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HEALTH

"Securing Good Health for the Whole Population"

The Secretary of State for Health (Dr. John Reid): Derek Wanless has today published his report, "Securing Good Health for the Whole Population", which has been commissioned jointly by the Prime Minister, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and me. Copies have been placed in the Library.

The report makes recommendations to the Government on implementing cost-effective approaches to improving population health, prevention and reducing health inequalities, and advises on whether current action is consistent with the fully engaged scenario which was outlined in the first Wanless Report, "Securing Our Future Health: Taking A Long-Term View" (2002).

The Government will address the report through the formal consultation on public health which will be launched next week and through the forthcoming White Paper on public health.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS

Weapons of Mass Destruction

The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr. Jack Straw): Over the past year, there have been some significant breakthroughs in countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The United Kingdom has worked effectively with the United States in the case of Libya's programmes and in countering AQ Khan's network. We have played a leading role, with France and Germany, on the issue of Iran's nuclear programme. We have enforced UN Security Council Resolutions on Iraq. We have been active on the proliferation security initiative designed to interdict the passage of cargoes intended for use in WMD programmes. We support the six party talks in North Korea. All of this demonstrates effective multilateralism in action.

I would like to set out for the House other steps we are taking and further proposals we will be discussing with our partners to deter, check and roll back WMD programmes in countries of concern, and to prevent WMD equipment and expertise falling into the hands of terrorists.

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Proliferation security initiative

The proliferation security initiative has developed well since it was launched in May 2003. Some 60 countries have indicated their support for it and their intention to apply its principles. There is more that we can do to extend its possibilities:

we are working in the International Maritime Organisation to secure amendment to the Suppression of Unlawful Acts at Sea Convention, which will make it an internationally recognised offence to transport WMD, their delivery systems and related materials on commercial vessels. It is already an offence under the Chicago Convention of the International Civil Aviation Organisation to transport WMD on civil aircraft.

agreements have been concluded in the past providing for the boarding of vessels which may be carrying drugs. We now plan to negotiate similar agreements with the main commercial flag states allowing for the boarding of vessels which may be carrying cargoes which could be used in WMD programmes. Shipping of the 10 largest commercial flag states covers some 70% of maritime trade. So with a relatively small number of such agreements, a large proportion of the world's shipping would be covered. The options available to the proliferator and rogue supplier would be reduced.

we will consider with our partners whether new penalties should be introduced to deter air or shipping lines from seeking to transport such cargoes. Might the vessels and planes of any companies found to have engaged in such transport be denied landing or port rights around the world? Should we consider an international register of companies and individuals convicted of proliferation offences?

we support President Bush's call to use Interpol and all other means to help law enforcement agencies work against the traffickers.

within the EU, we see a case for Customs experts considering how to tighten regulations and practices, and how better to exchange information in order to prevent the trafficking of WMD.

in the UK, we have begun work on the screening of traffic for the illicit movement of radioactive materials. This will eventually cover all air, sea and Channel Tunnel traffic—passengers, parcels, vehicles, freight and containers.

Global Partnership

Eighteen months ago, the Knaskis G8 Summit established a Global Partnership against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction. Under this initiative G8 leaders decided to support specific cooperation projects, initially in Russia, to assist the destruction of chemical weapons, the dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines, the disposition of fissile materials and the employment of former weapons scientists. The United Kingdom announced that it would make up to $750 million available over 10 years for this work. The first report of work undertaken by the UK was published in December.

Since Knaskis, we have had the Iraq conflict and Libya's decision to dismantle its WMD programmes. Work is under way to develop a programme for the employment of former weapons scientists in Iraq. The UK has offered to help with a similar programme in Libya. We would like to see the Global Partnership expanded so that it is fully global in its geographical extent, and for the number of donor states to be expanded so that the target of $20 billion can become a floor rather than a ceiling.

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The United Nations and Counter Proliferation

An anomaly in the field of counter proliferation has been the lack of discussion since 1992 of proliferation in an overall sense by the UN Security Council. Following a proposal by President Bush last September, work is now under way on a resolution which will call on states to adopt tough national legislation to criminalise the possession, manufacture or trafficking of WMD, in particular for terrorist purposes; to develop effective export controls where these do not exist; and to maintain effective physical protection of sensitive materials. I hope the Council will pass this soon.

We also believe that the Council should also consider establishing an appropriate follow-up mechanism, perhaps a counter proliferation committee, just as the Council's Counter Terrorism Committee was established in 2001.

The European Union

The European Security Strategy, adopted by the European Council in December, highlights the importance of work against WMD. The month before its adoption, the EU agreed that agreements with other countries should include a non-proliferation clause. We are working with our EU partners and the Commission to see this introduced as new agreements arise or existing ones are renewed.

