Select Committee on Transport Written Evidence


Memorandum by the London Transport Users Committee (LTUC) (OPT 11)

OVERCROWDING ON PUBLIC TRANSPORT

  Thank you for inviting us to submit a memorandum in connection with the Transport Committee's forthcoming inquiry into overcrowding. This is a topic which has long been of concern to the London Transport Users Committee (LTUC) and its predecessors, and we welcome the recognition of its seriousness which is implicit in its selection by your Members as an issue deserving of their scrutiny. In the astonishingly short interval allowed for receipt of submissions, it has not been possible for us to compile as comprehensive a review of the evidence as we would ideally have wished. But we hope that the following points will be of relevance and value.

1.  IS OVERCROWDING A SOURCE OF CONCERN TO USERS?

  1.1  "Overcrowding" is an elusive concept, though everyone knows it when they encounter it. What passengers regard as intolerable overcrowding may be seen by commercial transport operators simply as efficient asset utilisation. On the railways, it has no formal definition, because there is no legal limit to the number of people who can be carried on a train (or be present in a station), if they choose to force their way on board. And short of requiring all seats to be reserved, which is hardly a practicable option on busy commuter routes, there is no means of imposing one. Buses are subject to restrictions on their carrying capacity, which are set by law and (because they have fewer entrances and exits than trains) these are enforceable by their crews. But there is no systematic surveillance of the degree of compliance with these, and/or of the extent to which their capacity falls short of demand. On both modes, the operators' "conditions of carriage" specifically exclude any entitlement for ticket holders to be provided with a seat, except when one has been reserved, or to be accommodated on any particular journey.

  1.2  Complaints about overcrowding per se do not dominate the caseload of representations which the LTUC receives from members of the travelling public in and around the capital. Regular users have long since come to regard it as endemic on the busiest parts of the network at the busiest times of the day and week. Their failure to complain is doubtless conditioned by an awareness that it is not a problem susceptible to an instant solution which an intervention on the part of LTUC with the relevant operator is likely to secure. But when it occurs most acutely, it is often a symptom of other deficiencies in the planning and delivery of the service, such as delays, cancellations and (in the case of trains) short formations. So it is commonly mentioned in that context, where the primary purpose of the complaint is to secure redress for a specific journey failure.

  1.3  The Strategic Rail Authority commissions a twice-yearly poll of users' satisfaction with the quality of service offered on the National Rail network. Respondents are asked to rate their satisfaction with the overall journey experience, and with eleven individual service attributes, on a five-point scale from "very poor" to "very good". LTUC regularly monitors the findings, and reports these in terms of the net satisfaction rate, ie the excess of the proportion awarding positive ratings over the proportion awarding negative ratings (so the maximum possible range of values is +100% to -100%).

  1.4  The most recent results available at the time of drafting this letter were those for the seventh "wave" of the survey, conducted in the spring of 2002. The overall net satisfaction rating given by rail users in the London area was +55%, compared with +60% nationwide. Londoners were also more dissatisfied with all but one of the eleven individual facets of the service which are covered by the survey. In the case of "amount of seats/standing space" (the nearest approximation to a specific question on overcrowding), their average net satisfaction rating was +27%, compared with +38% nationally. Only two other service attributes were awarded even lower scores : "value for money" (-3% and "upkeep and repair of trains" (+15%).

  1.5  Not surprisingly, users of longer distance services were generally more content with this facet of performance than users of local trains in the London and south east area, because seats on longer distance journeys can usually be reserved in advance (and for some types of ticket, this is automatic). "Amount of seats/standing space" received a net satisfaction rating of +61% from passengers on the longer distance trains to and from London (ie the former InterCity routes), but a rating of only +32% from the users of the London and south east network. And within the latter group, there were wide variations between individual train companies. While Gatwick Express and Chiltern Railways achieved scores of +86% and +51% respectively, the equivalent ratings for Connex South Eastern and Thameslink were only +21% and +23%.

  1.6  Passengers declaring themselves to be "regular users" were also asked a more specific question about their experience of seat availability. Of these, 31% stated that there are always seats available, and 41% that this is usually so. Of the 16% who declared that they usually stand, 7% said that their trains were crowded and 5% that they were very crowded. The residual 10% reported that their experience varied. But these data are not disaggregated by operator, route or time of travel, and therefore give no direct insight into the location or duration of the problem if it occurs.

  1.7  London Underground also conducts regular satisfaction surveys amongst what it is wont to describe as its "customers". The methodology differs from that used for the Strategic Rail Authority's polling. For example, respondents are interviewed face-to-face on completion of their journeys rather than being asked to fill in questionnaires during the course of them, the content and wording of the questions varies, the range of issues covered is not identical, and satisfaction is recorded on a scale from 0 to 10 (with average scores scaled up to a range from 0 to 100). So direct comparisons cannot be made between the reported satisfaction levels of the users of the two networks, although many will be the same passengers.

