Memorandum by Rail Passengers Council
(OPT 19)
OVERCROWDING ON THE RAILWAYS
INTRODUCTION
The Rail Passengers Council (RPC) welcomes the
opportunity to submit a memorandum for the Transport Committee's
forthcoming inquiry into overcrowding on public transport. This
memorandum represents a coordinated response from the RPC—on
overcrowding on the national rail network—on behalf of the
Rail Passengers Committees around the country.
OVERCROWDED RAIL
NETWORK
Since 1910 more people have travelled more kilometres
using various methods of transport, but the number of kilometres
travelled by train each year has remained static. Railtrack made
the point that the stability of rail passenger numbers against
a background of social change, two world wars and the increase
in car ownership and travel, "results from an overall capacity
constraint on the rail network" (Network Management Statement,
1999).
Pre-privatisation, increased car ownership,
new roads and job and population dispersal reduced rail passenger
demand by between 1% and 2.5% per year, but the last few years
have seen constant growth. In the past there have been peaks and
troughs in passenger demand. However, there is an expectation
that the present growth in demand will continue and the Government's
current targets, set out in the Department for Transport's (DfT's)
10 Year Plan and the SRA's Directions and Guidance, are for a
50% increase in passenger rail use.
Extra demand puts serious strain on the rail
network. There is a limit to the number of trains that can be
run on the existing network and a limit to the amount of rolling
stock currently available. The Strategic Rail Authority (SRA)
has recently consulted on the development of a capacity utilisation
policy. The Rail Passengers Council supports the need for a policy
and welcomes the importance the SRA places on making optimum use
of the network's capacity. In its response to the consultation—which
is available on request—the Council urged the SRA to develop
demand-led solutions, built around passengers', local, regional
and wider societal needs.
If passenger demand continues to grow, overcrowding
on the capacity constrained rail network will be exacerbated.
Both the DfT's 10 Year Plan and the SRA's Directions and Guidance
stipulate the Government's target to "reduce overcrowding
in London to meet SRA standards by 2010". However, overcrowding
on trains is not confined to the London area—long-distance
routes and other cities also suffer from overcrowding (eg GNER
services from Kings Cross, particularly in the evening peak; peak
services on the Harrogate-Leeds line; Central Trains' peak Liverpool-Manchester
services; peak Bathgate-Edinburgh services).
Overcrowded carriages
It is not surprising that increased passenger
demand for services, on a capacity limited network, where a limited
number of trains pull a limited number of carriages, leads to
overcrowding on some carriages—particularly around peak
times. Overcrowded carriages indicate that services provided in
that area at that time of day are insufficient. There are many
factors that may lead to carriages becoming overcrowded, capacity
constraint on the network outlined above is just one of these.
Where definitions of overcrowding exist on the national network,
these are not consistent for all trains or all journeys. However,
uncomfortably full carriages will not entice and cannot accommodate
the car drivers whom the Government would like to encourage to
use public transport.
Contractual obligations
Under the franchise agreements, negotiated during
the original round of franchising, train operating companies (TOCs)
are bound to "use all reasonable endeavours to ensure that
sufficient capacity is provided on each train used . . . to carry,
without excessive overcrowding, all passengers intending to travel
on such train [sic] and holding a valid Fare (and if required,
a reservation) for such train [sic]".
Each TOC produces a passenger's charter that
has to be at least as favourable to passengers as British Rails'
(BR's) Passenger's Charter. It is a requirement, based on the
BR standard, that TOCs commit in their charters to providing adequate
services so that passengers do not have to stand for longer than
20 minutes (Passengers Charter, Guidance for Train Operating Companies,
OPRAF, September 1998). Individual Passenger Service Requirements
(PSRs) may stipulate further capacity requirements and some Public
Transport Executive (PTE) franchises stipulate detailed capacity
requirements.
Under the franchise agreements, the SRA can,
at any time, request that the franchise operator carry out a programme
of passenger counts. However, at present, only the London commuter
routes and some of ScotRail's commuter routes are regularly subject
to annual passenger counts in the Autumn as part of the SRA's
Passengers In Excess of Capacity (PIXC) controls. The SRA has
not to date required any other TOC to undertake such a count.
