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Schedule 16
Deferment of service
Mr. Malins: I beg to move amendment No. 727, in
schedule 16, page 227, line 20, at end insert 'in custody'.
The Chairman: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments:
No. 728, in
schedule 16, page 228, line 8, leave out from 'with' to 'relating' and insert 'a written report'.
No. 729, in
schedule 16, page 228, line 39, after 'offence', insert 'punishable with imprisonment'.
No. 730, in
schedule 16, page 229, line 38, leave out paragraph (b).
Mr. Malins: I shall be brief. Deferment of sentence is introduced in clause 242. On a personal note, I must tell the Minister that deferring sentence is not helpful. Most judges of any experience do not defer sentence because it is more trouble than it is worth—and here's why.
Judges normally defer sentence by saying to the defendant, ''I defer sentence for six months, and during that time you must first behave yourself and not commit any other offences; secondly, you must get a job; and, thirdly, you must make some reparation.'' The list may include other things. The odds are that the defendant will come back to court at the end of the period of deferment and be only halfway there—but not quite: he had a job but lost it; or he kept out of trouble but was given a caution. It puts the courts in a difficult position, and most experienced judges never defer sentence. However, the amendments are simple.
New section 1(6) of the Power of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, proposed in schedule 16 provides that a court that
''defers passing sentence on an offender shall not on the same occasion remand him.''
I assume that that means remanded in custody, which is the reason for amendment No. 727. I would be happy if the Minister could confirm that. New section 1A of the 2000 Act includes the phrase
''such information as the court may require''.
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That envisages an oral report, but it would be tidier to use the words ''a written report'', as suggested in amendment No. 728.
Amendment No. 729 seeks to amend proposed new section 1C(1), which states:
''A court which under section 1 above has deferred passing sentence on an offender may deal with him before the end of the period of deferment if during that period he is convicted in Great Britain of any offence''.
I assume that that must mean an offence that carries a custodial sentence, although it is not stated, because otherwise it could apply to a road traffic offence, which is of no relevance to the provision.
4.30 pm
I move on to amendment No. 730. I will not press any of my amendments, but page 229 made me think that if sentenced is passed by the Crown court it must mean that another offence had been committed. Would this provision aggravate an offence that had previously been the subject of deferred sentence by the magistrates? However, that is not a strong point. If I were asked as to my best point in the past five minutes I would be pushed to tell the Minister what it was, but I think it was the point that the offender should not be remanded for an offence carrying a custodial sentence.
Hilary Benn: I listened with interest to the hon. Gentleman's comments about deferment of sentence. Some judges seek to defer sentences and some do not. I respect enormously the hon. Gentleman's experience. As he said, sentences are deferred to enable the court to monitor the offender's compliance with community requirements. The offender will have a supervisor who will provide the court with information as to compliance. As with suspended sentences, if the offender does not comply or commits a new offence, he can be dealt with immediately.
In relation to amendment No. 727, the Bill currently states, ''remand him''. It is not necessary to add ''in custody'', because at this stage of the proceedings after conviction remand could only mean in custody. That is the confirmation that the hon. Gentleman was seeking.
Amendment No. 728 would limit the provision of information to a written report. We made provision for reports to be provided in oral form for pre-sentence reports under an earlier clause and we would like to retain that flexibility and read it through to these provisions.
Amendment No. 730 would remove the power of the magistrates court to commit an offender to the Crown court for sentence. We are dealing with a re-enactment of section 1(5)(b) of the Power of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000. There is no reason why, in cases where an offender has pleaded guilty before venue, the court cannot commit the offender to sentence after a deferment as well as straight away. There is no conflict with the changes to committal for sentence in the earlier parts of the Bill. The section 3 referred to in proposed new section 1D(2)(b) is section 3 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, which the Bill amends.
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In relation to amendment No. 729, proposed new section 1C(1) is a discretionary power, but it should go by the court, which can then choose to ignore a road traffic offence if necessary—to use the hon. Gentleman's example. However, we would want serious non-custodial offences to be included.
Mr. Malins: What about non-imprisonable offences?
Hilary Benn: I shall reflect on that point.
Mr. Malins: The Minister has kindly undertaken to reflect on the point; I think that he thinks that it is not a bad one. Given that he is going to come up with a serious non-imprisonable offence, I will look forward to his written response. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Schedule 16 agreed to.
