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Dr. Lewis Moonie (Kirkcaldy) (Lab/Co-op): The watchword in this debate, and in all debates on our response to potential acts of terrorism or disasters, is resilience. It is used advisedly, and I agree with the hon. Member for Sheffield, Hallam (Mr. Allan) that we should always remember that it is the key.
I speak as one who has spent not inconsiderable time over the years looking at the way in which we respond to disasters—and often respond very inadequately. One thing is certain: we should not do anything to reduce resilience. As the right hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Mr. Forth) said earlier, one way of ensuring that it is reduced is adding to the number of committees and other bodies that must be consulted on what is, after all, a series of hypothetical situations.
That is the great danger. I think that the IRA analogy, for instance, is quite wrong. In that case we were dealing with a predictable set of actions and a reasonably predictable set of responses that could be handled by any fairly intelligent person. Given the greater complexity of the asymmetrical threats that face us now, we cannot predict the form of an attack—if it occurs—and we must therefore ask what exactly we should educate people about. Many of the responses are basic common sense. I do not think the hon. Member for Newark (Patrick Mercer) is suggesting that in the event of a disaster, we would need hordes of ill-trained and semi-informed actors milling about trying to be helpful. That is the last thing we would need. What we do need is people responding quickly to information.
Setting up emergency numbers in advance may seem a sensible idea, but our experience of disasters around the world suggests that it is most important to establish a
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clear line of communication with the public, separate from anyone dealing directly with the disasters. That cannot be done in advance; it can only be done after the event, once the extent of its severity has been calculated by those capable of such a calculation. I am suspicious of any attempt to impose a public education gloss on circumstances that do not lend themselves to the type of education that is being suggested.
If we intend to be resilient, and set up a multitude of plans—which seems likely, as every area will set up its own plan—the civil contingencies unit must monitor events carefully, in order to recognise and implement best practice and generalise from it. Over the next few years we will generate many different ways of coping with potential disasters, but until we have to cope with a real disaster we will not know whether any of them will work. I recommend a book by Patrick Lagadec called "Preventing Chaos in a Crisis". If Members read about all the mistakes that have been made, the last thing they will want to do is repeat them.
The whole point of the exercise that the Government are conducting—with the broad support of Members on both sides of the House—is to try to avoid chaos when crises develop; for they will develop. I believe that adding to the complexity of what we are trying to do will not help to alleviate chaos in a crisis.
Peter Bottomley (Worthing, West) (Con): I hope the hon. Member for Kirkcaldy (Dr. Moonie) will not mind if I do not follow his line of argument. Let me say, in the gentlest possible way, that I disagree with him entirely.
My hon. Friend the Member for Newark (Patrick Mercer), with the assistance of the hon. Member for Sheffield, Hallam (Mr. Allan), raised an issue that goes beyond the contingency planning that is best represented in clause 2, which refers to
"preventing the emergency . . . reducing, controlling or mitigating its effects, or . . . taking other action in connection with it".
The matters that we are contemplating are not just for the professionals; they are for members of the public as well. We should be letting the public—individuals as well as groups—know what they can do to help reduce the incidence, impact and consequences of events. If those events do not happen, it will be fine—the best job that can be done by the blue-light services is not to turn the blue light on—but when they do happen, more people should know what they can do in order to make a significant difference. They need to know what they should avoid doing because it would do more harm, and what should be done to improve the situation.
I do not claim to be an expert, but for various reasons I have been around when a number of small disasters have taken place. I was beside the coffin of Oscar Romero, on the occasion of his funeral service on Palm Sunday 1980 in El Salvador, when a number of bombs—or demonstration bombs—went off in a crowded square containing 20,000 people. There was a lot of shooting from the military headquarters on one side of the square, and people sought refuge in the cathedral. There were two problems. The archbishop's coffin was blocking the doors; and the impact of a crush at the doors, straight away, would have made even the Hillsborough disaster look modest. A small number of us tried to make sure that there was enough space to get the coffin out of the way, and we ended up with about 5,000 people inside the cathedral.
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Fourteen people did die through crushing, which is one of the big panic problems in a disaster. The immediate problem is the rush. I suspect that the number of deaths would have been significantly greater if we had not managed to clear at least a pathway. In the Heysel stadium in 1985, the problem was caused by British louts attacking Italian fans. Because the other British fans were too squashed together, they took the space that was liberated. Plainly what was needed was an English voice on the loudspeaker system telling those not involved in the disturbances to stay where they were, and not to move into space that had become free. If that had happened, there would not have been the push, push, push and the 39 dead Italians.
