Memorandum by the Greater Manchester Branch
of the Institute of Logistics and Transport (REN 40)
RAIL SERVICES IN THE NORTH OF ENGLAND
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 The Institute of Logistics and Transport
(ILT) is the leading professional body for transport, logistics
and supply-chain management. Members are involved in all sectors
of transport. The Greater Manchester Branch has over 600 members
employed throughout the transport and logistics industries in
one of the north of England's key economic and transport hubs.
THE RAILWAY
INDUSTRY IN
GREATER MANCHESTER
2.1There is a general perception amongst the
transport and logistics professions in Greater Manchester that
the local rail network significantly under-performs in terms of
its share of the overall travel market, as well as failing to
capture as much freight traffic as it might—especially on
the Trans-Pennine corridor between Manchester and Leeds, parallel
to the very busy M62.
2.2 This is confirmed by analysis in the
Greater Manchester Local Transport Plan (LTP), produced jointly
by the ten district highway authorities and the Passenger Transport
Authority, which suggests that "while there are capacity
constraints on some services, particularly at peak times serving
Manchester City Centre, there is considerable spare capacity on
other parts of the network and further investment and improvements
in reliability are likely to be rewarded with further increases
in patronage". [Investing in excellence: Greater Manchester
LTP 2001/02-2005/06, p24.]
2.3 Data collected for the Annual Progress
report on the LTP confirms that rail patronage continued to rise
in 1999-2000, returning to a level some 14% above that in 1991—a
rate of growth of over 16% in the previous two year, reversing
a decade of slow decline up to 1997-98.
2.4 However, the question now raised is
what shape will the network—and its franchises operators—be
in to cope with, and continue to generate, continued growth in
rail patronage. In this context, the Greater Manchester ILT Branch
has serious reservations about progress in three main areas:
— the current performance of First
North Western and the other existing franchisees;
— the process of re-franchising to
date and its effects on future local rail services; and
— the ability of all rail stakeholders
to generate the necessary investment in the local network to overcome
infrastructure constraints on the potential for improving services.
3. PROBLEMS WITH
EXISTING FRANCHISES:
3.1 The experience of First North Western
as the areas local rail franchisee has not been much of an improvement
on its failed predecessor, NorthWest Trains—reflecting the
poor economic sense of the 1995 franchise contract, which led
to it being one of the largest loss-makers of all franchises.
3.2 We do not wish to go into great detail
regarding the specifics of service performance. However, in terms
of developing the local rail market, the franchise remains deficient
in several areas. It is:
— underinvested: with late delivery
of new rolling stock—the introduction of Class 175s on express
services is now over 18 months behind schedule and 30-year old
Class 101 stock remains in service on some local lines awaiting
the resulting rolling stock cascade;
— unambitious at management level.
FNW has delivered few service improvements over the life of the
franchise, lacks a positive attitude to route enhancements through
Rail Passenger Partnership bids—as a consequence, no bids
wholly within Greater Manchester have been submitted—and
has a poor working relationship overall with the PTE and local
Councils;
— providing low levels of passenger
service, with reduced station staffing in some places and a legacy
of unfulfilled commitments: eg. passenger security measures (help
points, phones and CCTV) which were promised in the franchise
but have not been delivered to date; and
— delivering services with little synergy
with, and poor access to, other operators' services—eg poor
connections to late-arriving long distance trains—and to
other modes of transport, despite cross-ownership with one of
the two major Greater Manchester local bus operators.
3.3 In many ways it remains an open question
as to whether the operator has a positive attitude to rail passenger
market growth—as witnessed by disproportionate and well
above inflation fare rises on those services not controlled by
agreements with PTEs at times when the franchisee has suffered
financial stringency. This attitude must have affected rail's
share of a vitally-important commuter market for travel into city-centre
Manchester from parts of Cheshire, Lancashire and Derbyshire.
3.4 Arriva Trains also has problems in terms
of its performance in serving Greater Manchester, where it runs
Trans-Pennine services eastwards to Leeds and the north-east,
Sheffield and Cleethorpes.
