Select Committee on International Development Memoranda


Memorandum submitted by Save the Children UK

  1.  Save the Children works in nine areas across Iraq and is developing its new headquarters in Baghdad. Previously Save the Children UK (SC UK) had worked in the Kurdish Northern Governorates (Iraqi Kurdistan) implementing reconstruction and development work since 1991. We are recognised as the leading international NGO working in North Iraq, from the point of view of both operational capacity and analysis. SC UK is currently responding to emergency needs throughout Iraq.

THE CURRENT SITUATION IN IRAQ

Food

  2.  In the last week, SC UK has completed the first structured assessment of the vulnerability of the poorer communities in Baghdad. The results indicate that even the poorest households have wheat. Wheat was distributed in large quantities by the UN and the former Government of Iraq under the 986 Oil for Food Programme (OFFP). Double and even triple rations were distributed in the run up to the war and many households have stocks of wheat that will last them through to September. The price of wheat on the local market is 100 Iraqi Dinar (ID) per kg or the equivalent of 5 US cents.

  3.  Whilst this means that people will not starve to death, the same survey shows a dramatic drop in household income. The lack of economic or government activity has left many families dependent on rich relatives or selling household assets to survive. In the poor district of Shu'la in Baghdad, a quarter of the families interviewed in depth by SC UK had no income at all. This rapid destitution of the population has grave implications in terms of both social unrest and the nutritional status of children. An added problem the team identified was that fuel is in short supply to prepare the wheat, and is also expensive.

  4.  The World Food Programme (WFP) has imported over 200,000MT of food since the end of the war, and is planning to re-establish the public distribution system (PDS) in June. This seems ambitious given the current security situation (warehouses continue to be looted in Baghdad and Mosul), but crucially is likely to be only wheat, the one commodity that is not in short supply. Distribution of the high value items in the former ration (which consisted of oil, pulses, sugar, tea and detergent) remains crucially important to meeting basic needs.

  5.  UNICEF reports a doubling of malnutrition rates in Baghdad since the beginning of the war. Whilst the data collection cannot be reliable under current circumstances the lack of a balanced food basket coupled with poor quality water is bound to lead to a worsening in children's health and leave them vulnerable to disease outbreaks.

Health

  6.  The health situation has been well documented in recent weeks. There has been a sharp increase in water-borne diseases such as gastro-intestinal diseases, Typhoid and in Basra, some cases of Cholera. This has led to acute shortages in intravenous fluids and certain types of antibiotics. The severity of these outbreaks is difficult to quantify because the insecurity means some people are unable to reach hospitals and the lack of a functioning health department means that collection of health information and data is patchy.

  7.  Hospitals are over-stretched, dirty and under-resourced. Staff are beginning to be paid but the administrative chaos caused by "de-Ba'athification" means that the health system remains highly fragmented. This situation is unsatisfactory. A functioning health department should be urgently re-started so that health services can function in a coordinated and efficient manner.

  8.  In addition to the serious outbreaks of gastro-enteritis, there are still large numbers of trauma patients from incidents of insecurity (banditry, crossfire, or other hostilities) and unexploded ordnance.

  9.  There are pre-existing severe shortages of specialist drugs such as cytotoxins for cancer treatment and pentostam for the treatment of the disease Kala Azar. There are also acute equipment shortages at many hospitals. In paediatric wards many children are therefore dying unnecessarily of preventable diseases.

  10.  The primary health care system is not functioning due to the prevailing disorder. This sector will need a great deal of investment, as years of sanctions and neglect have led to an erosion of rural services in particular.

  11.  There is a grave risk of epidemic (bacterial dysentery & cholera) due to sanitation problems in Baghdad, rising heat and the fragmentation of the health system. There do not seem to be sufficient contingency plans in place but SC UK will be working with the authorities and others in both the health and the sanitation sectors to urgently address this potential problem.

Child Protection

  12.  Children currently do not enjoy the special protection they are afforded in international law. The social services department is not functioning and general insecurity has put other institutions working with and for children at risk. There are persistent reports of children being abducted from orphanages and girls abducted from schools. Many orphanages had sent children to stay with extended families before the war and juvenile justice centres similarly closed down and released children in their care. Many of these institutions remain closed and the administrative chaos is pre-empting early resumption of work.

Education

  13.  One way to protect children is to open schools again and to ensure these are safe for children to attend. Some schools have not re-opened because of damage to their equipment and looting of furniture.

