Memorandum submitted by Christian Aid
INTRODUCTION
1. Christian Aid is the official relief
and development agency of 40 British and Irish churches, working
where the need is greatest in 60 countries worldwide and helping
communities of all religions and those with none. Christian Aid
is also a key member of Action by Churches Together (ACT), a world
alliance of church-based humanitarian agencies. Until the recent
war, Christian Aid's programme in Iraq was confined to the autonomous
Kurdish region of Northern Iraq. Since 1992, Christian Aid has
supported local NGOs in this region in a range of rehabilitation
and development activities in partnership with local organisations
such as the Rehabilitation, Education and Community Health organisation
(REACH) and the Iraqi Kurdish NGO Network (IKNN).
2. In response to the recent conflict, Christian
Aid has extended its operations beyond Northern Iraq to provide
humanitarian relief in the central and southern regions of Iraq.
To date, we have funded: the Iraqi Refugee Aid Council (IRAC)
to deliver the first consignment of medical supplies to the city
of Basra after the conflict and to assess water and sanitation
needs across southern and central Iraq; a water purification unit
administered by Norwegian Church Aid which is providing water
to up to 150,000 people daily in southern Iraq; emergency relief
provided to displaced families at reception centres in churches
and mosques through the Middle East Council of Churches in various
Iraqi cities; Danish Church Aid to remove landmines from locations
in southern Iraq. Future work planned in the coming months will
include such projects as: a "summer relief programme"
implemented by IRAC to distribute food to particularly vulnerable
families in southern and central Iraq; a mother-and-child health
programme undertaken by the Iraqi Al-Amal Association in up to
a hundred communities in southern and central Iraq; an agricultural
programme in northern Iraq undertaken by REACH and focusing on
seed banks and nurseries.
3. There are a wide range of issues and
concerns arising from the immediate aftermath of the recent US/UK
military action in Iraq. Rather than attempting to cover all these
issues, this memorandum will focus on a small number identified
as key concerns by Christian Aid's Iraqi partner organisations
and by other international ecumenical NGOs in the ACT alliance.
These are:
— The deteriorating security situation
in some parts of Iraq.
— The impact of this security situation
on the ability of occupying powers to fulfil their obligations
to civilians in international law.
— Returns of Internally Displaced Persons
(IDPs.)
— Civil administration in the current
transitional period.
— The role of the UN in post-war Iraq
and our concerns about the draft UN resolution of 9 May.
SECURITY SITUATION
4. The volatile security situation remains
a major concern for Christian Aid. Over the past two weeks, Christian
Aid staff currently stationed in Iraq have noticed a significant
deterioration in the security situation in Iraq, including in
and around Baghdad where at least three areas are deemed too unsafe
for humanitarian agencies to access. This assessment is shared
by Christian Aid's local partner organisations and by other European
ecumenical agencies. Indeed, poor security is the greatest hindrance
to both more comprehensive planning and the implementation of
humanitarian efforts in Iraq at present.
5. We are particularly concerned by reports
from one Christian Aid partner organisation (reiterated by others,
including the BBC) that the security problems appear to be greater
in cities where there is a higher concentration of coalition forces,
such as Baghdad, Karbala, and Basra. Christian Aid believes there
are two main reasons for this:
(a) The combined effects of inadequate planning
, and insufficient personnel have contributed to the failure by
coalition forces to move swiftly and decisively against lawlessness
immediately after the overthrow of the Saddam regime. In places
where forces failed to act from the start, it has been extremely
difficult to restore a semblance of law and order.
(b) Inadequate recognition of the need to
plan for the post-war period contributed to the failure by coalition
forces to research and understand local political contexts and
a lack of effective communication between local communities/organisations
and coalition forces. In many places, different groups of Iraqis
have taken responsibility for security themselves, creating local
security committees or police services and using peer pressure
to deter looters and gangs. These arrangements would appear to
have operated particularly well in smaller towns where the coalition
forces are absent. But in places with a coalition force presence,
local security forces do not want to be seen to be cooperating
with occupying forces and have either withdrawn or have not been
formed in the first place.
