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Mr. Ingram: In response to the hon. Gentleman's first point, of course I will keep the House informed of developments regarding the incident in Basra, and I hope that the information that I gave—that the injuries do not appear to be life-threatening—remains correct.
The hon. Gentleman is right that this is a significant issue. He is familiar, because of his time doing my job and his time in Northern Ireland, with the fact that any peace process in relation to major conflict between ethnic groups has the capacity to spill over. That must be planned for at all times. The rapid deployment of these reserve forces is a good indication of that
knowledge being immediately to the fore of all planning considerations, so that we could deploy back to the area if required.The hon. Gentleman asked about the length of time of the deployment. I stated earlier that 30 days is what is anticipated, but that will be dependent on NATO's request. In relation to the lead battalion, the UK was designated for the first six months of 2004, to be followed by the US, so we are halfway through that six-month period. The initial commitment, however, is anticipated to be for 30 days. If the situation can be stabilised, we can withdraw, and if there is a need for extension, of course, that judgment will have to be made following NATO's request. In relation to who then fills that lead role, 1 Para will step into that readiness role.
The hon. Gentleman asked about a full complement of equipment. I can tell him that the troops deployed have been given a full complement of equipment. He also asked about the deployment of Serbian forces. I know of no plans for that to happen. It seems to me that there would have to be a mature set of relationships between Kosovo and Serbia for such a development at this stage. As to the deployment of troops from Bosnia, as I indicated in my opening statement, three companies were moved initially from Bosnia, and the reserve, to be followed by the strategic reserve, will make up the numbers that the NATO commander requires.
Mrs. Alice Mahon (Halifax) (Lab): May I put it to the Minister that in 1999, 200,000 Serbs, Roma, Gorani and other ethnic groups either left out of fear or were driven out by the KLA—almost certainly the same people who organised a very effective burning and looting of 3,500 homes, churches and so on in the last few days? The UN spokesman has confirmed that. Has the Minister or the Prime Minister any plans to visit some of the people who have been ethnically cleansed for five years now, and who are living in miserable conditions in camps in Serbia and Montenegro? Will he do something about ensuring that they return safely and are protected? We hear reports that French troops and the police stood by while houses and churches were burned. Surely, if he supported the action to drive the Serbs out of Kosovo, as he did, it cannot be the case that one set of ethnic cleansing is right and the other is wrong.
Mr. Ingram: I do not think that NATO, the European Union, the United Nations or, indeed, the United Kingdom Government would say that one form of ethnic cleansing is wrong and another is right. Our aim in deploying troops into this troubled region is to bring back peace, separate the warring factions—if that is how they should be described—and find a way of establishing stability, so that we can make progress on the other agenda.
My hon. Friend is right: there are many tragic stories to be told about the Balkans. I think that we as a nation can hold our head high in view of the way in which we have contributed to the effort to find a solution. Many thought we should not engage in the Balkans, as they think we should not engage in other trouble spots; but if we have to face up to harsh realities and deal with big issues, it will mean a commitment of British troops.
Of course we shall do all we can to ensure that those who have been displaced across the region have a calm, peaceful future, but that will take time. It cannot simply
be asked for. It must be delivered on the back of what we do in this country, through Europe and through the United Nations, and we must also build on any good will that may reside within these troubled communities.
Tom Brake (Carshalton and Wallington) (LD): I, too, thank the Minister for agreeing to keep the House informed about the incident in Basra.
We entirely agree with what the Secretary of State said in his written statement about the need not to lose the gains made in Kosovo so far, and the need for our forces to bring stability to Kosovo and make it clear that ethnic cleansing is unacceptable. Can the Minister tell us what impact, if any, there will be on any existing UK commitments or responsibilities if the operational reserve force has to stay for more than 30 days, and what additional UK reserves are available for deployment if additional forces are required to bring stability to Kosovo?
It is early days for the ORF, but has any preliminary assessment been made of whether it is likely to have to stay beyond the 30 days, or whether it might be able to return before they have elapsed? What will be the impact if it is required to stay beyond June 2004?
Mr. Ingram: There will be no impact on other UK commitments. The ready battalion was designed specifically as an over-the-horizon force. As I explained in response to an earlier question, when it moves out others will move in to replace that capability. Plans have been made to cover predicted eventualities, although no one can say what else may be on the horizon. We must plan for such things, in one sense, but we must also stand ready for what may be unexpected. I cannot give answers about the future, because I do not have the capacity to predict with any certainty what else may happen internationally. What I do know is that the British armed forces have shown time and again that when there is a requirement for them to deliver they will do so, in a very professional and committed way.
The reserve force represents a multinational rather than just a UK response. A good many nations are very committed: there are some 42 in the Balkans, 25 of them European. We must show that international resolve and international strength can be used to deal with the emerging problems—quickly, we hope. Although the situation is calmer now, there is still tension. We have specified 30 days initially, but if the troops are required to stay longer and if the NATO commander wants them to do so, that is what they have been designated for. The questions must be answered at the time, however, because we do not know quite what the demand will be so far into the future.
David Winnick (Walsall, North) (Lab): To keep the matter in perspective, is it not the case that the NATO intervention five years ago stopped state organised ethnic cleansing and massacres, some of which were reported to the House, which led to the House concluding that such an intervention was absolutely necessary? Have not allied troops done a very good job in the past five years in trying to keep the two hostile communities apart, until the very sad situation last week? By and large, has not the intervention of 1999 shown itself to be absolutely justified?
Mr. Ingram: I agree with my hon. Friend. I visited Kosovo in 1999 to look at the police presence. At that
time, I was the Minister responsible for security in Northern Ireland. We put in a sizeable contingent of officers from the Royal Ulster Constabulary, as it was called then. Together with other police, they made a major contribution alongside the military in Kosovo. There is no question that what we did then was correct. Although some had doubts about it then and may still have doubts about it now, it was correct. Our recent deployment shows the strength of our resolve to try to work this through to a positive conclusion.
Hugh Robertson (Faversham and Mid-Kent) (Con): I associate myself entirely with the expression of good wishes to our armed forces as they deploy, but is not the lesson elsewhere in the Balkans, particularly in Bosnia, that enclaves on their own, such as we saw in Jepa, Srebrenica and Gorazde, are not viable in the longer term? What impact will that have for the long-term future of Kosovo?
Mr. Ingram: In a sense, that is going into territory for which I do not have direct responsibility. Trying to manage the process and to get people reintegrated to stop enclaves of people, as they can be described, clearly has big attendant risks but, as I said earlier, the process must develop with the good will of the people. It cannot be an imposed solution, so we have to marry up those two very difficult, conflicting problems. Some ethnic concentrations can put other minority ethnic concentrations at risk. That must be taken into account in seeking to establish any long-term structure for the Balkans, Kosovo and Serbia and for the various ethnic groupings in those areas. However, I do not think that what we are doing now is about trying to resolve the specific problem that the hon. Gentleman raised.
Hugh Bayley (City of York) (Lab): When I visited Kosovo with the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, I was encouraged to see the progress that was being made in the Kosovo police service and at the Kosovo police training college to bring in people from all ethnic groups to train them together and to ensure they slept in the same dormitories, attended classes together and learned each other's languages. Does my right hon. Friend agree that it is important to continue to provide resources that bring the communities together for training on issues such as policing, and that there is a general lesson that after conflict we have to continue to invest in post-conflict reconstruction if we are to provide a viable future for a country emerging from civil war?
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