  14.  The schools should urgently be reopened, or children risk losing most of a school year.

Security

  15.  While security is slowly improving, most cities in Iraq remain unstable and subject to daily incidents of looting and banditry. Many of the major transport arteries (including the main roads from Amman and Kuwait City to Baghdad) are similarly insecure. Popular anger is running high at the lack of security and services, and this in turn fuels anarchy. Most people own arms, which are also sold openly.

Unexploded Ordnance

  16.  Unexploded ordnance is a huge problem. There are still many arms dumps in schools, private residences and other civilian areas left by the former regime. There are also thousands of unexploded cluster bomblets, especially along the path of the Coalition invasion from the south and these continue to kill and maim children.

CURRENT AND EMERGING ISSUES FOR INTERNATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS (INGOS)

Access/Security

  17.  Access to children in need remains difficult, due to security constraints. Large parts of Baghdad and the countryside around Mosul remain very difficult to access safely. Getting supplies and personnel into the country also remains problematic although the lifting of sanctions and the commencement of both UN and NGO flights has started to ease this problem.

  18.  Security is a major problem (as above). Predictably, the power vacuum is being filled by criminal gangs and popular political movements. Humanitarian workers, who can often be viewed as part of the Coalition occupation, are very much at risk from the popular unrest.

INGO Co-operation with the Military

  19.  INGO co-operation with the military has been problematic, although this has improved with time. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) is starting to take the load off the military in terms of INGO coordination, but until this point the Civil Military Coordination Centre (CMCC) mechanism had proved frustrating. This was mostly due to high staff turnover and little real understanding of how INGOs worked or what they could do. Another frustration has been that the CMCC mechanism seems designed to keep decision-makers away from INGOs, leading to a lack of meaningful dialogue.

  20.  SC UK continues to attend meetings of CMCC and press home points about access, security, services, etc., but in general we have the impression that we are not being listened to—and that there is no mechanism for listening to us.

INGO Co-operation with the UN

  21.  The UN have only just established themselves in Baghdad so co-operation has been limited up to now. This is starting to improve with strong OCHA staff on the UN team, but a highly restrictive security curfew has not allowed the UN to properly resume work.

CPA (formerly ORHA)

  22.  ORHA had given the impression of being in internal turmoil, with little understanding of their role. With the formation of CPA, there seems to be a new spirit within this team but they still appear to be woefully short of skilled staff, and too few in numbers to properly carry out the job of government. This coupled with the removal of the top three levels of the former civil service in the "de-Ba'athification" process has left most ministries unable to carry out their former duties.

RECONSTRUCTION

The Role of the UN

  23.  The UN Secretariat and its specialised agencies and programmes are well placed to play a central role in seven key areas: humanitarian assistance; transitional governance; technical assistance for post-conflict recovery; security sector reform (civilian policing); electoral assistance; human rights monitoring; and management of oil revenues and reconstruction contracts.

  24.  UN Resolution 1483 gives the UN a variety of roles in different areas. Much remains to be done in terms of fleshing out what these roles will look like in practice. In order to work efficiently, a clear division of responsibility with the Coalition Provisional Authority will be essential to achieve the goals of the UN. Any UN involvement must share with the current occupying forces the objective of handing over decision-making to Iraqis at the local and national level. The UN's contribution in terms of inclusiveness, transparency and legitimacy, will be very important. Therefore, its position of independence in the monitoring bodies should be strengthened when detailed mandates are laid out.

  25.  The UN should focus on areas where the organisation can exploit its comparative advantage either vis-a"-vis Iraq or in relation to its organisational competencies. It should also only commit to a role where there is a reasonable level of certainty that the organisation can deliver in fulfilling that role. The comparative advantage of the UN relating to Iraq is based on its mandate and its organisational expertise, including extensive knowledge of humanitarian conditions and requirements throughout Iraq; extensive experience in co-ordination of humanitarian assistance in other emergencies around the world; a track record of engagement with national institutions and officials at all levels in Iraq, including in the oil sector, during implementation of the OFFP; some experience in human rights monitoring in the country; experience in institutional capacity-building for governance in a number of post-conflict situations and electoral assistance missions eg East Timor, Kosovo and Afghanistan.

Wider Recovery

  26.  Given the magnitude of Iraq's debt, the extensive humanitarian needs and the dearth of local resources, Iraq will continue to rely heavily on oil revenue for reconstruction and development. A key challenge will be to achieve sustainable development and break the cycle of dependency on oil, imports and government handouts. This will require fresh consideration of the relative weighting of the agricultural, manufacturing and service sectors and the state's involvement in them; intensive efforts to build Iraqi capacity and a focus on excellence in education; and good governance through transparency, accountability and responsiveness to local needs. Strategies should be participatory and include plans for the transition from emergency measures to development programmes. The rule of law and respect for human rights will be extremely important, as will efficient financial systems.

