Oral evidence

Taken before the International Development Committee on Monday 30 June 2003

Members present:

Tony Baldry, in the Chair
John Barrett
Mr John Battle
Huge Bayley
Ann Clwyd
Mr Tony Colman
Mr Piara S Khabra
Chris McCafferty
Mr Robert Walter
Tony Worthington

__________

Witnesses: ANN CLWYD, a Member of the House, Special Envoy to the Prime Minister on Human Rights Issues in Iraq and a Member of the International Development Committee, examined.

Q36  Chairman: Ann, I think we got slightly truncated last time because we had all those votes, which rather interrupted the flow of things, and you were halfway through telling us of your experiences in Iraq. Perhaps you would just like to summarise again your thoughts of where you think we are at, and then I think colleagues can pick the thread up from that to ask questions as a lead in to the evidence we are going to have with the Secretary of State. Is that all right?

Ann Clwyd: Yes, thank you.

Q37  Chairman: So, as soon as you are ready.

Ann Clwyd: Thank you, Chairman. I hesitate to continue my evidence because things are changing so rapidly in Iraq, that unless you were there last week your evidence is almost out of date. I see the briefings every day from the Coalition Provisional Authority, and a great deal is happening on the ground now and things are changing rapidly. I think an interesting development is what the coalition is doing about undertaking an assessment of the capacity and needs of the Iraqi justice sector. I met the leaders of all the political parties who were in Baghdad at the time I was there and, obviously, we discussed how you bring individuals to justice and what the process will be. Just now the CPA, Coalition Provisional Authority, is undertaking an assessment of the capacity and needs of the Iraqi justice sector, and that will provide a basis for evaluating issues relating to the protection of human rights in Iraq. For instance, Ambassador Bremer last week announced two important initiatives, the creation of a Judicial Review Committee and the setting up of a Central Criminal Court. Now, obviously, the judiciary in Iraq is tainted with the placement of the regime, and the task of the Judicial Review Committee will be to review every judge and prosecutor in Iraq for membership of the Ba'ath Party and complicity in human rights violations, or corruption, to ensure the Iraq justice system is run by people of integrity, and I think that is a very important development. The Review Committee's job is to clean up Iraq's judiciary by tackling those problems, so that the Iraqi people can have trust in their own judicial system and in those who administer it. The new Central Criminal Court of Iraq will help the Iraqi judiciary bring to justice those who are presently undermining Iraq's security reconstruction and who are targeting the coalition forces, and those will be brought to justice very quickly. I think it is important to say that the court will not replace any of the courts within the Iraqi judicial system, nor will it follow a different procedure or apply a different law. The judges and prosecutors of the Central Criminal Court will all be Iraqi. I think there are some doubts that that may be the case, but certainly that is the intention, and it will operate within the framework of the Iraqi court system. It will have a two stage appeal process, with a final right to appeal to the Iraqi Court of Cessation and, first of all, all members of this court will be cleared by this judicial review. Obviously, there is some discussion in Iraq about what form the justice should take for those who previously committed crimes under Saddam Hussein's regime. No decision has yet been taken on how this should be pursued but, obviously, the view of the UK is that those who have been responsible for genocide, for crimes against humanity and war crimes, should be brought to justice. We think the general view seems to be that it should be done by the Iraqi people. It is best for them to decide how to bring those responsible to justice with suitable international help, and that could be a series of mechanisms from special courts to truth and reconciliation commissions. I think it might be useful if I just tell you the view of one of the political parties that we met, who represents the majority of the Shia population in Iraq. Dr Hamid Al-Bayati is the representative of al-Hakim in the meetings that take place with Ambassador Bremer and also with Ambassador Sawyer, and he has been present at all those meetings and has just come back from Baghdad. He, in fact, will be speaking to the All Party Group on Iraq in the House of Commons tomorrow. He reiterated what I said previously that law and order is the most immediate priority, and the feeling is that the coalition forces are not addressing this sufficiently. This was said to us three weeks ago now and, as you know, there are renewed attempts to assert law and order. The SCIRI - the organisation Dr Al-Bayati represents - mentioned several incidents which had taken place, which he thought indicated there was insufficient appreciation of the culture of the people that the forces were dealing with. It is a similar problem to that which we heard, of course, in Afghanistan and identical things seem to be happening. On the point of law and order, SCIRI showed us a document issued by the regime in its last days ordering its followers to burn documents, burn buildings and then go underground, showing it still had power and authority. Also, it reported, and we saw the leaflets, there will be no peace without the return of Saddam. Now, obviously, I was not able to check the authenticity of those documents, but I have actually seen documents which say those types of things, which seems to tie in with recent events in Iraq.

Chairman: Great. That is really three topics, in a sense: the judicial system, security generally and, more specifically, is there a kind of organised loose guerrilla campaign making life difficult for the coalition forces? Shall we just deal with the judicial system, judicial inquiry and so on? Bob, do you want to ask a question on that?

Q38  Mr Walter: Yes, I do, if I can. Ann has given us a very good summation of the current situation, but without jeopardising you and my relationship of both being officers of the All Party Parliamentary Human Rights Group, I just want to ask a question really of detail with regard to what you said about judges and the judicial process. You said that all the judges who were members of the Ba'ath Party would be pursued, and you said also that the entire process following the conflict would be undertaken by Iraqis; Iraqi lawyers and Iraqi judges. Is Iraq anything like the former Soviet Union, where you could not get a job unless you were a member of the Communist Party? Is it a situation where all the judges and all the senior lawyers were members of the Ba'ath Party because that was the only way they could get a job and, if that is the case, are we going to have enough competent Iraqi lawyers to be judges, and prosecutors, and advocates in this process?

Ann Clwyd: Bob, obviously, I have not got detailed knowledge of this. It was not something that I was investigating in any detail, that was what I was told by the CPA. I did meet with political parties and one political party in particular, which was the Pachachi Party, and they were mainly made up of lawyers and we had a discussion with them. They said there were obviously stratas within the Ba'ath Party, and the highest echelons of the Ba'ath Party and the highest echelons of the judiciary obviously tended to be staffed with the people that the Ba'ath Party wanted in position. Now, how far that permeates, I cannot tell you, but the general impression that I was given was that the judiciary was heavily tainted, but that there were enough good people around to be able to sort out the wheat from the chaff.

Q39  Chairman: You have been very much involved with the organisation, Indict. We have seen elsewhere whether it be in Rwanda, or the former Republic of Yugoslavia, or more recently Sierra Leone, UN War Crimes Tribunals, under the auspices of the UN, seeking to prosecute those who, in the Sierra Leone court phrase "bore the greatest responsibility for war crimes". Can you just bring us up to date with where Indict has got to on this? What is the attitude of Indict? Are Indict and similar organisations content effectively for this to be done through an Iraqi judicial process, or are they wanting to see a tribunal under the auspices, say, of the UN International Tribunal, to deal with those who are most responsible, because it then comes to questions about if there are sentences of imprisonment where those sentences are carried out, who is responsible for that, and who deals with it and so on?