  1.8  The Underground satisfaction survey covers 19 separate attributes of the service. In the most recent period for which data have been published, July to September 2002, the overall rating awarded by users was 75. The ratings for train crowding and platform crowding were, respectively, 71 and 73, ranking 15th and 11th out of the 19 attributes (the lowest score, 64, being given to train cleanliness). By this measure, therefore, London Underground is clearly regarded by its users as serving them less adequately in relation to crowding than in relation to the majority of the elements of its service.

  1.9  A similar survey is conducted on behalf of London Buses, although again there are differences in methodology which make direct numerical comparisons invalid. In the most recent period for which results are available, July to September 2002, bus users' overall satisfaction rating was 79 (on a scale from 0 to 100). The score for "level of crowding on bus" was 77, placing it 11th out of the 17 service characteristics covered, the lowest score being given to reliability (66).

  1.10  Users of London's bus stations are also polled. In the same period, the overall rating was 67, and the rating for the level of crowding was 70, placing it 10th out of 22 elements covered. The lowest rating in this survey was for the condition of toilets (44).

  1.11  Taken in isolation, these figures may have little apparent meaning. But the overall message they convey is that, for any of the modes of travel cited, users are more likely to be dissatisfied with the level of crowding they encounter (which they may therefore regard as overcrowding) than they are with the quality of service experienced overall, and with the majority of the other individual attributes about which they are asked.

  1.12  What these surveys do not reveal, however, is the relative importance attached by users to the various attributes of the services they encounter, and therefore the relative weighting they give to the need for improvement in each aspect. An insight into the importance of understanding this was offered by a recent survey of Public attitudes to transport in England 2001, sponsored by the Commission for Integrated Transport. Respondents were asked to rank a number of possible areas of improvement according to the level of priority they believed each should receive. Bus users ranked overcrowding sixth out of nine service elements listed, while rail users ranked it third and Underground users ranked it first. This indicates that the issue which the Select Committee is addressing is one with high salience in the eyes of those who are affected by it.

  1.13  It is also worth bearing in mind the comparative ratings awarded by the Government's People's Panel to the service quality delivered by a sample of retail services (on a scale from 0 to 100). Energy and communications utilities received net satisfaction ratings of over 80, and high street banks or building societies were rated at 78. The equivalent figures in the transport sector were 44 for London Underground, 37 for local buses and 28 for train companies.

  1.14  The clear impression which emerges is that public transport in general is regarded as offering a much lower quality of product than other commercial services, and that amongst people who do use it, the level of crowding ranks high on the list of service attributes they dislike. If the Government's ambition that trains and buses should recapture a larger share of the total transport market is to be fulfilled (and LTUC fully endorses this as an objective), the problem of overcrowding will have to be addressed, because it is a major deterrent to the use of public transport on the part of those travellers who have a choice. The irony of the position is that if the Government's policy is successful, then at least in the short term the problem is likely to grow worse, because overcrowding is a symptom of undercapacity at the times and in the places of peak demand, and a modal shift away from other forms of transport will simply exacerbate the situation. But enlarging capacity is expensive, particularly on the railways, and offers a low rate of return on the investment required if the additional space provided is fully used for only a short period each day.

2.  WHERE DOES OVERCROWDING OCCUR?

  2.1  In the absence of any objective definition of overcrowding, it is impossible to describe its incidence precisely. But on some parts of the public transport network, loading levels are recorded, and the resulting data can be used to obtain a partial insight into the extent of the problem.

  2.2  The operators of all franchised National Rail services (which constitute the vast majority) on the national rail network are required under the terms of their contracts with the Strategic Rail Authority to "use all reasonable endeavours to ensure that sufficient capacity is provided on each train . . . to carry without excessive overcrowding all passengers intending to travel on such a train . . ." But the term excessive overcrowding is not defined. The contracts merely set an "initial number of vehicles" as a benchmark, and operators face financial penalties if the number of vehicles included in their train plans (timetables) persistently falls below this.

  2.3  There is no systematic tracking of passenger numbers relative to train capacity on the longer distance services. The relevant train companies are perfectly willing to carry standing passengers for long journeys if they have not reserved seats or if all seats have been taken, although their rolling stock appears to be designed on the assumption that such a situation will seldom if ever arise, because no specific provision is made for the presence of standees. If standing passengers travel in the aisles of the saloons, they will obstruct movement along the train, and will find only vestigial handholds to support them. If they cluster in the vestibules, they will find no grab rails, perches or other means of support at all (and will probably find conditions extremely draughty). Anecdotally, we are aware that travel in such circumstances is a common event, and has become more so where older types of train (typically loco-hauled stock) have been replaced by newer ones (typically multiple units, with fewer carriages). But in the absence of any centralised monitoring and reporting of train loadings, we have no means of quantifying the precise distribution, frequency or scale of the problem.