6. On 25 April Christian Aid received a
letter from the Prime Minister in which he assured us that the
UK government treats its obligations under international law,
including the Geneva Conventions and Hague Regulations, "with
the greatest seriousness". Under international law, occupying
forces have clear obligations to maintain law and order and to
protect civilians. Christian Aid would wish to draw the Government's
attention to reports we are receiving from partner organisations
that Coalition soldiers are still failing to provide effective
security, even in the areas where they are present. According
to one partner organisation, some officers are continuing to assert
that they do not have a mandate to provide general security to
the civilian population. The problems are compounded by the fact
that most soldiers appear to be young, inexperienced, speak no
Arabic, and are inadequately provided with interpreters or advice
on local culture and politics.
7. If coalition troops on the streets of
Iraqi towns and cities do not have either the required expertise
or mandate from their own command structures to provide security
to civilian populations, then the occupying powers must rectify
the situation immediately or make alternative security arrangements.
"A situation where the presence of international soldiers
is passive is actually worse for law and order than their absence,"
commented one Christian Aid partner organisation. If the population
sees soldiers standing by while a shop is looted, the impression
given is that stealing and looting can continue with impunity,
and the lawless behaviour spreads very quickly.
8. Christian Aid welcomes attempts by UK
forces in Basra to address public security needs by registering
and training individuals for an unarmed auxiliary police force
as well as a lower-level guard force to protect public installations.
But the continuing problems in protecting water installations
and the reported 20-25 shooting incidents arising every night
indicate that the situation in Basra remains volatile.
IMPACT OF
POOR SECURITY
ON MEETING
BASIC CIVILIAN
NEEDS
9. Nationally, the excessive looting that
occurred during the first few days after the overthrow of the
Saddam regime has now receded in most places. Moreover, in response
to calls from local religious leaders (eg at Friday prayers),
many Iraqis have returned some of the material and supplies they
looted. Nevertheless, the extent to which looting of public buildings
and installations was still occurring some five weeks after the
military campaign ended, remains a cause for concern.
10. Even more worrying have been the incidences
of looted installations being repaired but then looted once again.
For example, UNICEF recently reported that repairs to the important
al-Rustumiya water treatment plant had been destroyed and replacement
equipment removed by armed gangs (see IRIN News, 12 May 2003).
As a result, waste water produced by around 3,000,000 people,
60% of Baghdad's population, has been pumped into the Tigris river
— a river which serves as a water source for populations
further south. ICRC also reported that Baghdad's Abu Nawas water
pumping station was continuing to be attacked by looters after
repair work had been undertaken, while UK forces recently reported
continuing problems in protecting Basra's R-Zero water treatment
plant.
11. These events underline the urgent necessity
to improve security in order that aid organisations are able to
contribute to the repair of Iraq's water and sanitation infrastructure
— an infrastructure which not only suffered damage in the
recent war but was already severely dilapidated as a result of
previous wars, twelve years of sanctions, and the legacy of Saddam's
policies.
12. In addition to attacks on key civilian
installations, there has been an alarming increase in the incidence
of attacks on humanitarian NGOs by heavily armed gangs. NGOs are
a target because Iraqis know they have money, equipment, and vehicles.
Vehicle hijackings are a particular problem. According to the
UN security coordinator in southern Iraq, car-jackers currently
present the most serious threat to the humanitarian community.
Continuing attacks on NGO vehicles on the road between Baghdad
and the Jordanian border have also been reported, impeding an
effective humanitarian response. This has happened to a convoy
from our own ACT Alliance. Until the security situation improves,
NGOs will be forced to restrict their operations in Iraq.
13. Security of food depots is another cause
for concern in some places. Christian Aid staff have reported
that food stocks ready to be moved into Iraq are being held up
because of the continuing uncertainty over whether they will reach
their intended destination. These problems need to be addressed
as a matter of urgency, given that at least 60% of the Iraqi population
are dependent on external food supplies and that advance rations
distributed prior to the recent conflict are already starting
to run out.
14. In the light of these problems,, Christian
Aid calls on the coalition forces significantly to increase security
at installations that provide essential services to civilians,
such as water, sanitation, food, and medical care, and to provide
secure access for aid organisations, in order to fulfil their
obligations in the Geneva Conventions as occupying powers.
