil-for-Food Programme mechanisms which dictate its financing and delivery are controlled by the UN and are dictated by UN Security Council resolutions. Within Baghdad-controlled Iraq at the moment there is no doubt that Saddam has a large degree of influence over how that system is administered. If we get to a situation where for whatever reason oil production and the oil revenues which flow from the oil production, which are currently financing not only the food but the other things which are distributed then the United Nations Security Council, we would need to think quite carefully and quite quickly about what decisions it would need to take to allow different mechanisms to be put in place. As we have already said, informal discussions are already going on in New York and thinking about what the options are.

Tony Worthington

I read a lot in the American press about what the plans are for after the war, about governor generals or military control alongside civilian control, I have read nothing over here. Say the war goes very, very well from the American's viewpoint, at what point do humanitarian concerns become paramount?

(Clare Short) I have tried to say humanitarian concerns have to be paramount before any military action, how it is authorised and organised and what kind of military action and what kind of securing of order and proper treatment of people is absolutely crucial to minimising the risks of humanitarian disasters of hunger, the displacement of people and ethnic fighting, and so on, it is key that it is not just afterwards. We are back to the question of the second Security Council resolution, if there is to be second Security Council resolution it would have to make arrangements for authority.

Absolutely.

(Clare Short) If there were not presumably whoever took the military action power would be authority and that would be more complicated for the UN.

Tony Worthington: This seems to me to be absolutely crucial that all of the talk of it is being under UN control but then there seems to be a point where you hand it over to the Americans to run the war, but I would want to believe that the UN was in control all of the way through.

Chairman: That is fine as a statement.

Ann Clwyd

In the event of chemical and biological weapons being used will the aid agencies be able to operate? Is any protective clothing being offered to the aid agencies? Is there any training going on of Iraqi health workers who also may be called to deal with the population in the event of such weapons being used?

(Clare Short) The first thing to say is there is the UN there, and very few NGOs, in Baghdad- controlled Iraq. The UN has a duty of care to its own staff, I think I have said this already, it is important in thinking about what is to be done, if chemical and biological weapons were used I think the UN remit would be to withdraw their staff, that would leave Iraqi staff, and there is Iraqi staff working for the UN system, and the military. Obviously this is probably the worse possible scenario and everything needs to be done to avoid this coming about. The military would have to be in the lead in trying to bring relief to Iraqi people, both Iraqis who are working in the UN systems Oil-for-Food or in the health care systems that there are and to anyone who might have been injured or hurt in the use of such weapons. Clearly the overwhelming object is to ensure that that does not come about.

Can I ask you about the Kurds, the Kurds have been on the frontline in several conflicts in the past against the Iraq of Saddam Hussein. I do not think they have been offered any protective clothing either, although if there is a war they will be involved in that war alongside the United States and the United Kingdom. Is any account being taken of the very vulnerable situation that they will be in all over again?

(Clare Short) Again I am not party to all of the military planning and we would not be able to disclose that either, and there are plans about north, south, east and west of the country. I am not aware of any preparations to provide any clothes to civilians or maybe fighters, I do not know if that was the implication of your question. I am sure these questions have occurred to people.

Chairman: Secretary of State, we will have to conclude it there - we are expecting two divisions - we have covered the areas that you wanted to cover. Thank you to you and your officials for helping us. We will adjourn until 4.30 and then we will take evidence from the NGOs at 4.30. Thank you, Secretary of State.

(The Committee suspended for a division in the House from 4.00 pm until 4.30 pm)

Memorandum submitted by CARE International

Examination of Witnesses

MR RAJA JARRAH, Programme Director, CARE International, MR ROGER RIDDELL, Director, International Department, Christian Aid, MR MIKE AARONSON, Director General, Save the Children UK (SC UK), and DR AL-SHAHRISTANI, Iraqi Refugee Aid Council, examined.

Chairman

Thank you very much for coming to give evidence at comparatively short notice and I am sorry for the disruption in these proceedings. I think we will assume that all of you heard the evidence given by the Secretary of State, so please feel free to comment on that. I think just for the record it would be helpful to know what role do NGOs currently play in food distribution to the Iraqi people and, if the Secretary of State is right, the answer to that is not very much. In the event of severe food shortages, what methods could be used for food distribution? How do you see the logistics of this working, particularly if the Oil-for-Food programme breaks down, and to what extent, from your experience in previous humanitarian situations, do you think the pre-positioning of supplies, food and medicine can mitigate the situation? Who would like to have a crack at answering that?

