APPENDICES TO THE MINUTES OF EVIDENCE
TAKEN BEFORE THE WORK AND PENSIONS COMMITTEE
APPENDIX 1
Memorandum submitted by Mr Dave Lowrie
(EDP 01)
As a Welfare Rights Officer, I assist many people
who are incapable of work to claim benefits. Some benefits, such
as Incapacity Benefit, are only payable if someone is incapable
of all work. Due to previous changes, eg reduction in SERPS addition,
changes to age additions, reduction for occupational pensions
etc, the value of Incapacity Benefit has fallen and cannot now
be considered a disincentive to finding work. Other benefits,
such as Disability Living Allowance (DLA) are payable in work
so again cannot be considered a disincentive.
Actual disincentives include:
A lack of suitable part-time professional/skilled
work: many people may be able to manage three or four hours a
day (usually the middle of the day) but not always each and every
day. Understandably, employers find this difficult to plan for
so do not consider employment on that basis. Perhaps employers
need incentives to employ disabled people in professional/skilled
posts flexibly.
The jobs that are available on a casual/flexible
basis, eg cleaning, food industry, retail etc are too physical
and potentially stressful for people who are incapable of following
their regular occupation due to physical and/or mental reasons.
The apparent eagerness to withdraw benefit before
someone has tried work properly. Perhaps ICB could continue for
say a three months assessment period which would give a more realistic
assessment of capability.
Means-tested tax credits do not always provide
incentive. Several people have told me that their (at present)
DPTC—which is a perceived acknowledgement of their efforts
to work despite their disability—is in effect cancelled
out because of eg their partner's income, compensation etc. Perhaps
a Non-Means Tested element should be introduced to reflect their
disability (similar to the Industrial Injuries Prescribed Degrees
of Disablement but paid regardless whether or not the disability
was caused by work) but separate to DLA which has the need for
help from another person as a qualification rather than a specific
disablement.
When threatening benefit disincentives, perhaps
work history and future loss of earnings due to having to leave
work early because of disability should be considered. It is grossly
insulting to suggest that people choose to leave, in the main,
reasonably paid work and indeed careers to live on benefits. As
previously stated, if more flexible, light duties were available,
anecdotal evidence would suggest that fewer people would choose
to leave their employer.
The question then arises whether the employer,
the disabled person or both receives the financial incentive to
remain in work. It is surely more cost effective to have someone
in work and contributing (whether financially by tax/NI or socially)
to society than to stagnate at home because suitable work is not
available. The New Deal has shown that with both employer and
employee having an incentive, real, long-term employment can be
sustained.
The test is whether the Government are genuinely
trying to help disabled people find suitable work or whether the
objective is to save money. Perhaps financially, Government expenditure
overall savings would be minimal, as incentives would need to
be paid for; however social cohesion and in particular the belief
that working from 16-65+ was the norm would translate into votes.
Dave Lowrie
Stockton Welfare Rights
13 November 2002
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