One reason that the SRA might require other TOCs to carry out
a PIXC count would be to inform discussion about a proposed change
to a PSR.
Passengers in Excess of Capacity (PIXC)
Load-factor regulation was introduced by BR
to ensure that, in return for subsidy payments, overcrowding is
monitored and managed. Currently, the process for monitoring and
managing overcrowding on London commuter routes and some of ScotRail's
commuter routes comprises the following stages:
Calculating the capacity of peak-period trains:
— For journeys of more than 20 minutes,
capacity equals the number of Standard Class seats.
— For journeys of less than 20 minutes,
capacity is the number of seats available on the train plus 10%
standing in slam door trains.
— Currently, for sliding-door trains,
the capacity threshold is one passenger per 0.45 million2 of the
floor area of the carriage, whether occupied by a seat or not.
To calculate capacity, the number of seats are counted (each taken
to occupy 0.45 million2) and the total seat area is subtracted
from the total floor area to give the area available for standing
passengers—eg for a sliding-door carriage of 45 million2
with 50 seats, allowance is made for 50 standing passengers.
Taking a passenger count and calculating the
PIXC:
— For either the morning or the evening
peak alone, 4.5%.
— For both peaks combined, 3%.
If a TOC breaches those PIXC levels, it must
draw up an action plan to bring down overcrowding to within the
limits.
The SRA publishes the results of the PIXC annual
Autumn passenger counts in its On Track publication. Table 1 shows
the results of the counts carried out in Autumn 2001. The SRA's
figures show that the number of passengers travelling into London
increased by 1% in 2001 compared with the previous count in Autumn
2000/Spring 2001. The total number of passengers travelling into
central London at peak times during the 2001 survey was 471,388—up
4,468 on the previous count. However, the SRA does not indicate
how train capacity (train frequency and train length) has changed
over the same period. Three out of the ten measured London commuter
TOCs exceeded their PIXC thresholds in the morning peak in the
Autumn 2001 count, none of the TOCs exceeded the threshold in
the evening peak and four out of the ten TOCs exceeded the threshold
across both daily peaks. Additionally, the aggregate PIXC figure
for the London commuter TOCs exceeds the threshold for the morning
peak and that for both daily peaks combined. These results confirm
that the morning peak is more concentrated than the evening peak.
In On Track, for the period October 2001 to
March 2002, the SRA stated that "overcrowding decreased slightly
. . . [in 2001 compared with the previous count] . . . , with
eight of the 10 London commuter train operators recording a decrease
in overcrowding during the morning peak and two recording an increase
in overcrowding". However, in the evening peak, five out
of the ten London commuter TOCs included in the count showed an
increase in overcrowding under the PIXC regime, while four showed
a decrease and one showed no change. Aggregated over the two daily
peaks, three of the London commuter TOCs showed an increase in
overcrowding, six a decrease and one no change.
Table 1 shows that in Scotland, overcrowding
on ScotRail's commuter services across the Forth Bridge decreased
in the morning peak in Autumn 2001 compared with Spring 2000/Autumn
2002, increased in the evening peak and decreased slightly overall.