(Mr Aaronson) Thank you. Perhaps I would just answer the question by accepting your invitation to comment on what the Secretary of State said. Obviously what the Committee heard was that the Secretary of State and her Department are clearly very sensitive to the humanitarian issues at stake here. What I would say though is that I do not think really the full scale of the problem came through in that discussion. For example, I think on the questions that were raised about the Oil-for-Food programme, it seemed to me that everyone is hoping that somehow it might continue in the event of military action, but frankly I think that is just completely unrealistic. It is a programme that depends on a very complex chain and, for example, the prospect that people might send grain from faraway places, from Australia or wherever, knowing that there is a war with all the questions about whether it would get through and whether they would get paid I think, to be honest, the likelihood of existing mechanisms being sustainable in the event of conflict is actually pretty remote. I think also it is always difficult because we always play with these figures, but the extent of the existing humanitarian crisis, again it is easy to underestimate it and also to fail to take into account the fact that the population of Iraq by and large is an urbanised, sophisticated population which is very dependent on a sort of high degree of infrastructure for the way it lives its life, so the sort of scenarios are going to be very different from the scenarios where people who perhaps are better able to cope in the absence of that infrastructure then take an additional shock. Also finally it is just the scale of it. The Secretary of State alluded to the fact that if the Oil-for-Food programme did break down, then it would be the case of very large-scale food distribution. Well, we are talking about over ten million people possibly requiring food, and that is on a scale that nobody has ever done, so I just wanted to make that point, that I think possibly we did not quite get to just how fragile the situation is and how much it would be affected by conflict. I suppose the question that that leaves over really for the Government as a whole rather than for the Department of International Development is at what point do the scale of humanitarian concerns actually begin to suggest that the consequences, whatever the reasons for military action, the consequences of military action might actually represent a price that we are not prepared to pay.

Does anyone want to add anything on the logistics point?

(Mr Jarrah) On the logistics point, the conversation up to now has talked about the destruction of the Oil-for-Food pipeline, if it is decapitated because of the upper echelons of the administration being disrupted or if it is disrupted in the middle because of the distribution of wholesale food with the disruption of lorries and roads. However, there is also the bottom end of it, the sharp end of it, the 45,000 ration shops that actually distribute food and those are run by ordinary people, ordinary shopkeepers who will be as much victims of any bombardment or civilian disruption as their customers, so even if the international system can fix the upstream part of the food pipeline, there is still the very sharp delivery end which has not any chance of surviving an attack.

(Mr Riddell) The point I would like to raise is in terms of the timescale. We obviously do not know what is going to happen and the scale and length and duration of the war, but even if the war is over quickly, we need to factor in that the humanitarian crisis is likely to last for a considerable length of time. The Americans are talking about two years in their planning scenarios before a new civilian Iraqi administration is likely to be in. Senators in the United States yesterday said that that was naively optimistic. Given the war economy that the Iraqis are under and the dependence, as Mike has said, upon humanitarian assistance, we are likely to see, even if the war is quick, a humanitarian crisis continuing for a very long period of time.

When we have been to Afghanistan or Malawi or Ethiopia, there is the World Food Programme sorting out the logistics of food aid, but at the end of the food chain there are invariably NGOs working with local NGOs. If I am right from what the Secretary of State was saying, there are no international NGOs or barely any NGOs working in Iraq at the present moment and not really local NGOs because, as you say, Roger, the Oil-for-Food programme is distributed through a network of shops, so am I right in thinking there is absolutely none of that kind of end-of-line infrastructure in place at all and that none of those partnerships exist at all in Iraq?

(Mr Riddell) Well, in northern Iraq where Christian Aid has been working for the last ten years, we do have partners, the largest being Reach which is involved in a big programme, a DFID-funded programme, so we do have partners like that. In terms of in Baghdad and the centre of Iraq occupied under the control of Saddam Hussein, one of our partners, Norwegian Church Aid, has a very small office in Baghdad, but limited to water and sanitation projects, so it is not true that there are no international organisations there, but what they can do is extremely limited.

But no significant presence as yet?

(Mr Riddell) That is right.

After all, we all know it takes time to build up these kind of relationships.

