On controlling the costs of the outbreak
(xi) The Department is currently engaged in discussions
with the livestock and insurance industries about alternative
ways of reimbursing farmers for the costs of having their animals
slaughtered. Rather than continue to make direct compensation
payments, the Department is considering a subsidised insurance
scheme or a joint industry-Government levy scheme. We are glad
that these options are being considered since they offer the prospect
of substantially reducing the taxpayer's exposure. The Department
should report its conclusions to Parliament.
(xii) The Livestock Welfare Disposal Scheme cost
over £200 million in payments to farmers and nearly as much
again to run, but failed in its purpose of alleviating animal
suffering. The eligibility criteria were difficult to monitor
and enforce, and generous payment rates led to the scheme being
overwhelmed. Future welfare schemes should have clear objectives
and eligibility criteria which can be readily checked. Payments
to farmers should be set at a level that encourages applications
to be submitted only in respect of genuine welfare cases.
(xiii) The Department has been withholding payment
of £90 million from companies in respect of invoices where
it has so far been unable to verify that the work claimed for
has actually been carried out. The Department is checking outstanding
invoices and seeking supporting documentation. It should seek
recovery in those cases where it believes it has been overcharged.
(xiv) Poor financial controls were exercised
by the Department over cleansing and disinfection work, which
cost some £300 million in total. The Department had few standards
or criteria on how cleansing and disinfection should be carried
out, and this lack of guidance led to large variations between
regions and significant differences in the costs incurred per
farm. Improved guidance should be developed on the standards of
cleansing and disinfection to be adopted in the event of any future
outbreak.
(xv) The Department chose to pay for the cleansing
as well as the disinfection of farms because it wanted to be sure
that the disease would not re-emerge. The Dutch government did
not pay for the cleansing of farms and therefore incurred significantly
lower costs on this work than the United Kingdom. The Department
should examine the Dutch experience to assess the risks and benefits
of their approach. The Department should also examine whether
in any future outbreak the cost of cleansing and disinfecting
could be met by the proposed insurance or levy scheme that is
under consideration.
CONTINGENCY
PLANNING FOR
A POSSIBLE
OUTBREAK OF
FOOT AND
MOUTH DISEASE
- The Department had prepared contingency plans
for foot and mouth disease which met European Union requirements.
The plans comprised a national contingency plan for Great Britain;
local contingency plans; and standing field instructions for veterinary
and other staff. The plans were approved by the European Commission
in 1993 and had been updated in various ways since then. In the
event, contingency plans worked in those areas where there were
relatively few cases. But in the worst hit areas, the resources
needed to deal with the disease rapidly went beyond what had been
envisaged in contingency plans.[2]
The Department acknowledged that the plans had proved inadequate
for the situation it faced, as the plans of other countries would
have done if they had faced the same situation.[3]
Scenario planning and wider impacts
- In line with European Commission guidance, the
Department's plans were based on the assumption that there would
not be more than ten infected premises at any one time. The Department
had not considered any other scenarios because it felt that the
risks of foot and mouth disease were low. This was a serious misjudgement.
In the event at least 57 premises were infected before the outbreak
was discovered and 2,000 premises were infected in total.[4]
- Little prior consideration was given to the impact
that a large-scale epidemic might have on non-farming businesses.
The outbreak had a severe impact on the rural economy, with many
small businesses that depend on countryside visitors being badly
affected. The closure of rights of way, alongside images of the
burning and burying of animal carcasses, was widely perceived
by the public at home and abroad as meaning that the countryside
was closed.[5]
The Department acknowledged that, in
the light of the experience of the 2001 outbreak, a blanket closure
of footpaths in the event of a future outbreak was unlikely.[6]
Consultation with stakeholders
- The Department had not consulted other key stakeholders
about its contingency plans, such as government departments, local
authorities and representatives of farmers and the veterinary
profession, though stakeholders had been involved in a number
of simulation exercises to test contingency plans, and a large
number of local authorities had been involved in the development
of local contingency plans. During the outbreak of classical swine
fever in 2000 the Department had held regular meetings with stakeholders.