Train operating company
Route group
| AM peak | PM peak
| Overall |
| c2c | 0.3% (1.6%)
| 0.6% (1.0%) | 0.5% (1.3%)
|
| Chiltern Railways | 2.4% (2.5%)
| 0.6% (0.3%) | 1.6% (1.6%)
|
| Connex South Eastern | 3.2% (3.7%)
| 1.3% (1.9%) | 2.3% (2.9%)
|
| Inner | 2.8%
| 0.3% | 1.7%
|
| Outer | 4.4%
| 3.6% | 4.0%
|
| First Great Eastern | 3.7% (6.4%)
| 1.6% (1.4%) | 2.7% (4.1%)
|
| Inner | 6.0%
| 2.4% | 4.3%
|
| Outer | 1.5%
| 0.8% | 1.2%
|
| Silverlink | 8.1% (9.8%)
| 3.4% (3.1%) | 5.9% (6.6%)
|
| Inner (orbital) |
15.9% | 8.9%
| 12.7% |
| Inner (radial) | 2.2%
| 0.0% | 1.1%
|
| Outer | 3.5%
| 0.0% | 1.9%
|
| South Central | 11.2% (6.2%)
| 1.0% (2.7%) | 6.9% (4.7%)
|
| Inner | 10.5%
| 0.7% | 6.5%
|
| Outer | 12.5%
| 1.7% | 8.0%et
|
| South West Trains | 6.3% (7.9%)
| 2.5% (1.1%) | 4.6% (4.9%)
|
| Inner | 6.5%
| 2.1% | 4.6%
|
| Outer | 5.9%
| 3.4% | 4.7%
|
| Thames Trains | 3.3% (1.9%)
| 1.6% (1.9%) | 2.5% (1.9%)
|
| Inner | 2.8%
| 2.9% | 2.9%
|
| Outer | 3.6%
| 0.5% | 2.2%
|
| Thameslink | 4.3% (4.4%)
| 3.9% (2.7%) | 4.1% (3.6%)
|
| Inner | 9.7%
| 8.6% | 8.2%
|
| Outer | 3.0%
| 3.2% | 3.1%
|
| West Anglia Great Northern |
2.3% (2.8%) | 1.6% (1.6%)
| 2.0% (2.3%) |
| Inner | 1.8%
| 1.7% | 1.8%
|
| Outer | 2.7%
| 1.4% | 2.1%
|
| London commuter service total
| 5.0% (5.1%) | 1.7% (1.8%)
| 3.6% (3.6%) |
| ScotRail | 1.3% (3.1%)
| 3.2% (2.9%) | 2.2% (3.0%)
|
Table 1: Overcrowding levels (measured as a percentage of
passengers in excess of capacity) on London commuter services
and on Edinburgh services across the Forth Bridge, Autumn 2001.
Values highlighted with grey shading indicate overcrowding levels
greater than the defined "acceptable" levels for individual
TOCs for the 2001 count; figures in parentheses are those for
the previous count in Spring 2000/Autumn 2001. For the Autumn
2001 PIXC count, the allowance for standing room for sliding-door
stock differed slightly from the current definition quoted above
(employed during the Autumn 2002 count, for which figures are
not yet available). The 2001 count required that on sliding-door
trains, each standing passenger be apportioned 0.55 million2 of
floor space; the number of standing passengers equated to around
35% of the number of seats. Source: SRA.
However, there are a number of limitations of the PIXC regime.
These are as follows:
— PIXC is not applied to intercity routes or the
former regional railways system; where PIXC is not measured, the
level of overcrowding is merely conjecture. Even where PIXC is
measured, the passenger counts are conducted manually and are
subject to human error—more use could be made of new technology
to reduce this error.
— Where it is applied in south-east England, PIXC
only applies to peak travel into and out of London termini. ScotRail
similarly looks only at Edinburgh commuter routes. The annual
count does not consider differences in summer and winter timetables/demand.
— The defined capacity of a train is set to accommodate
a significant number of standing passengers for journeys of less
than 20 minutes. For sliding-door trains all the floor area between
the seats—regardless of whether there are handholds—is
assumed to be standing room.
— The PIXC for each commuter TOC is determined for
the operator's whole franchise and is not disaggregated by route
group. For example, Table 1 shows that in 2001, Thameslink exceeded
the PIXC threshold for the "inner" route group for both
the morning and evening peak despite the fact that aggregate figure
for both the "inner" and "outer" route groups
was below the PIXC threshold. Within each route group, the PIXC
is aggregated across all the trains in the count—ie individual
trains may be over-capacity, but the count may show the route
group to be within limits. PIXC is a lower standard than BR's
measure of overcrowding, which used to disaggregate for "inner"
and "outer" services.