(Dr Al-Shahristani) There are a few small Iraqi NGOs which have been working with the Iraqi refugees, particularly in Iran, and they have been involved in the food distribution and so on, but we are speaking about a scale of a few hundred thousand refugees at these camps. I do not think realistically that it is possible to distribute food to over ten million Iraqis inside Iraq without the current set-up through a network that is operational. Much depends on how this war is going to be conducted and what Saddam's reaction would be to this war. We are hearing from inside Iraq that people fear Saddam's chemical and biological weapons and that he may use them against people in the south in particular. If that happens, then perhaps over one million people will be heading towards the borders, Iranian and Kuwaiti borders, and then there will be no network whatsoever to take care of the distribution for this kind of movement. If, however, Saddam does not do that and people stay in their towns, then the only realistic option is to depend on the current network. It would be a matter of plugging in a supply from elsewhere rather than from the central government and there should be sufficient supplies pre-positioned to be able to be plugged in and quite frankly we have not been able to see such preparations. I have just come back myself from Kuwait and Iran and I have talked to people on the ground who presumably are preparing for this and I was not really convinced that there are sufficient preparations on the ground to plug the food into the network, assuming everything is in tact in the country and the war will be over at least in central and south Iraq very quickly. On the other hand, as I said, there are strong fears that Saddam might use his chemical weapons against one or two towns in the south which would cause over one million people leaving to the borders and I have not seen much preparation for that scenario.

Tony Worthington

This is an open question really for you to respond to about the numbers of refugees and where you see any camps are going to be, the problem of displaced people, the particular issue of the relationship between the Kurdish part of Iraq and the rest of Iraq, so perhaps as much information as you can give us about what you see as the possible scenario.

(Dr Al-Shahristani) If I may comment on that, based on contacts and almost daily contacts we are having now with people inside the country to gauge their feelings and their plans, our understanding is that most people are going to stay where they are and not leave their homes unless there is a use of chemical or biological weapons where people will panic and everybody will just be running away for their lives from their town to the nearest border. If there is no use of chemical or biological warfare agents, we do not expect that there will be many people leaving their homes and they will be just waiting for the whole distribution system to be functional again and when they will have a new set-up or administration.

(Mr Jarrah) In the south yes, we would endorse that view.

(Mr Riddell) In the north I spoke to the Christian Aid people who are in the north at the moment last night and they said that the local authorities are preparing for a possible influx of a million IDPs in the north and discussing with UNHCR the setting up of ten camps for a population of about four million. It is scenario-planning and I would agree with my colleagues that people will not move unless they have to, but they are talking about numbers of up to a million that they are planning for in the north.

(Mr Aaronson) I think it is really very difficult and almost dangerous in a way to assume that we can predict that. I think it just depends on the course of the war if there is a war and what it does to the civilian population and over what period of time which is obviously a critical issue. Could I just make one comment on the earlier round of questions. I would not want the Committee to have the impression that somehow international NGOs did not have the capacity to do things on the ground. Certainly for Save the Children, as for Christian Aid, we have been working in the north since the last Gulf War and we have a very well-developed programme, lots of local partners, lots of different kinds of activity. The question, I think, was specifically in the context of the Oil-for-Food programme. That, as it were, rests on a different infrastructure. I hope at some stage we might get on to another comment the Secretary of State made which was whether there would be a role for NGOs in the event of military action, so if you were planning to come back to that, I would certainly want to comment on that, but I certainly would not want the Committee to feel that we somehow did not have a capacity to engage with humanitarian assistance; I think we do.

What is your reading of the neighbours? We heard in the earlier session about where people might go, where they would be welcomed and where they would not be, so is there anything you would like to add to that?

(Dr Al-Shahristani) Traditionally, the Iraqis would be moving towards the Iranian borders because geographically that is the closest to the main towns on the Tigris. Because of the change of heart and the treatment that the Iraqi refugees have been receiving in Iran over the last two years, we do not expect many Iraqis will opt to move to camps along the Iranian borders if they do not absolutely have to. As I said earlier, most of them will prefer to stay where they are unless chemical weapons are used against them. As for the Kuwaiti borders, that would be an option for the people in Basra either to go to Iran or to go to Kuwait, depending on the situation. The rumours that they are hearing now are that there will be sufficient food and other relief materials for them at the Kuwaiti borders, so that might encourage them to consider going to those borders rather than to the Iranian borders.

