Standing Committee B
Tuesday 11 February 2003
(Afternoon)
[Mr. Eric Illsley in the Chair]
Clause 217
Meaning of ''fixed-term prisoner''
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
2.30 pm
Mr. David Heath (Somerton and Frome): I wonder whether the Minister could enlighten me. The definition of ''prison'' in clause 217(2) is
''any place where a person serving such a sentence is liable to be detained.''
What do the words ''is liable to'' mean in that context? Why does the clause not refer simply to a place where a person is detained under the terms of clause 217(1)?
Mr. Graham Allen (Nottingham, North): This part of the Bill on the release of prisoners on licence is welcome and the Government are doing precisely what is needed. However, although what the clause means will be evident to judges and lawyers, unfortunately, the public are missing out yet again. We are in danger of snatching defeat from the jaws of victory because having introduced the positive concept of custody plus, we are putting it to the public as imprisonment minus. We all seem to agree on the concepts in the chapter relating to the release of prisoners on licence, but I wonder whether we could not phrase the provisions in such a way that would enable the ordinary member of the public to understand them.
It is the old cliché; offenders get 12 months but are out after six. The chapter turns that round so that an offender will get six months but must keep his nose clean for another six. In their wording, the Government have failed to recognise that they need to change the public's perception. I tabled amendment No. 919, which, sadly, was not selected, but in which I defined ''sentence'' as the term of imprisonment, plus that which was served in the community or on licence. Until the terms are clear, not only for the Committee and for judges but for the public, the sentencing process will lack credibility. I ask my hon. Friend the Minister to bring the public's perception in line with reality, so that a member of the public down at the Dog and Duck does not have to engage in judicial archaeology to understand why an individual leaves prison after six months. We can explain that honestly, and I hope that the Minister will do so. Otherwise, instead of calling the chapter ''Release of prisoners on licence'', we should call it ''The dishonest sentencing section.'' We need to restore that honesty, otherwise we shall be talking to ourselves and not involving members of the public in their criminal justice system.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Hilary Benn): Let me say to the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath)
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that if the word ''liable'' was not used, it would suggest that the definition depended on the offender being present in prison. If we stop to think about it, we will realise that that is not always so—for instance, when offenders are released on temporary licence. That is why the word is necessary. The definition of a fixed term of imprisonment encompasses all those serving a sentence for a determinate term and those under the age of 18 serving either an extended sentence for certain violent or sexual offences or a sentence of detention for non-dangerous offenders convicted of a serious offence.
I was much taken by the phrase ''judicial archaeology'' used by my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham, North (Mr. Allen). For good reasons, the Committee has often been engaged in that. I am at one with my hon. Friend in wishing the public to have a better understanding of how sentencing works. That is why, in those clauses already agreed to, we made provision for the court to explain exactly what a sentence means.
My hon. Friend touched on an important point when speaking of the difference between sentence and custody. People are confused about it. The sentence is the entire period; it consists of the time spend in custody and the period on licence. However, as my hon. Friend knows, if people fail to adhere to their licence conditions, they are liable to recall, which means that they will have to serve the rest of the sentence in custody. I agree with him that the public need a better understanding of how the system works.
I hope that the requirement for the courts to explain sentences and how they work, and some of the other things that we debated earlier such as the work of the Sentencing Guidelines Council, will begin to move us towards what my hon. Friend wants to achieve, with which we all agree—namely, a better understanding of what happens, and why and how it happens.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 217 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 218
Power of court to recommend licence
for certain prisoners
Mr. Heath: I beg to move amendment No. 908, in
clause 218, page 120, line 17, leave out 'particular' and insert 'reasonable'.
The Chairman: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments:
No. 724, in
No. 907, in
clause 218, page 120, line 21, leave out 'have regard to' and insert 'consider in full'.
Mr. Heath: Under the amendment, when passing sentence, a court may recommend to the Secretary of State reasonable conditions that could be included in any licence that is granted. However, that does not
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exclude the possibility of particularity. I hope that the conditions imposed would not be general but specific to the prisoner. It is important, however, that the conditions can reasonably be complied with by the offender. Otherwise, they would presage an automatic return to custody. I would be entirely satisfied if the Minister were to tell me that the condition of reasonableness could be applied in another way. I am not sure that it is, and the amendment therefore seems reasonable. It makes clear the context in which the conditions would be set.