3.5 It has proved unreliable due to both
poor industrial relations and rolling stock failures—with
its operational efficiency hindered by having no base west of
the Pennines. (This caveat goes even more so for the other Trans-Pennine
service, Central Trains' Norwich-Liverpool route). This east-side
bias leads to a notably worse service pattern on westbound services—with
the last departure to Liverpool as early as 22.10 compared to
the more reasonable 23.22 from Manchester to Leeds.
REFRANCHISING TO
DATE—TRANSPENNINE
EXPRESS:
4.1 We are greatly concerned at the separation
of TransPennine Express into a separate, and first-to-be-let,
"TPE" franchise. We consider separation from Northern
is bad for operational efficiency, synergy and integration between
local and express services across the north's main conurbations.
4.2 Along with the limited scope of current
plans for West Coast Main Line upgrades into south Manchester,
we fear the creation of a "three-tier railway" while
infrastructure constraints remain—with a clear danger of
"cherry-picking" the best train paths and departure
times for the two more profitable inter-urban operators, first
Virgin, then TPE, with only the worst left for local services.
4.3 The potential letting of a TPE contract
before the Passenger Service Requirement for a Northern franchise
has even been finalised cuts against LTP aspirations for clockface
departures and more cross-Manchester services, which have already
been submitted in the PTE's Section 34 statement.
4.4 We consider the best result now would
be for both franchises to be won by the same bidder, and maintained
as separate business units within one company. Within this structure,
all Manchester local services should be included, but across the
entire Greater Manchester travel-to-work area—thus including
the "country" end of lines like Buxton, Macclesfield/Alderley
Edge, local routes to Preston, Blackburn, Clitheroe and Calder
Valley—so they can be better timetabled and managed.
4.5 We are also concerned that the TPE franchise
design lacks coherent logic in train service terms, with the inclusion
of Manchester Airport services from Windermere and Barrow (which
do not cross the Pennines) but the exclusion of the Central Trains
South TransPennine route (Norwich-Liverpool) and Leeds-Blackpool
via Blackburn and Calder Valley "trans-Pennine" local
services.
4.6 The effect is to create a Manchester
Airport-centred service west of the Pennines. This could create
problems by generating service aspirations that will impact on
the most congested parts of the Manchester Hub—especially
at Slade Lane junction (where the line from the airport joins
the West Coast Main Line into Manchester) and on the approaches
to Manchester Piccadilly station.
The process
4.7 The TPE franchising process appears
flawed and has undermined stakeholders' confidence. The decision
to start with a "blank sheet" approach, asking bidders
to generate ideas for new service aspirations led initially to
a perception that the (then Shadow) SRA did not know its own railway.
4.8 However, this decision appeared vindicated
when some bidders (notably Arriva—before the later industrial
problems reached crisis point) produced proposals that suggested
significant potential existed for expansion of services and subsequent
development of infrastructure enhancements. In the course of the
initial process, options like a Parkway facility at Guide Bridge;
a Leeds-Airport via Stalybridge/Stockport service and a study
of reopening the Woodhead route garnered support.
4.9 Yet the SRA then stopped this momentum
dead by announcing that the three short-listed bidders would be
asked to resubmit on the basis of the least ambitious submission—believed
to be that of Connex—which worked entirely within the existing
constraints of the Manchester Hub network. To what extent this
generates a pattern of service based on the (less popular) city
centre station at Manchester Victoria, rather than the greater
interchange potential at Piccadilly, has yet to be seen.
5. INFRASTRUCTURE
AND INVESTMENT
NEEDS TO
DELIVER ENHANCED
SERVICES:
5.1 The Northern franchise needs to be able
to meet key local service aspirations contained in the PTE Section
34 statement referred to above (para. 4.3) As well as the regular
departure pattern, this includes aspirations for 15-minute frequencies
across the local rail network and additional links to allow travel
between all of Greater Manchester's ten district centres (all
of which are served by local rail or Metrolink) with no more than
one change of service and maximum one hour journey.
5.2 Lack of investment remains our greatest
fear for the local rail network. The SRA's Strategic Plan proposal
that investment should be concentrated in the South-east ignores
the enormous potential for expanding rail-based commuting into
the major centres of employment in the north—where it will
have the same environmental benefits and, arguably, greater economic
ones than in London.