  27.  Rehabilitating basic services is an initial strategic goal. The concomitant goal of training and capacity building in institutions and among Iraqis by Iraqis is a necessary ingredient of short term as well as longer-term development. Excellence in education would not only improve the childhood of the more than 50% of Iraqis who are under the age of 18, but also lay the basis for building sustainable livelihoods.

  28.  Humanitarian indicators such as household income, daily caloric intake and employment rates could be used to assess progress in reducing dependency on the food ration and building sustainable livelihoods. Further gender and child-sensitive intra-household indicators of inclusive access, participation, assets and entitlements could provide the basis for an assessment of the degree to which the relevant human rights of the population, and of children in particular, are being realised.

  29.  The humanitarian imperative and prime objective for food security in Iraq must be that no child or poor or otherwise disadvantaged family has to struggle to obtain adequate and sufficient food and the means to survive. To that end, the former rations can be modestly improved so that nutritional deficiencies are resolved and so that the ration lasts the full month. Complimentary policies should target the poorest families—those 20% of families who sold part of their ration in the past. Such measures could include income generation or provision of essential children's items (such as clothes and school books) to reduce family expenditures.

  30.  The food rationing system can build in corrective measures by introducing "complaints and arbitration boards". The norms of a community may by themselves ensure that all those in need can exercise their right to adequate food. Experience shows, however, that women and children in particular are often better off if they can have a direct say in such programmes, rather than depend on the decisions of others. Key elements of targeting the food ration will be accurate information, widely accepted criteria of eligibility, inclusion of beneficiaries in the implementation, local management of alternative, integrative measures across sectors, and independent, transparent and accountable boards to monitor food security. The current system should be maintained until experience from pilot projects and information gathering can guide national and local policy.

  31.  It is important to reduce both macro-economic dependency on oil and food imports and household dependency on food packages through local substitution. Using local harvest and produce instead of imports in the food ration will immediately benefit Iraq's economy and farmers' income. If Iraq's agricultural production prices are below those of the imported items, the trade deficit would be reduced and foreign exchange increased, and rural incomes could be boosted.

  32.  The crop harvest is due shortly but the current re-establishing and re-structuring of the Iraqi administration means that only central authorities will initially be able to manage integration of the local harvest into the existing food ration Public Distribution System. Food will have to be purchased, processed, shipped and distributed. This task is best undertaken by those with experience, and under oversight, with procedures that eliminate corruption.

  33.  The distribution of the free food ration through the Public Distribution System will likely need to continue, until experience with local substitution over one harvest cycle is gained, and greater clarity reached in the following areas: the integration of plans for food distribution and agriculture under OFFP and the UN Flash Appeal; legal tender through currency reforms; validity of foreign contracts; property rights, especially in landholding structures; and the effects of import substitution on agricultural production and sharecroppers' livelihoods.

  34.  These are only some of the tasks facing the new UN Special Representative in respect of the six-month phasing out of the OFFP. With sanctions lifted, the administration of the OFFP can be gradually assumed by Iraqis and move from direct planning and implementation to government regulation and oversight. However, livelihoods will be in danger if the food ration changes prices and availability. This area therefore merits special attention by the international community beyond the duration of the OFFP.

QUESTIONS FOR THE UK GOVERNMENT

  (i)  How soon will the Coalition be able to ensure that there are sufficient security personnel (Coalition forces and local police) on the ground to provide a basic level of civilian security?

  (ii)  What assessments have been made of the recent significant increase in cases of gastroenteritis among children in Iraq and of the ability of the Iraqi health care system to respond to this serious problem?

  (iii)  What measures are being taken to protect children from unexploded ordnance dropped by Coalition forces in Iraq?

  (iv)  What contribution is the UK Government making to the budget for the Coalition Provisional Authority?

  (v)  How much of the £60 million for Iraq announced in the 2003 Budget has been allocated, and to which UN agencies?

  (vi)  What assessment has the Government made of whether key UN agencies, including UNDP, have adequate resources to play a meaningful role in Iraq?

  (vii)  What assessments have been made of the volume and nutritional adequacy of existing food stocks and of the adequacy of distribution mechanisms in Iraq?

  (viii)  What steps is the Government taking to kick-start the economy and support local markets through selective import substitution?

  (ix)  Once the OFFP has been phased out, how will the Government ensure that Iraqi children and their families have access to basic goods and services?

  (x)  What measures are being taken to ensure that not only emergency needs are met, but also that as reconstruction is taken forward, Iraqi children and their families are given opportunities to become more independent and self-sufficient?

Save the Children UK

June 2003


 
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