It took 20 minutes to find someone with authority to enable microphones and loudspeakers to be used. It is not necessarily the authorities who spot what should be done first; it may be a member of the public. In this case it was me, and I did not succeed in getting it done fast enough, but another 200 or 300 people there might, with some foreknowledge, have been able to say, "This needs to be done". They might have passed on the message, so that someone with the necessary authority and control could take effective action.
Then there was the King's Cross disaster. People were brought out of the underground after a fire that was not—so to speak—necessary, and had consequences that were not necessary either. I suspect that, as in the case of the fire at the Bradford football stadium, many people knew that there was rubbish around that could be set alight. The cause of the fire might not be known, but the existence of fuel that need not and should not have been there was something of which any member of the public should be aware.
We learned from the Windsor castle fire that breaking up roof spaces stops a fire spreading. As a result of explosions, gas can be ignited. If ordinary members of the public were aware that the presence of unnecessary combustible material is wrong, public emergency training and education could greatly reduce secondary consequences, although it might still be impossible to prevent the primary cause.
So generally raising people's awareness of the practical steps that can be taken is important. If the Government do not accept the new clause today, it is fairly safe to say that they will have to answer some of the arguments in detail now and later, and that they are almost certain to say within six weeks or six months, "Well, perhaps we will adopt it in a modified form." I would much prefer them to say today that they have authorised the Minister to accept it, and that they have tried to work out the consequences. However, my experience is that Ministers who agree with a particular proposal often have to put the argument against it because of the process of government.
According to this process, a good idea is first ignored, then people just say "no", bringing up the historical negative whereby one cannot do something in a new way because it has not been done that way before. But when the Government of the day produce a two and a half page argument against the proposal in question, they actually engage with the arguments, and within six
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weeks or six months they say, "It was our idea in the first place and we always intended to do it, so we aren't going to share the credit with others."
My hon. Friend the Member for Newark and I would not mind if the Government did not share the credit for this proposal, so long as they introduce such a board. The proposal is a sensible one, involving as it does category 1 responders such as local authorities and the emergency services, category 2 responders such as the utilities and the transport agencies, and independents. Such a structure is very similar to that of the Health and Safety Commission, which is also a tripartite body. Of course, one reason why our performance in respect of injury and death at work is about the best in the world is the existence of a tripartite system that involves independent experts and the two sides of industry. Combining the two sides of the emergency services—put simply, local government, and the blue light services—with the utilities and the transport agencies would be a good way of achieving the same thing.
Moreover, having a public discussion is probably the best way of dealing with the ghouls and the real worries. The worst worry is the darkness; having light is not actually a serious worry. Each of us, whatever our station or responsibilities in life, will at some stage be told that we or someone dear to us—a parent, spouse or child—will have our date of death known rather more accurately than we anticipated. Nothing can bring death where there would otherwise be unending life; the question is whether death is to be brought forward. If each of us can cope with such information, I suspect that we can cope with anything that might emerge from an emergency public education and training board.
It is open to the Government to say that their civil contingencies system will be able to absorb the kind of work to which the proposal of my hon. Friend the Member for Newark relates. That argument is perhaps slightly better than the one offered by the hon. Member for Kirkcaldy, but it is not good enough. There could be an overarching national body and a body for each of the nations of the United Kingdom, and certain groups could be given the task of working on particular issues. However, my belief is that we ourselves know more about what we can do, and that we could contribute our knowledge.
Let us consider the Kegworth air disaster, in which an airliner landed on the M1. Some four or five hours after it happened, I said to Sir Michael Bishop—this sounded a bit odd to say so in the middle of a disaster—that I thought he was doing rather well. He said that he had gone through what his and his team's reaction ought to be to such a disaster. Although one hopes that planes will always land safely, one has to plan for when things go wrong. He and his people knew what to do. I am not sure that the general public always know what to do, which is one reason for having the kind of board that my hon. Friend the Member for Newark has proposed.
I am very pleased that we are having this debate. Contingent on a serious approach to our growing knowledge and anticipation of disaster—be it man-made or natural, deliberate or accidental—is the beneficial and open discussion that such a board would enable. I hope that the House will agree to the new clause without Division. If, by chance, the Government
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have instructed the Minister to resist it, I hope that such resistance will not be offered on the basis of poor reasoning.
Board after board, forum after forum and organisation after organisation have been introduced in the past seven years, although I shall not take this opportunity to discuss my current pet worry, which is the proposed substitute for the community health councils. The House should reject the argument that we should not create this board, which has a real purpose and could be made to work. The people expect us to anticipate what will be helpful, and such a board would be.
8 pm
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