Memorandum by Transpennine Rail Group
(REN 08)
RAIL SERVICES IN THE NORTH OF ENGLAND
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 The Transport Sub-committee of the Transport,
Local Government and the Regions Committee of the House of Commons
has decided to undertake an inquiry into rail services in the
North of England.
1.2 The Committee will consider the Government's
and Strategic Rail Authority's commitment to improving rail services,
and the impact of the Strategic Rail Authority's approach to franchising
in the Region. The committee will be particularly concerned with
:
— whether the existing franchisees
provide satisfactory services, particularly in relation to safety,
punctuality, reliability, comfort and frequency of services;
— plans for investment in the rail
network in the region and whether they meet the needs of additional
network capacity and other improvements; and
— the influence of rail services on
the economic and social development in the region.
Witnesses are invited to submit memoranda to
the Committee before Monday 10 June 2002. Because of the tight
deadline the Transpennine Rail Group is making a submission based
on reports already considered and policy resolutions already enacted,
as follows.
2. PERFORMANCE
OF EXISTING
FRANCHISEES
2.1 Existing operators of Transpennine services
are as follows:
— Calder Valley Route (Manchester and
Preston to Rochdale, Hebden Bridge, Bradford and Leeds). Arriva
Trains Northern and First North Western (partial route only) (Franchised).
— North Transpennine Route-(Manchester,
Stalybridge, Huddersfield, Dewsbury and Leeds/Wakefield). Arriva
Trains Northern and First North Western (Franchised).
— South Transpennine Route (Manchester-Sheffield
via the Hope Valley) Arriva Trains Northern, Central Trains and
First North Western (Franchised).
— Freight operating companies operate
over all three routes (not franchised).
nb Central Trains operate the Norwich—Liverpool
service over the Hope Valley route, but this is not in the Transpennine
Express Franchise.
2.2 We have no reservations concerning the
safety performance of local franchise operators. Other aspects
of performance are however less satisfactory. No performance information
is available for Central Trains. Neither Arriva Trains Northern
nor First North Western have consistently achieved the required
performance benchmarks. Arriva have been "called in"
on several occasions for poor performance, both by the Strategic
Rail Authority and their predecessors at OPRAF and were recently
fined £2million by the SRA for poor performance in the last
financial year. On the latest statistical information available,
for Period 11 of the current year (5 January 2002 to 2 February
2002) Arriva cancelled 3.3% of scheduled services compared to
a 12-month average of 7.7% and a benchmark target of 1%. First
North Western cancelled only 0.9% compared to a 12-month average
of 1.9% and a benchmark of 1%. Punctuality performance statistics
for First North Western show that the percentage of trains that
were on time or within five minutes of booked time was 87.3% compared
with a 12-month average of 80.3% and a benchmark of 90%. Comparable
figures for Arriva show that the percentage of trains that ran
to time, or to within 10 minutes of booked time (the standard
benchmark for longer distance services) was 89.7% compared with
a 12-month average of 83.4% and a benchmark target of 90%. Performance
of both companies over the life of their present franchises has
been consistently poorer than benchmark targets.
2.3 We do not have any reliable information
about overcrowding, or trains running in short formation. However,
information on unit availability for First North Western's new
fleet of Class 175/0 and 175/1 units first introduced to traffic
in the Winter 2001-02 timetable suggests that, of the 26 units
now allocated, for the 22 occasions in April and early May for
which information is available, unit availability was over 60%
on only one occasion and sank to 50% or lower on 13 occasions.
This not infrequently has the consequence that older units with
lower seating capacity have to stand in for the new rolling stock,
and may not be able to offer the same seating capacity. As an
anecdotal example, train 1N57 16.35 Manchester Airport to Blackpool
North was diagrammed in the Winter 2001-02 to be worked by a Class
175/1 unit offering 198 seats. On several occasions it has been
worked either by a 2-car Class 175/0 units offering 134 seats,
or a 2-car Class 150 unit offering 124 seats, with the consequence
of serious overcrowding. Similar short formation working during
the period of poor availability has been widespread, but is not
well documented.
