| Criminal Justice Bill
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Mr. Grieve: I did not. I believe it was someone else. Hilary Benn: In that case, I apologise.
10 amMr. Grieve: I certainly did not upbraid the Minister. I would not have been so rude as to do so. In the 19th century the pronunciation appears to have been Column Number: 277 variable. Disraeli was undoubtedly the Earl of ''Beeconsfield'' but it is now pronounced ''Bek'', and the etymology shows that it was originally spelled ''Bek''.Can the Minister comment about other jurisdictions by way of providing a caveat to the right to trial by judge alone of the kind that is included in the Bill? Do they allow for trial by judge alone but deny it under certain circumstances, as is proposed here? It appears that this is a nub point. The Government have extolled the possibilities of the system, but have pulled back, and have therefore introduced an element of doubt into their reasoning. The Committee is entitled to understand why. Hilary Benn: I do not know the answer to the question about other jurisdictions. If the information is available, I shall gladly write to the hon. Gentleman. I was coming to the point that he made in his opening remarks, during which he coped admirably with his surprise in having to speak so early. He encapsulated the debate in asking the two questions: is it right to allow the choice, and is it right to deny such a choice if it is made? That goes to the heart of a number of the amendments. The Government see no reason to quarrel with Sir Robin Auld's argument that the principle should be that the defendant should have the right to opt. Therefore, the question is whether there should be any limitation on the option. Being in favour in principle of the right to opt is not inconsistent with the restrictions on that right that are proposed in subsections (6), (7) and (8). Clause 36 sets out the few cases in which it is in the public interest for a jury trial to be ordered, even though that might not be what the defendant wants. In such cases a jury can provide the additional measure of public ventilation of the criminal justice system that, in the limited circumstances in question, is sufficiently important to tilt the balance against the defendant's wishes. Amendment No. 285 suggests that the defendant should have to give reasons for choosing one method of trial rather than the other. I can see why my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham, North has tabled it, but I am not persuaded that it would be right for us to place such an obligation on defendants, when that is not required in the case of their current right, which is being retained, to opt for trial by magistrate or by jury. Defendants should be free to opt—that is the purpose of the clause—so their choices do not need to be justified. They could have been made for any of a variety of reasons, some of which have arisen in the course of the debate on both the amendments and the substance of the clause. It might be, as the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey suggested, that the defendant believes that a judge alone trial will be over more quickly. That can be a reasonable consideration. It might be that he has a desire to have a reasoned verdict, which is one of the features of judge alone trial. I am not persuaded, because even if the defendant were required to give reasons, the judge would not be able to take any of them into account. I would also make the point that in clause 39 there is provision for an appeal by either side, so in so far as Column Number: 278 issues surrounding this clause are subject to its later provisions, an appeal would provide the opportunity for the arguments to be ventilated publicly.Mr. Allen: The defendant may well opt for a judge only trial because he or she wishes to avoid a jury trial. If someone wishes to avoid a trial by their peers, but others are totally convinced about the need for a jury trial, it should, at least, be incumbent on that person to say in open court why they do not wish to be tried by their peers. The hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey mentioned sex offenders. Having carefully weighed up the odds, such people might feel that a technical defence before a judge would carry more weight than a trial before their peers. The provision is not intended to deny them that right but merely to ask them to say why they wish to exercise their right to avoid trial by jury. Hilary Benn: I hear my hon. Friend's argument. To express the reason for their desire to be tried by the magistrates rather than by a jury, for example, is not a requirement that we currently place on those who are charged with either way offences. If it is not required of them, I am not convinced that it should be required in the circumstances that we are discussing. Secondly, what would constitute a reason? A defendant might have a particular preference, having regard to all the circumstances, but there would be no examination of the reason and no one to say that the reason was insufficient. I understand my hon. Friend's point, but I do not think that his suggestion would benefit the process. Mr. Malins: In answer to the point raised by the hon. Member for Nottingham, North, the reality is that, day after day, thousands of defendants in our courts opt for district judge alone trials without having to give any reasons at all. That is common practice. For the purpose of the principle, the difference between the titles ''circuit judge'' and ''district judge'' is irrelevant. Hilary Benn: The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. That supports my point. Mr. David Kidney (Stafford): Presumably, the rules of court will set out the procedure for making such applications. After all, looking ahead to clause 39, if the judge thinks that subsection (6), (7) or (8) applies and the application must be refused, there will have to be a pre-trial hearing, so presumably, at some stage, there will be some indication that a person is making an application. Although an application might not list the reasons in detail, it will include some information on the basis of which the judge can determine whether he needs to consider whether subsection (6), (7) or (8) applies. Hilary Benn: I understand my hon. Friend's point, although the clause provides that it will be for the judge to consider whether subsections (6), (7) or (8) apply, having received a simple application from the defendant that he or she wishes to be tried by a judge alone. Clearly, a conversation will take place in those circumstances. Ian Lucas (Wrexham): Can my hon. Friend clarify how the judge would be in receipt of the information Column Number: 279 with which to determine whether those subsections apply?Hilary Benn: There will clearly need to be guidance on the operation of the clauses, and that guidance will need to cover the point raised by my hon. Friend. Mr. Grieve: The hon. Member for Wrexham (Ian Lucas) has picked up an important point, which concerns me, too. I had rather assumed that it was likely to be the prosecutor who would say that he was not happy with the choice, so that the view would first be put to the judge by the Director of Public Prosecutions, the Crown Prosecution Service or other prosecuting service. If that is not the case and the judge must make an independent judgment, he will need to be assisted by documentation or by the history of the case being made available to him. However, the Minister may agree that it is somewhat naive to think that the judge would be making an abstract decision; he will come to that decision under prosecution pressure. Hilary Benn: As I said in answer to my hon. Friend the Member for Wrexham, that would be clearly covered by the rules of court. The judge at the preparatory hearing will have to decide whether it is appropriate to fetter what would otherwise be the choice of the defendant to opt for a judge alone trial. Stephen Hesford (Wirral, West): Is not the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Stafford (Mr. Kidney) relevant? It would be for the defendant to decide how much information to put before the judge when making the application rather than, as my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham, North suggested, its being a requirement to tell the court on what basis the request was being made. It would be for the defendant to decide how much information to offer. Hilary Benn: As I said when answering my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham, North, there is no obligation on the defendant to provide information on why he wishes to be tried by a judge alone. I draw the Committee's attention to clause 39, which sets out the procedure for dealing with applications relating to clauses 36 to 38. Mr. Malins: The defendant may have the right to apply to a Crown court judge for the trial to be conducted without a jury, but will the Minister answer this specific point? Will an obligation, laid down in rules, be placed on the defendant to declare his preference at the plea and directions hearing, on the first day of the trial or at any other time? What prejudices or bars will exist if he fails to declare at that specific time? Putting it another way, if the application is made on the first day of the trial will it not require an expensive adjournment, lasting weeks, while the prosecution investigate whether there has been a link with the man's past and with certain employments? Mr. Allen: I am certainly not going to press the amendment to a Division, but I wonder whether, if the Minister feels that some helpful points were made this morning, he would consider bringing something back on Report that accommodated some of those matters? Column Number: 280 Hilary Benn: I feel a letter coming on. I shall try to answer the first of those points. It would clearly need to be included in the rules of court that the defendant should indicate his choice as early as possible in the process. It would be ridiculous to leave it until a later stage or until a jury trial had been organised. A common-sense approach suggests that the rules of court would need to cover that.
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