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15 Dec 2003 : Column 703W—continued

Airports

Mrs. Gillan: To ask the Secretary of State for Transport what comparison he has made of the noise impact upon local residents of (a) the proposal to construct a third runway at Heathrow Airport and (b) other proposals for airport expansion in the South East. [144086]

Mr. McNulty: The data to inform such comparison are set out in Chapters 7 and following of the consultation document, "The Future Development of Air Transport in the United Kingdom: South East, Second Edition", published in February 2003. We will announce the Government's conclusions in the White Paper to be published shortly.

ATOL Scheme

Miss McIntosh: To ask the Secretary of State for Transport what proportion of those booking overseas holidays from the United Kingdom were protected by the ATOL scheme in (a) 1995 and (b) the most recent year for which figures are available; and if he will make a statement. [143552]

Mr. McNulty: In 1995 the proportion of people protected by ATOL compared with the number of people going on holiday overseas was 97 per cent. In 2002, the most recent year for which figures are available, that proportion was 92 per cent. If people going abroad to visit friends and relatives are included, the proportions become 82 per cent. and 75 per cent. respectively.

Big Conversation

Mr. Heald: To ask the Secretary of State for Transport what visits (a) he and (b) Ministers in his Department (i) have made and (ii) plan to make using public funds in connection with the Big Conversation; how many civil servants accompanied each Minister in respect of such visits; what the cost to public funds was of visits by (A) each Minister and (B) civil servants in connection with the Big Conversation; and if he will make a statement. [143157]

Mr. McNulty: I refer the hon. Member to the answer given by my right hon. Friend, the Leader of the House of Commons on 9 December 2003, Official Report, column 355W.

Correspondence

Mr. Kaufman: To ask the Secretary of State for Transport when he will reply to the letter to him dated 4 November from the right hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton with regard to Mr. T. P. Garvey. [142955]

15 Dec 2003 : Column 704W

Mr McNulty: My right hon. Friend, the Secretary of State replied to my right hon. Friend's letter on 11 December 2003.

Crash Barriers

Sue Doughty: To ask the Secretary of State for Transport how many lorries have crashed through barriers on (a) dual carriageways and (b) motorways in each of the last five years. [143011]

Mr. Jamieson: The following table shows numbers of Heavy Goods Vehicles that have either hit the central reservation or crossed it for both motorways and dual carriageways for the years 1999–2002. The information is not available for 1998.

Vehicles

	(24)Crossed central reservation	Hit central reservation	Hit near/offside crash barrier
	Dual Carriageways
1999	42	171	104
2000	57	168	112
2001	48	152	118
2002	46	150	120
Motorways
1999	20	98	76
2000	31	86	89
2001	21	81	95
2002	26	80	95

⁽²⁴⁾ May include vehicles that either "hit the central reservation" or "near/offside crash barrier".

Heathrow Airport

Mr. Randall: To ask the Secretary of State for Transport what discussions his Department has held with the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister on the implications for sustainable development in the areas of construction of a third runway at Heathrow. [143792]

Mr. McNulty: The Department is liaising with the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister on all aspects of the forthcoming air transport White Paper.

Mr. Randall: To ask the Secretary of State for Transport if he will arrange for the British Airport Authority's air quality strategy and action plan for Heathrow to be assessed by independent consultants. [143814]

Mr. McNulty: The three local authorities (Hillingdon, Spelthorne and Hounslow) adjacent to Heathrow have declared Air Quality Management Areas in the vicinity of the airport and are now developing action plans in order to reduce emissions.

The BAA Air Quality Strategy and Action Plan has been developed in consultation with local authorities and will be considered by the authorities in their assessments of future achievement of emissions requirements.

BAA's Air Quality Strategy and Action Plan was published in 2002 and has been in the public domain since then. It is also available on the internet, http://www.baa.co.uk/main/corporate/publications frame.html.

15 Dec 2003 : Column 705W

Many of the actions contained in the strategy are independently assessed (by independent consultants Casella Stanger) through BAA' Heathrow's reporting of performance in its annual sustainability report (see www.baa.coni).