3. REFRANCHISING
3.1 The Transpennine Rail Group has considerable
reservations about the preferred structures chosen by the Strategic
Rail Authority to bring about refranchising. Whilst the concept
of a high speed Intercity type operation linking principal destinations
in the North West and the North East has obvious attractions,
the route strategy adopted, and the manner in which Intercity
type criteria are to be applied to detailed service planning,
gives rise to a number of anxieties.
3.1.1 Firstly, the failure to incorporate
the present Central Trains Liverpool to East Anglia service within
the TPE Franchise means that three different operators will be
providing services over the South Transpennine route via the Hope
Valley between Manchester and Sheffield. It is not clear why the
preference expressed within the SRA's Strategy document for a
single operator working into each major London terminus does not
apply with equal force to Liverpool Lime Street, Manchester Piccadilly,
Leeds City or Sheffield Midland.
3.1.2 Secondly, the decision to incorporate
the present First North Western services between Manchester Airport,
Manchester Piccadilly and Barrow in Furness or Windermere, but
not the Manchester Airport to Blackpool North services which inter-work
and are inter-diagrammed with them is likely to lead to diseconomies
of scale, unless either one operator is allocated both the Transpennine
Express and Northern Trains franchises, or there is an agreement
on inter-working between the two operators chosen. Indeed the
whole process of disaggregation to form separate TPE and Northern
Trains franchises will produce serious diseconomies of scale,
but it is probably too late to change this decision.
3.1.3 Similarly the decision to exclude
from the TPE Franchise the Leeds-Blackpool North service via Hebden
Bridge and Blackburn, which interworks with the Leeds-Manchester
services seems equally irrational, but probably by now not capable
of being changed.
3.2 The Strategic Rail Authority's proclaimed
intention to apply Intercity criteria to the design of TPE services
seems in certain instances to run counter to geographical and
operational practicalities. There are currently some examples
of efficient interworking between services which will become parts
of two separate franchises.
3.2.1 At present, the First North Western
unit which operates from Manchester Airport via Oxenholme to Windermere
then does a local shuttle service all stations from Windermere
to Oxenholme, and returning all stations to Windermere before
taking up a return Windermere to Manchester Airport service. There
are no stabling or crossover facilities between Oxenholme and
Windermere or at the terminus. It would seem irrational and unnecessarily
wasteful for the TPE unit to work Manchester Airport to Windermere,
then to return empty to Oxenholme and be stabled there, whilst
Northern Trains sends a second unit empty from their nearest operational
base (Lancaster or Preston) to work the Oxenholme to Windermere
shuttle.
3.2.2 Similarly, the former Furness Railway
main line from Carnforth to Barrow in Furness is ill-suited to
an Intercity type operation. There are significant parts of the
day when the Barrow to Manchester Airport service also provides
the all-stations stopping service between Barrow and Lancaster.
To suggest that this service, which will be operated by TPE, should
call only at two intermediate stations would imply either a serious
loss of service to all of the other intermediate stations or significant
enhancements of the present infrastructure to enable a stopping
service to be superimposed on the TPE express service. There are
currently a limited number of peak hour stops in TPE trains at
Hunt's Cross, Hazel Grove and Dore, which provide for the specific
needs of long distance Transpennine commuters as well as providing
an express link to other stations served, and these also should
be retained.
3.2.3 Finally it has seriously been suggested
that the present Manchester Airport to Cleethorpes service should
be curtailed at Doncaster. The logic behind this suggestion is
that the service presently stops four times between Doncaster
and Cleethorpes and that this is incompatible with Intercity type
operation. This observation ignores the fact that, of the four
intermediate stations, Scunthorpe, and Grimsby, as well as Cleethorpes
itself, would appear to merit Intercity status, by virtue of the
volume and character of business available. We cannot see that
the need to service Barnetby and Habrough stations by whatever
other means would justify the withdrawal of useful through services
from Cleethorpes, Grimsby and Scunthorpe to Manchester Airport.