— Cancelled trains are considered to be part of
the capacity on the route. Even if, for example, the first train
on a route was cancelled and all 500 of its passengers squeezed
onto the next train, the PIXC figures would not show that a train
was 100% over capacity. PIXC is a count of passengers in excess
of scheduled capacity over a given period.
— Under the PIXC scheme, overcrowding is only monitored
once a year; PIXC is measured at key points where highest passenger
numbers are deemed to occur, not necessarily the terminal stations.
If a TOC is found to have PIXC above the threshold, the TOC
has to provide a plan for reducing this overcrowding. Theoretically,
an enforcement action can be started if the problem is not solved.
However, as with any enforcement action under the current system,
if the problem is rectified before the enforcement action is completed,
the enforcement action must be halted and restarted if the problem
recurs. On Track for the period October 2001 to March 2002, which
contains the most recent PIXC figures, does not cite any action
being taken to alleviate overcrowding by TOCs that exceed the
PIXC threshold.
A further criticism of the PIXC regime is that the threshold
that is deemed "acceptable" by the SRA may not be deemed
so by passengers. If the capacity is X, (including standing space
for journeys of less than 20 minutes), how can it be acceptable
for there to be X+4.5% passengers on aggregate at one of the peaks?
Indeed, the results of the National Passenger Survey carried out
in Autumn 2002, revealed that only 60% of all passengers questioned
were satisfied with the amount of seats/standing space and 19%
were dissatisfied. At a regional level, overcrowding was thought,
by passengers, to be worst in London (54% satisfied; 24% dissatisfied),
while the next highest percentage of passengers who were dissatisfied
(17%) was recorded in three regions—the English Midlands,
South England and Wales.
Short Formations Incentive Payment
Peak commuter services into and out of London and some other
cities are subject to the Short Formations Incentive Payment regime.
Under this scheme, operators must have a train plan to show how
capacity will be delivered. If the operator fails to deliver its
plan, a charge is made based on a proportion of the cancellation
charge. Again, as with any enforcement action under the current
system, if the problem is rectified before the enforcement action
is completed, the enforcement action must be halted and restarted
if the problem recurs. First Great Western, Midland Mainline and
Virgin West Coast are subject to slightly different regimes—short
formations payments, details of which can be found in the SRA's
On Track publication covering the period from July to September
2002.
Franchises without load-factor regulation
Outside the London commuter routes, some commuter routes
in Edinburgh and some PTE franchises with capacity specification,
the majority of franchised services have had no monitoring or
enforcement regime for overcrowding since the first round of franchising.
Although the SRA can ask for passenger counts at any time, this
has not happened to date. TOCs are required to plan services to
avoid excessive overcrowding, however "excessive" is
not defined. The only action the SRA would take under current
arrangements would be if the capacity provided by a TOC fell below
the level of capacity at franchising—ie if the TOC reduced
the service to below PSR levels, or reduced the number of carriages
on those trains.
If the SRA did order a passenger count and found services
provided in the PSR to be inadequate to meet demand, the TOC concerned
would be entitled to ask for payment to increase service provision.
Overcrowding as a safety issue
Anyone with a valid ticket for travel on a train has the
right to get on it (National Rail Conditions of Carriage). However,
under the bylaws, authorised staff may decide a course of action
in the interests of safety with which passengers must comply.
There are recent examples of train drivers refusing to pick up
passengers on full trains, citing safety as a reason—eg
on Virgin Cross Country routes after the introduction of the "Operation
Princess" clockface timetable. In the case of the Virgin
Cross Country example, a number of factors have combined to cause
severe overcrowding, resulting in passengers standing in the aisles
and vestibules and hampering movement of passengers around the
trains. A large advertising campaign before the launch of the
new timetable resulted in significant increase in demand for the
services and problems on the tracks (eg an ongoing speed restriction
as a result of an engineering train damaging a vital portion of
track at Aynho Junction; and the aftermath of the October 2002
storms) has meant delays and consequently passenger numbers have
more time to build up at stations. The result is overcrowding
on Virgin Cross Country's more-frequent, but shorter trains. To
alleviate the overcrowding, the trains need to be lengthened;
the alternative is the much less palatable option of increasing
fares to price passengers off the train services.