5.3 The Greater Manchester transport authorities
have developed a clear vision of the role rail could play—supported
by the Strategic Rail Study, undertaken in partnership with Railtrack
in 2000. The same themes have been taken up by a further study
commissioned by the SRA, which has not reported publicly but informed
the re-franchising process and Strategic Plan. The key issues
are:
— the capacity constraints across the
"Manchester Hub", between Piccadilly station approach
and Castlefield Junction, where the Warrington-bound and Bolton-bound
routes diverge This affects three sets of services—(a).
the TransPennine routes from Leeds to Warrington, which must cross
the entire station approach layout, including south- and east-facing
local lines and the West Coast MainLine, to access the only through
platform (14) at the extreme west of the layout, where they then
meet congested paths and major boarding time delays; (b). freight
services to Trafford Park terminal, which share with the passenger
services; and (c). trains to and from the north west (across the
Windsor Link to Salford) out of Piccadilly;
— stretches of line with restricted
capacity, including single tracks between Blackburn and Bolton;
a two-track stretch between Adswood and Cheadle Hulme where Virgin
and local trains share line, the lack of more than two working
tunnels through Standedge and speed restrictions at Guide Bridge
and Stalybridge on the Manchester-Leeds TransPennine route; and
— further constraints will be created
by Virgin's aspirations for more paths to and from the south,
under the PUG I agreement for the West Coast Main Line. The extra
fast trains will create crossing conflicts at key junctions which
are not gaining additional capacity under West Coast Route Modernisation:
Slade Lane, Heaton Norris and Cheadle Hulme will all have restricted
paths for local services due to WCML expresses. PUG I will also
impact on the capacity of the West Coast Main Line between Crewe
and Preston to handle local train services that provide important
links between Wigan, Warrington and Newton-le-Willows.
5.4 Because the local train operating franchises
are being designed before the solutions to all these problems
have been fully evaluated and identified, there is a grave danger
that no account will be taken of them. This could result in franchise
agreements that freeze into place the shortcomings of the present
network for a further 15 years, constraining the industry's ability
to deliver any enhancement schemes because all the costs would
be loaded onto the specific enhancement itself.
5.5 Without a process that will deliver
local operators willing and able to share the revenue risks and
potential income from new services that could result from infrastructure
enhancements, all risks will remain with the SRA through the Rail
Passenger Partnership bidding process. Because the agreements
with train operators could be based on a fixed level of subsidy,
they may have little or no incentive to join in with future bids—as
indeed the present operators appear not to have now.
5.6 There is a danger that local aspirations
for the Northern franchise will not be delivered for reasons other
than the problem created by TPE. In particular there is a danger
attaching to both franchises that the PTEs will not wish to be
co-signatories to the agreements—thus safeguarding local
fare structures, inter-ticketing and service synergy—due
to uncertainty over their continued ability to finance local rail
services without creating a significant additional burden on Council
taxpayers, since the Government has provided no guidance on the
future of Metropolitan Rail Grants. These have been paid since
1995 through Metropolitan authorities' Standard Spending Assessments
to cover the cost of local rail services under the franchise regime,
where the loading of infrastructure costs on to Train Operating
Companies (through track access charges) caused a rise in the
price of "Section 20" agreements for enhanced levels
of service and lower fares regimes in the PTA areas.
Investment needs and service aspirations:
5.7 While the Greater Manchester PTE Section
34 statement on the Northern franchise concentrates on service
standards—the need for clockface departures, frequencies
and local stopping patterns to be maintained, more investment
in stations and passenger facilities—they and other local
rail stakeholders also have particular service enhancement aspirations
which impact on infrastructure.