Ann Clwyd: Indict gathered evidence on the ten leading members of the regime and, according to our lawyer, we had enough evidence to make those cases stand up in any court anywhere; the evidence was firm enough. Of course, for the past six years Indict researchers have gathered evidence in 15 countries of the world, and so we have a lot of signed witness statements, and all the witnesses realise that they signed those statements on the understanding they may be called upon to give evidence in a court. Obviously, I was hoping in the run up to the war that a European country would take action. As you know, I pressed it pretty hard here in the UK, because we had given evidence to the Attorney-General on the basis of the taking of hostages in Kuwait, which are more British hostages, and we have taken detailed statements from many of those British hostages. The advice from our QC, Clare Montgomery of Matrix Chambers, was that short of getting Saddam to sign a witness statement in his own blood, we had everything that was necessary for that to stand up in court. So it was a great disappointment to us that that action was not taken by the Attorney-General in this country. Also, we had cases in Belgium, Switzerland and Norway. With those, Switzerland was not going to take any action, Norway did not feel it could at the time, and the Belgian case was pending. On the top ten, that is Saddam Hussein, Tariq Aziz, Saddam's two sons and Ali Hassan al-Majid, we have got evidence which we think can stand up against all those characters if they are caught.

Q40  Chris McCafferty: Ann, what do you think are the reasons behind the lack of action by the Attorney-General in regard to Indict's proposals?

Ann Clwyd: Chris, I wish I knew the answer to that. Obviously, we took the evidence to one attorney two years ago, that was the previous attorney, who referred the case of Tariq Aziz to Scotland Yard. We have meetings with the top people in Scotland Yard - that is members of Indict, plus our QC - and have offered to help Scotland Yard if they need to collect additional evidence. I believe the evidence is already there because this is about the taking of hostages in Kuwait, and the Ministry of Defence took detailed evidence in Operation Sandcastle, after the invasion of Kuwait, from the British hostages. Personally, I do not know why it was necessary to get any further evidence and we offered to help Scotland Yard to do that. Indict was subsequently rubbished in the press with cartoons and editorials, which actually did not understand that you could indict somebody in their absence; you did not physically have to have hold of them to get an indictment, but I think that was the kind of prejudice we were facing. When the second attorney came in, I have to say I found the whole exercise extremely frustrating, because we could not get hard answers to the question of why no action was being taken and a prosecution started in the British courts. Saddam Hussein by that time in a judgment of the International Court apparently, from the period he was President, was immune from prosecution. I think that was a very controversial decision in the International Court and could have been challenged anyway. Certainly, as far as Tariq Aziz was concerned, I do not see why that action could not have been started in the British courts.

Q41  Mr Khabra: How long would it take to install an effective stable administration? The difficulty in the expectation of the coalition partners was perhaps the Shias from the south and whether they would co-operate. The Shias are becoming one of the biggest problems now and they have a particular agenda. On top of that you have the Kurds in the north and then you have the Ba'athist supporters in a well-established country and all of them are pulling apart in different directions. It is a difficult task, but how long do you think it will take to set up a political solution? It will take much longer to set up a civil administration, it will take less time than to set up a political structure.

Ann Clwyd: I do not agree with the scenario as you have set it out. Dr Hamid Al-Bayati, who I quoted earlier, and who is speaking here tomorrow night, represents something like two-thirds of the Shia of Iraq. He has repeatedly said - and he said it in here - that what they want is a federal, secular, democratic Iraq; they do not want an Iranian situation translated into the Iraqi scene. I see them all working quite closely together because, of course, the people who were in opposition for so many years - people like Dr Hamid Al-Bayati, who was here in London, the leader of the Iraqi National Congress, the representatives of the PUK and the KDP, and the other political parties in exile - worked closely together in the Iraqi National Congress for several years in the lead up to this situation. I would agree with you that the political parties are unhappy with the process because, understandably, after 35 years of being in opposition, and some of them in exile, they want to get their hands on power. I think that is understandable, but that is about the pace of the transfer of power to elected representatives. I think it is a very good signal that to date about 15 town councils have already had elections and those are democratically elected people. I think that is almost half of the large councils that exist in Iraq. The Kurds, of course, have already been working since 1991 in a sort of protected environment, even though they were under two sets of sanctions, and they have set up a system now with elections and with a parliament. I think they are a very good example for the rest of Iraq, and they should not be discounted simply because they have had a head start. I think many of the things that they have done; like disarmament, which was done over a period of time and not too rapidly are things that should be looked on perhaps as a way the rest of Iraq could proceed. I am quite optimistic - I think I have said it before - about the future as long as the political process can proceed and agreement can be reached on the kind of structures on the constitution, because that is the first thing that has to be put in place. There is going to be a large meeting, I understand a sort of delegate conference, to determine the constitution of Iraq. So things are moving, and I do not think it would be accurate to depict the people of Iraq as all fighting with one another because they are not.

Q42  Chris McCafferty: Ann, the evidence that we heard from the aid agencies two weeks ago, indicated the work that was being done by the British military in encouraging local people to come forward and participate in the formation of local councils. It was suggested that was being kiboshed by the American administration in Baghdad, and that this was preventing the work in the British zone going ahead. With regard to the elected councils that you have referred to, are they in the British zone, or are they all over Baghdad?

Ann Clwyd: All over Iraq, yes.

Q43  Chris McCafferty: So they are not just predominantly on the British side?

Ann Clwyd: No. I was in Kirkuk, for example, and I met the new mayor in Kirkuk who had just been elected, he was a Kurd, and I met other members of the council who had just been elected. Obviously, I could not travel in 12 days throughout the country, but from what I have read these elections are proceeding throughout Iraq.

Q44  Chris McCafferty: Can I just ask then, do you believe there is any truth in what is being suggested that more work is being done in the British sector, and that it is more difficult to take work forward of a pragmatic nature in the predominance of Iraq, which is controlled by the American army?

Ann Clwyd: Clearly, I think the Americans are in charge and maybe the British sometimes feel frustrated that they cannot get things done in a certain way as they would like. Again, I think it would be inaccurate to portray it as a generalisation.

Q45  Chairman: From your contacts in the Kurdish part of Iraq, what are relations like now with Turkey?

Ann Clwyd: I can speak about the PUK, because I know that Jalal Talabani, the leader of the PUK, has gone out of his way to keep good relations with Turkey, and that he has been to Turkey for meetings and it seems perfectly amicable. Obviously, I think the same is probably now true of the KDP, although before the war started the KDP in particular were very concerned about the intentions of Turkey, but that seems to have died down generally now. I did not see any indication while I was there this time that there was any fear of what Turkish reaction might be to any development in Iraq.

