Committee on the Lord Chancellor's DepartmentMinutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 80-99)

TUESDAY 11 MARCH 2003

PROFESSOR LEE BRIDGES AND MRS NICOLA PADFIELD

  80. Mrs Padfield, are you happy with that?
  (Mrs Padfield) I think we have to keep separate the judicial issues and the administrative issues. One of the recommendations in Auld which I thought was particularly interesting, and has slipped away at the moment on—page 272—is that all members of the judiciary, whether lay or professional, should be brought within the responsibility of the local resident judge, and the judicial hierarchy of which he is a part. That strengthening of the local judiciary to include the magistracy could be hugely useful. I am with Professor Bridges that there needs to be much greater continuity between magistrates' and crown courts. Centralisation in itself, may be a good thing but I would repeat, as I said right at the beginning, that I do not think we can judge whether the proposals in the Bill will make court users happier people. There is not enough on the face of the Bill to see what will happen in practice and whether local courts will function better. Who knows?

  81. You said earlier that your field was not particularly the civil field but I wonder if either of you feel that an opportunity has been missed to unify the family courts?
  (Mrs Padfield) I would not feel confident to speak on that subject.
  (Professor Bridges) I guess the question is do you take the family jurisdictions of the magistrates' courts and put them somewhere else? I personally have my doubts that that is necessarily a good thing because I think it would become much less local if you did so, but I am not a great expert in this area either.

Keith Vaz

  82. Can I take you back to the answer, Professor Bridges, that you gave to Mr Soley, and the issue of listing not being a judicial function? Is there an example anywhere in the world, and you have vast experience in these matters, that we should be looking at which best deals with this issue, because the issue of listing and delay is, of course, a real problem for people going before the courts. Is there another country where they have got it right?
  (Professor Bridges) I am not sure there is. In most countries I know about judges hold on to listing as a judicial function because they like to be able to control what sort of cases are appearing before them and what they are doing. I do not mind in one sense that it is regarded as a judicial function but, in making the decisions about it, it has to be done in some sort of co-ordinated way with other issues, both to do with the court system and with things like legal aid. I once did a study for the old Legal Aid Board about providing duty services in County Courts for housing possession cases, and it was fairly economic to do it as long as you could make sure the County Court heard all the housing possession cases on one list one day a week but many County Court judges would not have that. They wanted a mixed list, and so you would have to provide these duty services every day in the County Courts rather than one or two days a week, and those sorts of issues have to be taken into account both by what I would call the local board of management, which would marry up the judicial decision-making with these other decisions, and through the consultative councils which I would hope would have much broader representations than is laid down in this Bill. They have to be much broader. If I may make a plea here, both in terms of the membership of the court administration councils and in terms of membership of rules committees later on in the Bill, the Lord Chancellor seems to have forgotten that he is also responsible for the Legal Services Commission and legal aid. I do not know why the Legal Services Commission is not represented on all of those bodies.

  83. On the courts administration councils, are you a fan of the new CACs? The new arrangements for the new courts administration councils?
  (Professor Bridges) If they become a wider consultative body. At the moment we have court users' committees for Magistrates' Courts, County Courts, and similar for Crown Courts. The great advantage of CACs is you need to look at those courts as a whole, particularly Magistrates' and Crown Courts in terms of criminal matters, and I think to the extent that they have that remit that is a step forward. We should be talking about the Court Service generally within a local area and where things fit within that structure. If that is their remit and it is that wide then membership has to be much wider than having two judges, two practitioners and two representatives of the public.

  84. So what is the ideal size?
  (Professor Bridges) If they are going to be a consultative body which is what I would make them, an advisory body, I would certainly want to have a much wider group of judges on them, a much wider group of practitioners on them, and have a lay membership that at least made up a third of the membership. But I can see these being 25 member bodies because they should be consultative bodies; the board of management should have to consult with them on a regular basis about the issues supporting a management scheme.

