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Mr. Stinchcombe: I do not share hon. Members' objections to the principle or philosophy of the clause. It is right that we already have trials by jury and trials by judge alone, in both criminal and civil jurisdictions, and that we already give many accused people the right to choose trial by judge alone. For all the reasons set out in the preliminary reports that resulted in the clause, it seems correct that that right should be extended. If that happens, it is essential that there should be exceptions, fettering the right in the interests of justice or some other public interest. We have debated that in the context of one sort of case, in which race, rather than celebrity, is the determining factor. However, the clause gives rise to practical concerns, for which reason I join in the request of my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham, North for the Minister to think again about at least some of the clause and come back to us with further reassurance, either by letter or on Report. I am especially concerned about the use of the word ''necessary'' rather than the word ''desirable'' in subsection (8), which will have certain consequences. An accused might make an application for trial by judge alone in a case that involves race, an extremely serious offence, or religious prejudice, but the judge might be of the opinion that in the interests of justice it is clearly desirable that the trial should be conducted with a jury. Notwithstanding the fact that the judge comes to that conclusion, he would be prevented by clause 36 from ordering trial by jury. That gives rise to some concern. I believe that a critical practical issue on timing is involved, which I believe would have to be dealt with by the Bill. The reality is that any lawyer will be mindful of which judge is to hear the case before he advises his client whether to exercise the right. Although I share the concerns expressed by my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham, North, I accept that. If we are not aware of the reality when framing legislation, we will pave the way for miscarriages of justice and all sorts of delays and expense. We should be mindful of that reality and try to legislate to prevent the harm and mischief that could arise. Mr. Malins: The clause has excited a great number of people, and principled arguments have been made by both camps. On one hand, the Metropolitan police Column Number: 296 support the principle of the clause; on the other, a respected group such as Justice takes a very different view.The General Council of the Bar and the Criminal Bar Association have considered the clause carefully. I was struck by what they said about the defendant's ability to choose trial by judge alone. They feel that it is an area of high principle, but I shall not go into detail, save for one item. They state:
That is something that we will have to watch. One the face of it, plenty of arguments can be made that the clause should not trouble us too much. However, after reading what the Bar Council has to say, one thinks that it may not happen but that it may be the beginning of a move that we would desperately deprecate in the long run. That is a concern that we should all genuinely share. I end on a marginally flippant note. I was listening carefully to the point made about the Leeds United footballer, which reminds me of the trials of some great celebrities in the past few years. I may be wrong, but I am sure that Lester Piggot, Jeremy Guscott—what a great three-quarter he was—Ken Dodd and Bruce Grobbelaar all appeared before juries during the past few years. I have a funny feeling that they were all acquitted, which suggests that they would have been properly acquitted by a judge. However, it is swings and roundabouts, and there are hundreds of thousands of people in this country who, if their great hero came before a jury of which they were a member, would not convict them whatever the charge. I remember saying that about Jeremy Guscott, because it was necessary for him to play in the England trial a few weeks later. I make that flippant point to show that there is an upside and a downside for celebrities. As my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield said, the celebrity who is denied the safeguards of clause 36 because he is a celebrity may be in a difficult position compared with the non-celebrity. It should trouble us that although the clause appears now to give certain rights, and although there are too many problems, the real danger is where it could lead. That is why what the General Council of the Bar said was effective; and we should not ignore it. Vera Baird: The issue that has latterly come to the fore, which I intended to raise, is the real difficulty— It being twenty-five minutes past Eleven o'clock, The Chairman adjourned the Committee without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order. Adjourned till this day at half-past Two o'clock. Column Number: 297
The following Members attended the Committee:
Column Number: 298 Humble, Mrs. Kidney, Mr. Lucas, Ian Malins, Mr. Mann, John Simmonds, Mr. Singh, Mr. Stinchcombe, Mr. Taylor, Ms Turner, Dr.
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| Prepared 14 January 2003 | |