Q46  Chairman: Ann, when are you hoping, or when are you envisaging next returning to Iraq, or have you any plans to do that?

Ann Clwyd: I would like to go quite soon. Obviously, there are certain things I hope will be done there and I would like to see for myself, because there is nothing to beat seeing for yourself , but there is concern about the security situation. I did discuss my possible return with officials only a few days ago and they would prefer me to delay my return until September or thereabouts, but I would still like to go in July. It is a question of protection and people feeling responsible for your protection. So I cannot answer that question, but I would like to go quite soon.

Chairman: Two final questions from Tony C and John, as we have got the Secretary of State outside. Tony?

Q47  Mr Colman: Yes. My question is about mine clearing and clearing of ordnance. Before the war one of the main concerns was that the UN mine clearing people were not being fully informed about potential new forms of ordnance, to ensure that as they came in they would be able to clear the ordnance. Do you believe that sufficient is being done on this and, if not, is there any sort of problem in terms of new types of ordnance that you have heard about that the UN do not now have clear?

Ann Clwyd: I do not know the answer. I saw mine clearance teams in Kurdistan, for example, but, obviously, those were mine clearance teams working on previous mine problems. The Kurds I was with were a bit critical, because they said they were too slow and they claimed that the Peshmergas were faster at clearing the mines than were the mine clearance teams that had been brought in, that was hearsay and I do not know the answer. I do not know how many mine clearance teams are presently working there, it was not something that I looked at.

Q48  Mr Battle: Before you went there were horrific scenes on our televisions that were reminiscent of post-Pol Pot, the discovery of the mass graves. Since you have been and when you were there, has more effort been made to identify and perhaps properly bury the bodies of those found in mass graves? Are we helping and is America helping with techniques, such as DNA? Are we building mortuaries? Where is that whole effort up to, please?

Ann Clwyd: There is somebody from the Foreign Office working on this. His role is to put together an assessment and action plan for war crimes and justice issues to avoid the piecemeal allocation of resources, and he will have responsibility for forensic examinations and also for investigations. Obviously, we need sustained funding to be promised and extra personnel to be seconded, in particular a co-ordination unit for forensic teams and NGOs working in that region. The CPA put out a press release while I was there about how they were going to deal with the problem of the mass graves. I do not know whether I mentioned in the last session, but I thought the press release and the reality were a bit far apart at the point when I was there. Now, just to give you one example, they were setting out how graves should be excavated, how forensic teams should be called in, and how local leaders should be informed of the process. However, when I was in Kurdistan talking to the Human Rights Minister of the Kurdish Government, he had never heard of any of these plans and it seemed a bit strange to me that somebody who you could identify had a responsibility did not know about the plans, but that may all have changed in the time I have been away. Obviously, in the Kurdish area, they were excavating graves and identifying new graves - I saw big mechanical diggers working away at the earth - and that was a site to which the Human Rights Minister in Kurdistan referred me to where activity was taking place on that particular day, but it was being done in a way that, according to the CPA, was not the right way to do it. So one has to check whether the aspiration and the reality are getting closer together, or whether it is still an aspiration and the reality is a bit different, but I do not know now, three weeks later, what the situation is.

Chairman: Ann, thank you very much for helping us with the benefit of your insight. I hope, when you have the opportunity, we can again take evidence from you and you can keep the Committee up to date. If you would like to come and join us now.

 

Examination of Witnesses

Witnesses: RT HON BARONESS AMOS, a Member of the House of Lords and Secretary of State for International Development and MR MOAZZAM MALIK, Head, Iraq Humanitarian Response and Co-ordination, Department for International Development, examined.

Q49  Chairman: Secretary of State, welcome. I think this is the first time you have given evidence to the Select Committee as Secretary of State. So welcome. Thank you very much for doing a double session, from Iraq to Cancún in one afternoon is very kind of you, and it is very good of you. Would you like to introduce your official, Mr Malik, because that would be helpful as well?

Baroness Amos: Mr Moazzam Malik, who is heading up the Iraq Humanitarian Team in DFID.

Q50  Chairman: Right. Okay. Can I just say I think the acoustics in this room are not brilliant and sometimes we get misled into thinking that these are microphones, and so sometimes it is a little difficult to hear. If I can just put a thought to you, which is something like this. I think that either fairly or unfairly - and I would welcome your comments on this - the Committee got the impression that a lot of those who went to Iraq heard the military saying: "Where is DFID? Why is DFID not here?" It is a bit like they expect the Royal Logistics Corp to do something, or REME to do the wiring, so why is DFID not here to do the humanitarian stuff. DFID were saying: "These are occupying powers acting under the Geneva Convention, it is for the military to take the lead on all this" and, not least, they have to take the lead on providing security and, not least, providing security to provide what I think, in current policy shorthand, is known as the humanitarian space to enable DFID and, indeed, NGOs supporting DFID, the opportunity to act. We would just welcome some clarification as to what you see as DFID's role under the Geneva Convention and the Hague Regulations. Where is DFID interfacing with the military, who is in the lead on what, and just those sort of basic machinery of government-type issues, and perhaps we could lead off with that?

Baroness Amos: Okay. Thank you very much. Perhaps I should start by saying there was planning which DFID was involved in with respect to what would happen post the conflict, and much of that planning went into thinking about the scale of the humanitarian crisis. At that time it was feared that there would be huge numbers of internally displaced people, refugees and so on, and much of the planning went into that. What was not anticipated was the scale of looting which happened post the conflict and which has hampered the effort to a certain extent. I am happy to come back to that if that is something that the Committee would be interested in. On your wider question, I think that in the immediate aftermath of the conflict the military's role was very clear with respect to Geneva and the Hague Convention, and that is why money was allocated to the military for quick impact projects, things that they could go in and do immediately which would help the situation in the short-term. We have been working very closely with the military, in fact we have some people who have been imbedded with the military in Basra. As of today we have some 27 people between Basra and Baghdad who are working in a number of ways, they are working either with the CPA, they are working with UN organisations, they are working directly with the military or working as advisers on specific issues. A key element of their responsibility is liaison and the co-ordination across CPA, military and ourselves. We very much see our role as giving information and advice to the military about what they could do and what they could engage in immediately post conflict. The other thing to say is that we gave substantial amounts of money to UN agencies and to NGOs operating on the ground, which goes to the heart of the question, "Where is DFID?" A number of people fail to see that in the work that the ICRC are doing, in the work that UN agencies, like the WFP and the World Health Organisation are doing on the ground that DFID resources have gone into that work. Our approach has been very much that we want to work with those organisations that have the experience, the expertise and the knowledge. That is why we have now given some £150,000,000. When I was in Baghdad I announced an additional £35,000, 000 towards the UN flash appeal, which was made last Monday, which brings our contribution to UN organisations and NGOs to £150,000,000. When people see water resources up and running as a result of the work of UNICEF some of that is because of DFID. There is not necessarily a DFID truck or a DFID badge on the back of somebody's jacket which indicates that we have given support, our support has been through the people we have allocated, through the work that we have done in liaison with other agencies and through the direct financial support we have given to other agencies. Of course we must not forget the 19 per cent of EU money that comes from DFID as well.