The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) found that "there
is no evidence to suggest that overcrowding per se is a
safety issue" (Implications of Overcrowding on Railways,
HSE Contract Research Report 225/1999). The findings of this report
concur with the findings of the Clapham Junction Inquiry. This
pronouncement has often been quoted out of context and particularly
by TOCs answering complaints about overcrowding.
It is important to note that both the Clapham Junction Inquiry
and the report on Implications of Overcrowding on Railways
had a narrow remit in assessing overcrowding as a safety issue.
Although the latter mentioned that high stress levels in high
passenger density situations had been recorded in research in
the 1960s and 70s, the findings were dismissed because the cause
of the stress may have been owing to "the lack of choice
in the selection of seats and company" more than "the
duration of the trip". Previous research into overcrowding
was also dismissed by the report on Implications of Overcrowding
on Railways. The author of this report considered that passenger
densities and the situation on a train to be different from those
experienced at large-scale incidents—for example Hillsborough,
on which much research into crowd behaviour was based. Hence little
consideration was given, for example, to uncontrolled evacuation.
The report conjectured that the "suddenness of impact . .
. reduces the likelihood that individuals will have sufficient
time to effect some kind of behavioural response to the situation".
Likewise, passengers being swept off trains in a "surge"
was not given any consideration in the report on Implications
of Overcrowding on Railways, despite mention of research on
this phenomenon in the same report.
The report therefore concentrated on injuries as an effect
of overcrowding in the event of a crash. In comparing the injuries
that were likely to be sustained, using information from previous
rail crashes, it was concluded that both seated and standing passengers
were likely to be injured to an equal degree of severity in a
crash at high speed. Seated passengers would have less risk of
serious injury in the case of a low-speed impact, particularly
if they had sufficient time to brace themselves. The report conceded
that the more passengers on a train, the more people would be
injured in the event of a crash. However, the report maintained
that the proportion of seated and standing passengers injured
would be the same. The report suggested that the higher number
of passengers exposed to risk of injury on one train had to be
weighed against the risk posed by adding another train to carry
the excess passengers on an already busy network. The report concluded
that there was no net factor in case of crash to say overcrowding
is a safety issue per se. However, the HSE report was published
a month before the Paddington rail disaster in which fire played
a significant part in increasing the number of fatalities. On
an overcrowded train, in the event of a fire evacuation is impeded
and more fatalities are likely. Whereas buildings are governed
by fire regulations that determine levels of occupancy, trains
are not.
Little weight has been given to health and safety issues
on overcrowded trains other than injury in the event of a crash.
Capacity constraint on the network at a time of growth in passenger
demand and the running of "1000 extra trains" rightly
requires safety experts to focus on management of the network
and ensuring crashes/derailments do not occur. Thankfully, however,
crashes on the rail network are very rare. Nevertheless, people
are injured as a result of overcrowding on trains; in hot conditions,
discomfort can escalate into fainting. In addition, stress levels
do go up in crowded carriages, which may result in unsafe behaviour.
The RPC recently carried out a literature study of published research
on the health implications of passenger stress caused by overcrowding.
The study revealed that very little research on this subject has
been conducted and, as such, it is extremely difficult to make
an informed judgement as to whether overcrowding on trains and
the attendant stress levels per se are detrimental to passengers'
health.
In the addition to the above, there are other safety issues
concerning overcrowding. For example, serious overcrowding can
result in ventilation problems on trains, which are intensified
by the failure of air conditioning units on some trains—such
as Class 175s—that do not have manually operated windows.
Train drivers, controllers, passengers and the Rail Passengers
Council and Committees consider overcrowding on trains to be a
health and safety issue. There are, of course other issues involved,
but failing to take the issue seriously until "objective"
evidence is presented is tantamount to waiting for a tragedy to
occur.
Factors that contribute to overcrowded carriages
In addition to general capacity constraint on the rail network,
there are a number of factors that may contribute to overcrowding.