(Mr Aaronson) We have certainly, Save the Children, been involved in contingency-planning in all the neighbouring countries, but I think it might just be worth pointing out that not all of the neighbours have signed the Refugee Convention. I think I am correct in saying, this would need to be checked, but I think I am correct in saying that Syria, Jordan, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have not, so clearly there are some big issues about who would allow people across the borders and what our stance would be not only as humanitarian agencies, but as concerned governments, if people were not allowed to seek refuge in neighbouring countries.

(Mr Riddell) I would concur with the Secretary of State that this issue is very, very sensitive. We, like Save the Children, have been in discussions with governments in the region which I am happy to talk to you about in private, but not in public clearly.

Alistair Burt

We also picked up a report that the Kuwaiti border would be or was being electrified. Is that something you are aware of?

(Dr Al-Shahristani) Yes, the Kuwaiti border is electrified now, all the border is. The assumption is that as soon as any operation would start that would all be removed. The other thing perhaps I should say is that it is the stated policy of the Iranian and the Kuwaiti Governments that they will put up camps at the borders on the Iraqi sides and they would not like to see Iraqis move across the borders so they would not have to consider them as refugees. They would rather keep the camps inside Iraq, and the Iranians have actually chosen ten points along the borders where they feel there would be some water and electric power available and they would like to set up the camps there and they are talking about each camp holding 20,000 people, which is a total of 200,000 people.

Can I turn back just a little bit to the NGO networks. You were mentioning earlier on your sense that there were sufficient NGO networks on the ground to make an effective delivery force for humanitarian relief. In the absence of the UN, would that be the case?

(Mr Aaronson) Well, I suspect we would all want to say that none of us would want to give the impression that the capacity is there to make an adequate response to the sort of scenarios we are talking about. I think a general point we would want to make is that there is a general lack of preparedness and there is a general lack of leadership within the international community for all sorts of reasons, so frankly it would be wrong to count on too effective a response. I think you are right, I think the fact that the UN has not been prepared to take a leadership role contributes to that and I think it would certainly be very difficult for NGOs in the event of military action, but I just did not want the impression to take root that somehow one would not have to, as it were, worry about the NGOs because the action would be taken.

Chairman

We have understood that. Alistair has asked a slightly different point which is whether the NGOs would be willing to participate in all of this if there was not UN authority.

(Mr Jarrah) It would be very difficult for the NGOs to do that. There are two aspects to the UN operations which are absolutely fundamental for us. One is their scale and their operational capacity and certainly in the south of Iraq the number of international and local NGOs available would not meet the humanitarian need without the punch that the United Nations has operationally. The second issue, which is perhaps more important, is that it is a messy one. If there is not a credible, co-ordinating and leadership position by the UN for the humanitarian relief and rehabilitation activities in the aftermath of a war, it could be very difficult for most humanitarian NGOs to even justify being there at all, let alone being operationally effective. We do not have a clear answer on this. This is a huge moral dilemma for us between agencies and even within agencies. This is a battle which is raging on everyday. Under a military administration in a post-war Iraq, would we be able to operate as humanitarian agencies? The answer is not clear. The moral dilemma is up there and we want to be open about it.

(Mr Aaronson) I would go one stage further and I would say that even if there is a UN structure, those dilemmas will exist because I cannot see the UN structure being completely separated from the military objectives and the Secretary of State was at pains to state that humanitarian concerns have to be paramount from the start, but actually I think that is a contradiction in terms. I think if the primary aim is to prosecute a successful war against the regime in Baghdad, then I think we are all deluding ourselves if we think that humanitarian action, whether it is carried out, certainly it is carried out by military forces, but military forces, by definition, cannot carry out humanitarian action, but even under a UN framework if there is still a war going on, I think it is actually very difficult to see how humanitarian agencies will be able to provide humanitarian assistance in an impartial way on a neutral basis. I find this deeply worrying because I think our Government and other governments would like us all to believe that the humanitarian considerations can somehow be rolled up alongside the political and the military ones and I just do not think that is the case. We saw that in Afghanistan and I think it would be far worse here because our military will have such a directly combatant role.

Alistair Burt

Why do these moral considerations not trouble you now because you are operating in Iraq now and no one claims for a moment that you are, by doing so, giving support to a murderous dictator? As you say in your submission, you are driven by your solidarity with the people of Iraq, so why can you not continue to be driven by your solidarity with the people of Iraq even if there is action taken?

(Mr Aaronson) Obviously that is what we would want to do. The question would be whether, if you like, the framework within which we were operating allowed us to operate in accordance with principles of humanity, impartiality and neutrality. That is the issue.