5.8 These were comprehensively catalogued
in the Greater Manchester Strategic Rail Study written
by Gibb Rail Consulting for the PTE and others in 2000. Key service
elements identified include:
— the need for four trains per hour
Manchester Piccadilly to Preston via Bolton—constrained
by capacity to Castlefield Junction west of Piccadilly, across
the "Windsor Link" in Salford (which allows access to
the north Manchester network for trains departing Platform 14
at Manchester Piccadilly) and on the West Coast Main Line from
Euxton Junction to Preston;
— services could be expanded on the
Calder Valley line to Leeds via Halifax from Victoria—which
could grow into an alternative TransPennine route from Liverpool
to York, using the Chat Moss route, thus avoiding the constraints
between Castlefield Junction and Piccadilly;
— increased TransPennine services to
Manchester Airport—these presently reverse out of bay platforms
on the eastern side of Piccadilly, with consequent waiting delays
for through passengers from the west, and then cross West Coast
Main Line and local tracks to reach the Styal (Airport) line approach
to Slade Lane junction, on the extreme west of the layout;
— an alternative TransPennine route
could be provided by bypassing the Manchester Hub via Stalybridge
and Stockport—however, this would fall foul of crossing
conflicts at Heaton Norris junction north of Stockport where,
again, westbound trains would have to cross the West Coast MainLine
and all local lines to reach the west of the layout for the Chester
line;
— South TransPennine services could
be enhanced across the Hope Valley line to Sheffield, while the
proposed reopening of service to Derby via Buxton and Matlock
would impact on levels of service between Manchester and Chinley/Hazel
Grove. This may create new pressures on the Hazel Grove chord,
across Stockport viaduct and at Slade Lane junction.
5.9 Some significant infrastructure solutions
were identified to address many of these problems, such as: a
flyover on the Piccadilly approach to allow TransPennine trains
direct access to westbound through platforms; two additional through
platforms to expand passing and waiting capacity at Piccadilly;
an "Ordsall chord" to allow Liverpool-Manchester Victoria
trains to run to Piccadilly Platform 13 and on south to the Airport;
a western link to the Airport from Chester and an eastern link
on to Cheadle Hulme, allowing south and north TransPennine routes
to reach the Airport via Stockport (without accessing the Manchester
Hub at all); and reinstating a Partington-Cadishead link to allow
freight trains access to Trafford Park from Chat Moss, avoiding
central Manchester.
5.10 The Local Transport Plan also suggest
a case for new stations at around 20 sites, some of which could
be developed as strategic Park-and-Ride facilities, with the potential
for taking thousands of peak hour car journeys off the network
However, appraisal of the proposals is being hindered by negative
assumptions in the standard methodology, which it is not clear
apply in a PTA area.
5.11 For example, although some sites have
significant regeneration benefits, they "score" low
when evaluated because the local catchment area does not have
a demographic profile typical of rail commuters—broadly,
insufficient numbers in socio-economic categories ABC1. This raises
the question of how any facility giving socially-excluded people
access to rail will ever be justified. Similarly, each new station
evaluation is assumed to draw passengers from existing stations
in the vicinity, and is deemed only to generate new traffic from
areas which were previously more than one kilometre from any station,
also militating against new station provision in dense urban areas.
5.12 Elsewhere, the artificial boundary
in the fares structure created by the PTE Section 20 area has
caused difficulties in provision of Park and Ride. Sites at the
edge of the PTE area would simply encourage railheading by commuters
anxious to get the cheaper fares offered inside the boundary.
A strategic approach is therefore likely to require extension
of the ticketing arrangements—which will restrict a future
franchisee's ability to raise uncontrolled commuter fares, as
FNW has done.
5.13 Other issues include the urgent need
for higher-capacity rolling stock to alleviate overcrowding on
some lines—notably Manchester-Bolton-Preston—more
modern trains on key Trans-Pennine routes and a rolling stock
cascade to local lines, eliminating unpopular Class 100 and 150
stock.
6. CONCLUSION:
6.1 The above concerns result from a desire
by ILT members of the transport planning and logistics profession
in Greater Manchester to see rail play a greater role in personal
travel and movement of goods around our county. We worry that
this is not being achieved, even in the context of a period of
passenger growth, and that if this opportunity is missed another
may not come quickly.
6.2 Refranchising presents an opportunity
to address the key constraints that will limit the potential for
growth in services and extension of links on the network. However,
unless a vision of the key improvements is quickly developed,
new longer franchises could become a barrier to that growth.
6.3 We therefore hope that the Select Committee's
work will contribute to overcoming these obstacles and making
clear the way to achieve a vision of a greater role for local
rail at this crucial point in its development. We are willing
and happy through our work to support other stakeholders in the
development of proposals for rail in Greater Manchester and links
with our region and beyond.
Bruce Allan
Branch Policy Officer
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