4. INVESTMENT
STRATEGY AND
CAPACITY ENHANCEMENT
4.1 We have serious and fundamental reservations
about the intention of the Strategic Rail Authority, as proclaimed
in their Strategy Document, to concentrate investment priorities,
apart from the West Coast Main Line, on lines into London and
the South East. In particular, it appears to us that the decision
to postpone any enhancement of cross-Manchester capacity until
after year 2010, and the decision to postpone the development
of freight avoiding links until 2007 or 2008 fatally constrains
the ability of the local rail network in Greater Manchester (as
in the West Midlands for similar reasons, though that area is
outside our terms of reference) to deal with contractually committed
growth on the West Coast route whilst accommodating legitimate
aspirations to frequency enhancement and growth on the Transpennine
routes and the local network which feeds them. It is relevant
that the Greater Manchester Strategic Rail Study produced by the
Gibb Consultancy for Greater Manchester PTE envisaged a virtual
doubling of service frequency on most local routes in Greater
Manchester to levels of frequency comparable with Metrolink, in
order to bring about modal transfer on the scale necessary to
avoid the total gridlock of the local highway network over the
next 10 years or so. It does not seem appropriate or reasonable
to us that the Government's targets for a 50% growth in passenger
carryings and 80% growth in freight should be concentrated on
the South East to the detriment of the North East and North West.
Similarly, earlier studies on the development of Transpennine
routes required both enhancements of service frequency (which
have in part been achieved) and the provision of faster services
on a clock-face, regular interval departure pattern. The growth
in business at Manchester Airport, which has developed as the
largest International Hub outside the South East, will also demand
some enhancement of capacity both at Manchester Piccadilly and
between Manchester Piccadilly and Manchester Airport. Finally,
it should be noted that many of the multi-modal studies now emerging
are predicated on an enhancement of rail service provision for
which the SRA's Strategy document, in its present form, makes
no allowance. The South East Manchester Multi-Modal Study (SEMMMS)
assumed capacity enhancement on the local rail network to enable
the full stipulations of the Gibb report to be attained. The Midman
Study, which considered travel demands on the corridor from the
West Midlands to the North West, assumed full modernisation of
the West Coast Main Line to PUG2 140 mph operation, which will
not now take place. In terms of the delivery of Transpennine service
aspirations, early investment in the enhancement of capacity across
Manchester, and in particular the construction of the Ardwick
flyover and the provision of two additional through platforms
at Manchester Piccadilly, are crucial.
4.2 The broader economic context is also
important. The whole issue of the provision of Transpennine rail
services is of paramount importance to constituent local and public
authorities and a range of northern business interests. The Transpennine
routes are strategic transport links for the north, and have significance
in national and international settings. Accordingly, the importance
of these rail links has been identified in many local and national
economic strategies, and is an explicit part of local and regional
development planning. The quality and capacity of rail services
is central to business and visitor perception of the North, and
is therefore hugely significant for the tourism industry and in
encouraging inward investment. In these respects the key strategic
economic issue can be identified as access to and from Manchester
Airport. The local authorities who own and control the Airport
are supportive of the need to develop a positive approach to this
issue, and their forward planning targets are consonant with and
rely upon the development and improvement of public transport
and especially rail links to the Airport from across the North
and further afield. The need for adequate investment cannot therefore
be overstated. Better services, faster running times, new rolling
stock and improved infrastructure are and should be the prime
components in the delivery of the Government's 10 Year targets
for the growth in rail usage, for Transpennine services in particular,
and the north in general.
5. TRANSPENNINE
FREIGHT CAPACITY
5.1 Existing studies of the Transpennine
trunk roads show that these are effectively already at capacity.