But you overcome that at the moment.

(Mr Aaronson) But the framework at the moment is benign and I find it very difficult to conceive of a framework in the context of a war against Iraq that would actually allow humanitarian agencies to operate in that way.

(Mr Jarrah) To follow up on the question of solidarity with the people of Iraq, if the people of Iraq felt that any post-war administration was a legitimate model and one that they welcomed, then it would make it much easier for us to work with them. If, however, there was a feeling from the Iraqi population that the post-war regime was an unwelcome one, then, by association with that, we would have lost our relationship of trust with them.

I am sorry to press this, but in the context of this particular conflict or potential conflict, this is important. In the morality of the current regime which has obviously oppressed certain sections of the Iraqi population, you find it perfectly possible and moral to work in those circumstances.

(Mr Jarrah) But the Iraqi population accept the authority of the current regime.

Willingly?

(Mr Jarrah) If they accepted the authority of the new regime which succeeds it, then we would find it much easier to work with it.

I take your point, but I am just interested that you are not operating to different standards here.

(Mr Aaronson) I would like to answer your question very directly. We have worked over the years in a number of countries which have despicable regimes, but we have only continued to work there if we have been able to operate in accordance with our own values and principles, so we operated in Ethiopia under the Derg, for example, and we manage to do that at the moment in Iraq. Paradoxically, the sort of armed conflict we are now talking about from our own side might create dilemmas for us which are more acute than the dilemmas we currently face working in Iraq. That was the point I was trying to get across.

That is fine. I would be interested to see how they could be greater than your current ones, but we will wait and see. At the moment you do not have any particular set of circumstances under which you would withdraw from Iraq?

(Mr Aaronson) When you say "at the moment", do you mean ----

In terms of planning for the immediate future. Do you have a set of circumstances where either your staff felt insecure and concerned about the military action or you have a defined set of principles and you said, "We feel we would have to come out"?

(Mr Aaronson) Yes, undoubtedly. I think there are any number of circumstances where reluctantly that might have to be our conclusion.

(Mr Riddell) Part of our scenario-plan is withdrawal for a period if there is a war and if the war threatens the lives of staff and that happened in Afghanistan. Local staff continued and international staff went back.

Tony Worthington

Do you not think this is an absolutely crucial point, that we have been pursuing this argument that if there to be a war, it has to go down the UN route and then if it is authorised by the UN, there is some legitimacy to it and then it seems to be over to General Tommy Franks. It does seem to me that you are saying a similar sort of thing, that if it is under the UN route, then certainly the military commander has to have a good deal of leeway to pursue war without being too committed, but surely there has to be a UN controller who is there to decide upon how the humanitarian aspect is to be administered. The Secretary of State seemed to be hinting at that in terms of a second or even a third resolution. Is that what we are saying?

(Mr Aaronson) Yes, obviously it would be far better that there should be that sort of UN framework and we would all argue very strongly for that, but it depends also on how that works out in practice. There will be dilemmas for the UN as well as for NGOs, depending on how the UN relates to the war, whether the war is ongoing or whether it has finished, whether, if you like, control has been handed over from the US military to the special representative, the Secretary General. There would be a different situation. I think what I have particularly in mind is the provision of humanitarian assistance and protection while conflict is ongoing and I am saying that would also be very problematic even with the UN present.

Mr Colman

I wrote down what you said, Mr Aaronson, which was, "Military forces by definition cannot carry out humanitarian actions". Of course, if the NGOs and the UN start to withdraw, what other option is there to deliver humanitarian services in Iraq?

(Mr Aaronson) I think it is probably a question of definition. If a hurricane hits a Caribbean island and a British frigate is passing by and provides fresh water or shelter for the stricken population, that is a non-contentious situation. If British forces are conducting a war and are trying to provide assistance to the population, that is a very different scenario. What I am really saying is that any military commander has to put the pursuit of military objectives first and therefore humanitarian objectives inevitably have to be subordinate to the overall military goal. By definition, humanitarian assistance is given on an impartial basis without reference to any other objectives, so it is actually not possible for there to be a humanitarian war or for military forces to provide humanitarian assistance on that definition.