  2.4  Most local rail services in and around London and the south east are subject to more exacting requirements in the form of "load factor specifications", related to the notional carrying capacity of each type of train. This varies according to the configuration of each type of rolling stock, depending on the number of seats and on the available standing space, but in broad terms it equates to about 110% of the seating capacity of slam-door trains and to about 135% of the seating capacity of sliding door trains. First class accommodation is disregarded. In addition, it is assumed that no passengers should have to stand for involuntarily for more than 20 minutes, so on trains where scheduled intervals between stations exceed this, the notional capacity is equal to the number of seats.

  2.5  All with-flow peak period trains entering or leaving London are monitored once a year, usually in the autumn (on dates selected to avoid known fluctuations in demand, eg school holiday periods). The peak period trains are defined as those arriving between 0700 and 0959, and those departing between 1600 and 1859. The count is carried out by observers located on platforms, because the level of crowding is often such as to make it impracticable to conduct counts on board, and only a small number of trains are yet fitted with automatic counting equipment (which detects variations in the load borne by the suspension system). There is thus an element of estimation in the results, but their accuracy is regarded as sufficient to identify the routes and trains on which crowding is most acute. The monitoring sites are selected to reflect the point of maximum loading on each route, which is normally on the approach to the London terminus, though it may be further afield if there is substantial level of transfer to/from the Underground at an intermediate station (such as Finsbury Park). Some sections of line are omitted where there is a high level of interchange between services for short-distance feeder trips, eg between Charing Cross and London Bridge, where many users simply board the first train to depart regardless of its ultimate destination.

  2.6  These counts are used to calculate the number of "passengers carried in excess of capacity" (PIXC). The total number of such passengers on any trains where the notional capacity is exceeded is expressed as a percentage of the total number of all passengers on the relevant route in the relevant direction. "Undercrowding", ie unoccupied spaces on trains with fewer passengers than their notional capacity, is disregarded because it is assumed that such spaces are not pertinent to the needs of "excess" passengers on other trains.

  2.7  It should be noted that PIXC counts take no account of whether or not trains are actually running in their planned formations (or at all). So carrying 800 passengers on a train with a notional capacity of 1,000 would not result in a breach of the PIXC target even if in reality half the carriages are not provided and only 500 spaces are actually available. Similarly, no breach would occur if one of two trains each with 500 places and 400 passengers is cancelled and all 800 are carried on the other. Operators are penalised financially by means of other incentive regimes, if they fail to provide the planned number of spaces (and trains), but for PIXC monitoring purposes the phantom spaces on missing carriages are still deemed to be present. This means that although these data can be used as a theoretical indicator of the incidence of crowding, they necessarily understate its true prevalence.

  2.8  The published PIXC totals are averages based on all trains to or from London on a particular operator's network, taken over the whole of the peak period. Loadings on individual trains and individual routes may be very much higher or lower. But because operators cannot directly control the number of passengers who may choose to travel on any particular train, they are not subject to penalties if individual services are excessively crowded. Instead, they are required to make "reasonable endeavours" to match their resources to passenger demand, if and when the recorded PIXC rates exceed the SRA's "threshold" levels for their network as a whole. These thresholds have been set at 4.5% in any one peak, or 3.0% in both peaks combined. The more exacting threshold value for the combined peaks reflects the fact that the evening peak is more extended than that in the morning, with passenger numbers during the peak three hours about one fifth lower, and pressure on available capacity is consequently less acute (partly because, for example, schools open at around the same time as shops and offices in the morning, but close earlier in the evening).

  2.9  The most recent PIXC census for which results are available is that conducted in the autumn of 2001. The published results (shown in the accompanying table) are expressed purely in percentages, to facilitate inter-operator comparisons, and the SRA does not disclose the actual number of passengers affected. In the case of the operators with larger or more complex networks, sub-totals for individual "inner" and "outer" route groups are provided, although the thresholds still apply only to the average for the entire company. Results in excess of the applicable threshold value are shown on a shaded background.

  2.10  The table reveals that three of the 10 London area operating companies to which load factor specification applies exceeded their PIXC thresholds in 2001 in respect of the morning peak period (Silverlink, South Central and South West Trains). The same operators plus a fourth, Thameslink, were in breach of the combined peaks threshold. These thresholds were also exceeded by the combined load factor performance of the London and south east network taken as a whole. And First Great Eastern would also have been in breach, in respect of its inner area services, if the thresholds applied to route groups separately.