Mr. Randall: To ask the Secretary of State for Transport (1) what assessment his Department has made of the need to construct further terminals at Heathrow if a third runway were to be constructed; [143815]

(2) what estimate his Department has made of the effect on capacity on the north runway at Heathrow of aircraft crossing to access the third runway; [143820]

(3) what estimate his Department has made of how long it would take for aircraft to taxi from terminals to the proposed third runway at Heathrow. [143821]

Mr. McNulty: We have carefully considered all consultation responses on these issues and carried out some further assessment. We will announce the Government's conclusions in the White Paper to be published shortly.

Mr. Randall: To ask the Secretary of State for Transport what assessment his Department has made of the potential risks from aircraft crossing the northern runway to gain access a proposed third runway at Heathrow. [143822]

Mr. McNulty: In our assessment of all of the options for new airport capacity, we have taken full account of the need to ensure that all aircraft operations comply with the UK's very high aviation safety standards.

Dr. Tonge: To ask the Secretary of State for Transport what assessment his Department has made of the need for further terminals at Heathrow airport, if a third runway is approved. [144173]

Mr. McNulty: We have carefully considered all consultation responses on these issues and carried out some further assessment.

The Government's conclusions on UK airport capacity, including the consideration of development at Heathrow airport, will be set out shortly in the White Paper.

Dr. Tonge: To ask the Secretary of State for Transport what assessment his Department has made of the number of new areas in London which will be affected by noise pollution if the decision to create a third runway at Heathrow Airport goes ahead. [144180]

Mr. McNulty: The areas that would be affected are summarized in Chapter 7 of the consultation document "The Future Development of Air Transport in the United Kingdom: South East, Second Edition",

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published in February 2003, pages 56 and 57, and supplementary documents which were published in July 2002.

Lifeboats

Mr. Carmichael: To ask the Secretary of State for Transport pursuant to his answer of 4 December 2003, Official Report, column 158W, on lifeboats, when the International Maritime Organisation's Design and Equipment Sub-Committee will conclude its review of the standards and guidelines which currently apply to the launching and operation of lifeboats; and what the main objectives of the UK delegation on this committee are. [143498]

Mr. Jamieson: The Design and Equipment Sub-Committee will next meet from 1 to 5 March 2004. The short term objective, which will be reviewed at this meeting, is particularly concerned with reducing the number of accidents during lifeboat drills and ensuring reliability of the equipment. Additional guidance and regulations are being developed on crew training and the maintenance of equipment.

In the longer term, the Sub-Committee seeks to simplify standards for the design of lifeboats in order to make them easier and more reliable to use. It is essential that safety standards in this area are established on an international basis. The UK delegation will therefore support the Sub-Committee by working with international partners to ensure guidelines to the shipping industry are sufficient and effective.

London Underground

Mr. Damian Green: To ask the Secretary of State for Transport what the overall investment figures in the London Underground were for each year between 1990 and 2003, broken down by line. [140927]

Mr. McNulty: London Underground, which transferred from central Government to Transport for London on 15 July, does not record investment by line. They have provided the following information. In April 2000, London Underground adopted new accounting treatment for its investment expenditure which removed the category 'investment renewals' the majority of this expenditure was reclassified as capital, although some (£90 million) became resource expenditure. Therefore the figures before and after April 2000 are not directly comparable and are presented in two separate tables with the years 1990–91 to 1999–2000 on one consistent basis and those for a restated 1999–2000 to 2002–03 are on another. It is normal accounting practice when a change in accounting treatment occurs to restate the previous year's figures on the same basis in the accounts, so that a true comparison can be made.

Investment expenditure£ million (outturn prices)

	1990–91	1991–92	1992–93	1993–94	1994–95	1995–96	1996–97	1997–98	1998–99	1999–2000
Capital	327	225	414	320	319	210	173	133	171	134
Renewals	87	70	218	159	184	275	198	191	244	208
Total core business	414	295	632	479	503	485	371	324	415	342
Jubilee line extension	40	63	68	261	396	587	660	476	283	655
CrossRail	5	12	29	45	30	16	4	—	—	—
Total investment	459	370	729	785	929	1,088	1,035	800	698	997

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Investment expenditure£ million (outturn prices)

	1999–2000	2000–01	2001–02	2002–03
Capital	252	293	418	402
Total core business	252	293	418	402
Jubilee line extension	655	—	—	—
CrossRail	—	—	—	—
Total investment	907	293	418	402

The deteriorating performance of London Underground in recent years reflects a long period of unstable funding and insufficient investment. That is why this Government have put in place stable long-term arrangements which will see more than £1 billion invested each year for the next 15 years in maintaining

15 Dec 2003 : Column 708W

and modernising London Underground's assets, with financial incentives on the infrastructure companies to reverse the decline in performance.