The Department accepted that it needed to have a much more rigorous
process of engagement with stakeholders in the preparation and
testing of contingency plans.[7]
Reporting by farmers of suspected cases of foot
and mouth disease
- Foot and mouth disease is a notifiable disease
and there is an obligation on farmers or their vets to report
any suspected cases. In the event of an unreported case, the Department
would become aware of the disease only after it had spread, perhaps
being picked up in an abattoir or being noticed by a vet on a
farm visit. In the 2001 outbreak, the source case on a pig farm
was not reported for three weeks, by which time the disease had
spread far and wide. The Department's contingency plans did not
allow for the possibility of the disease not being reported, nor
did the plans consider that the disease might subsequently be
spread through sheep, where it would be difficult to detect.[8]
Preventing illegal meat imports
- The 2001 outbreak of foot and mouth disease was
probably caused by the importation of contaminated meat into the
United Kingdom. The Government was trying to minimise the risk
of illegal imports, and in March 2002 the Department published
an action plan on illegal imports. This plan included a risk assessment
based on the probabilities of undetected imports, the relevant
hazards and the risk pathways. Its success depended crucially
on effective intelligence and the sharing of data amongst the
various enforcement agencies.[9]
Vaccination
- Before the outbreak the Department had drawn
up detailed instructions for the use of emergency vaccination,
but these had not been distributed to local offices. At the height
of the outbreak, the Government had accepted that there might
be a case for a limited emergency vaccination programme, and the
Department had considered protective vaccination in Cumbria and
possibly Devon. A European Commission decision would, subject
to strict conditions, have permitted the vaccination of certain
animals in certain counties, with the vaccinated animals allowed
to live. The Government also set further conditions which would
have had to be met before vaccination went ahead: there would
be no slippage on the slaughter policy; there would be sufficient
support from farmers to ensure that vaccination of the vast majority
of the cattle involved would be completed within 14 days; and
the meat and milk from the animals would find a market. Vaccination
did not go ahead because the last two conditions were not met,
since the necessary support of farmers, veterinarians, retailers
and food manufacturers could not be obtained.[10]
- In November 2002, in response to the reports
of the Royal Society and Lessons Learned Inquiries into the 2001
outbreak, the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural
Affairs announced that the option of vaccination would form part
of any future strategy for the control of foot and mouth disease.[11]
Preparation of revised contingency plans
- The Department is revising its contingency plans
in the light of experience in 2001. An interim contingency plan
had taken account of discussions with stakeholders and other Government
departments. After discussions with stakeholders, the plans would
be tested by all the interested parties on a regular basis. The
Department was also working on the revision of contingency plans
for other notifiable animal diseases.[12]
In November 2002, in response to the various inquiry reports,
the Department published a revised version of its contingency
plan on its website for comment and consultation.[13]
HANDLING THE
OUTBREAK
- Foot and mouth disease was eradicated in two
months or less in around half the infected areas (Figure 2).
The Department was largely successful in containing the outbreak
to those areas initially infected with the disease, thereby protecting
large areas of important livestock production in adjoining and
more distant areas. The Department was also successful in ensuring
that once the disease had been stamped out in an area it did not
reappear. However, there were severe problems in handling the
outbreak in the worst-hit areas.[14]
Figure 2: Time taken to eradicate foot and mouth
disease by Disease Control Centre
Source: National Audit Office analysis of Departmental
figures
National movement ban
- Preventing the movement of infected animals
is a vital element of disease control since direct animal to animal
contact is the quickest means of virus transmission. The Department
did not impose a national movement ban (and closure of livestock
markets) until 23 February 2001, three days after the first case
was confirmed. It did not do so earlier because it believed that
local movement restrictions would control the disease. A national
ban would have been unprecedented, and the Department initially
considered that there was no evidence to justify it. One of the
Government's academic advisers has estimated that the overall
scale of the outbreak might have been reduced by between a third
and a half if a national movement ban had been imposed straightaway
on 20 February 2001.[15]
- The Department acknowledged that, had it known
on 20 February 2001 that the virus was already active on
57 farms, it would not have waited until 23 February 2001 to impose
a national movement ban. Between the identification of the disease
and the imposition of the national movement ban, a further 62
premises in seven counties were affected. If the ban had been
imposed from the first day, the disease might not have affected
those seven counties. However, the national movement ban imposed
on 23 February 2001 was widely regarded at the time as a
draconian measure, which could cause major welfare and economic
problems.[16]
The contingency plan now published by the Department is based
on the presumption that a national movement ban would be imposed
on the day the first case was confirmed.[17]
Shortage of vets
- After the disease was confirmed on 20 February
2001, operations were initially directed by the Department's veterinary
officers. In many areas they were overwhelmed by the scale of
the managerial and organisational role that they had to perform.