Operator/route group
AM peak
PM peak
Both peaks
c2c
0.3%
0.6%
0.5%
Chiltern
2.4%
0.6%
1.6%
Connex
3.2%
1.3%
2.3%
   Inner
2.8%
0.3%
1.7%
   Outer
4.4%
3.6%
4.0%
First Great Eastern
3.7%
1.6%
2.7%
   Inner
6.0%
2.4%
4.3%
   Outer
1.5%
0.8%
1.2%
Silverlink
8.1%
3.4%
5.9%
   Inner (orbital)
15.9%
8.9%
12.7%
   Inner (radial)
2.2%
0.0%
1.1%
   Outer
3.5%
0.0%
1.9%
South Central
11.2%
1.0%
8.9%
   Inner
10.5%
0.7%
6.5%
   Outer
12.5%
1.7%
8.0%
South West Trains
6.3%
2.5%
4.6%
   Inner
6.5%
2.1%
4.6%
   Outer
5.9%
3.4%
4.7%
Thames
3.3%
1.6%
2.5%
   Inner
2.8%
2.9%
2.9%
   Outer
3.6%
0.5%
2.2%
Thameslink
4.3%
3.9%
4.1%
   Inner
9.7%
8.6%
8.2%
   Outer
3.0%
3.2%
3.1%
West Anglia Great Northern
2.3%
1.6%
2.0%
   Inner
1.8%
1.7%
1.8%
   Outer
2.7%
1.4%
2.1%
London and south east: total
5.0%
1.7%
3.6%


  2.11  The SRA's bulletin On Track, in which these results are reported, records that "there are now more than 50 additional trains running into London every morning compared with the figure in 1996, when 809 services ran." But the report does not indicate whether or not total train capacity has grown by the same proportion, or how this growth compares with the change in passenger numbers. In fact, at the aggregate London and south east level, since the final year of BR operation the PIXC result has risen by 2.4% for the morning peak and 0.5% for the evening peak. Nor does the bulletin mention any particular steps that the operators which are in breach of the planning thresholds are being required to take to mitigate the situation.

  2.12  There are no published data on the incidence of crowding at stations on the National Rail network. Operators are not required to carry out any census of station usage.

  2.13  London Underground has adopted a statement of its Customer Service Delivery Standards, in which it aims to "identify the constituents of a customer-facing service and define the quality of delivery required in each service area to meet customers' needs and priorities". One of the underlying themes is stated to be "the aim to minimise potential stress by offering a pleasant, safe and calm travel environment." The standards are very much more comprehensive and prescriptive than any requirement placed on the franchised train companies, but are purely aspirational in character as they have no mandatory force.

  2.14  The standards lay down a minimum average service interval of five minutes over the central part of the network, and go on to state that "service frequencies and patterns, when new or refurbished rolling stock is being introduced, must be sufficient to obviate the need for any customer to stand for more than 15 minutes. Seating for at least 1/6 of the maximum capacity of each car must be provided. Any major upgrade should take account of the fact that the existing standard for train loadings is often unavoidably exceeded on some sections, and should have congestion management as a key objective." An internal reference manual, containing a commentary on these standards, notes that "Crowding is a complex issue, influenced by service volumes, train capacity, reliability, and demand. Significant improvements in the on-train crowding penalty will only be possible through major upgrade projects." The requirement for seating to be provided for only 1/6 of passengers does not include perch or tip-up seats, and relates to the theoretical maximum crush- loading capacity of the trains, rather than anything which would be tolerable in normal operating conditions. It is noteworthy that significant congestion relief is seen as attainable only in the context of "major upgrade projects", rather than through any change in day-to-day operating practices.

  2.15  London Underground conducts regular monitoring of train loading levels during weekday peak periods, the results of which are expressed as a statistic showing the percentage chance of being on a train with a given ratio of passengers to seats. Prior to the creation of Transport for London, these data were routinely published. This appears no longer to be the case, although they are available on application. This table shows the results for the period July to September 2002.


% chance of being on a train with:
Line
all seats full
at least
1 person standing
for each 1 sitting
at least
2 people standing
for each 1 sitting

Bakerloo
18
4
0
Central
69
15
1
Circle & Hammersmith
84
45
4
District
23
12
2
East London
n/a
n/a
n/a
Jubilee
68
9
1
Metropolitan
16
8
1
Northern
72
7
0
Piccadilly
50
4
1
Victoria
54
19
1
Waterloo & City
95
83
4
All lines
52
16
1


  2.16  The table shows that at peak times the majority of Underground passengers are required to travel standing. But the figures are averages which do not necessarily reflect the situation on the most heavily used sections on each route, and this can fluctuate markedly from minute to minute depending on the evenness of the intervals between trains. Assuming that passengers enter platforms at a constant rate, any significant delay will cause excessive loading on the next train, and this in turn will result in under-loading of the train following that. The distribution of platform entry and exit points can also cause uneven loadings between individual carriages on the same train.

  2.17  There are wide variations between lines, but it should be noted that average journey lengths differ markedly depending on the geography of the route. What may be tolerable on the Waterloo & City line, for a maximum journey time of four minutes, is unlikely to be acceptable on the District or Metropolitan lines where journeys can last more than an hour. The design of the rolling stock varies between the lines, so that on the Circle and Hammersmith & City lines (where loadings are high but most journeys are short) there is a much higher proportion of standing space to seats, and for any given passenger loading, the percentage chance of all seats being occupied is automatically higher. These data also take no account of the turnover of spaces within trains. If the number of passengers alighting at a succession of stations is equal to the number boarding, the aggregate loading level will be unchanged, but any individual passengers obliged to stand involuntarily at the start of their journeys will not necessarily remain standing for the whole of the trip. Although London Underground has set a target maximum of 15 minutes, the actual length of standing times experienced is not reported.