From my rather flimsy experience through the Parliamentary Armed Forces Scheme and knowledge of the rules of engagement and the basis on which the military can engage, there is certainly, as I have seen it on other times, a humanitarian side in their work, because clearly hearts and minds have to be won not just territory. Is there some sort of ideological basis that you have not yet said - not just you, Mr Aaronson, but the others - in terms of why the delivery of humanitarian relief can be carried out by the military, not simply a passing frigate, but from the point of view of being part of their key role if the UN has withdrawn and the NGOs have withdrawn?

(Mr Aaronson) Two points, if I may. Firstly, hearts and minds is part of the military objective not a humanitarian one. Secondly, most of the situations you are referring to I am quite sure are peace support situations not combat situations, and that is the difference.

Mr Riddell, Mr Jarrah or Dr Al-Shahristani?

(Mr Riddell) One of the critical aspects is the manipulation of the local people. If local people have some degree of acceptance of the alien forces, that is a different scenario from those who do not. That is, to me, absolutely crucial.

(Mr Jarrah) One of the issues which came to a head in Afghanistan and is likely also to come to a head in Iraq is that in the turbulent post-war situation, or immediate post-war situation, where violence is being perpetrated by all sorts of actors, not just formal armies, then any action that fudges the distinction between military and civilian activities is always going to be problematic for humanitarian agencies because it makes us complicit and targets, and makes us identified in the eyes of ordinary people with possible vigilantes. One of the important issues for us in separating civilian and military action is the safety and security of staff.

Yes, but you clearly accept that the British military forces on previous engagements have very much taken on board a humanitarian side to their work?

(Mr Jarrah) I accept that there is a humanitarian need which can be filled by military forces if nobody else is filling it.

Ann Clwyd

I think that was certainly the case in Kosovo, when people crossed the border to Macedonia and the UN simply could not cope with that situation, and were it not for the intervention of the military at that stage, who quickly put up tents, et cetera, et cetera, then I think a lot more people would have died. I think there are several occasions in the past where I have seen - actually there when the crisis has been taking place - the efficiency of the military in providing that kind of humanitarian aid and that has been appreciated by all who witnessed it. So while your objective may be the ideal one, the reality is sometimes a bit different.

(Dr Al-Shahristani) If I may say, Iraq is a very special case. A lot of the people have been on the verge of starvation over the years. The regime has been so oppressive that there has been no civil society, institutions, which people can really depend on. Of course, the best route would be for the UN to take over the whole operation, the provision for the people and setting up an administration, it would be much more acceptable to the Iraqi people. Everybody aims for that, but if the situation comes to a point where there is military action and people are very dangerously exposed, I do not think the ideal situation will prevail. At least for NGOs like us, which is based completely on Iraqis, we will see no other option but to go and try and help the people inside Iraq as much as we can. I have mentioned earlier that the present network of food distribution is the only option for the general population but it remains to be said that there is a small percentage of the population that has been targeted by the regime, denied food rations because they considered them opposition, et cetera, et cetera. Those have to be identified and plugged into the system again. I do not think this can be done on the current records and that brings the point of why Iraqi NGOs who are aware of the local situation from these different towns have to go in immediately as soon as they can. They would love to under UN sponsorship but if that option is not available to them, I do not think they will turn their back on their own people and walk away.

(Mr Riddell) I am worried about a line of questioning which suggests we do the war and then worry about the humanitarian consequences afterwards. The Geneva Conventions require that those who engage in military activity focus on civilians right from the start.

Mr Colman

I agree, I think perhaps one of our witnesses was denying that, Chairman.

(Mr Aaronson) Could I put the record straight on that, which was in response to Ann Clwyd's point about the camps in Macedonia. The point I was trying to make was that military actors cannot deliver impartial humanitarian systems when they are fighting a war. The situation in Macedonia was very different because the military were not fighting the Macedonians, they were not fighting the Kosovar refugees, therefore they were in a position to be able to - up to a point unless of course you were probably Milosevic - act in an impartial way. The fact is, if you are fighting your way into Baghdad, it is a very different scenario from if you are putting up a refugee camp on the borders between Kosovo and Macedonia. Just to make it clear, I am saying that when you are fighting a war you cannot be impartial.

Tony Worthington

Every time we go to a disaster area the word which comes up all the time is "co-ordination" of the many, many players and how they are working together. What does the scene look like in Iraq at the moment in terms of planning for you? Are you getting co-operation from DFID and other bodies? I am giving you a number of areas which you can respond on.