A severe shortage of vets led to delays in disease control, particularly
the identification and slaughter of infected and exposed animals.[18]
- The Department said that on 23 February
2001 it had activated the International Veterinary Reserve, an
agreement between the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Ireland
and New Zealand to support each other in the event of an outbreak
of disease. It had also advertised and requested vets from private
practice. However, it had proved difficult to achieve the very
rapid increase in the number of vets that was needed; it took
time both to recruit them and also to get them mobilised.[19]
Many were deterred by what they saw as the low rate of remuneration
of £160 a day. The Department therefore increased the daily
rate to £250 and backdated the increase to the start of the
crisis.[20]
- The availability of veterinary resources was
increased further by relaxing the quarantine periods for vets
after visiting infected premises. At the beginning of the outbreak
anybody who had been in contact with the foot and mouth disease
virus was not allowed on to farms for five days. During the outbreak
this period was first reduced to three days, following discussions
with the Institute for Animal Health, and then to 24 hours. In
Cumbria, which was extremely short of vets, the quarantine period
was reduced to overnight. The possibility of vets spreading any
disease was remote as they were cleaning and disinfecting as they
moved from one farm to another. In the event of another outbreak,
the quarantine period would probably be set at between 24 and
72 hours.[21]
- The Department said that the number of front
line vets had not altered significantly since 1990. Although there
had been a significant reduction in the management structure of
the State Veterinary Service, the number of field vets had remained
stable, varying slightly according to the ease of recruitment.
The staffing of the State Veterinary Service would now be reviewed
in the light of the various inquiry reports. The Department would
also be considering how to increase resources from outside the
State Veterinary Service to deal with an emergency.[22]
Military assistance
- The Department kept the military informed from
the outset but did not call for large scale military assistance
until mid-March 2001. The armed services went on to play a key
supportive role, assisting centrally and locally in the organisational
and logistical arrangements, particularly for slaughter, transport
and disposal.[23]
The Department said that it had initial contacts with the armed
services from the outset. Ministers formally notified the Ministry
of Defence on 1 March 2001 that they were considering military
assistance. But it was only at the beginning of the week of 12
March 2001, when the scale of the disease had become apparent,
that the Department identified a clear role for the armed services.[24]
Information technology systems
- The Department's communications and information
systems were severely stretched throughout the epidemic. At the
beginning of the foot and mouth outbreak, the Department had developed
the Disease Control System, a web based database which could be
accessed to add and remove information. A major difficulty with
the database was the three-fold problem of identifying animals,
owners and land. First, the farm and the land had to be identified,
then the owner of the land had to be established and finally the
animals had to be located. The Department was actively working
with the Rural Payments Agency and others to introduce a system
which would provide precise data on the location of each holding.
Such a system would however be extremely expensive and complex
to develop.[25]
Biosecurity and livestock tracking
- Biosecurity precautions to minimise the risk
of the foot and mouth virus being spread inadvertently are a key
element of disease control. They include the thorough cleansing
and disinfecting of people, equipment and vehicles by those working
on and visiting farms. Strict movement controls also need to be
put in place. During the 2001 outbreak foot and mouth disease
was spread largely as a result of movements of people, animals
and vehicles. Some 78% of foot and mouth disease cases resulted
from local spread between infected premises within 3 kilometres
of each other, much of which resulted from poor biosecurity.[26]
- Asked about an unmarked pig with suspected foot
and mouth disease which was identified in June 2002, the Department
said that the farmer was breaking the law, and the abattoir should
not have accepted it. Ministers were examining urgently with the
industry what further action should be taken in the light of this
case.[27]
The contiguous cull
- In mid-March 2001 the Government's scientific
advisers provided evidence that the Department was finding it
difficult to keep up with the number of new daily outbreaks and
was effectively chasing the disease. The advisers warned of an
exponential growth in the number of new cases. In the light of
this advice, the Department introduced a number of changes, including
the slaughter of animals on premises contiguous to infected premises.
These changes helped to control the disease but led to the culling
of many apparently healthy animals.[28]
- The Department said that the Government used
what it considered to be the best external scientific advice in
developing the contiguous cull policy. Animals on contiguous premises
would have been exposed to the disease and could have shed virus
before clinical signs of the disease became apparent. The scientific
advice given to the Government, and shared by the Government's
Chief Scientific Adviser, was that the number of cases would continue
to increase, perhaps dramatically, unless further action was taken.[29]
Disposal and environmental impacts
- The most commonly used methods of disposing of
slaughtered animals were burning, rendering, landfill and burial.
In practice the Department experienced problems with all the methods
used. In March 2001 many carcasses were disposed of on mass pyres,
but the Department said that it would not use funeral pyres as
a method of disposal in the event of any future outbreak.[30]
- Some 1.2 million carcasses were disposed of at
mass burial sites (Figure 3). Mass burial was adopted when
the disposal problem became very severe, especially after the
introduction of the contiguous cull policy. The Department thought
it prudent to plan for the worst case scenario, and the total
capacity of the sites was about three times that which was eventually
needed. The Department was in discussion with local authorities
and residents about what should now happen to the sites.[31]
Figure 3: Cost, capacity and use of the mass
burial pits