  2.18  In relation to stations, London Underground stipulates that "Minimum dimensions and station capacity requirements are described in station planning standards. These are to be observed in respect of ticket halls, routeways (including stairs) and platforms. Capacity limitations at stations are kept under review and plans developed to address changes in demand." These standards have been applied at the very limited number of new stations which have been constructed in recent years, notably on the Jubilee line extension from Green Park to Stratford, whose spaciousness is in striking contrast to most of the rest of the network. But London Underground still has many stations built to the standards in use a century ago, and it is the lack of access and egress capacity, as much as a lack of train capacity, which is the primary cause of congestion and delay for a large proportion of its passengers.

  2.19  Regular users of stations such as Victoria and Oxford Circus have long since become accustomed to the need for "station control" to be imposed at busy times, when access to the station is denied until congestion at platform level eases. In the straitened financial circumstances in which the organisation has been compelled to operate in recent years, little or no funding has been available to address this. While staff are enjoined "to encourage passengers to move to less crowded sections of station platforms" by means of notices and announcements, at the busiest stations at the busiest times there is little or no underoccupied platform space available. Published details of the outputs which will be required of the "infraco" consortia which will become London Underground's partners under the Government's PPP plans for the network are scarce, but it appears that the anticipated capacity enhancements relate primarily to the train service rather than to stations. If the PPP is successful in raising service quality, and in generating additional demand as a result, the under-capacity of the busier stations will become ever more acute.

  2.20  At one time, London Buses regularly monitored and published statistics relating to "the percentage chance of boarding the first bus to arrive." This survey was abandoned several years ago, and there is now no systematic tracking of the incidence of crowding on buses. Loadings are checked as part of the "key points survey" conducted on all major routes, but this is only undertaken at 18-month intervals. At other times, the organisation appears to rely on ad-hoc feedback from users and/or operators, plus occasional "mystery traveller" reports, to alert it to the extent of under-capacity both on vehicles and at bus stations.

3.  DOES OVERCROWDING MATTER?

  3.1  Self-evidently, uncomfortable travel conditions are a deterrent to the use of public transport. Those who have the option of travelling by other means will do so, unless rail or bus offer substantial advantages in terms of time and/or cost. The persistence of overcrowding on parts of the public transport network indicates that at busy times it is catering for a largely captive market, at least in the short term, and that those who endure these conditions do so because the perceived value of the journey exceeds the perceived cost, including the element of discomfort. The fact that well over 80% of people entering central London every day do so by rail or bus (a higher proportion than in virtually any other major city in an OECD country) does not imply that they regard the experience as satisfactory, let alone enjoyable, but simply that there is no practicable alternative mode available. Even if central London's roads could accommodate more people travelling by car, there are no legal or affordable parking spaces available for their use. Providing extra capacity (in the form of tracks, vehicles and staff) is costly if it is only required for a small proportion of the time—many trains on the London and south east network already make only one fully laden journey each way per day. So there is little or no commercial incentive for operators to take mitigating action.

  3.2  When passengers complain about overcrowding, they commonly assert that they regard it as a threat to their safety, particularly on the railways. Trains are built to carry as many people as can be physically accommodated on them, and their braking and suspension systems are designed to function correctly under maximum crush-load conditions. There are no instances known to LTUC of crowding having led directly to an accident. So such concerns generally relate to the number of people potentially at risk in the event of an accident (such as a collision, derailment or fire), particularly if they are standing, and to ease of evacuation or escape.

  3.3  This concern has found expression from time to time at inquiries arising from major railway accidents. For example, the "Hidden Inquiry" into the Clapham Junction collision in 1988 took evidence to the effect that "the severity of injury, or the risk of fatality, was no greater for standing than seated passengers." The report concluded, however, that "the fact is inescapable that the higher the number of passengers on a train, the higher the number of casualties is likely to be in absolute terms." It therefore contained a recommendation that "BR shall ensure that overall train loading criteria are achieved. The Department of Transport and BR shall keep the criteria under review." In practice, the criteria then in use were the same as the threshold values subsequently incorporated into the franchise specifications set for privatised operators, as set out in paragraph 2.8 above. On substantial parts of the network, they were never achieved by BR and they have not been achieved by its successors either.