Amendment No. 907 is self-explanatory. It would apply when the Secretary of State was exercising his powers under section 229(3)(b), as it would allow him to introduce other conditions from time to time. It cannot be right that the Executive consider it in a vacuum, outwith what is already the sober consideration of the court. It is self-evident that the Secretary of State, in applying those conditions, must properly have regard for the conditions originally applied by the court. It is a matter of emphasis and degree rather than a change in meaning of the terms of the clause, in that it would be made explicit that the Secretary of State must consider as a matter of overriding importance the views of the court in the first place, rather than any discretion that he might accrue to himself. That brings us back to the central issues of the Executive's role in sentencing, and its tendency to overreach itself in that respect. We shall come back to that argument later, and we have touched on it already. The amendment is the very smallest of nudges in the direction of the discretion of Secretary of State in taking fully into account the views of the court at the first point of sentencing.
Mr. Allen: It tells you something about me, Mr. Illsley, that in my diary I carry not only a picture of my wife and daughter, but a dog-eared piece of The Guardian that I ripped out about two years ago, because the facts it described stunned me and I felt that I could not be without it. It says that
''the 100,000 hard cases share identifiable problems which can be tackled. These problems include the fact that half are under 21; nearly two-thirds are hard drug users; more than a third were in care as children and half have no school qualifications at all.''
The quotation ends rather cryptically:
''Mr. Blair has told colleagues that the figures are 'shocking'.''
I shall not delay the Committee unduly on the matter, except to say that when we are considering conditions that should be attached to licences we should surely examine some of those root causes of crime and what the courts can do to tackle them. That is why I tabled amendments Nos. 109 and 110, which were not called, but which ask the court to take into account factors such as
''the attainment of emotional maturity, social skills, and in the case of parents, parenting skills'',
and
''the attainment of educational and employment qualifications.''
If the court does not bear such matters in mind as part of the conditions that are attached to a licence it is, in my view, being negligent, because it is just recycling
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offenders through the courts system, rather than tackling the root causes.
The hon. Member for Woking (Mr. Malins) probably has more experience of daily dealings with such people than any of us, and must have come to the same conclusion as I have. Many of these people are poorly qualified, inadequate, unsuccessful and lacking in emotional intelligence, if not basic intelligence. One way to crack the recycling of offenders is to break that circle and give those offenders something that they can grasp. That is why I raise with the Minister the issue of ensuring that the courts, in deciding on licensing conditions, pay more attention than is currently provided for in the Bill to what they can get offenders to aspire to and get better at, so that they can be more adequate people, make more of a contribution and come out with qualifications.
Mr. Humfrey Malins (Woking): Let me say how much I agree with the hon. Gentleman in relation to his comments about the problems that some defendants awaiting sentence face. He is right to paint the picture he did—it is extremely accurate.
Amendment No. 724 would require the court to
''tell the offender when passing sentence what conditions are to be recommended and . . . give the defendant an opportunity to make representations'',
and is no more than a probing amendment. It has not hitherto been the practice of the judiciary to talk much about licences, which have been an afterthought. Perhaps that has been a mistake, inasmuch as hitherto the judiciary has simply said, ''Bloggs, you will serve 18 months. Half of that will be served and after that you will be released on licence, but if you muck around under licence you will go back again. End of story; bring me the next case.''
That might not be good enough. I understand what the Government are saying. However, will the judge not require much extra information about the defendant before passing comment about licence conditions? Will he require separate reports? Will there be any cost implications about which we should be concerned, and would it not be a good thing for the judge to explain to the defendant in simple language what conditions he is going to recommend, just in case the defence or its legal team has anything to say about the conditions? That is the only reason for my probing amendment. I also note that the clause refers to the fact that the judge ''may'' as opposed to ''must''. Am I right in thinking that that gives the judge an option that might or might not be exercised depending on the mood of the judge and the suitability of that position for that judge on that day?
2.45 pm
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