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Mr. Andrew Miller (Ellesmere Port and Neston) (Lab): Will the inquiry extend to examining the points made by the leader of the Liberal Democrats on 18
March last year, when he said of the previous Administration:
- "They provided him"—
- "with anthrax and other chemical weapons, and they approved the construction of dual-use factories in Iraq."—[Official Report, 18 March 2003; Vol. 401, c. 783.]—
Mr. Straw: That would be entirely a matter for the inquiry, but the right hon. Member for Hitchin and Harpenden (Mr. Lilley) quite properly put on the record of the House the fact that such a claim was without foundation.
Sir Peter Tapsell (Louth and Horncastle) (Con): Do the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary feel no shame or even regret that as a consequence of their ignoring the advice of many of us on both sides of the House—we expressed grave doubts by voice and vote in the months before the war, suggesting that Iraq no longer possessed weapons of mass destruction, and urged that Hans Blix and the UN inspectors should be given more time before military action—their faulty political judgment caused the deaths of more than 50 British servicemen and thousands of innocent Iraqi citizens?
Mr. Straw: I respect the view that the hon. Gentleman took before military action and subsequently. The advice, as he describes it, was not taken by the overwhelming majority of his own party, still less by us. Many people will want to quote Dr. David Kay. The hon. Gentleman must weigh up the fact that there is overwhelming evidence about the violation of resolution 1441 by Iraq, and I ask him to consider—this is a difficult calculation, but it is one that we must all consider—what would have happened had we allowed Saddam to continue. My judgment is that had we simply sat on our hands, which is all that was on offer from other countries in the Security Council, Saddam would have been re-emboldened and re-empowered. He would have posed an even greater threat to his own people and the whole region, and those mass graves being filled up weekly by Saddam's thugs would have become even fuller.
Sir Stuart Bell: Does my right hon. Friend agree that the entire House feels pleased that Saddam Hussein is no longer able to develop his deadly poison, ricin, his rudimentary nuclear programme and all those weapons of mass destruction programmes that were concealed from Dr. Hans Blix? Given that my right hon. Friend will place in the House of Commons Library the full text of Dr. Kay's statements to the Senate armed services committee, would a proper reading of that not show that it would have been the grossest dereliction of duty of this Government or any Government to have taken any decision other than the one we took in the House on 18 March?
Mr. Straw: I agree with my hon. Friend. Dr. Kay used almost exactly those words in his evidence to the Senate armed services committee.
Mr. Alex Salmond (Banff and Buchan) (SNP): Was it not Lord Butler who, when still Cabinet Secretary in
1997, approved Alastair Campbell's right to issue instructions to civil servants? Might that issue not be germane to the inquiry that Lord Butler has now been asked to chair? How could the Prime Minister this morning and the Foreign Secretary this afternoon claim that Lord Hutton had cleared the Government of any misuse of intelligence material, when Lord Hutton did not even examine the February 2003 dossier—the dodgy dossier, the fabricated dossier, the load of Horlicks, as the Foreign Secretary once described it? How can that possibly be? Finally, given that the minority parties were not consulted about the remit and did not even get the chance to decline to serve, may I say that we certainly would not have served on an inquiry with such a dodgy, restrictive and cover-up remit.
Mr. Straw: The issue of the 7 February dossier—whose process I described in that way, but not its content—was comprehensively dealt with by both the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Intelligence and Security Committee. As to the announcement by the hon. Gentleman that no Scottish nationalist would have served on the Committee, I am sure the House will be deeply shocked and upset by that news.
Mr. Malcolm Savidge (Aberdeen, North) (Lab): Does my right hon. Friend recognise that whatever controversies there may have been about some of the conclusions, there was overwhelming approval of the openness with which the Hutton inquiry was conducted, including the publication of written evidence? Can we consider the possibility of allowing this new inquiry to follow that example, subject to national security considerations?
Mr. Straw: The problem is in what my hon. Friend said right at the end—subject to national security considerations. This inquiry is significantly about intelligence. The Intelligence and Security Committee of the House does its work in private, but makes its report in public. That is the appropriate way for the inquiry to proceed, as well.
Sir Patrick Cormack (South Staffordshire) (Con): Is it not regrettably clear that the minority who on 18 March last year voted, in effect, to keep Saddam Hussein in power will not be pleased by anything that is said by any committee?
Mr. Straw: That is true. Although none of those who voted for that had that intention, I am in no doubt that that would have been the consequence if their advice had been accepted.
Donald Anderson (Swansea, East) (Lab): Surely the question of the Government's competence and judgment is a matter for the House and ultimately for the electorate. With regard to timing, the inquiry is asked to report before the summer recess. That means in less than six months, whereas the US inquiry, with somewhat narrower terms of reference, may take more than a year. Should not the inquiry be given whatever time the committee deems necessary for its task?
Mr. Straw: My right hon. Friend is correct in what he first says. The House must be the judge of whether we
made the right or wrong decisions, and must be as well informed as it can be, including by the committee's report. As regards time, my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has expressed his hope and intention about the time scale, but ultimately it will be a matter for the inquiry.
Mrs. Patsy Calton (Cheadle) (LD): When can we expect the Government's response to the report that the Foreign Secretary has mentioned twice in his answers today—the report from the Intelligence and Security Committee entitled "Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction—Intelligence and Assessments"? It was published in September 2003. We have yet to hear from the Government.
Mr. Straw: I think the response is due to be published today, but I will make sure.
Ann Clwyd (Cynon Valley) (Lab): My right hon. Friend is right when he says that if Saddam had not been checked, he would have continued to kill. He was responsible for genocide. The United Nations has a responsibility to act in the case of genocide. The House and the Government have a responsibility to act. We signed the genocide convention and we are bound by its terms. It is a disgrace that the United Nations did not act to check Saddam's genocide.
My right hon. Friend speaks of WMD, but it was not my argument that WMD was the ground for toppling the regime of Saddam Hussein. I have made that case many times in the House. A year ago when I was in Kurdistan, before the start of the war, the Kurds were convinced that chemical and biological weapons would be used against them. The Kurds are Iraqis. They too must have had their own intelligence. Will my right hon. Friend bear that in mind when the committee investigates the intelligence that was available before the start of the war?
Mr. Straw: My hon. Friend, who has seen the brutality of Saddam and his regime at starker and closer quarters than ever have I, speaks with huge and poignant authority on the matter. The House needs to take note of what would have happened, had Saddam stayed. That would unquestionably have been the consequence of a decision on 18 March not to take military action.
Mr. Bernard Jenkin (North Essex) (Con): May I remind the Foreign Secretary of exactly what the conclusions of the Hutton inquiry were? He stated:
- "The term 'sexed-up' is a slang expression . . . capable of two . . . meanings"
- "because of the drafting suggestions made by 10 Downing Street for the purpose of making a strong case against Saddam Hussein, it could be said that the Government 'sexed-up' the dossier."
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