Clause 243 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 17
Inclusion of drug treatment
and testing requirement in supervision order
or action plan order
Simon Hughes: I beg to move amendment No. 915, in
schedule 17, page 230, line 41, at end insert,
'and
(c) that his dependency upon, or propensity to misuse, drugs is related to his offending behaviour, such that it is relevant and proportionate for the court to require treatment, and
(d) that the option of voluntary treatment provided concurrent to the order would be unsatisfactory'.
The Chairman: With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 916, in
schedule 17, page 232, line 11, at end insert,
'and
(c) that his dependency upon, or propensity to misuse, drugs is related to his offending behaviour, such that it is relevant and proportionate for the court to require treatment, and
(d) that the option of voluntary treatment provided concurrent to the order would be unsatisfactory'.
Simon Hughes: The schedule is linked to clause 243. It would give the courts power to include drug treatment and testing in certain orders in respect of young offenders. It raises an issue that we have touched upon before, which is when is it appropriate for young people, particularly 14 to 17-year-olds and, in theory, those who are even younger, to be subject to a formal drug treatment and testing order? The children's organisations and societies quite reasonably express concern about this.
The amendment would allow the power to be used only if alternatives of voluntary treatment had been considered and rejected for good reason. At present, the power is proposed to be available where a court proposing to make an action plan is satisfied that the offender is dependent on or has a propensity to misuse of drugs, and that his dependency or propensity is such as to require and be susceptible to treatment. If the amendment were agreed to, the dependency on or propensity to misuse of drugs would be related to the
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offending behaviour. We must ensure that we do not send youngsters for compulsory drug treatment and testing if their offence is unrelated to drug addiction. There may be perfectly good reasons for treating their drug addiction but making them subject to a court order, if is unrelated to the offence, may not be helpful at all.
Any such order should be relevant and proportionate to the offence. If the offence was breaking a window, nicking some apples off a tree or some sweets from a sweetshop, it might not be proportionate to send the offender through a great regime of drug treatment and testing. Secondly such an order could come into play only if the option of voluntary treatment provided concurrently to the order would be unsatisfactory. If it were known through the social inquiry report that the youngster had had contact with solvents and might have a solvent abuse concern, there might well be an argument for dealing with it. However, voluntary regimes might be able to do that.
Youngsters of 14 to 17 often breach orders to which they are made subject. That is not necessarily intentional; it could be natural adolescent indiscipline. They might not turn up. They might be persuaded to go off with their mates instead of turning up at the health centre, the doctor's surgery, the clinic, the school education welfare office or the local family centre. That would bring down on their heads all the sanctions that result from breaching an order.
4.39 pm
Sitting suspended for a Division in the House.
4.55 pm
On resuming—
Simon Hughes: The Children's Society has provided a strong argument in support of writing the qualifications into the schedule, and I think that the Committee should heed it. It states:
''The Children's Society believes that any compulsory medical or psychological treatment by court order should be taken as a very serious prospect, and recognised as one that incurs many civil and children's rights issues. We are concerned in principle at the prospect of children being compelled, on pain of the criminal offence of breaching a court order, to undergo the treatment they need. We recognise, however, that these are measures to which the Government and many others have a strong commitment . . . We are therefore deeply concerned that the provisions contained in Schedule 17 do not include safeguards to ensure that the very serious step of using court compulsion to treatment would only be used where absolutely necessary, and where voluntary options had already been considered and tried.
We are also concerned that, for a court to compel drug treatment as part of a sentence there ought to be good reason for that treatment to form part of the disposal for their offence. The inclusion of treatment in the order should not merely be justified simply because the child needs it and would benefit from it. For example, a child suffering badly from asthma may both need and benefit from regular medical attention during the course of their sentence, however it would not be considered something appropriate to require within their sentence, on pain of breach for failure to comply. For this reason, we believe that the link between the individual child's drug use and the offence(s) for which they have been convicted, should be demonstrated to the court in order to warrant the inclusion of treatment requirements.''
That is a strong argument. There should be a clear link between the drug problem or addiction, if there is
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one, and the offence. There should be a clear view that there is no alternative way to deal with the matter. I hope that the Minister will be sympathetic.
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