  3.4  The inquiry which followed a buffer stop collision at Cannon Street in 1991 commissioned some computer modelling work on the relative levels of risks faced by seated and standing passengers. Its broad conclusion was that in the case of collisions at speeds exceeding 15 mph, both groups would be likely to be thrown around uncontrollably, and would be equally exposed to a number of potentially injurious impacts. At lower speeds, standing passengers might be at greater risk because they were more likely to lose their balance and fall in an uncontrolled way. But much would depend on the rate of deceleration and whether the movement of the train gave any forewarning of the impending collision. The inquiry concluded that although there were no safety grounds for prohibiting passengers from standing on a train, "care needs to be exercised in the way standing passengers are conveyed". It noted in particular that "with a free choice many passengers will choose to travel in the front coaches even if this means having to stand" in order to be able to exit more quickly on arrival at the terminal station. The report therefore contained a recommendation that BR should examine what measures could be introduced to distribute passengers more evenly along the train, such as "better advice to intending passengers of the available space . . ., arranging access points to platforms away from the front of trains, and making arrangements at terminal stations . . . to remove the perceived advantage to those at the front of the train." Whatever examination BR may have made in the light of this recommendation does not appear to have led to any subsequent action.

  3.5  The "Cullen Report" into the Ladbroke Grove collision in 2000 also touched briefly on these issues. It noted approvingly that the train company First Great Western was "considering the possibility of dissuading passengers from moving forward in the train shortly before arrival at the terminus" but made no specific recommendation on the matter. Like the Clapham Junction and Cannon Street inquiries before it, the Ladbroke Grove inquiry heard suggestions that seat belts might be fitted to trains, but like them it declined to endorse such a proposal. The safety benefits were open to question, and even if they were real, it was felt to be impracticable to make the use of belts obligatory on trains used for very short journeys. To the extent that any real difference existed, seated passengers were already at less risk than those obliged to stand (or who chose to do so).

  3.6  The available evidence from accidents prior to that date was reviewed in a 1999 report for the Health & Safety Executive on Implications of overcrowding on railways. This confirmed that "in higher-speed collisions, whether a passenger is seated or standing makes little difference to the overall severity of injuries sustained". Although seated passengers may be less likely to sustain serious injuries in lower speed collisions, "in overcrowded conditions . . . the situation may be somewhat more complex". This was because while a large number of standing passengers may have a cushioning effect which would protect them against some forms of injury (such as those sustained by hitting carriage fittings or other passengers), it was possible that other injuries such as head-to-head collisions would be more prevalent. Overall, the report concluded that "there is no evidence to suggest that overcrowding per se is a safety issue." But it should be noted that this was purely a desk study, and no original research was undertaken in the course of it.

  3.7  The HSE report endorsed the view that any policy requiring all passengers to have seats in order to travel, and to remain in them while the train is moving, would be impossible to implement and police. It also noted that if "excess" passengers were removed and put on an extra train, there might be "an increased risk to the total population of rail travellers simply due to the addition of the extra trains required to deal with the excess passengers." This comment is based on the apparent assumption that there may be a positive relationship between the intensity of traffic on a railway and the level of risk faced by its users. This is a highly debatable issue, giving rise to complex questions about (eg) the performance of train control systems and/or the rate of asset deterioration and maintenance, which are outside the parameters of this letter. What can be said with some certainty, though, is that if the effect of overcrowding on railways is to displace some travellers onto other modes, then—except in the case of those who might go by air—the net effect will almost certainly be to increase the overall level of casualties, because all other modes entail significantly higher levels of risk.

  3.8  Perhaps surprisingly, none of these reports addresses the extent to which ease and speed of escape or evacuation in the event of an accident is likely to be affected by the number of passengers on board—possibly because none of the actual accidents reviewed involved trains that were particularly heavily loaded. The only recent incident of which LTUC is aware in which this issue has arisen in practice occurred on the Underground's Victoria line in July 2001, when some 4,000 passengers were trapped in three trains held in a small-bore tunnel for up to 90 minutes as a result of malicious interference with train equipment. The only ventilation on such trains is provided by the movement of the trains themselves, so rapid build up of body heat can occur in heavily-loaded carriages held stationary for long periods. Because this incident took place on one of the hottest days of the year, ambient temperatures were high, and 17 people were taken to hospital suffering from the effects of heat exhaustion. But trains do not have to be heavily crowded, or in tunnels, for similar problems to arise. Much of the newer rolling stock on the main line railways has air conditioning, and no openable windows in the passenger saloons. When electric trains are held stationary because of power failures, the air conditioning is rendered inoperative, as the demands it would place on emergency battery supplies are excessive. The result, on warm days, is that conditions on board can rapidly become extremely uncomfortable. The industry appears to have no solution to this problem.

  3.9  The HSE report makes some mention of research which has been conducted into other effects which overcrowding may have, of a psychological and physiological nature, which manifest themselves through their impact on the health of those affected, rather than their physical safety—though they may have indirect safety consequences if, for example, they lead to an increased level of violent conduct. Although these effects have been studied in the behaviour of crowds in other contexts, very little research appears to have been undertaken into the health effects of the various sources of stress to which public transport passengers are routinely exposed. The current, very restricted state of knowledge in this field is demonstrated by a recent (and as yet unpublished) study of Rail passenger stress and health, commissioned by the Rail Passengers Council from the Institute of Work, Health and Organisations at the University of Nottingham.

