Supplementary memorandum by Railtrack
PLC (REN 34A)
RAIL SERVICES IN THE NORTH OF ENGLAND
Q186-189 (Crewe-Kidsgrove electrification)
Initial discussion relating to the electrification
of the Crewe-Kidsgrove line dates back to the time of British
Rail in the mid 1980s.
Following Railtrack consultation with the train
operating companies and as part of the Regulatory requirements
of the Major Project Notice and Network Change processes and outputs
from discussions through the joint SRA/TOCs and FOCs route utilisation
work this year, it was suggested that electrification of the route
should be re-examined. The rationale being that the route may
be suitable as a key diversionary route for electrified traction
between Crewe and Colwich.
Railtrack has undertaken a feasibility study
on behalf of the SRA that encompasses the running of the overhead
line but also other operating infrastructure requirements, signaling,
permanent way and structures etc. The feasibility is expected
to be complete in the autumn of 2002 and will seek to deliver
costs, programme and implementations requirements. Decisions to
proceed with these proposals are not a matter for Railtrack
Q199 (Freight Capacity on East-West Rail routes
in the North of England)
Consideration of possible alternative opportunities
to facilitate a significant increase in railfreight market share
is to target the unaccompanied unit traffic through Immingham
and/or Hull that use the Ro-Ro ferries to/from mainland Northern
Europe and Scandinavia. It is noted that this may require gauge
clearance of a Transpennine route to W18 for piggyback operation
of road trailers.
This concept of a railway "land bridge"
between the Humber ports, the North West and the Irish Sea has
considerable support from various public bodies in the North of
England and in Europe.
The Diggle (Huddersfield-Manchester) route is
also under consideration as it is a particularly direct east-west
link and also directly serves both Basford Hall at Crewe (via
Stockport) and Trafford Park. The latter has some daytime capacity
issues as trains would have to cross the "throat" of
Manchester Piccadilly. The Diggle route provides for container
traffic in 8'6'' boxes, domestic waste and some wagon-load traffic.
Customer predictions of traffic growth are mainly concentrated
on inter-modal business but are relatively limited. The main capacity
issue on the line is the inability of the infrastructure to support
a15 minute time interval passenger service between Manchester
and Leeds rather than overall capacity.
The SRA have made some considerations regarding
the enhancement of gauge for the route to W12 or W18 to attract
more inter-modal business and we will continue to support their
considerations via additional appraisal work on their behalf in
the coming months.
Other Transpennine freight routes which would
require infrastructure work for more or larger gauge freight include:
CarlisleNewcastle (passing loops and structures
via Hebden Bridge (more passenger services would
Hope Valley (work to increase capacity eg Dore
The SRA has been working on a freight strategy
for the North West and we are happy to continue to co-operate
on these issues as we have with the Manchester "hub study"
(see Q229 below).
Q219 (Ashton-under-Lyne station work)
Plans to make significant improvements at the
station have dated back for some years and the project has had
several incarnations although Railtrack's involvement with the
current scheme is relatively recent.
A works agreement is now in place between Railtrack
and Greater Manchester Passenger Transport Executive. Scope changes,
including changes brought about by the SRA's latest code on disabled
access and alterations to building regulations, have increased
costs. GMPTE informed us on 17 June 2002 that additional financial
authority is now being sought. The current project cost stands
at £975k, and the scheme can be progressed by Railtrack when
funding is confirmed.
Q229 (Issues on Passenger and Freight capacity
It has been recognised for many years that the
network operating around Manchester, particularly in the Piccadilly
area is congested. Over the past few years Railtrack has conducted
numerous studies and this cumulated in the "Manchester hub
report" produced in 1999.
The SRA have set up a steering group consisting
of Railtrack, GMPTE, GONW, Manchester Airport and the Highways
Agency to look at the long term strategic development of rail
services in Greater Manchester with a view to considering outline
strategy for the development of the network over the next 10 years.
The result of this study in June 2001 was a list
of options, and it was recommended that a number of further workstreams
were carried out:
Workstream 1: Further expansion of
Workstream 2: Manchester freight
Workstream 3: City centre heavy rail
Workstream 4: Airport "western
Workstream 5: Integration study.
Further work is expected to be undertaken by
the SRA. In parallel, feasibility studies have been commissioned
by the SRA up to Level 2 to assist with the Transpennine refranchising
process. This has resulted in studies on the following infrastructure
Additional platforms at Piccadilly.
6A chord and flyover at Ordsall lane.