(Mr Jarrah) Certainly in Iraq there is no need for co-ordination because the whole thing is currently very centralised and running very efficiently. I will pass over to my colleagues to talk about Northern Iraq. The second half of your question was about relationships with DFID. We have not had a meeting with them since 2 December and any exchange of information between us and them has been informal since that time.

(Dr Al-Shahristani) I will respond to the second part of your question. I listened very attentively to the Secretary of State and I was anxious about what real preparations are being done for the population inside the country after there is a regime change, or at least the regime releases its control over some parts of the country. It is very reassuring, and I will try my best to believe it, that they are thinking about it and they are preparing and discussing with the military et cetera, but some small preparations which could be done visibly to reassure the people that somebody is concerned and thinking about them are not there. A small NGO like us has set up what we call a crisis-preparedness project where we are training hundreds of Iraqi doctors, paramedics and others, taken from refugee camps in Iraq, we have even tried to get a British colleague to go and train them on how to treat victims of nerve gas attacks and so on. Even projects like this have not been looked at by DFID so far, they have not been provided for, and the NGOs are left on their own to prepare whatever they can prepare.

There is another question about the UN Disaster Group and the Disaster Management Teams. What are the NGOs' views of these organisations and their effectiveness? What has been the experience?

(Mr Aaronson) The UN has hitherto said that in the event of an outbreak of hostilities it will base itself in Cyprus and co-ordinate the operation from there. I think it is fair to say, as I said before, there is no leadership at the moment in terms of contingency planning.

Chairman: Just on that point, listening between the lines of what the Secretary of State was saying, she was giving some weight to a second resolution and what might be in the wording of the second resolution, and it sounded to me as though DFID were making a bid for the wording of the second resolution to have some emphasis on directing the Security Council and members of the UN in relation to humanitarian plans. I think it would be interesting - and I do not expect you to do it now off the top of your head - if over the next couple of days the NGOs could give some thought as to what wording might be helpful in the second resolution. One of the things which strikes me as being very important is, within that separation, does the Secretary-General appoint a special representative? Is there somebody who is a sort of brahmin-type figure who is getting a grip on these things? At the moment there is no indication of anyone getting a grip on things, and as we all know UNHCR and WFP are extremely stretched and you could have some very confused scenarios and some very confused situations. I think those are issues which we collectively as a Committee are going to give some thought to but if you have, on the basis of previous experience of UN resolutions enhancing and helping humanitarian action, precedents which you think have helped in the past, I think we would be very grateful if you could share that with us.

Ann Clwyd

Can I ask some questions about funding which is obviously of interest to you. Can you tell us how the humanitarian relief effort is going to be financed? Can you tell us if adequate provisions have been made by donors? Will resources be diverted from elsewhere and can diversion of resources to a possible situation be justified if it results in less funds being available for current humanitarian crises? Finally, what do you think about the money from the Oil-for-Food programme being used for humanitarian relief?

(Mr Jarrah) Wow! Maybe I should start by saying we must not give the impression that we, as NGOs, are well prepared because we simply do not know what is going to happen. We are deeply concerned about the scale and extent and duration of the war and worried that we will not be able to cope. In terms of funds, our own British public gave an enormous amount of money for Afghanistan. We think if there is a war, given the scale of concern and focus, the British public are likely to respond favourably. We are, as the Secretary of State's written evidence pointed out, very, very worried about the loss of publicity of very serious humanitarian disasters which are in place at the moment in Southern Africa, in East Africa and we now have West Africa with the disruption in Cote d'Ivoire. In terms of funding from DFID, we have no indication from them, as the Secretary of State confirmed, of the amounts of money which will be available. We fear that there will be a gap between what is needed and what is provided. The evidence from Afghanistan in terms of what was pledged by the international community and what has come, shows that the gap remains enormous. If the international community is to focus on Iraq, we want them to focus for the long term to assist in the humanitarian disaster which, as I indicated, will last for a considerable length of time. In terms of the agencies together, the Disasters Emergency Committee has been discussing this issue and, if circumstances are right and there are projects which we can put forward to the British public for them to fund, I am sure the DEC will launch an appeal.

(Mr Aaronson) I am not sure whether this has already been said in evidence, and forgive me if it has. It is worth remembering that the Oil-for-Food programme costs £1 billion US dollars a month, of which £200 million US dollars is on the food component. Were that to be disrupted, that gives some sense of the scale of the funding which would need to be made available to keep the humanitarian option going.