Q51  Tony Worthington: Can I ask you, Secretary of State, questions about the planning for this? As you know your predecessor said, "the level of preparedness was limited and this involved serious risk. It was not as great as it could have been". We had Mr Jarrah of Care International who said, "Looking at the situation now it is impossible to think that a well laid plan was so badly conceived that it did not work and we are left with the conclusion that there were no plans in the first place by anybody". How would you react to that?

Baroness Amos: I do not think that is entirely accurate. As I said in my first answer, there was preparation, there was preparation for a range of possible crises, ranging from prolonged urban warfare through large population movements and widespread disruption of essential infrastructure. As it happened what we did see was widespread looting and a breakdown in law and order, which had not been anticipated and which led to serious problems. Members of the Committee will recall that an Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs, ORHA, had been established, which very quickly became the CPA, the Coalition Provisional Authority. I think where mistakes was made were in in anticipation of what we thought the problems were going to be, we tended to see them as large-scale humanitarian crises, which we had seen in other places post the conflict, rather than what we did have, which was a short conflict, then widespread looting and a breakdown in law and order. What I saw last week, for example, real difficulties in getting water and electricity and the basic services up and running, was not because the capacity and other capabilities are not there but because as soon as something is repaired it is basically sabotaged.

Q52  Tony Worthington: Secretary of State, ORHA was set up and it was not that it smoothly became the CPA, it was a disaster. General Garner was appointed after about a month and even the Americans realised it was going badly wrong, he was replaced and his organisation disappeared. Is that not what happened?

Baroness Amos: As I said, there is no doubt there was real initial difficulties, and that is because the planning was for different things. The planning was for a humanitarian emergency, which thankfully did not happen. What we saw was a short conflict and a need to move almost immediately into getting the Iraqi ministries up and running again. There were real problems with the Iraqi ministries because the looting that happened meant that key records, and so on, were not available for use. OHRA, as it then was, which became the CPA, had no idea. People mentioned the issue of making payments, but they had no idea who they should pay because those records were simply not available. Whilst I think it is right to say that there could have been more pre-planning with respect to the kind of situation which actually occurred I also think that we need to recognise the nature of what happened. I saw some of these buildings, if you go to Basra and Baghdad what you see are not cities that are completely flattened or devastated as a result of war, you see individual buildings which were attacked and have basically crumbled and everything round them is standing. The targeting that we were told about is essentially what happened. Then you see even more buildings which have been looted and set fire to from inside and this is what caused and continues to cause a huge amount of problems. For example if some Iraqis had not taken home essential discs with information on them we would still be facing significant difficulties in terms of being able to pay public service workers.

Q53  Tony Worthington: It is very difficult to accept that it was the looting that made it go wrong because we in this country were saying it was completely wrong that the UN should not be in control. The UN had its organisations, it had a track record on this and to expect General Garner under the control of the US military to take this over was surely misplaced?

Baroness Amos: I think we are confusing a number of different things here and if I have given you the impression everything is down to the fact that there was looting I hope I have not done that. As I said, I think that we planned for very specific scenarios which did not occur, and on top of that you had the looting which did occur and records were taken away. In addition to that there was confusion at the beginning, and part of that confusion was to do with the fact that the planning had been for these particular humanitarian scenarios. Very quickly ORHA had to move into something else, they needed people with different kinds of skills and they needed to work with the Iraqis to try and get their services up and running again. I would not dream of saying that administratively there was not a great deal that needed to be done or indeed that mistakes were made at that stage because I think mistakes were made at that stage.

Q54  Tony Worthington: Thank you for your update on Iraq from Humanitarian Relief Towards Reconstruction in which you say, "In many respects the situation has improved since the immediate aftermath of the conflict. Food aid and distribution is on track in difficult circumstances and the military initially and humanitarian agencies subsequently have done a good job". There does seem to be a conflict between that and what is generally reported. I would quote Megan Chisholm, a co-ordinator in Baghdad for CARE, she said, "the security situation had particularly deteriorated over the past week". An organisation with someone, an American, who has been allocated £62 million of a US Government contract to run the education system says, "The ad hoc security situation is extremely dangerous in Iraq". I am quoting these because they did not seem to be the usual suspects, say British-based or opponents to the war protesting about it. They seem to be saying, it is not right, the situation is deteriorating. A major article in the Financial Times today is saying "Where has it all gone wrong?"

Baroness Amos: Can I try and address that, this links in with your previous question about the role of the UN in this. There are very different roles being undertaken here. I spoke to all of the UN agencies that are represented in Basra as well as speaking to Sergio de Mello, who was the UN specialist representative while I was in Baghdad, and the feeling I got from speaking to US agencies and Sergio deMello is they felt there was very good co-ordination and a good relationship between the UN, the CPA and the military, but that the key issue is security. There is no doubt that the security situation in Baghdad is poor, in Basra it is very different. In Basra there is very little visible military presence. There are cars out, people are driving round, there are people walking round the streets, the majority of shops are open, restaurants are open, markets are open and appear to be thriving, and there is a great deal of fruit and vegetables available for sale in those markets, this is despite the terrible situation that we saw last week when six RMPs were killed. In my discussions with the military and indeed with the head of the RMP there is a very strong feeling this was an isolated incident and one that would not impinge or indeed cause them to change their way of behaving in the south. With respect to basic services in the south, in relation to water the quality and quantity of water available is now back to pre-conflict levels, however, I have to say to the Committee in my estimation that would not be good enough. This is an area that was starved of investment. I went to visit a water treatment plant for example which had not received the kind of repairs that had been required over many years. Whilst we have these basic services now back to pre-conflict levels this is in a part of the country where they have been starved of investment in any event, so the expectations of what the coalition would deliver were very high indeed. On the health side we managed to avoid a cholera epidemic. We have the water pipeline open to Umm Qasr. The port should be open for traffic by mid-July, it is being used, but mainly for humanitarian purposes. I would say that in Basra there has been some success with the provision of basis services but it is still being undermined by the security situation. There are some concerns I have about the CPA in Basra and its relationship to the CPA in Baghdad and the level of administrative support that it receives from the CPA Baghdad with respect to budgeting, and so on, but I think those issues have been resolved. In Baghdad the situation is different. The Committee knows what has been happening on a daily basis to the US military. The military presence is much, much more visible and whilst you do see a few people out on the streets it is much, much less. I was able to travel round in Baghdad much less, so I saw much less there than I saw in Basra. We have to get the security situation sorted out because when I was there Baghdad had had no water for two or three days because the electricity had been sabotaged and, of course, they could not then pump water. This is a real problem. It was not that it had not been fixed, it had been fixed but it had then been sabotaged. This happens on a nightly basis. I do agree with the NGOs that their job is being hampered by the lack of a secure environment, there is no doubt about that.

