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Mr. Spellar: It is right that we gave considerable thought, as I said in Committee, to the appropriate penalty to attach to the offence. It was decided that it should be compared to the offences of intimidating a juror, which carries a penalty of five years following conviction on indictment, and of perjury, which carries a penalty of seven years following conviction on indictment. It is true that the common law offence, like all such offences, attracts a maximum penalty of life. However, it is not a logical conclusion that moving away from that step towards infinity lessens the penalty.
As I said, case law suggests that the offence has in practice carried a sentence of between four and 24 months. There have been about 11 cases of attempting to pervert the course of justice in the past five years. It is
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not likely that introducing penalties that are significantly higher than those that are being imposed will lead to a reduction in the range of the tariff. In common law cases that carry a maximum sentence of life, it is not the maximum that is the major determinant, but the case law and the standard tariff that is applied by the courts in a particular jurisdiction.
Mr. Carmichael: Is the Minister really telling the House that he cannot envisage circumstances in which a serious attempt to pervert the course of justice by influencing a prosecutor would not merit a sentence in excess of five years?
Mr. Spellar: All I can say is that that has not been the experience, and five years is a substantial penalty. The hon. Gentleman is a lawyer and he could advise me whether a common law case could be mounted if it were felt to be more relevant in the circumstances. The case law shows a substantial gap between the average tariffs imposed and the one that we are suggesting. It is not normally the case that hon. Members suggest that the penalty should be life imprisonment.
The hon. Gentleman rightly points out that Governments of all persuasions seek to put on statute offences found in the common law. Why have they done so? First, common law offences are by their very nature uncertain, particularly at the edges. Offences therefore may be put on statute for reasons of clarity. The common law is open to interpretation, and that interpretation may change over time.
Mr. Carmichael: What particular problems, around the edges or otherwise, relating to the common law offence of attempting to pervert the course of justice have been encountered that have led to this provision being introduced?
Mr. Spellar: It is more a general movement towards rationalising the position. We have considered the offence and the theoretical possibility of a life sentence against the range of sentences that have been imposed, and we will bring the two a little closer together. Secondly, it may be necessary to formalise the range of penalties available for a certain offence. Finally, an offence might be put on statute to ensure that it is fully human rights compatible.
Turning to the specifics of the offence in clause 7, the Government have decided to put it on statute for the sake of clarity. We want to underline the independence of the director by making it abundantly clear that improperly seeking to influence him or her is illegal. The independence of the DPP and the prosecutors is critical to the functioning of the justice system in Northern Ireland. The current director, and indeed the previous incumbent, brought integrity and independence to the job; and have always made their prosecution decisions impartially, independently and objectively.
However, a new system of justice is being created for Northern Ireland, and in that new system, after devolution, the DPP will be an explicitly independent officer. At the moment, the DPP is subject to the superintendence of the Attorney General for Northern Ireland. However, when part 2 of the 2002 Act is commenced, his relationship with the Attorney-General
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and the Advocate-General will change and become one of consultation. In those changing circumstances and the circumstances of Northern Ireland, it needs to be made very clear that prosecution decisions will be taken impartially, independently and objectively. The creation of this offence will help further to enhance public confidence in the administration of justice.
Amendment No. 15 would mean that prosecutions of this offence could be carried out without the consent of the director. The subsection the amendment seeks to remove is there to ensure that a prosecution is brought only when there is sufficient evidence and when the prosecution will be in the public interest. It is an important safeguard to ensure that only cases that should be prosecuted are prosecuted.
I ask the hon. Member to withdraw his amendment.
Mr. Carmichael: In circumstances in which all hon. Members agree that attempting to pervert the course of justice by influencing a prosecutor is a serious matter and requires prosecution with the full array of powers available to the authorities and punishment with the utmost vigour, I find it hard to believe that we will again divide on the issue. But what alternative does the Minister leave us? We have asked him pertinent questions on three occasions. What problems have the prosecuting authorities encountered? How many cases have been lost, and how many have even been mounted? Why is a problem perceived?
The Minister referred to statistics gathered in the past five years, which have, fortunately, been among the calmer in Northern Ireland's history. What would the story be if we went back 15 or 20 years? Is it not possible that we would find instances of attempting to pervert the course of justice by influencing a prosecutor or other people in the criminal justice system that would merit a sentence in excess of five years?
The Minister has answered none of these questions. When I asked him about cases of attempting to pervert the course of justice in which a sentence of five years or more would be appropriate, he said that they could probably still be liable to the common law offence anyway. Does that not show the futility and nonsense of re-enacting that which is already criminal?
The Minister told us that the common law can be problematic because it is open to interpretation. The words
"with the intention of perverting the course of justice"
are contained in clause 7. If there is a problem with the interpretation of the common law offence, there will be a problem with the statutory offence that he seeks to create. If I am wrong, I hope that he will intervene to point out to me why I am wrong. He stays firmly glued to his seat; I suspect that I am not wrong. Worse than that and most frustrating of all, he knows that I am not wrong.
Mr. Spellar:
I thought I had indicated at some lengthalthough not as much length as I did on a previous clausewhy we believe this is a useful
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provision. It has the advantages of clarity, ensures compliance with human rights and provides a proper scale of penalty that more accurately reflects the tariff in the courts. That may not satisfy or please the hon. Gentleman, but I do not think that he can say that I have not responded.
Mr. Carmichael: I am afraid that I can say that because, yet again, the Minister has failed to answer. He was asked: what are the problems, where has the lack of clarity arisen and what in the Bill will change the situation? He has not answered any of those questions. I shall give him one more chance to respond, but it appears that he will not.
In these circumstances, the debate on this clause has been one of the biggest wastes of parliamentary time that I have seen since I came here. The fault for that lies fairly and squarely with the Minister and with his refusal to engage in proper debate with the House. Accordingly, I will press the amendment to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made:
The House divided: Ayes 132, Noes 254.
Clause 8
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