  3.10  LTUC is not aware of any published work relating specifically to the risks associated with congestion at stations. Under paragraph 71 of the Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 1995, station operators are required to notify the HSE of incidents of serious congestion, defined as "Any case where planned procedures or arrangements have been activated in order to control risks arising from an incident of undue passenger congestion at a station unless that congestion has been relieved within a period of time allowed for by those procedures or arrangements." But the term "undue passenger congestion" is not defined, and the annual report of the HSE's Chief Inspector of Railways makes no mention of the frequency with which such cases are reported, or of the circumstances which give rise to them.

  3.11  The Public Service Vehicles (Carrying Capacity) Regulations 1984 require maximum seating and standing capacities to be set for buses and coaches, and it is an offence to allow these to be exceeded. LTUC understands that (except in the case of buses operated with conductors) the primary purpose of these regulations is to ensure the stability of moving vehicles. A report by the London Accident Analysis Unit on Public service vehicle accidents in Greater London showed that in 1991 standing passengers accounted for 42% of all reported casualties to bus and coach users. Since it is likely that on most buses the proportion of standees is less than this, it is reasonable to conclude that the risk of injury is higher for those who are standing than for those who are seated. It is our impression that the frequency of claims made by passengers against operators for minor injuries sustained in the course of journeys, eg as a result of sudden braking, has been increasing. But it is not clear whether this is the result of a higher incidence of such events, or a greater propensity on the part of passengers to seek compensation as a result of them. If fault cannot be shown to lie with the driver, or with another road user who is required to carry insurance—eg where the bus is forced to brake to avoid colliding with a pedestrian, cyclist or animal—the risk is likely to be uninsured and any victim to remain uncompensated.

4.  HOW CAN THE PROBLEM OF OVERCROWDING BE ADDRESSED?

  4.1  There are no simple or cheap solutions, particularly on the railways. Trains cannot be made wider, or higher (to allow double deck operation), without immensely costly alterations being made to railway infrastructure—platform edges, tunnels, bridges and overhead wiring. They can be made longer, but this often necessitates the lengthening of platforms (and sometimes sidings), which is also expensive and sometimes physically impossible. Their maximum speed is set by such factors as the curvature of the line, the capacity of their traction units, the number of powered axles, and (in the case of electrified lines) the available power supply. On routes with closely-spaced stations, such as the Underground and much of National Rail's London and south east network, the effective overall speed is set by the spacing of the stops and the maximum tolerable rates of acceleration and deceleration.

  4.2  On-board capacity is controlled by the number and distribution of seats provided, and the ease of circulation within the train. Metros and suburban railways in other countries typically have only a limited number of seats, arranged longitudinally, and it is assumed that most passengers will travel standing. The removal of seats is not popular where passengers have been accustomed to having them, but a recent consultation exercise by Connex suggested that many of its passengers would accept this if it could be shown that, in the short term, it was the only means of allowing them to continue to board the train of their choice. Wider aisles and a more generous provision of handrails encourage passengers not to cluster in vestibules, thus making better use of the space available. Wide inter-carriage connections (similar to those found on articulated trams and buses) would encourage passengers to move between carriages, distributing themselves more evenly along the train, and would have the incidental benefit of mitigating concerns about personal security at times of low usage. But the rail industry in Britain has been reluctant to embrace this feature, although it is commonplace on metros overseas. This appears to be due to concerns about cost, crashworthiness, the spread of smoke in the event of fire, and the difficulty of draught-proofing cabs when passages are created through them to allow units to be coupled.

  4.3  In the past, all trains were provided with guards' compartments which were also used to carry passengers' luggage and cycles. Some also carried buffets on board. Capacity has been increased by removing these, albeit at some loss of passenger amenity. On the National Rail network, first class accommodation is provided at the discretion of the operators, and excluded from PIXC calculations. It has lower seating density, and (typically) a lower occupancy rate. One operator, Chiltern, has recently decided to discontinue it. Underground trains do not have toilets on board, but generally these have been provided on National Rail services, except on some trains used only on shorter-distance inner-suburban routes. Connex has canvassed opinion on the option of eliminating them from some new rolling stock, to enhance capacity, with the proviso that the quantity and quality of toilet facilities on stations would be increased instead.

  4.4  On high-capacity routes with frequent stops, "dwell time" at platforms represents a significant element of journey time, and thus of route capacity. The time required for boarding and alighting is a function both of the total number of passengers carried, and of the length of their journeys (ie the numbers using each station). As trains become more crowded, movement within them becomes more restricted, and passengers take longer to enter and leave, thus prolonging each stop—especially if some are obliged to alight involuntarily simply to allow others behind them to exit. The rate of boarding and alighting can be made faster by providing more (and wider) doors and larger vestibules, but this is necessarily achieved at the expense of seating space.