TENSIONS ARISING
FROM RETURNS
OF INTERNALLY
DISPLACED POPULATIONS
(IDPS)
15. Christian Aid's largest partner organisation
in northern Iraq, REACH, has expressed particular concerns about
the growing tension arising from the return of Kurdish families
to areas of Iraq from which they were expelled or from which they
fled during Saddam's rule. In the intervening years, much of the
property and many houses belonging to these Kurdish families were
occupied by Iraqi Arab settlers who were relocated to Kurdish-dominated
areas such as Kirkuk in a concerted strategy by Saddam to undermine
Kurdish identity and rights. For example, on 8 May, Kurdish families
in Darbandikhan asked a number of Arab families in Jalawla to
leave the houses they had occupied 28 years ago but (not surprisingly)
the Arab families refused to leave. When these problems were reported
to US forces stationed nearby, the forces refused to get involved,
stating that it was "your problem, solve it yourselves."
The Arabs demonstrated and clashes then occurred between demonstrators
and the (largely Kurdish) police forces in the area. Two Arabs
were killed and four policemen injured. In another incident in
Taza, four people were killed.
16. To prevent further violence of this
nature, as a matter of urgency the occupying powers must establish
a mechanism for adjudicating over conflicts resulting from the
return of IDPs to areas which have since been settled by others.
Returnees have a legitimate claim to property that belonged to
them but it is also essential that adequate mechanisms and processes
are quickly put in place to address these serious, and potentially
very volatile disputes.
17. At present, these problems are largely
confined to northern areas of the country that experienced large-scale
displacements of Kurdish populations in recent decades. But Christian
Aid would like to impress upon the Committee that returns of potentially
hundreds of thousands of IDPs and of refugees from neighbouring
countries (eg Iran) in the coming months could mean that such
tensions become a nationwide problem. If plans and procedures
are not made now by the occupying forces to deal with the consequences
of these returns, then there is a danger that large areas of Iraq
will experience serious civil unrest which could quickly spread.
HEALTH, WATER
AND SANITATION
18. Christian Aid shares concerns expressed
by other agencies about the continuing shortage of medical supplies
and of staffing in Iraq's hospitals, together with ongoing problems
with water and electricity supplies to some hospitals.
19. In addition, Christian Aid's partner
organisation, the Al-Amal Association has highlighted the deteriorating
health of mothers and children in a country that already had particularly
high rates of infant and maternal mortality prior to the recent
war. Initial assessments by Al-Amal in the central region of Iraq
have identified an urgent need to promote the health care of mothers
and children in the community and extend primary healthcare in
general, moving the focus away from purely hospital-based curative
care.
20. As the summer months draw on and temperatures
rise, Christian Aid remains concerned about the continuing failures
to provide clean water supplies and adequate sanitation services
to civilians in many parts of Iraq. One indication of associated
health problems has been the alarming increase in diarrhoea cases
reported in Baghdad which is putting hospitals already stretched
to the limit under further pressure. A paediatrician, Dr Abdullah
Husayn (quoted in IRIN news on 14 May) at the Al-Wiyah paediatric
hospital in Baghdad estimated that diarrhoea cases this year were
likely to be four times the normal rate and that his hospital
was already receiving 200 cases a day. Children are already dying
from diarrhoea across Baghdad. But supplies of intravenous fluids
are running low as the main stores of medical supplies in Baghdad
have been looted. Recently, too, the first confirmed cases of
cholera have also been reported.
CIVIL ADMINISTRATION
21. Iraqi communities recently visited by
Christian Aid emphasise that they want control of their country's
resources and administration as soon as possible. In the meantime,
the concerted efforts of many communities to return to normality
are being blocked by the absence in many places of an effective
post-conflict administration. A key problem is that most major
decisions, including those regarding the release of public funds,
have to go to ORHA in Baghdad, even when they concern local, community-based
funds. One local community committee interviewed by Christian
Aid in southern Iraq said they had asked ORHA to release funds
from an existing community bank account. Over a week later, they
were still waiting for a response. Another anxiety expressed in
the same community was about who will buy the wheat local farmers
are due to harvest in the coming months. Under Saddam, this wheat
was purchased by the government.
