| Sexual Offences Bill [Lords]
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Mr. Dawson: I was much persuaded by the hon. Gentleman's arguments during the previous debate on indecent photographs. I do not understand why he is slightly demurring over these amendments, which I should have thought are based on the same principle—that of recognising that children are children under 18, and ensuring that they are protected. In this case, it is a matter of a worse form of abuse. Mr. Grieve: I appreciate the hon. Gentleman's point, but there is a distinction. In one case, I was dealing with the question of what should or should not be criminal. We are now dealing with the way in which we reflect or mark our disapproval of conduct through the sentence imposed. The act is still criminal. There is a distinction to be made between those two concepts. I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his comments in relation to what I said earlier. I am sympathetic to the intention behind his amendment, but it is also right to say that it is undesirable to have on the statute book draconian penalties relating to criminal offences that are never imposed in reality. There should be something in the tariff that reflects what is likely to be imposed by the court; otherwise, as I am sure the hon. Gentleman will understand, there would be no point in Parliament putting upper limits on tariffs at all. We could, if we wanted, remove all upper limits on tariff sentences and tell judges to do whatever they like. A burglar or someone stealing in a particularly serious case could be sent to prison for life. We could remove all tariffs if Parliament wished to do so. Historically, we have tended to impose upper limits, and those limits are supposed to mark what we consider to be the most serious type of offence in relation to the category of criminality that we are considering. The difference between the categories of seven and 14 years is that prostitution with a child under 16 is deemed to be more serious because that child cannot consent to sexual intercourse at all. That is the distinction. The hon. Gentleman's amendment could easily be accepted if the Government wanted it, and I shall be interested to hear from the Minister the reasons for making this particular distinction. Beverley Hughes: As we have heard, clause 49 introduces a new offence, and I am grateful for the recognition by my hon. Friend the Member for Lancaster and Wyre of the importance of introducing a new offence, criminalising paying for the sexual services of a child. Existing criminal law as it relates to prostitution focuses only on the activities of the prostitutes themselves, or those who exploit them, such as their pimps. Although it is currently unlawful to engage in sexual activity with a child under 16, we are for the first time making it a criminal offence specifically to buy the sexual services of a child. We must focus on that point in this debate, which is specifically about the purchase of the sexual services of Column Number: 265 a child. Other offences in the Bill, which we have debated, make sexual activity with a child a criminal act in its own right.As my hon. Friend said, the amendment's purpose is to remove the distinctions by age on the proposed penalties for the offence. As it is drafted, the offence carries three bands of penalties, depending on the age of the child victim and the type of sexual service that was paid for. For penetrative sexual activity involving a child under 13, an offender could face life imprisonment. For non-penetrative sex with a child under 13, or any type of sex with a child aged 13 to 16, the offence carries a heavy maximum penalty of 14 years. For any type of sexual services bought from a child aged 16 or 17, an offender faces a maximum of seven years in prison. I would say first to my hon. Friend that an amendment saying, for example, that there should simply be a maximum penalty for all those different circumstances such as life imprisonment or 14 years has not been tabled today. Members of the Committee, including my hon. Friend, have implicitly accepted the point raised by the hon. Member for Beaconsfield, which is that we have a well-established practice of setting down maximum sentences when we are criminalising certain behaviour to take into account different circumstances in different scenarios, and what we think the upper limit of what courts are likely to impose would be. My hon. Friend has implicitly accepted that the gradation of sentencing in relation to those offences to reflect the varying vulnerability of children, the nature of the sexual activity and the particular circumstances is both reasonable and proportionate, which is why there are three gradations. My hon. Friend is not arguing against the distinctions at the upper limits. Secondly, the fact that three grades of sentencing are proposed does not mean that the activity is any less serious in one situation or another. We are criminalising the activity because it is a wholly serious matter whenever someone pays for the sexual services of anyone under 18. However, the maximum sentences imposed should reflect not lesser seriousness but the different circumstances in relation to the vulnerability of children. Thirdly, I point out to my hon. Friend the Member for Lancaster and Wyre that a seven-year sentence is still, by anyone's standards, a significant maximum sentence for a court to be able to impose. In part, a seven-year sentence for offences relating to young people aged 16 or 17 reflects—I take his point that in some circumstances such young people are very vulnerable—the fact that they are over the legal age of consent to sexual activity. It is therefore appropriate that that particular factor is part of the reason why the maximum penalty is focused on paying for the sexual services of a child as opposed to the circumstances, age and vulnerability of the child, which is certainly the focus of the other two groups. I say to my hon. Friend that the argument is difficult. I understand his point and there could be a legitimate reason for saying, ''Let's have no gradations Column Number: 266 whatsoever. Let's simply have life imprisonment, and we'll let the courts decide.'' We have not often taken that route when legislating. It is a valid approach to say that we should reflect different circumstances in the different maximum tariffs that we want courts to be able to impose. That largely reflects what we think that courts will want to do. We do not envisage it as very likely that a court will want to impose a sentence of more than seven years in a situation involving a young person of 16 or 17.This is a matter of judgment. I am not saying that my hon. Friend's argument is not valid, but in using gradations of sentencing we are following a well established tradition, which we feel has validity to distinguish in law, in this new offence of paying for the sexual services of a child, children of different ages and different vulnerabilities with different maximum sentences. Mr. Dawson: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for her reply, but I am quite disappointed by it. I accepted when I first spoke that the Government were maintaining the very important distinction that there has been throughout the Bill between under-13s and those aged 13 and over. I accept entirely that there is an important gradation of sentencing for those who abuse children in those particular age groups. However, my hon. Friend has not convinced me in any way at all that abuse through prostitution has any link with the age of consent of 16. All the experience of young people who have been involved in prostitution, and all the work that has been undertaken with young people who have been subjected to that appalling abuse, says nothing about the age of consent or about ordinary, normal relationships undertaken by young people over the age of 16. This is one of the most appalling, coercive, damaging forms of child abuse that there can be and it is, quite honestly, a great shame that despite accepting the United Nations convention definition that a child is someone under the age of 18 and the definition laid down in our Children Act 1989 that a child is anyone under the age of 18, the Government seek to draw what I regard as a spurious distinction between under-16s and those aged 16 and over. I have not attempted to argue that we should have mandatory sentences, or the opportunity for sentences of life imprisonment, for people convicted of such offences against children aged 13 and over, but I cannot believe it right for the Committee to rule out the possibility that a court might want to sentence someone convicted of the abuse of someone aged 16 to more than seven years imprisonment. We make a mistake by not allowing that possibility. Decisions must be taken on individual circumstances. I am not seeking to argue that everyone convicted of this appalling offence should immediately receive a sentence of 14 years, but we are wrong to rule out the possibility of a court wanting to do that, with the major point of sentencing being to protect the public and other young people from someone who has abused children in that way. I have fully acknowledged that we owe a huge debt of gratitude to the Government for introducing clause 49 and the other clauses associated with it. It is fine Column Number: 267 legislation indeed, and it would be a shame if it were not carried through to the fullest possible extent. I shall withdraw the amendment, but with real regret. I hope that my hon. Friend will spend time to reflect on the issue and think again about the clause. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. Clause 49 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
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