  4.5  Even if the planned capacity of a service is sufficient to meet demand, any shortfall or irregularity in its delivery can result in a rapid build-up of overcrowded conditions. Poor reliability plays a major part in exacerbating the problem. In the period from April to June 2002, 0.9% of planned longer distance trains to or from London did not run, nor did 1.2% of those on the London and south east network. But, in addition, 20.9% of longer distance services reached their terminus more than 10 minutes late, and 15.6% of those on the London and south east network terminated more than five minutes late. On the Underground, the overall incidence of delay is measured by "excess waiting time", ie the average amount by which passengers' actual waits exceed those they would experience if the service ran exactly as planned. In the year 2000-01, the average waiting time experienced across the network was 3.2 minutes, but the excess element of this was 0.8 minutes. In other words, passengers were typically obliged to wait one third longer than they should, if the full level of service was operated, and delivered on time. The causes of this unreliability are outside the parameters of this discussion, but they are a significant contributory factor in the overall incidence of crowding.

  4.6  Even if additional rolling stock is available, or can be provided, it is not necessarily possible to increase the overall frequency of service, since this is governed by the capacity of the route—which is in turn governed by such factors as the spacing of signals, the number of stations and platforms, and the number and layout of junctions and crossovers. In general, the more complex and variegated the service pattern, the lower the number of trains that can be run. The greatest utilisation of capacity is usually obtained where all trains run between the same destinations and observe the same stops—a situation which is rare in London, even on the Underground (because higher frequencies are operated over the sections with greater levels of passenger demand). Requiring fast and slow trains to operate on the same tracks (as occurs on parts of the National Rail system) invariably reduces the frequency of both. And timetabling services at or close to the theoretical limit of capacity is unwise, because it eliminates the necessary "recovery" margin which is essential if any delay to one train is not to result immediately in a cascade effect which repercusses on the timekeeping of all following trains. Indeed, experience on parts of the Underground has shown that overall reliability—and thus evenness of passenger loadings between trains—can be improved by removing trains from the timetable at the busiest times, rather than adding them, when the planned schedule has proved itself to be over ambitious.

  4.7  If demand is not evenly distributed between trains on a route, passengers can be reallocated from overcrowded to undercrowded trains by varying the stopping pattern, so that not all trains serve the same stations. This is very effective in redistributing loads (provided that passengers do not change their choice of stations in response). But it makes local journeys between intermediate points more difficult if they are no longer served by the same trains, and is a technique which is therefore best used sparingly and selectively.

  4.8  Finally, fares can be adjusted to "choke off" excess demand, or to redistribute it to times and/or routes when and/or where pressure on capacity is less. This technique has long been employed by the railways, eg by offering discount fares for off-peak travel. In the era of BR, prices were deliberately raised as a device for curbing the unwanted growth of peak period traffic. But fears that privatisation might lead to excessive profiteering by train operators catering for a captive market caused a price capping regime to be introduced for certain key fare categories, including the standard class season tickets which are most likely to be used by commuters travelling at the busiest times. Pegging these fares to a level below the prevailing rate of price inflation, and imposing additional fares reductions as a penalty for poor reliability, has made the cost of rail travel cheaper than might otherwise have been the case. This is a welcome development, from the users' perspective, where the system has sufficient spare capacity to cater for the additional demand thus attracted. In principle, we favour any policies designed to make the use of the railways more attractive. But they have a perverse effect where overcrowding is already acute. In the London area, the differential pricing of bus and rail travel has had some limited success in diverting trips from rail to bus, but the two modes are not serious alternatives for any but fairly short journeys, and the zonal pricing basis of the Travelcard (which has largely replaced point-to-point season tickets) means that it cannot be used to deflect demand from one route to another.

  4.9  On the buses, there are far fewer constraints to increasing capacity in line with demand, either by enlarging the size of vehicles or increasing their frequency. Both the volume and usage of bus services in London are growing steadily at present. But reliability remains problematic: on the higher-frequency routes, actual average waiting times are currently about 40% longer than planned. The principal obstacle to increased reliability is the traffic environment in which the bus service is required to operate. The Mayor's London Bus Initiative is designed to achieve much more extensive bus priority measures on major corridors, coupled with more systematic policing and enforcement. But there is a looming shortage of depot space to handle the growing size of the bus fleet, and in a buoyant labour market the cost of recruiting and retaining sufficient staff of the required calibre (both in operating and engineering roles) is rising, particularly as housing costs escalate. As routes are re-tendered, operators' bids are rising steeply, and with fares frozen in money terms the subsidy requirement is escalating at a rate which the Greater London Authority may find difficult to fund. Unless the planned increase in capacity can be sustained, however, particularly in the central area, the success of the Mayor's congestion charging strategy may be compromised—because this acknowledges that there is no realistic prospect of being able to handle many additional peak period travellers on London's railways, and if the strategy is successful in inducing some diversion of travel away from cars, much of this demand will have to be met by the bus network.

December 2002





 
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