22. These sorts of problems demonstrate
the need for an effective interim civil administration which would
enable Iraqi communities to access the resources they require
in order to rebuild their lives. Iraqis consulted by Christian
Aid have argued that in order to unblock the current impasse and
get Iraq moving again, clear processes and mechanisms for an interim
civil administration must be put in place as soon as possible
with clear divisions of responsibility, and approved by the UN
Security Council in a new UNSC resolution.
23. Christian Aid partner organisations
have also expressed concern about the serious lack of effective
communication between the coalition forces and local people and
local committees. There is a general sense that neither side is
making any real effort to communicate and a perception that the
Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs (ORHA) only
seems to liase with people they have themselves appointed, including
expatriate Iraqis who have recently returned to Iraq after many
years in exile. Many of these peopleare neither supported nor
respected by local populations who believe such figures are out
of touch with the suffering Iraqis have endured in recent years.
There is also resentment among local populations at ORHA's reappointment
of ex-Baathist Iraqis to positions of responsibility.
24. By contrast, many of the Shia clerics,
headed by five mullahs in Najaf, enjoy widespread support from
Iraq's majority Shia population. Unlike Iraqi expatriate leaders,
the Shia clerics are seen to have supported local populations
both practically and morally during the Saddam years. More broadly,
a number of communities have created their own committees for
administering local authority and strongly believe that these
should be recognised as legitimate authorities by the occupying
powers.
25. It is essential that coalition forces
undertake careful research to identify Iraqi interim leaders who
have legitimacy and support among local populations and that they
involve these leaders in decision-making. Iraqis want to take
control of their own affairs and to see democratic elections held
as soon as possible, after which time coalition forces should
hand over power to those elected leaders and then withdraw.
ROLE OF
THE UNITED
NATIONS (UN)
26. Christian Aid has two areas of concern
over the role of the UN: in the coordination of humanitarian assistance
and in the political reconstruction of Iraq.
27. As a signatory to the International
Red Cross and Red Crescent Code of Conduct for NGOs in disaster
relief, Christian Aid abides by the central principal that humanitarian
action should be impartial and independent of warring parties.
Consequently, we have been concerned about the extent to which
humanitarian operations have been overseen and managed by the
US/Kuwaiti Humanitarian Operations Centre (closely linked to US
military operations) and by the Office for Reconstruction and
Humanitarian Affairs (ORHA) — a body created by the US Defense
Department. We question the ability of such organisations so closely
aligned to the US military to oversee humanitarian operations
and civil administration in Iraq impartially and independently
and to respond solely on the basis of need.
28. Christian Aid recognises that this situation
has now changed. Neither ORHA nor the Humanitarian Operation Centre
(Kuwaiti/US organisation) are coordinating humanitarian relief
and in principle, coalition forces have stressed that they are
now committed to providing humanitarian access to UN agencies
and NGOs. Yet verbal commitment must be matched by action, and
the occupying authorities must ensure they are able to facilitate
independent humanitarian access, not least by providing adequate
security. Furthermore the political agenda of ORHA must not be
allowed to impede the delivery of humanitarian assistance on an
impartial basis by the UN and NGOs.
29. With regard to the political reconstruction
of their country, Christian Aid's partner organisations report
that the priority for Iraqis is to have a democratically elected
government in place as soon as possible. In the interim, there
is a preference for the UN to oversee and coordinate humanitarian
and reconstruction efforts rather than the Coalition, and for
the UN to oversee the political transition to democracy, including
the supervision of elections. Iraqis regard the UN as a more neutral
body than the occupying forces whose intentions in Iraq are not
entirely trusted and who, as invading forces, are not seen to
be impartial.
30. It remains Christian Aid's view that
the UN should play a pivotal role not only in coordinating humanitarian
operations in Iraq but also in overseeing Iraq's transition to
a democratically elected government. We were encouraged by a letter
we received from the Prime Minister on 25 April (mentioned above)
in which he stated that he shared Christian Aid's view "of
the importance of the UN's role both in coordinating humanitarian
assistance and in helping Iraqis reform their country post-conflict.
The UN has a central role to play and is rising well to the challenge,"
he wrote. And yet to date, the Prime Minister appears to have
failed to secure such a central role for the UN in Iraq.