Q55  Tony Worthington: Can I ask one final question on this, I am trying to get a picture of what the aspirations are. I am under the impression that the British's Government position is that it wants the UN with a central role and it wants to get to that as soon as possible. I would hope that that is what it is urging upon the CPA and the United States. First of all, could we have confirmation of that? We talk about having a sort of British zone, is a degree of devolution possible so that if the British said that the way to get the schools, the water, the sanitation, everything going in this area is to bring in UN organisations or to co-ordinate the services this way it would have the power to do that independent of the CPA headquarters?

Baroness Amos: First of all, yes, we do want to see the UN having a more central role, we have said that from the start. In saying that we are not saying that the UN is the only body that has a role in Iraq, and perhaps that is where there is a slight difference emerging in talking about the UN having a central role. The UN themselves are absolutely clear that there are major areas of reconstruction that they would have no experience of. The international financial institutions, the World Bank and the IMF, are engaged in needs assessments in Iraq and they gave a read out last week to their boards about what is required. The World Bank will now send 14 assessment teams out looking at different areas with respect to the reconstruction, and that will form the basis of the longer-term reconstruction plan for Iraq. The UN themselves see themselves as having a central role but not as having the only role in Iraq. I think that is the important thing to remember. With respect to the south I think we see the south very much as a European zone, if you like, rather than just a British zone. The Italians are coming in soon. There is a Dane who is running CPA south, who is responsible for CPA south. The coalition effort is now very broad. I think some 20 countries will be contributing to the coalition effort in Iraq, it is not just the United Kingdom and the United States. We have identified a number of areas where we think we can make a significant contribution on the basis of our experience, particularly in the security sector reform, that is one of the areas on which we would like to focus. Obviously education is important, health is important and we have given substantial amounts of money to the World Health Organisation and UNICEF and others. The other thing I would like to remind the Committee of is that UN agencies have been active and working throughout Iraq. What we have seen to date, if you look at the World Food Programme and the Food pipeline, is that some 19 million Iraqis have now been fed through the World For Food Programme pipeline which is up and running, so that has been a success story.

Q56  Mr Battle: I am glad you mentioned Sergio de Mello because I would say to you just as I believe you are very good news for policy development here I think he will be very good news for the future of Iraq. Why I mention that is because he was involved in East Timor. The East Timor crisis and indeed the Kosovo crisis were very different from this one, both were about massive numbers of their population being forced into refugee status and then moving them back in to re-build. What you are suggesting is that the Department planned for a refugee crisis - indeed in this Committee we were pressing that as the concern - and that did not happen. Is that what you are really saying? The people are all still there, and it is about handling that.

Baroness Amos: Yes. What you have are some displaced populations from previously, but not significant population movement as a result of this current conflict.

Q57  Mr Battle: If I can focus on water. We took evidence from some NGOs who suggested, yes, that the electricity infrastructure is not working, therefore the pumps do not work and therefore you cannot get water. There was a suggestion that there was a general shortage of chlorine. You have emphasised strongly the issue of sabotage, both to the electricity supplies to pump the water and indeed to water stations and pipelines, what planning is there for trucking water to rural areas or even to unserviced areas in Baghdad? Are there sufficient back-up supplies of water and chlorine? In the best of all worlds without the sabotage could the water system be got up and running?

Baroness Amos: In the best of all worlds if we did not have a degree of sabotage, yes, we could have the water supplies up and running but as I said in response to a previous question the situation in Iraq prior to the conflict was such that there was a lack of investment, a lack of availability of some purification chemicals and a lack of investment in the infrastructure. What we are dealing with is not a problem that is recent, we are dealing with a historical problem over some 30 years. Whilst we have, and I mentioned Basra in particular, the quality and quantity of water availability in Basra back up to pre-war levels in my view that is not sufficient because pre-war levels were not what the Iraqi population should expect in a country of that size but also in a country that has the potential wealth that Iraq does. We have a major task, it is not just about dealing with the security problems and getting the situation back pre-war levels we also have to improve on them significantly. That is where our challenge lies.

Q58  Mr Battle: Can you give me a crude estimate of the scale of the problem, how much of Iraq is without water?

Baroness Amos: It is not even so much without, Baghdad for example will have had no water over three days, prior to that, depending on the area, water was either back up to about 30 per cent of pre-war levels and up to something like 65 per cent or 70 per cent of pre-war levels. You asked whether or not water was being tankered in, yes water is being tankered in to particular areas but the problem is greater than that because we need more investment and in some areas we may well need to construct new water treatment plants. That is not the case in Basra, I asked that specific question when I visited the water treatment plant there and I was told that we did not necessarily need a new one but we needed to work very hard to get the one that is there already working effectively and serviced.

Q59  Mr Battle: Are you reassured that there is not a chance of widespread outbreaks of disease as a result of the lack of clean water? Is that a fear haunting the Department or do you think if we can get water once every three days we will be able to assuage that fear of a major epidemic either in Baghdad or in the rural areas in the next few months?

Baroness Amos: It is a concern. We were very pleased that we managed to contain the possibility of a cholera outbreak. In the discussions that I have had with UNICEF they have been very, very worried indeed about the spread of diarrhoea or diseases, particularly in children. Of course the problems with water are not just about access to clean drinking water but it is also about sanitation, and problems with sanitation remain a particular concern.

Q60  Mr Battle: A last question, I do not know how appropriate it is, when the immediate conflict in Kosovo ended I seem to recall the Government was also discussing in Parliament a windfall tax on the electricity and water utilities and they were being persuaded to move out pretty quickly to help repair electricity in pumping stations and make a contribution to the reconstruction of Pristina. Is there any talk yet - if there needs to be an upgrading of the water facilities and electricity facilities - of British companies being involved either making a contribution for free or being engaged in contracts to do that work?