Mr. Damian Green: To ask the Secretary of State for Transport how many (a) track and (b) signal failures there were on the London Underground in each year between 1990 and 2003, broken down by line. [140930]

Mr. McNulty: This is an operational matter for London Underground (LU), which transferred from central Government to Transport for London on 15 July. London Underground has provided the following information for those track and signal failures that caused more than two minutes delay to services. The information for the years before 1996 could be provided only at disproportionate time and cost.

	1996–97	1997–98	1998–99	1999–2000	2000–01	2001–02	2002–03
Signals
Bakerloo	264	292	249	355	248	357	187
Central	644	880	308	335	490	582	520
District	303	269	278	394	525	632	590
East London(25)	—	—	—	—	46	68	57
Jubilee	79	110	197	338	398	415	304
Circle and Hammersmith	129	131	125	238	407	396	274
Metropolitan	209	266	194	290	522	613	510
Northern	298	323	216	317	358	388	597
Piccadilly	261	241	213	202	326	289	327
Victoria	115	166	149	131	186	314	425
Waterloo and City(26)	—	16	27	29	—	—	—
Total signals	2,302	2,302	1,929	2,600	3,522	4,081	3,820
Track
Bakerloo	193	201	176	168	171	210	111
Central	203	92	65	50	62	133	89
District	74	51	69	83	179	190	259
East London(25)	—	—	—	—	10	26	20
Jubilee	45	38	77	146	126	103	139
Circle and Hammersmith	75	61	57	62	98	166	157
Metropolitan	105	73	83	82	136	136	157
Northern	141	165	109	105	208	143	246
Piccadilly	92	110	109	135	165	144	245
Victoria	54	80	66	66	56	56	62
Waterloo and City(26)	—	—	—	—	5	5	9
Total track	982	982	811	897	1,216	1,312	1,494

⁽²⁵⁾ East London Line was included with Jubilee line until 1999–2000.

⁽²⁶⁾ Waterloo and City Line included with Central Line until 1999–2000.

The deteriorating performance of London Underground in recent years reflects a long period of unstable funding and insufficient investment. That is why this Government have put in place stable long-term arrangements which will see more than £1 billon invested each year for the next 15 years in maintaining and modernising London Underground's assets, with financial incentives on the infrastructure companies to reverse the decline in performance.

Mr. Damian Green: To ask the Secretary of State for Transport how many delays of more than (a) five minutes, (b) 10 minutes and (c) 15 minutes there were on the London Underground in each year between 1990 and 2003, broken down by line. [140933]

Mr. McNulty: This is an operational matter for London Underground (LU), which transferred from central Government to Transport for London on 15 July.

London Underground does not hold the information in the format requested. It only holds data on delays irrespective of their cause where the delay is greater than 15 minutes. The information for the years before 1996 could be provided only at disproportionate time and cost. London Underground has provided the following figures:

Number of train delays >15 minutes

	1996–97	1997–98	1998–99	1999–2000	2000–01	2001–02	2002–03
Bakerloo	255	232	300	329	300	318	356
Central	512	678	541	446	495	501	284
District	385	332	360	326	418	574	573
Jubilee	138	142	173	234	208	289	246
East London	—	4	295	136	110	108	102
Northern	343	336	332	235	216	247	250
Piccadilly	258	246	275	246	267	333	392
Victoria	131	183	142	95	97	151	148
Metropolitan	374	375	302	319	404	495	564
Circle and Hammersmith	181	135	134	189	291	287	287
Waterloo and City	79	30	44	34	38	39	76
Total	2,656	2,693	2,898	2,589	2,844	3,342	3,278

15 Dec 2003 : Column 709W

The deteriorating performance of London Underground in recent years reflects a long period of unstable funding and insufficient investment. That is why this Government have put in place stable long-term arrangements which will see more than £1 billon invested each year for the next 15 years in maintaining and modernising London Underground's assets, with financial incentives on the infrastructure companies to reverse the decline in performance.

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