  85. Mrs Padfield, did you agree with the principle of court administration councils?
  (Mrs Padfield) I think it would be difficult to disagree with having an advisory committee on court users or of court users. I would want to distance myself a little bit from Professor Bridges in relation to judicial control over listing. I heard him to be asking a question which did not necessarily have an answer yet and it is terribly important that some of these questions be explored much further before decisions are taken. A truly independent judiciary needs to be in some sense in control of its courts, and I think this question of who runs the courts is a hugely important issue which we have not adequately grappled with yet.

  86. Who should run them?
  (Mrs Padfield) Obviously the executive—civil servants if you like—will run them and they should be under, therefore, a government department accountable to Parliament and to the judiciary. I think the question which to me is very difficult is the extent to which the Court Service can be accountable to the judiciary, but if you think in terms of constitutional theory and separation of powers it is very important that the independent judiciary is in some sense responsible. I am not going to go so far as to say that they should run the Court Service because I think that is unrealistic in terms of resources. There is a pay-off, a trade-off, between issues of resources and issues of independence which to me are very troubling. I am not an expert on comparative constitutional law but in the little bit of reading that I have done on the subject it is not clear to me that countries where judges are more clearly in charge of their courts are better systems because it very often boils down to questions of resources and that is where, of course, these efficiency and effectiveness questions are troubling because the cynic knows they are about saving money.

  87. But as far as the magistrates' courts are concerned and the proposals in this Bill, in principle you think they are okay but there are features of the old system which we need to retain and we need to look at membership and issues of accountability? Apart from that, you are relaxed about them?
  (Mrs Padfield) It is difficult to take issue with them because there is not anything in the proposals to take issue with.
  (Professor Bridges) On the CACs, one thing I think should be done is to require the Lord Chancellor to consult them in particular about his decisions under Clause 25 which is to do with court sittings and where courts can sit and issues of court closures, because at the moment there is no specific remit for CACs to consider these matters—

Chairman

  88. At the moment, if Mr Vaz were to ask a Parliamentary Question about the closure of a magistrates' court and the fact it was not sitting in a particular place the Lord Chancellor would answer that this is a matter for the Magistrates' Court Committee which illustrates, of course, that theoretically it is autonomous. The Magistrates' Court Committee will say, "The Lord Chancellor is making us to do it and will not give us the resources to keep the court going" so you have that typical British fudge, whereas under the Bill's proposals it will presumably not be a fudge; Mr Vaz can ask the Parliamentary Question and the Lord Chancellor will have to say, "I have decided after consulting the CAC to close this court".
  (Professor Bridges) Or the Lord Chancellor's spokesman in the House of Commons will have to answer the question, yes, but I also think that there is an issue about local consultation and it is not clear to me at the moment that the CACs would need to be consulted about a court closure if you look at the way the general duty is framed, etc, and I think there should be a very specific reference in the Bill that the Lord Chancellor has to consult the CACs under section 25.

Keith Vaz

  89. But in practice they would be consulted, of course, would they not?
  (Professor Bridges) I do not know because what the Bill does is allow enormous flexibility about where courts can sit and when, etc, and I can well imagine not closing a court but just not sitting in it so often or something like that, so you are effectively closing a local court in some distant place, or you could suddenly say, "Well, we are going to sit in the local CAB", or something like that. That may be good but there does need to be wide consultation on these issues. I am concerned, for example, with advising the Legal Services Commission in various guises about the provision of criminal defence services, and I have to say that when we have been asked to look at the provision of criminal defence services in a number of rural areas—and I am not just talking about mid-Wales where you may have to travel 100 miles on local roads in Wales to get to your magistrates' court; I am talking about Norfolk and Suffolk and places like that as well—it is, within the rules that the Legal Services Commission has laid down for duty solicitor services, very difficult to run an economic service because of the distances involved.