Baroness Amos: We have not quite got to that stage yet and part of the reason for that is the Committee will know that USAID already have a number of contracts which they have given to a number of companies for the interim. Some are with respect to public health. There is one to ABT Associates, which is for 10 million initially, and up to 43.8m over 12 months, which is about reforming the Iraqi ministry of health. On health, water and sanitation services there is a contract with UNICEF of some 8m for one year and initially up to 40 million, so there are a number of contracts that have already been let. I know that Patricia Hewitt has been talking to British companies about their interest in going into Iraq and looking at some of the possibilities, but nothing specific has happened as yet.

Q61  Ann Clwyd: Can I continue on the question of security, obviously there was a gun amnesty proposed and people were supposed to hand in their guns at the beginning of June, do you think that was a bad idea given the situation, where people still feel it necessary to keep their guns given that they also feel threatened? Was this misconceived? What has happened in the meantime?

Baroness Amos: There is a huge amount of disappointment at the response, which has been an extremely low level. I think that we would all probably say that it is worth trying, although I take the points that you make about the security situation. The point was also made to me that there is a cultural point here, this is a culture where a number of people are used to having arms and weapons and in a situation where there is a great deal of insecurity any kind of arms amnesty would not work.

There is a further issue which is about communication. One of the things that I was very struck by when I was in Iraq was our need to communicate more and through a range of fora with the Iraqi population - television, radio, newspapers, whatever - so that there is a greater understanding of what the coalition forces are there for, what our plan is with respect to next steps, our desire to hand power over to the Iraqis as quickly as possible with the political councils being a first part of that, so it may be that if there had been an information campaign going hand in hand with the amnesty campaign we might have seen a little bit more. But I do take your point: that with the security situation as it is at the moment people are going to be very reluctant to hand in their weapons.

Q62  Ann Clwyd: I think maybe they ought to look at what happened in Kurdistan because, when I first went there, everybody carried a gun on the street and it was over a period of time - years not just weeks - that the disarmament of the population was achieved. I think maybe there is a tendency not to look at the experience in other parts of Iraq, having got that experience and it being successful. I do not know if you managed to visit that area when you were there?

Baroness Amos: No, I did not. Again, I do think that it is important that we learn from success stories but also that we recognise that things are going to take time.

Q63  Ann Clwyd: Did you get any information on the kind of attacks that you have described of sabotage, burning, looting, and whether you thought it was part of any plan, because I was describing earlier documents that I saw which gave instructions to the population as to how they should deal with the people who took over after the war and how they should be ready for some reawakening of the Ba'athists some time in the future. Did you get any further information on that?

Baroness Amos: I certainly got a sense that what happened in the initial aftermath of the conflict was very likely spontaneous and to do with people's dislike of the regime but that what is going on now is much more planned and is much more about sabotage than it is about looting. For example, I met a group of Iraqi women and they told me of conversations that they had overheard - I think they were talking about when they were trying to shop but basically the individuals were being intimidated - individual Iraqis - who it was felt perhaps had skills and would work with the coalition: that, as Saddam Hussein had not been found, they were being intimidated and told that the Ba'athists would return so that people needed to be very careful. Indeed, while I was in Baghdad there was at least one individual working for the electricity company, an Iraqi individual who was shot and killed, so that rumour is rife: individuals are being intimidated and being told that if they either help the coalition in any way or indeed give the coalition information in any way they or their families would face retribution.

Q64  Ann Clwyd: Do you feel the reinstated Iraqi police have been adequately vetted, given that a few weeks ago they found a Ba'athist cell within a reinstated group of police who then had to be dismissed? Do you think that process has been sufficiently thorough to root out those kind of people?

Baroness Amos: Well, again, the whole de-Ba'athification process is something I discussed in very general terms, particularly when I was in Baghdad. There was a sense that mistakes had been made certainly earlier on, but also a recognition that the CPA would not necessarily get it right every time but that Iraqis themselves would be contributing to this process - and indeed have, and I was giving examples with respect to the Ministry of Health where Iraqis themselves had denounced individuals. This process has to be managed very sensitively because, of course, what you do not want is a situation where people use this process because of individual vendettas. On the police, we now have some 10,000 police who have been contracted back - some 8,000 in Baghdad and 2,000 in Basra. There is a process that they are being put through. I hope that it is a rigorous process but, as I say, there was a recognition within the CPA that mistakes might be made but that they just had to be conscious of that and would need to respond and react quickly if, indeed, that were the case.

Q65  Ann Clwyd: What do you think are the recent implications of the killing of the British Military Police in that very unfortunate incident, of which we do not know the full facts yet, for the training of police and Iraqi police in future?

Baroness Amos: As I say, of course it was a deeply, deeply unfortunate incident - terrible - but I spoke to the head of the Military Police when I went to visit a prison in Basra that had been reconstructed, as it were, and there is now almost a complex - calling it a "complex" is putting much too fine a point on it but we now have a police station, a prison and a courthouse all of which have been refurbished and all of which are now in use, and he and his team were very clear that their work would continue, that they saw this very much as an isolated incident and they did not feel it would impinge in the longer term. What we have to do, I think, is to wait and see the result of the investigation which is being carried out. I admire enormously their commitment and their dedication but I think we need to know the facts behind this. I absolutely hope that they are right.

Q66  Ann Clwyd: There is some argument going on about whether other military people should be armed. The Kurdish peshmerga are allowed to carry arms but the Shia feel very angry that they are not allowed to carry arms. I do not know what you feel about the involvement of local security people in the policing of their own country, whether you think that should be extended to the Shia as well as to the Kurdish peshmerga?

Baroness Amos: I think this is something the Iraqis themselves are going to have to make some decisions on in the longer term. What we have to try and do is, first of all, get the security situation under control. We have to train the police and we have seen some success in that in the south. It is one of the areas that we see very much as a priority and I am aware that there are plans which are being drawn up to disarm the peshmerga, for example. I think we have to get the situation stable and then it will be for the Iraqis to make decisions in the longer term about armament, but I think we would want to see disarmament in the first instance.

Q67  Mr Walter: I would like to ask you, Secretary of State, some questions about the delivery of humanitarian relief and more particularly about the lessons we might learn from this particular conflict, but I must say I was a little bit concerned by your earlier suggestion that one of the problems that we are suffering from in Iraq at the moment in terms of the breakdown in the security situation was because we had prepared for a different type of outcome - we had prepared for a humanitarian problem rather than a security problem - because certainly when the Committee were meeting with officials from UN agencies and the World Food Programme and others before the conflict and at many of our meetings when we were in Washington and New York and the conflict was under way talking to USAID and again with UN and others, certainly my perception and I think of other members of the Committee was that really we had under-estimated the potential problems that could have arisen in this conflict and if there had, God forbid, been 25 million starving Iraqis on the streets, we could simply not have coped with that. Going on from that, however, could you perhaps tell the Committee who has been responsible for the delivery of humanitarian relief in Iraq because it appears, certainly from my perception, that it has very much been the military, and if it is the military who are responsible in a conflict situation inevitably their military objectives come first and it is up to the other agencies to pick up afterwards. If it is coming second in terms of the military's objectives in the conflict that we have just gone through, how do you think in future conflicts, if there are to be future conflicts - and Heaven forbid that there are not - when the Oil For Food programme and the Iraq situation is suspended and all the NGOs have to pull back and there are just a few International Red Cross or Red Crescent people on the ground, how do you think that this vacuum could and should be filled, if we were facing, which we did not face in Iraq, a situation where most of the population were starving and on the streets?