All routes from A57 and A616/A628 northwards to M62 suffer from
congestion, and there are no effective solutions available to
give relief. Under the auspices of the Peak Park Transport Forum,
the South Pennines Integrated Transport Study group is attempting
to find solutions which minimise the impact of this congestion
on the National Park, but the absence of a coherent rail freight
strategy inhibits any attempt to secure modal transfer in this
area. Derbyshire County Council (ironically with SRA funding)
is currently funding a study into the possible re-opening of a
route from Matlock to Buxton, and at least one of the finalist
bidders for the TPE franchise envisages the reopening of the Woodhead
route in the medium to long term. The SRA's Strategy Document
does refer to a proposal to carry out gauge enhancement work on
the North Transpennine route via Diggle to accommodate 9'6'' square
containers, but there is no specific time horizon set for this
work and, in the absence of a diversionary route around Manchester
the usefulness of gauge enhancement is limited. Proposals developed
internationally under the North European Trade Access banner,
and funded under Interreg 2, envisaged the development of an East-West
corridor across Northern England, linking Northern Ireland and
the Republic of Ireland through West Coast Ports, and a land bridge
to the Humber Ports, thence by short sea crossings to Holland,
North Germany, and beyond. These proposals were launched at an
International Conference in Amsterdam in September 2001, and won
the enthusiastic support of the National Governments concerned.
Discussions between NETA and Railtrack, or their heirs and successors,
continue. However the serious constraint on any freight development
is the lack of capacity across Manchester. The only effective
cross-Manchester link is presently through Manchester Piccadilly
and Oxford Road to Castlefields Junction, thence to Trafford Park
and beyond, and no spare capacity exists on this section of route.
A private sector proposal to develop a major freight presence
at Carrington adjacent to the Manchester Ship Canal has been discussed
with Trafford MBC. This would involve re-opening the disused freight
line from Skelton Junction across the Ship Canal to Carrington
(around SW Manchester), and Railtrack have considered extending
this as far as Glazebrook and Kenyon Junction (on the Manchester-Liverpool
route) in order to service their major intermodal freight facility
on the former Parkside Colliery site without imposing a further
burden on the West Coast Main Line. If implemented, this would
provide a significant means of shifting freight round Manchester
without creating additional congestion on the local network, and
is to be commended. The NETA proposals are particularly welcome,
since they address the problem of how to cope with projected demands
for international freight haulage, without pouring further traffic
onto lines into South East England which are already oversubscribed.
An early decision on this, and on the enhancement of cross-Manchester
freight links, are of crucial importance.
CONCLUSIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS.
6.1 The Transpennine Rail routes, if properly
developed, offer a serious opportunity to contribute to the economic
wellbeing of the region, and to accommodate legitimate demands
for the movement of passengers and freight across the network,
in ways which are environmentally and physically less damaging
than any of the available alternatives. To achieve these objectives
in the best possible way, the following specific changes are necessary:
(a) It is necessary to persuade the Strategic
Rail Authority to adopt a more flexible approach to the application
of Intercity type criteria to the specification of services within
the Transpennine Express franchise, particularly at the geographical
extremities of the franchise.
(b) Careful consideration needs urgently
to be given to the extent and nature of the working arrangements
which will be required to operate between the holders of, respectively,
the Transpennine Express Franchise and the Northern Trains franchise.
(c) It is necessary that the decision outlined
in the SRA's Strategy Document to postpone investment in capacity
enhancement in Greater Manchester and the West Midlands until
beyond year 2010, and investment in cross-Manchester Freight capacity
until 2008, be reversed, and that urgent attention be given to
the need to provide additional cross-Manchester capacity between
Castlefields, Manchester Piccadilly, Ardwick Junction and Slade
Lane Junction.
(d) It is necessary to develop, as a matter
of priority, a freight strategy for North West England which will
take full account of current pressures on Transpennine Routes
and across Manchester, as well as the West Coast Main Line north
of Crewe, and preferably one which does not concentrate the demand
for additional freight paths on already overloaded routes into
the South East.
(e) In view of the need to develop an East-West
freight strategy identified above, there is an absolute need for
the SRA to co-operate in funding preliminary work on the High
Gauge Freight Strategy for the North Transpennine Route. This
would complement attempts currently being made under the aegis
of the North European Trade Axis to secure Interreg 3 funding
to carry forward the necessary development work for this essential
project.
Cllr Derek Smallwood,
Chair,
Transpennine Rail Group
30 May 2002
|