(Dr Al-Shahristani) I think it also has been brought up that Saddam might attempt to block the oil wells, as he has done in Kuwait. We hear reports coming from inside Iraq that he has been considering such actions. If that happened, there will be a long disruption of the oil flow and obviously the food has to be provided from some other funds. As for the availability of funds from DFID, it is a bit alarming to small NGOs like us, who are trying very hard to prepare themselves to do something inside the country, we have not been able to set up bases along the borders even though they have obtained all the permissions and so on to do so in Kuwait and Iran for lack of funds.

(Mr Jarrah) Just on the question of Oil-for-Food, while it may be practically possible to fund some of these humanitarian operations from that fund, what makes us uneasy is the precedent that might set about the responsibility for the financing of humanitarian action following a war, and what would happen if similar political circumstances prevailed in a country which was poor and did not have oil for food and what the international system would do to resource the humanitarian response to that. So practically perhaps the Oil-for-Food programme might be able to provide some bridging funds for humanitarian action but we would be very concerned about the precedent that would set. Just going back to Mr Baldry's earlier point about the United Nations and the possible wording of the Security Council resolution, we do not have any answers now but I can inform the Committee that as a result of NGO lobbying in New York the Security Council is having a special briefing session on the humanitarian consequences of a war tomorrow, and at that session we hope that not only will the facts and figures which have been exchanged around this table be shared but also some forward thinking about how to solve some of these problems will also happen. That is under the chairmanship of Kofi Annan.

Ann Clwyd

Is enough money available to you now to make the necessary preparations?

(Mr Jarrah) No.

(Mr Aaronson) No.

No for all of you. Finally, can you tell us how international humanitarian refugee law might apply to this situation? What implications will it have for aid agencies?

(Mr Aaronson) We have already considered the issue of whether the frontiers will be open or closed. Did you say international humanitarian law?

Yes.

(Mr Aaronson) Sorry. As Roger said earlier, obviously the application of the Geneva Conventions to all armed forces engaged in any conflict. That is it really, I cannot think of anything else.

Chairman

Can we just do a quick tour de table, perhaps starting with you Mike. Was there anything else the Secretary of State said that caused you concern in its detail, by omission or otherwise? Secondly, is there anything else you feel you would like to say to the Committee which we have not covered in the questions, and we are talking in headline terms here?

(Mr Aaronson) I think the Secretary of State clearly is very concerned about the humanitarian dimension of this and we, as humanitarian agencies and perhaps this Committee as the International Development Select Committee, have a particular responsibility to make sure that those considerations play a significant part in the debates that feed into policy-making. I think the Secretary of State was as direct about that as she could be, but clearly I do not feel - we do not feel - that the humanitarian considerations have featured as prominently in those debates as they should.

Roger?

(Mr Riddell) We are concerned about what we see as the slide to war. We believe that peaceful methods to address the problems have not expired; there are other methods which can be used. We would support the Secretary of State in all the actions she can take within the Cabinet to give even greater prominence to the humanitarian dimension of the crisis in Iraq.

(Mr Jarrah) What I would have said has just been said more eloquently.

(Dr Al-Shahristani) The Secretary of State was very clear that she considered the possible humanitarian crisis and humanitarian need as a very important component in this crisis. However, I was left with the impression that we are depending too much on the goodwill of the military to make a lot of these humanitarian preparations. I have not really seen much else being done by the non-military on the ground to take care of the crisis that might develop. The fact that DFID still has not been able to release any funds to the NGOs who are preparing to play an active role is also alarming to me.

Chairman: Thank you very much for your help this afternoon and thank you very much for having come and given evidence at such short notice. I just want to say something when I close the meeting on another matter but I think you have made very clear your concerns, not least about the scale. I think that point came through from the Secretary of State as well, so that is a point which we collectively need to keep on hammering home. Informally, having moved off the agenda, we all share your concerns too about this issue drowning out any attention on any other international issue at all. We saw this when we published our report recently on the Reconstruction of Afghanistan, and I was in Sierra Leone the other day and they feel on the edge of the world although they have just got the War Crimes Tribunal; they feel completely forgotten. We are publishing our report on the humanitarian situation in Southern Africa on 11 March at the ODI at 10.30 in the morning, and it would be very good if representatives of the EEC were there because that would give us an opportunity of focusing with the media on the scale of what is happening in Southern Africa. These things cannot be forgotten. Thank you very much for your time this afternoon, we are very grateful to you for having come and given evidence. Thank you.