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Mr. Trimble: May I go back to what the Minister has just said—that, inevitably, there would have to be some sort of collective consideration. Will he explain how the Law Society and the Bar Council could possibly take part in that collective consideration and how it could override their responsibility individually to make a single appointment?

Mr. Spellar: On the question of those bodies being overriden, on this matter we are talking throughout about aspiration—about trying to ensure a reflective commission. Those bodies might well want to secure that, and would therefore want to consider their nominations, of course on merit, but also on whether they would be able collectively to meet that aspiration. That is a reasonable argument.

Mr. Trimble: The Minister must try to answer the question. He has again used the word "collectively". We are discussing the appointment of the commission. At present, the Lord Chancellor appoints the laypersons, the judicial persons are then appointed, and then the Bar Council appoints one person and the Law Society one. How do those bodies, which are themselves collective,
 
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take part in collective decision making with the other bodies—the Lord Chancellor and the judiciary? How does the collective body known as the Law Society do that, especially bearing in mind the fact that the Minister is imposing on it a legal duty to make arrangements? The Minister has an obligation to tell us—indeed, he promised to tell us—what those arrangements might be, but he has not yet done so.

Mr. Spellar: I beg to differ on that. I have indicated—

Mr. Trimble: No, the Minister has not.

Mr. Spellar: Yes, I think I have indicated that we would envisage meetings or correspondence between those with the power to appoint or nominate, and some collective consideration, which means a degree of engagement between those bodies. They will then make their own decisions in the light of those discussions. That is not unreasonable. The right hon. Gentleman might disagree with that, but I believe that it is a perfectly credible way of undertaking that duty.

Mr. Dodds: Just to tease the issue out a little further, let us suppose that someone was aggrieved at being overlooked for appointment to the judicial appointments commission. Can the Minister tell us who they would take the case against under this arrangement? Would a solicitor take it against the Law Society and a barrister against the Bar Council, or would the case be taken against the Lord Chancellor? If the arrangement were collective, where would the remedy lie?

Mr. Spellar: I envisage that the individual organisations would make the nomination, but that they would do so in the light of their collective discussion. That is not unprecedented in this world, and maintains the individual organisations' ability to make a decision while allowing them also to consider the impact of their decision on the decisions of others.

Mr. Trimble: I am sorry to intervene on the Minister again, but I remind him that the words in his Bill are, "to make . . . arrangements". An arrangement under the Bill means something more than a telephone call. The Minister hints at some sort of collective approach, but the legislation gives to the General Council of the Bar the power to make an appointment. How can a telephone conversation with the secretary of the Bar Council in any way bind, or have any influence on, what the Bar Council as a whole does? The whole approach is misconceived.

Mr. Spellar: It seems to me that the right hon. Gentleman has put his finger on the point exactly in referring to binding or having influence. Such a call could well influence the decision, and that secretary might even then have to go back to other people to consider how his organisation could best achieve the objective. The arrangement seems to be a perfectly sensible basis, which enables each individual organisation to make nominations, but in a framework in which they consider how their individual decisions might impact collectively. That is a perfectly reasonable way of doing business.
 
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Moving on, I recognise what the right hon. Gentleman is trying to achieve in amendments Nos. 11 and 13, and I acknowledge that he is doing so in a genuine attempt to build confidence in the system.

I am not convinced that those amendments are necessary, however, because the appointment of lay members of the commission will be within the purview of the Commissioner for Public Appointments. It will be part of her responsibility to ensure that appointments are made for the right reasons, and I have no doubt that the qualities that the right hon. Gentleman lists are of exactly the sort that she will expect the commission to look for. So it is not necessary to make that explicit in the Bill, and I shall rely on the wisdom of those responsible for the administration of the process.

5.15 pm

Likewise, prescribing how committees and sub-committees of the commission should be composed is not a matter for the Bill. The Justice (Northern Ireland) Act 2002 makes it clear that the commission shall be responsible for the regulation of its own practices and procedures, and I have every confidence that the chairman—the Lord Chief Justice—will oversee its functions with great care. I am not sure that there are compelling reasons to amend the Bill as the right hon. Gentleman suggests. But regarding his specific question on my contribution in Committee, although it is for the commission to decide in each case how it organises its business, the practical arrangements are being worked through with the Lord Chief Justice. However, the Lord Chief Justice has agreed that High Court appointments will be dealt with in the way that I described. I hope that that provides additional reassurance to that offered in Committee.

Mr. Trimble: The Minister's response to my amendment No. 13 was wholly inadequate—as, indeed, was his argument against the earlier amendments—and he has not dealt with my further point about enabling the commission to delegate its entire functions to a committee on which there might be only one or two members of the commission. We are talking about enabling a committee to make an appointment, yet there is no safeguard as to its composition, other than that one commission member be on it. How can the Minister regard that as satisfactory?

Mr. Spellar: Frankly, it is a matter for the members of the commission, which will deal with more than 1,000 judicial appointments, and for its chairman, the Lord Chief Justice. It seems that I have greater confidence in the Lord Chief Justice and his fellow commissioners than do others. The provision provides the right balance to enable the commission, which will consist of highly eminent persons, to organise its business effectively.

Mr. Garnier: Is the Minister suggesting that there are 1,000 judicial office holders in Northern Ireland?

Mr. Spellar: I am advised that 1,000 appointments are catered for.
 
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I realise that some Members are concerned that securing a reflective judiciary will somehow compromise the principle of appointment on merit, but that is not the case: merit and reflectiveness are not mutually exclusive. The 2002 Act makes it clear that individual appointments must be made solely on the basis of merit, but equally, equal opportunities issues may arise that have implications for the judicial appointment process. In most spheres of work, where merit does not lead to a broadly reflective body, it is reasonable to ask why. Sometimes, there are good historical reasons, some of which the hon. Member for New Forest, West (Mr. Swayne) alluded to, but we would want to know what was preventing the emergence of a reflective body. Barriers, disincentives and other problems that are not obvious might mean that talent is being wasted. All that the provision requires is that the judicial appointments commission analyse and address any such problems, in the expectation that the measures put in place will achieve a broadly reflective judiciary.

Mr. Swayne: Will the Minister deal with the example that I gave? Would the commission be wrong to consider another candidate—a competent and good one—if the best one was from, let us say, a part of the community that was already over-reflected in the judiciary?

Mr. Spellar: It is a question not just of what I say, but of the merit principle's not being compromised. It will be no part of the commission's programme to recommend appointments "mainly" on the basis of merit, or to "have regard" to it; rather, it will recommend appointments solely on the basis of merit. I hope that that provides the reassurance that the hon. Gentleman seeks.

Mr. Dodds: The Minister referred to the number of judicial appointments in Northern Ireland as being about 1,000. On Second Reading, it was stated that there were only about 900 such appointments a year in England. That matter was also brought up in respect of the size of the commission, which we argued was too big for Northern Ireland. Will the Minister clarify the point? If there were about 1,000 judicial appointments per year in Northern Ireland, that fact would certainly be relevant to the size of the commission.

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