An additional platform at Manchester
Q197 Costs at Sheffield and Leeds stations (overrun)
The works at Sheffield station are the first
phase to have been completed in a series of proposals to improve
and transform Sheffield station. The final proposals will give
a significant step change in the quality of the Station and which
would then provide a gateway to the City of Sheffield.
The programme of works have been designed to
keep any impacts on passengers or the operation of the network
to an absolute minimum and in the main works have been completed
without a requirement for any possession overruns.
Delays were experienced around Christmas 2001
which increased the amount of work to be completed based on the
availability of one weekly possession (Sunday morning 03.00-12.00).
In order to meet the requirements of the Sheffield City Council
Planners, the Listed Building submission had to produce a footbridge
design significantly different from the "like for like"
replacement normally encountered at a Listed location and envisaged
in this case. The footbridge design now has glazed sides and stainless
steel cladding and the work to extend the passenger footbridge
to the Supertram link is slightly ahead of programme and on budget.
The expected cost of the works programme at
Sheffield station works is approximately £9 million (subject
to the normal "factoring" that takes place at the completion
of such schemes).
Lessons learnt from both the Leeds 1st and Sheffield
station schemes have been identified and were included in the
estimates prepared for the SRA RPP Sheffield Station Masterplan
Sheffield station scope of works:
Footbridge renewal (three spans).
Three No.21 person passenger lifts.
New staircases and access to the
concourse on platform 1.
New staircases to platform 2-5 including
new waiting area.
New staircases to platform 6-8 including
new toilets and disabled toilet on platform 2-5.
Renewal of lighting and main distribution
Refurbishment and renewal of roofs.
Repair and renewals to Porte Cochere
Repair and renewals to taxi rank
Enabling works to parcels bridge
to form temporary passenger footbridge.
Canopies adjacent to footbridge/staircase
areas to be renewed.
Patch repairs to platforms where
"Leeds 1" is the project to redevelop
the railway station at Leeds and the infrastructure on its busy
approaches. Final authority to proceed with implementation was
originally granted by the Railtrack board in January 1999 with
work commencing on site during the summer of that year. The project
achieved substantial completion on the 31 May 2002 in time for
introduction of the summer timetable (May 2002).
||2.5||Initial design and development costs
||122||Main infrastructure works
||28||Main station works
||7.5||Compensation to train operators
||5||Move signalling control to York
||165 ||Railtrack introduce umbrella name of "Leeds 1st" and goes public with "£165 million" cost of the project in March 1999
The original authority represented a general scope development
to "outline design" status (using Railtrack's assessment
criteria design development to a level 2-3 out of a 5 level measure).
A contingency level of approximately £10 million (6%) was
The programme had been compressed by 12 months to meet the
completion deadline of the summer 2002 timetable change to ensure
buy-in from the train operators.
||Compensation to train operators
Item 7-Design Development
This reflects the evolution of design from outline design
(level 2-3) to full detailed design (level 5). Key development
issues included redesign in the signalling to reflect changes
in the current technology standards and re-configuration of the
entire overhead line electrification system to meet the requirements
of the previously untested mechanically independent registration
requirements of the specification.
Item 8-Schedule Issues
This effectively reflects the impact of the compressed schedule
by 1 year and the recovery plan following the overrun at Christmas
2000 to deliver the scheme by the end of May 2002 as per the original
schedule. The schedule impact was compounded by the design development
changes which by December 2000 meant the planned 17 day blockade
over Christmas had become over ambitious leading to the 14 day
overrun. The overrun required a revised schedule to be formulated
that required increased access (more track possessions) to recover
Item 9-Compensation to Train Operators
The allowance in the original authority was significantly
under estimated. The required level of access to the infrastructure
in which to undertake the works was totally insufficient and major
additional access was negotiated with the Train Operators.
The original schedule (compressed by one year) authorised
in January 1999 gave an overall target for work to be complete
ready for the 2002 summer timetable (ie by 31 May 2002). The actual
schedule has still delivered substantial completion by 31 May
2002 ie all the capacity improvements have been delivered to the
The contingency provision in the original authority was only
£10 million. This proved totally inadequate for the level
of design development and programme risk to be finalised. If authorised
today at a similar level of development the recommended contingency
would be 25-30%, not the 6% included in the original authority.
Similarly the provision for compensation to train operators
was totally inadequate. For a scheme of this size and intensity
a compensation level of 30% of the work activity would not be
A full and open programme of "lessons learnt sessions"
was undertaken with all the relevant industry partners. This has
directly led to changes within company procedures as to how schemes
are evaluated and project managed.