Non proliferation treaty and International Atomic Energy Agency

The non proliferation treaty obliges states party to enter into safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to verify that nuclear activities are and remain legitimate. Article IV of the treaty confirms states' rights to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

But states which fail to comply with their safeguards obligations inevitably lose the confidence of the international community. The bargain which is at the heart of the treaty is then called into question. We should consider whether such states should not forfeit the right to develop the nuclear fuel cycle, particularly the enrichment and reprocessing capabilities which are of such proliferation sensitivity. That does not mean that they would be deprived of the possibility of constructing and running civil nuclear power stations. These could still operate with fuel supplied by countries honouring their safeguards obligations. The fuel would be subject to agency monitoring while in the receiving country, and would be returned to the country of supply when spent. This would prevent a seemingly civil programme masking a weapons programme.

Experience in recent years has shown the need for more wide-ranging agency inspections of national nuclear industries. The agency's additional protocol provides the basis for carrying out such inspections. It is important that all members of the international community adopt one. Suppliers of nuclear technology should increasingly see this as a key commitment when they judge export licence applications.

The agency has done well to meet a growing verification workload within the constraints of its budget, but we should not ask it forever to do more

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within the same resources. We may need seriously to consider further strengthening of its Safeguards Division.

Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention

The Government set out in a Green Paper in April 2002 ideas on how to verify compliance with the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention. We continue to believe that we need a mechanism, possibly under the authority of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, for investigating instances of alleged use and suspect biological weapons facilities. We will be putting forward proposals to follow this up at the next meeting of states party of the Convention in Geneva in July.

Conclusion

Countering proliferation remains as important today as it ever was. The part our intelligence services play in it is vital. We and they can be proud of what we have achieved over the past year. But we cannot let up. There is much work still to do. The proposals I have outlined are designed to assist that.

Spring Supplementary Estimate

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr. Bill Rammell): Subject to Parliamentary approval of any necessary supplementary estimate, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Departmental expenditure limit (DEL) will be increased by £60,035,000 from £1,708,768,000 to £1,768,784,000 and the administration costs limit will be increased by £34,778,000 from £795,600,000 to £830,378,000.

Within the DEL change, the impact on resources and capital are as set out in the following table:

	Change	Voted	New DELNon-voted	Total
Resource	46,596	1,524,729	173,527	1,698,256
Capital	13,439	64,728	5,800	70,528
Depreciation*	-25,000	-124,194	-6,800	-130,994
Total	35,035	1,465,263	172,527	1,637,790

The change in the resource element of the DEL arises from:

A public expenditure survey (PES) transfer from the Home Office of £2,088,000 for European residence permits.

A PES transfer from the Home Office of £740,000 for biometrics trials in connection with the issue of UK visas.

An increase of £4,171,000 to fund increased contributions to international organisations subscriptions. A decrease of £2,783,000 in respect of an adjustment for overseas price movements.

A PES transfer from the Cabinet Office of £500,000 in respect of Coalition Information Centre (CIC) costs.

A PES transfer to the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) of £300,000 in respect of the E-business programme.

PES transfers from the DTI and Department for Transport totalling £134,000 (£67,000 each) in respect of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

An increase of £5,725,000 in respect of increases in providing consular and visa services overseas.

An increase of £27,149,000 in respect of increased Iraq related security costs.

A PES transfer from HM Customs & Excise (HMC&E) of £806,000 and from the Home Office of £1,000,000 and £2,000,000 in respect of the FCO Afghanistan Drugs Plan

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and an additional £122,000 from the Home Office to continue research techniques for identifying and measuring opium cultivation.

A PES Transfer to the Home Office of £20,000 as a contribution to the Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO).

A PES transfer from the Department for International Development (DFID) of £10,150,000 in respect of the remainder required to fund planned programme activity to the end of the financial year.

Take up of end- year flexibility (EYF) of £18,215,000 from a combination of underspends on the 2002–03 conflict prevention departmental unallocated provision (DUP) and DFID and FCO conflict pool (CP) underspends.

A PES transfer to DFID and the Ministry of Defence (MoD) of £11,000,000 and £2,000,000 respectively for the remainder required to fund planned programme activity to the end of the financial year.

PES transfers to the Security and Intelligence Agencies (SIA) of £7,016,000 and £85,000 to reflect funding revisions for CP.

PES transfers to the MoD of £1,800,000 and £1,200,000 to reflect funding revisions for CP.

The change in the capital element of the DEL arises from:

An increase of £9,000 in respect of an adjustment for overseas price movements.

An increase of £9,751,000 in respect of increased Iraq related security costs.

A PES transfer from the Home Office of £1,013,000 in respect of the setting up of a new visa regime in Kingston.

A PES transfer from the Home Office of £912,000 for European residence permits.

A PES transfer from the Home Office of £122,000 for biometrics trials in connection with the issue of UK visas.

A PES transfer from HMC&E of £816,000 in respect of the FCO Afghanistan Drugs plan.

A PES transfer from the DTI of £816,000 in respect of the E-business programme.

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