Some of these factors are outlined below, but the list is not
exhaustive:
No enforced capacity limit on trains
Whereas all passengers on an aeroplane must have a seat, and
buses and coaches have clearly marked seating and standing capacity,
the concept of a walk-up fare facility and the open return have
been preserved on the train making actual passenger numbers difficult
to predict accurately. It has been remarked that there are tighter
guidelines concerning the transportation of animals than there
are for rail passengers.
There are some hours of the day, some days of the week and
some times of the year when more people want to travel than at
other times. A large proportion of people use some form of transport
to go to work; Friday evening sees people travelling to weekend
destinations; and school holidays, particularly the first and
last weekends, see an increase in leisure passengers.
There is often an uneven distribution of passengers on the
trains. Commuters tend to bunch in the carriages nearest the exit
at their station to minimise walking time. Longer distance travellers
congregate in the coaches nearest the buffet car.
Large sporting events, such as football or rugby matches,
have a logistic problem of their own. A typical stadium has tens
of thousands of seats with spectators sometimes travelling great
distances. Not only are carriages overcrowded in these cases but
stations and platforms too.
Passengers at a station will take the first available train.
Therefore, if the train a passenger intended to take is late or
cancelled, the passenger will get on the next train to his/her
destination, adding to the usual passenger numbers on that train.
Franchise operators are contractually bound to provide the
services outlined in their respective PSRs. Any services in excess
of the PSR are run on the basis of commercial viability. PSR levels
were based on service provision at franchising. However, from
February 1996, the Franchising Director's Objectives, Instructions
and Guidance restricted PSR services to those that were socially
necessary. Lightly used or commercial services were to be omitted
from the PSR on the basis that the former were not socially necessary
and the latter had a built-in incentive to run. Infrequent services
on socially necessary routes result in full carriages.
Insufficient rolling stock
There is a limited amount of rolling stock available. In some
cases a TOC may decide it is commercially more viable to run short
formation trains on some services and redeploy the rolling stock
elsewhere. In other cases there is simply a lack of rolling stock
to juggle in the case of unusual events eg the sporting events
and the Ladbroke Grove crash.
Lack of incentive to tackle overcrowding
Under current franchising agreements, there appears to be
no incentive for a TOC to put on more services when it can maximise
revenue from its existing services by selling more tickets than
seats, albeit at the expense of passenger comfort. There also
appears to be no incentive for the SRA to demand a passenger count
because, if "excessive" overcrowding is found, the TOC
will be in a position to ask for extra payment to put on extra
services.
Tackling overcrowded carriages
BR increased standard open fares to price people off the
peak trains. Fares regulation made it difficult for privatised
TOCs to continue this policy on commuter routes, although price
increases on intercity routes at peak times have been justified
as a means of alleviating overcrowding at peak times. However,
the privatised TOCs have tried to incentivise off-peak travel
with cheaper fares on certain services. So far, these efforts
appear to have had little effect on peak demand but have attracted
passengers onto off-peak trains who might otherwise have not made
the journey. Whilst people choose to, or have to, live some distance
from their workplaces and whilst offices insist on office hours,
there will be morning and evening peaks in passenger demand.
In trying to meet peak demand, longer trains should be put
on at peak times and short formations avoided—payments for
short formations provide some incentive for TOCs to ensure trains
are sufficiently long. Longer trains are likely to be an inherently
safer option than increasing the number of trains on an already
crowded network. Ensuring that peak demand can be accommodated
through longer trains, means that carriages must be available
and train platforms must be long enough. Where there is a shortfall
in these areas, investment is needed. However, franchise operators
on short leases are reluctant to order rolling stock in excess
of their franchise commitments.
When joining trains together it is important that there are
end-corridor through connections. This has an impact on overcrowding.
It is not uncommon for passengers to be standing in parts of the
train despite empty seats being available elsewhere. Without through-corridors
passengers cannot move down the train to spread out the load.
Overcrowding is often made worse by inadequate information.