  90. Finally, on the question of involving those judges and magistrates in court management, do you not think there is a real possibility of conflict of interest arising over issues of resources and closures, for example? People know the local magistrates, do they not, so would that not put them in a very difficult position?
  (Professor Bridges) I do not see that it is going to put people in a difficult position; no more than a local councillor is in a difficult position in terms of making decisions.

  91. Yes, but do not forget that a local councillor is elected. They have to go back to the electorate.
  (Professor Bridges) We do accept, and I accept, that there are some areas of management to do with the management of the judicial resource that for reasons of judicial independence have to rest with unelected people, the people you have appointed as judges or as magistrates, but I do not accept that that means, when you are carrying out those management functions, they cannot operate in as open and democratic way as they can. That is not to say that there will be interference with their individual judicial decisions and cases. I think we can make that separation and we often do on all sorts of bodies, and if the board of management is dealing with a matter which does affect an individual it can go into private sitting to deal with that, as I do when I chair the School of Law staff meeting. If we have to discuss an individual member of staff it becomes a closed meeting, and that is perfectly possible.

  92. Do you agree, Mrs Padfield?
  (Mrs Padfield) Yes, but what I would want to add is that Clause 8 of the Bill says, "The Lord Chancellor is to specify local justice areas and may make orders altering them". We are talking as though we know what a local justice area is, but it might be any size. If you look at the history of the Magistrates' Courts Committees there have been huge changes over the last twelve years, and the animal which is a Magistrates' Court Committee is not the same as it was in 1949 when they were invented. So does "local" mean small or quite big? I think we should be very worried about these issues, and the lack of clarity.
  (Professor Bridges) There is enormous lack of clarity in the present arrangements, I might add. I have recently been trying to find out the postal areas covered by petty sessional division areas and I can tell you, nobody knows. The local police do not know, the local courts do not know, the Lord Chancellor's Department does not know—nobody knows.

Chairman

  93. There still seems to be a confusion of views which I cannot resolve. The merit of magistrates' committees as they used to be, not so much as they have been in the last few decades but as they used to be, administering courts and making decisions about where they sit and whether they close or stay open, is that it is local and is open to local communities. The de-merit of that is that it ignores the existence of a whole resource issue and the need to manage courts efficiently rather than as a whole series of separate units each making their own decision in that regard to anybody else further up the judiciary chain. The Bill appears to go in the direction of central management which is more democratically or locally accountable because at the end of the day somebody has to answer Parliament politically for a decision to close the court but some of the magistrates would feel that they have lost or will be losing local control, particularly if the distinction between an advisory and management role is clearly maintained.
  (Professor Bridges) I would agree. Where the Bill is lacking, and I agree with Nicola Padfield on this entirely, is how it is going to work locally. It is very vague. At the moment if you look at the CACs it is unclear whether they will have a management or advisory role, what their role is, how it is going to be sorted out, what their membership should be, etc, and that is where I would hope you and your colleagues will really be pressing the Lord Chancellor to say, "How is this going to work locally?"

