Sexual Offences Bill [Lords]
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Mr. Malins indicated assent.
Paul Goggins: The hon. Gentleman nods. That is a sound argument showing why his helpful and constructive suggestion would not work. The hon. Member for Beaconsfield asked me again about prosecutions. I promise to get back to him on that. I hope that there are not many. None of us wants to think that such cases occur in great numbers, but we would want prosecutions to happen where appropriate. I return to the combination of good, solid legislation coupled with sensible guidance, which gives us good law and common sense in practice. The hon. Gentleman asked me further about issues relating to lack of consent. I give him the example of an adult—I will not put that adult in a position of trust—on whom the child has what used to be called a crush, to the point where sexual activity is taking place. That child feels that she loves that individual and will want to protect him, and will not give evidence against him. We have a scenario where a child is placed in the position of having to give evidence to prove the case for the prosecution, which is totally unwarranted. If we move those goalposts we hit the problem that in order to prove the case we have to put children in distress and question their consent. I put it to the Committee that as soon as we try to add greater clarity to the provision, we actually introduce more complexity. Mr. Malins: It has been an interesting debate. There will be more interesting debates later this afternoon. I Column Number: 142 am grateful for the Minister's response. It may be that my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield would like to intervene to make a few comments. It will fall to me in a moment to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. I do not do so yet in case others wish to make concluding remarks. I believe that they do not. Having had a good debate, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. Mrs. Brooke: I beg to move amendment No. 160, in
'(a) under subsection (1)(c)(i) of this section is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years, (b) under subsection (1)(c)(ii) of this section is liable— (i) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or both; (ii) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 7 years, (iii) in determination of the sentence, consideration must be given to the age differential between A and B. (3) A person aged below 18 years at the time of the offence— (a) prior to sentencing, shall be subject to a comprehensive assessment by a multidisciplinary agency or youth offending team, (b) shall only be subject to notification requirements under part 2 of this Act following an assessment of the risk that he poses to the public.'.
The Chairman: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Amendment No. 139, in
'(a) summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or both;'.
Amendment No. 165, in
'(3) Unless subsection (2) applies, a person guilty of an offence under this section is liable— (a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or both; (b) on conviction or indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 7 years. (4) A person aged below 18 years at the time of the offence— (a) prior to sentencing, shall be subject to a comprehensive assessment by a multidisciplinary agency or Youth Offending Team. (b) shall only be subject to notification requirements under part 2 of this Act following an assessment of the risk that he poses to the public.'.
Amendment No. 168, in
'(3) Unless subsection (2) applies, a person guilty of an offence under this section is liable— (a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or both; (b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years. (4) A person aged below 18 years at the time of the offence— Column Number: 143 (a) prior to sentencing, shall be subject to a comprehensive assessment by a multidisciplinary agency or Youth Offending Team, (b) shall only be subject to notification requirements under part 2 of this Act following an assessment of the risk that he poses to the public.'.
Amendment No. 171, in
'(3) Unless subsection (2) applies, a person guilty of an offence under this section is liable— (a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or both; (b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years. (4) A person aged below 18 years at the time of the offence— (a) prior to sentencing, shall be subject to a comprehensive assessment by a multidisciplinary agency or Youth Offending Team, (b) shall only be subject to notification requirements under part 2 of this Act following an assessment of the risk that he poses to the public.'.
For the life of me, I can see no reason why the offence of sexual activity with a child should be regarded in every single case as so serious that it can be tried only in a Crown court. There must—I repeat, must—be examples in which the sentencing powers of the magistrates would be sufficient. Perhaps that would be so in most cases, or perhaps in some, but there must be some cases. Surely it cannot be right that every single allegation under this clause would be deemed suitable to be tried before a jury. Remember that the position in a magistrates court, after the person is arraigned, is as follows: if the Crown thinks that the either-way case, such as a case of theft, which can be tried in either court, is so serious that it can be tried only in the Crown court, it will say so and the magistrates will commit it for trial. There is no danger of terribly serious cases remaining in the magistrates court. Surely we should retain the option—perhaps it would be used often, or perhaps occasionally—of trying such cases in a magistrates court. Why is the offence triable only on indictment, as opposed to summarily as well? Have I missed anything? If I am right, surely my amendment covers both situations. Column Number: 144 Mr. Grieve: I am waiting in haste to hear the Minister, but unless I have misunderstood how statutes are drafted, my hon. Friend is absolutely right and clause 10 provides only for trial on indictment. If that is the case, that raises an interesting question. To jump back to my argument on the previous group of amendments, the suggestion is that only extremely serious cases will go to trial. That is probably not what the Minister intends. If a 17-year-old sexually touches a 15-year-old in circumstances—[Interruption.] Let us say that an 18-year-old inappropriately touches a 15-year-old and a prosecution is brought. There would be instances in which it would be possible for a magistrates court to dispose of such a case. The difficulty is that the phrase ''sexual activity with a child'', which has been drawn from the previous statutory framework, covers everything from consensual sexual intercourse with a 15-year-old, which is not rape, but is still a very serious offence if the other person involved is, say, a 35-year-old, right down to an 18-year-old having a snog behind the bike sheds with a 15-year-old. At the bottom end, there must surely be provision for a summary trial. Paul Goggins: On first reading those clauses, one imagines some horrendous scenarios that would trouble us all. The penalties in the Bill reflect the sense of seriousness that we would feel. They are the maximum penalties, but none the less, the crux of the argument made by the hon. Member for Woking—whether trial could take place in a magistrates court or would have to be in a Crown court—deserves further reflection. If he will withdraw his amendments, I will undertake to give the matter further consideration, and either I will provide a compelling argument, or he may see something on Report that will give him some cheer.
3.30 pmMr. Grieve: There may be an argument for considering the point in the context of clause 11 as well. As I said earlier, the circumstances outlined in clause 11 are on the whole likely to be more serious than the bottom end circumstances outlined in clause 10. Paul Goggins: I acknowledge that the hon. Gentleman was intervening on me. If any other member of the Committee would also like to intervene, I will of course give way. Mr. Hilton Dawson (Lancaster and Wyre): I am grateful to my hon. Friend. Will he clarify whether a sentence on indictment could be for six months or anything up to the maximum sentence? The fact that the case could not be tried summarily does not preclude the possibility of a six-month sentence on indictment.
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