31. Indeed, Christian Aid believes that
the UN and its specialised agencies have been consistently sidelined
in Iraq. During the conflict itself, there may well have been
reasons for the minimal engagement of any civilian agencies because
prior to the collapse of the Saddam regime, the coalition forces
were unable to provide secure access for such agencies. But even
as coalition forces took control of different areas of Iraq, it
appears that little was done to promote a central role for either
the UN and its specialised agencies or for other independent humanitarian
agencies.
DRAFT UNSC RESOLUTION
OF 9 MAY
32. The draft UNSC resolution which came
into the public domain in early May provides no assurance that
the US and UK governments are promoting a central role for the
UN in post-war Iraq. Indeed, it confirms the continued attempts
to marginalize the role of the UN in both the political transition
process and in the reconstruction of Iraq. The draft resolution,
if agreed, would limit the role of the UN primarily to that of
humanitarian relief. If passed in its current form, it would give
a leading role to the occupying forces in administering Iraq and
in managing the process towards the achievement of democracy.
It gives no explicit authority to the United Nations, merely giving
the proposed UN special coordinator an advisory role, focusing
largely on humanitarian assistance.
CONTROL OF
OIL REVENUES
33. The draft UNSC resolution also contains
extremely worrying proposals for the administration of Iraq's
oil industry, including the use of oil revenues, radically changing
the UN's current role in managing Iraq's oil revenues. At present,
the United Nations is effectively the trustee of Iraqi oil assets,
in accordance with agreements made in the Security Council after
the imposition of UN sanctions in 1991 and the introduction of
the Oil for Food programme in 1995. Instead of oil revenues being
paid into a UN-controlled escrow fund (as is presently the case),
the draft resolution presented on 9 May proposes the creation
of an Iraqi Assistance Fund with an international advisory board
which would make decisions on the disbursement of oil revenues
but at the discretion of the occupying powers, whose views would
be decisive. Consequently, the UN's role in managing oil revenues
would be reduced to one seat (among a number) on the international
advisory board. Moreover, there is no explicit recognition of
Iraqi representation on this board. After four months, all funds
remaining in the UN's escrow account would be transferred to the
Iraqi Assistance Fund.
34. From our experiences of working in oil
rich countries elsewhere in the world, we are concerned about
the apparent focus of the US/UK governments on reconstituting
the oil industry. Theses need to be developed in the context of
comprehensive national economic planning, including the building
of a more diversified economy and agreed by the Iraqi people,
if the needs of all Iraqis, particularly the most vulnerable,
are to be met. Until a legitimate Iraqi government is in place,
Christian Aid believes the revenues from oil should be managed
by the UN.
35. Above all, it is essential that decisions
about the use and allocation of these revenues should be taken
transparently — whoever is responsible for managing Iraq's
oil revenues — so that the Iraqi population can be assured
that oil revenues are being used to benefit the Iraqi nation as
a whole and can hold those in control of oil revenues to account
if revenues are not being used for these purposes.
OIL FOR
FOOD PROGRAMME
36. Given few viable short term alternatives,
Christian Aid believes the UN's Oil for Food programme (OFF) should
continue to function for at least a further six months. This is
because there is clearly a great need to ensure an orderly distribution
of food and medical assistance. Unemployment is high and large
sectors of the population, especially poorer people, remain dependent
for their sustenance on the distribution of food and other essential
items. While the OFF distribution system has its faults, it is
a functioning system that, in the absence of any short-term and
effective alternative, needs to be used to ensure continuing food
distribution.
37. After the next six months, the need
for the continuation of the Oil for Food programme should be reviewed
in accordance with UN procedures (at present, the programme is
renewed on a six-monthly basis, and the current mandate runs until
3 June). When post-conflict Iraq is no longer in an "emergency"
phase, the Iraqi administration and the international community
will need to address the high levels of dependency of the Iraqi
population on external food aid that the Oil for Food Programme
has arguably encouraged. A future comprehensive rehabilitation
plan should include incentives to expand the domestic production
of basic foodstuffs to replace the high level of dependence on
external food aid.
16 May 2003
| 