Dr Whitehead

  94. Changing the subject somewhat, a number of groups that have taken an interest in this Bill have welcomed with some reservations the establishment of the new courts fines officers. Do you share that welcome or do you have concerns?
  (Mrs Padfield) I think the question is why you want these fines officers; what is their function; who are they? Again, it is not transparent on the face of the Bill. There are, of course, and we all know it, huge problems with the enforcement of fines. What do we have to do? What is the key to good fine enforcement? The first question has to be appropriate fines in the first place. Unit fines—scrapped ridiculously fast in the early 1990s for reasons which we all remember. There needs to be structured support for those paying fines. I have long been a fan of money payment supervision orders and at the latest figures they are going down all the time—in 1996 there were 6,400 and in 2000 there were 1,600 money payment supervision orders. Why so few? Magistrates do not think about them and probation officers do not want them because they themselves are hard pressed with more serious community penalties and they do not want to be involved. But I think we need more structured support for those paying fines and the other issue is some very fundamental thoughts about the role of financial penalties in the sentencing framework. Again, there are interesting links to be made between the Courts Bill and the Criminal Justice Bill which could be explored further. There are a number of very important areas where huge fines are unenforceable where you could argue that fines should not have been given in the first place. I was very impressed by a Home Office On-line Report 09/03, Clearing the debts: the enforcement of financial penalties in Magistrates' Courts and Alan Mackie's research, which, I commend to the Committee's attention, where they explore all sorts of issues in relation to non payment of insurance or non payment of TV licences, for example: "A number of magistrates also suggested that the best way forward in this context would be to make it a mandatory requirement to display certificates of insurance in car windscreens so that such offences could be more quickly detected and to create a stronger deterrent effect". On TV licences: "The better way, many suggested, from the point of view of minimising risk of evasion and the costs of enforcement, would be to tax usage (for example through `pay to view' TV or through duty on petroleum spirit...", in relation to cars. There are other issues in relation to fine enforcement and my feeling about what is in the Bill is that it is a red herring to the real issues.

  95. So are you essentially saying as far as fines officers are concerned that you would view them as individuals who, as it were, would "mop up" after rather inappropriate or not entirely effective levying of fines in the first place, rather than an innovation which will take the matter forward?
  (Mrs Padfield) The implication of your question is there are not people "mopping up" at the moment, and there are, of course people mopping up at the moment. Will the same people be mopping up in the future or will they be different? Again, on the face of the Bill, the message is quite clear. The Lord Chancellor needs more powers in relation to fine officers but it is not really very clear what powers he is going to give them and why, and there are some bigger issues than just who is a fine officer and what does he or she look like.

  96. Do you think there is an issue between the levying of a fine and the collection of a fine in the power of the fines officer to increase or vary the fine, and do you think that is perhaps an area of concern in terms of what might appear to be a second bite of the cherry in the fine process?
  (Mrs Padfield) Of course it is one of the issues. It is another of the issues close to the issue we were discussing earlier in relation to what is a judicial role and what is an administrative role so of course there are issues there to be thought about, but I do not see there is any problem with giving the fine enforcement officer some powers subject to the supervision of the court.
  (Professor Bridges) There is a right of appeal. There is no right of appeal, for example, against pre trial hearing decisions.

  97. Do you think the increased fine idea is likely to prove anything of a deterrent?
  (Mrs Padfield) It depends who has been fined. To talk in generalisations in these terms is very dangerous. I am about to do what I criticised the Bill for doing—generalising—but I think you do have to look a lot more deeply into the issue of who is being fined and who is not paying their fine and why they are not paying it. There are no easy answers and nobody should romantically believe that creating a fine officer will remove the problems of fine enforcement.

Mr Soley

  98. I am puzzled. You are saying there is not enough clarity. The whole of section 2 relates to the powers of fines officers. You refer to the money payment supervision orders and really all anybody could do there was go back to the court and say, "Look, I think you have hit this person excessively hard and they cannot really pay", or they have lost their job or whatever. Here you have much more flexibility for the fines officer. I suppose my only concern is that the question may be how well qualified and trained they are, but the fact is the powers are more varied, more flexible and better spelt out than ever under the old MPSO. Is that not right?
  (Mrs Padfield) No, because with a money payment supervision order the only option available to a probation officer is most certainly not to go back to the court and say, "My client cannot pay" but to sit down and help the client work out how they are going to pay. There are great issues whether the CAB and all sorts of other people can be involved in that way. Again, I think the interesting issue is who the fine officer will be, and what sort of person.

  99. But the fines officer can sit down and work it out with the person too but they have the power at least to vary it themselves instead of saying, "Well, I will go back to the court and ask for it to be varied". That is better, is it not?
  (Mrs Padfield) I have no problem with that, no.


 
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