Baroness Amos: I hope I have got the sense of your question right. On food, the World Food Programme has been taking the lead in terms of managing and getting food to the millions of Iraqis who have been dependent on the Oil For Food programme, and one of the things that has been very positive in that process is that the whole distribution network, and the Iraqis themselves who have been running the Oil For Food programme, was pretty much able to be up and running in a very short period of time, and we have funded the World Food Programme. UNICEF has taken the lead in immunisation services, in water and sanitation restoration, for example, UNDP, the UN Development Programme, the restoration of electricity supply system, the World Health Organisation, emergency support for the health sector; the UN office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs established humanitarian information centres and also gave support for information and communications technology, so a whole number of different UN agencies, plus NGOs like Save the Children fund and, of course, the International Federation of the Red Cross. What the military did in the immediate aftermath, and indeed what our own military are still involved with, was some of what we call the quick impact projects, the things they could go in and do - for example, our engineers in the military who could go and help get a prison back up and running. They could do the basic repairs and get the infrastructure put together - and I visited a prison in Basra where they had got the basic infrastructure back up and running - so that you could get the people back up in there to get the services back up and running. They have rehabilitated a number of police stations across the south and got the courthouse back in state where it could be used again as a courthouse, so a lot of these quick impact projects - putting a roof on a school so that classes could then restart - are what we expected the military to do in the immediate aftermath of the conflict and that is what they have been doing, but at the same time you have had the UN agencies and the NGOs in there as well who have been working in specific areas.

Q68  Mr Walter: That is how it has transpired but the point is that, up until 28 March when the UN passed its Oil For Food resolution and we had the Flash appeal, the assumption in Washington of the people driving this was that they were going to be in the lead in any humanitarian assistance, and in fact the Committee was in Washington and had a meeting with Andrew Natsios, the director of USAID, who asked us in the meeting if we could help him get a shipment of wheat from the Gulf into Basra because he had no money to pay for it because it was not American wheat, but he was working on the assumption that it was his job and it was only later that week that the UN passed that resolution. There did not seem to be, certainly in our preliminary meetings with UN agencies, any sort of co-ordination between the military drivers of the campaign and the humanitarian agencies. Luckily they were prepared and desperate to get involved on 28 March, but up until that date they were not there. Do you not think that in any future adventure of this nature we ought to be involved?

Baroness Amos: I would not agree with that from our side of things. I would say that we have always seen a central role for the UN: that we have consulted and liaised with a range of UN agencies: that we have not stopped doing that: we have done that in previous crises and it is certainly something we did in this crisis.

Q69  Mr Walter: We certainly did.

Mr Malik: May I add to that? The UN agencies have a humanitarian mandate come what may, regardless of the circumstances of the conflict. The UN agencies planned for their humanitarian response in Iraq: they were active in Iraq before the conflict: they had 3,500 national staff who continued to work through the conflict, and as soon as was possible, due to the good preparation that they had made, they were able to bring back their international staff quickly and to activate the emergency supplies that they had pre positioned, so the UN agencies did gear up for this crisis. We talked to them behind the scenes over perhaps a 6/9 month period prior to the war itself so a lot of work went into preparation for this war on the UN side.

Q70  Mr Walter: But the problem that I am trying to get to the bottom of is that the UN agencies had to suspend their operations and the Oil For Food programme was suspended when the conflict broke out and it was only good luck (a) that the conflict was short and (b) that there was at least six weeks' of food supplies in Iraq prior to the conflict breaking out, but if we had had a different situation those UN agencies could not have gone in if the conflict had still been under way, if there was serious fighting going on throughout Iraq. What would have happened in those situations?

Baroness Amos: I do not think it was good luck that there was six week's food available in Iraq. It was pre positioned for the very good reason that it was not clear how long the conflict was going to last, so there was a stocking-up of food supplies for that very reason. It was not good luck.

Q71  Mr Khabra: One of the biggest problems at the moment which is affecting Iraq is the absence of a facto post conflict station. The situation is that new leaders have emerged, mainly Shia clerics, who would like to take control of the country, who are not acceptable to the coalition partners. On the other hand, the coalition partners have appointed ex-Ba'athist and Iraqi exiles who are not perhaps acceptable to the people, and then there are other groups trying to take control of the political institutions. In this sort of situation the NGOs have called for a rapid re-instatement of civilian authority in the country, which should be co-ordinated by a visible impartial UN presence which can distance post-war recovery from what happened during the conflict. How much of that assessment do you share? Is the UN perceived as having done a bad job in Afghanistan, because the UN is involved quite a lot there? What problems do you anticipate if the UN is confined to a marginal advisory role?

Baroness Amos: In terms of the analysis, I think it is absolutely critical that we get to a situation where Iraq is run by Iraqis and is seen to be run by Iraqis who can make decisions about priorities with respect to the reconstruction effort. The Committee will know that progress is being made on establishing a political council that will be representative of the different religious and ethnic groups in the country, and which will also have significant participation by women. A number of meetings have been taking place: a number of women are meeting on a regular basis with members of the Coalition Provisional Authority: there are a number of political groups, representatives from some seven political groups, meeting on a regular basis and the intention is for the formation of the political council which would then form the basis of an interim Iraqi administration. It was very interesting; in the discussions I had on this while I was in Baghdad there was a very strong feeling emerging that it was more important for the political process to take time and to bed down to get it right than to move to something which was hurried where perhaps some dominant groups would have a greater say because it had been rushed. On your specific question whether the UN have done a bad job in Afghanistan, I would not say that. I am not sure where that view is coming from. As you know, the Secretary General has a special representative, Ambassador Brahimi in Afghanistan, who is working very closely with international organisations and NGOs and others. On your second question about the UN, we very much see the UN as having a central role. I had a conversation with Sergio de Mello; he was absolutely clear that he has been talking with a number of individual Iraqis and Iraqi organisations; he has some very good ideas about the political process which he is feeding into the CPA, and he very much sees his role, given the Security Council resolution, as being ensuring that that resolution is upheld.