Passengers may be prepared to wait for a following train if they
are told it is coming and that it has room. But often the information
is not provided causing a rush for the first train to appear and
severe overcrowding. Improved information would help to alleviate
overcrowding in some cases.
There is no effective monitoring or regulation covering overcrowding.
There are no uniform capacity requirements and, where regulation
exists, it is woefully inadequate. It has been suggested that
capacity requirements should be uniformly part of the specification
for all routes and should allow for no standing passengers except
for in exceptional circumstances. It may not be possible to plan
services on some commuter routes to exclude standing passengers,
but the existing guideline that states that services should be
planned to avoid passengers standing for more than 20 minutes
(which is a commitment in many TOCs' passenger's charters) should
be adhered to.
On suburban commuter lines, particularly in south-east England,
overcrowding is a result of a severely constrained network, with
available paths limiting the possibility of extra services. Overcrowding
on rural lines, however, is inexcusable. The paths exist.
Overcrowded stations
TOCs and Railtrack/Network Rail (in the case of Railtrack
Major Stations) are not required to measure station usage. Consequently
there is no published data to measure the level of station overcrowding.
However, the Rail Passengers Council and Committees are aware
that stations, particularly in London, can become severely congested
at peak times and/or when there are delays to services. Stations
affected include Cardiff Queen Street, Clapham Junction, London
Bridge, Kings Cross Thameslink, London Victoria and London Waterloo.
Aside from the issue of passenger comfort, passengers' safety
is put at risk.
Overcrowding on platforms (especially where access is made
difficult by poor design) puts passengers at risk of being pushed
onto the tracks, particularly because overcrowding causes changes
in passengers' behaviour and makes jostling and pushing more likely
to occur. In addition, severe overcrowding on platforms means
that, on occasions, passengers are unable to board trains and
are forced to wait for the next service—inconvenient at
the least and in the worst case may contribute to temporary or
even permanent modal shift to cars. Stations with small concourses
that lead directly onto roads may mean that passengers are forced
onto the road area where they are put at risk of injury from road
traffic. An example of this was at Kings Cross Thameslink station,
where overcrowding at an already capacity constrained station
was exacerbated during the recent London Underground strikes.
Conclusions and recommendations
1. Overcoming systemic capacity constraint and symptomatic
overcrowding requires a strategic approach and a willingness to
invest.
2. Overcrowding should be taken seriously as an issue
that concerns drivers, passengers and user groups in terms of
passenger comfort and perceived safety. An overcrowded rail network,
overcrowded carriages and overcrowded stations discourage people
from using trains and exacerbate road congestion.
3. The lack of a system to monitor overcrowding on the
majority of the rail network means that the extent of the problem
is not fully understood; the lack of a enforcement mechanism on
the majority of the network means that where passengers perceive
an overcrowding problem there is no means of redress. The current
Passengers In Excess of Capacity (PIXC) guidelines only cover
London commuter train operating companies (TOCs) and Edinburgh
services across the Forth Bridge. There are some serious limitations
with the PIXC regime even where it is employed. For these reasons:
Capacity should be defined—for all carriages on all
routes.
Effective monitoring and enforcement of defined capacity requirements
should be implemented for all train routes.
4. It is unclear why TOCs run trains shorter than planned.
It may be that rolling stock is not available—eg due to
lack of train fitters or insufficient time for maintenance as
a result of having to use existing rolling stock too frequently.
In the case of those TOCs subject to penalties for short formations,
it may be that it is cheaper and easier to pay the fines rather
than have trains on standby or solve the problem. If the latter
is the case, this issue must be addressed by the Strategic Rail
Authority's (SRA's) franchising policy.
5. There may be little scope for increasing the number
of services on the capacity constrained rail network, but running
longer trains—up to maximum length—on overcrowded
routes, particularly at peak times could help to reduce overcrowding.
The Rail Passengers Council (RPC) hopes that this issue will be
addressed by the SRA's Capacity Utilisation Policy.
6. Train services should be planned to meet the travelling
needs of the general public rather than TOCs focusing on trying
to persuade passengers to travel when it is most commercially
viable for the companies.
December 2002
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