Q72  Mr Khabra: But what is your assessment, because we read in the press quite a lot about the leadership of Shias who before the conflict started in Iraq were living in Iran and were getting all the support from the Iranian government, and they were the ones who were getting a lot of support when, during the Middle East conflict, they were the victims of Saddam Hussein's atrocities and they got all the support from the western countries and they do not seem to realise now that they are coming back, and it appears to me that there is perhaps a possibility of a merging of Islamic fundamentalism. What is your assessment about that?

Baroness Amos: I think there are all kinds of different pressures at present - there is no doubt about that. Politically Basra and Baghdad I think are the most complicated and, again, that is because of the complexity in terms of the different groups wanting to have a voice and wanting to have a say. It is interesting - if you go outside of Basra and Baghdad you will see that mayors have been elected, that a political process is emerging which there is support for in those smaller towns, but in Basra and Baghdad it is much more complicated because of these different religious and ethnic affiliations. It is by no means an easy process. I too have read concerns being voiced in the press about the possibilities of a rise in Islamic fundamentalism and I think that is one of the reasons that some of the Iraqis I was speaking to said they would rather see a slower process with respect to the political council, the constitutional process and the establishment of the Iraqi interim authority than a process that was too fast, that embedded at too early a stage an unevenness in the political structure which would not be helpful in the long term.

Q73  Chris McCafferty: At a previous hearing our colleague, Ann Clywd, told us that during meetings she had had with women whilst she was in Iraq some of the women were accusing each other of being members of the Ba'athist party, therefore "Do not listen to her" - that kind of attitude - and in the hearing today she has told us of the difficulties of developing an untainted and independent judiciary in Iraq. How do you distinguish between those Iraqis who were simply members of the regime in order to do their job - low level technocrats, managers - and those who were in fact the elite, were very involved in the regime - the commissioners, if you like?

Baroness Amos: I spoke to Ambassador Bremer about this and the coalition are looking at this in two different ways. First of all, the first three tiers, as it were, are excluded, and the first three tiers mean the minister, deputy minister and the director general of the ministry. The other thing they have looked at are the individuals who held very senior party positions, so if you held a very senior party position but you were more junior in the pecking order you were still excluded. There is an exclusion process - individuals can apply or, indeed, if a ministry feels it cannot function effectively without a particular individual then an application can be made for that individual to be excluded, and it will be weighed up, and I understand that some applications have been made for exemptions, but that basically is the criteria that is being used. You are quite right: there will be people who joined the Ba'ath party just so they can get a job, not because they necessarily believe in what the regime is doing.

Q74  Chris McCafferty: It must be very difficult for people who have worked in a centrally controlled police state - which obviously Iraq was for many, many years - and how those people are coping now working under a much more open, new CPA organisation. Are people finding that difficult? Are they able to think for themselves? Are they being allowed to use their initiative or do they not know what initiative is, and is that having an impact on the new processes?

Baroness Amos: I certainly did not have any sense that people were finding it difficult but I did meet senior people, as it were, in the ministries. I met with 38 senior people from the Health ministry, from Planning and Public Works. I think they absolutely relish the possibilities in terms of having control, being able to set priorities for themselves. Iraqis are skilled, knowledgeable, and have a great deal of capacity. I have no sense that people fear this, certainly at senior levels, although there will undoubtedly be management problems in some of those ministries because you will have some people who have worked in a particular way and you will have to generally change the culture of those ministries, and that will be daunting. In any organisation, to change organisational culture is a difficult process. I think the other and perhaps more difficult issue will be the relationship between Baghdad and the other areas, the governance, because what they are used to is Baghdad very much having responsibility to set the budget, set the priorities and then giving instructions down to the governance. That will have to be changed. The governance will want to set their own budgets and their own priorities, so a more decentralised system will have to develop which I think will be a challenge but I have no doubt people will be able to rise to it.

Q75  Chris McCafferty: Has any thinking been done about this issue? Ann Clwyd I think mentioned earlier that some of the Shias would like to see a federalised kind of union in Iraq, in different areas, and clearly that is not the thinking in Baghdad at the moment by the American administration. Has any thinking been done along the lines of what you are talking about decentralisation and regional power?

Baroness Amos: There are two different things here. I think immediately what is happening is that a process is being set up between CPA Baghdad and the governance with respect to budget setting and so on and that is just an immediate thing - it is not about any kind of longer term decentralisation. Those discussions will form part of the constitutional discussions that will happen once the political council is established and once a framework is established for the constitutional discussions which have to take place.

Q76  Chris McCafferty: Can I ask in particular about the role of women in the future of Iraq? Two weeks ago I chaired a conference here in Parliament which was about women and conflict resolution and the delegates were Iraqis, Iranians and Afghani - all women - and the Iraqi women, of whom there were a number, all expressed very grave reservations about the status of women in Iraq currently. It was being suggested that women not covering their heads were being refused pick-up by taxis and refused service in shops, and that this was an increasing occurrence, and obviously they were very concerned about it. What I would like to know is what is being done to ensure the full involvement of women at a political and, indeed, economic and social level because it is only by having women involved particularly in discussions about government, both centrally and regionally, that you are able to affect the lives of ordinary women lower down?

Baroness Amos: As I said, there are on-going discussions between the CPA and representatives of women's organisations and also the CPA trying to encourage the political parties that are engaged in discussion about the political process to involve women in that process. The women I met had a number of concerns. Top of their agenda was security and the impact this was having on their own ability to move around freely, but also the ability of their children to return to school and so on. They also have concerns that a fear culture was developing, so it was not so much that women were being told that they had to cover their heads or had to look a particular way but that somehow there was a fear being generated which made women feel they had to do this even though they had not been told they had to do this and they were very concerned about that, and the third point was raised with me was that we needed to recognise that this was not new: that although women had had a lot of freedoms, in fact they had had freedoms in really the 70s and 80s and the Saddam regime had used the 90s really to constrain women and that this needed to be recognised too. A number of women who had high profile jobs had just been sacked in the early 90s, for example, on very spurious grounds which related to perhaps a member of their family being perceived as being engaged in dissident activity and that kind of thing.

Q77  Chris McCafferty: I think your point about security is absolutely right and that was one of the points that was raised because, whilst women feel insecure on the streets, it is important if they go out on the street that they can get a taxi pretty quickly, and if now they are finding that if they are not covered the taxi will not pick them up then obviously the choice is cover your head or stay at home, so it is very important.

Baroness Amos: Finally, there is a concern about an increase in violence against women - publicly but also in the home.

Chairman: Secretary of State, thank you very much. That was a very comprehensive coverage of some of the most immediate issues relating to Iraq. We are now going to go on briefly to talk about trade and WTO and Cancun, and I think you very kindly said that you will come back in October and have a more extended session on Cancun or post Cancun and the WTO, and it may well be that we could then, if needs be, crave your indulgence and ask some questions on Iraq depending on how things develop.