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Mr. Robathan: Will the Minister join me in hoping that my hon. Friend will be able to improve his accent and pronunciation of Welsh words?
Mr. Touhig: I have no doubt that the hon. Member for Leominster will be giving him some lessons, or that Labour and Opposition Members will seek to help him improve his pronunciation of Welsh place names. He has a long way to go, but if he is a willing pupil there are plenty of good teachers here.
Finally, I thank all hon. Members who have taken part in the debate today. The Bill is an excellent example of how the Government and the Assembly work in partnership in the best interests of the people of Wales, and I invite hon. Members to give it a Second Reading.
Question put and agreed to.
Bill accordingly read a Second time.
17 Jun 2004 : Column 961
PUBLIC AUDIT (WALES) BILL [LORDS] (PROGRAMME)
Motion made, and Question put forthwith, pursuant to Orders [28 June 2001 and 6 November 2003],
That the following provisions shall apply to the Public Audit (Wales) Bill [Lords]:
Committal
1. The Bill shall be committed to a Standing Committee.
Proceedings in Standing Committee
2. Proceedings in the Standing Committee shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion on Thursday 1st July 2004.
3. The Standing Committee shall have leave to sit twice on the first day on which it meets.
Consideration and Third Reading
4. Proceedings on consideration shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion one hour before the moment of interruption on the day on which those proceedings are commenced.
5. Proceedings on Third Reading shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at the moment of interruption on that day.
6. Sessional Order B (programming committees) made on 28th June 2001 shall not apply to proceedings on consideration and Third Reading.
Other proceedings
7. Any other proceedings on the Bill (including any proceedings on consideration of Lords Amendments or on any further message from the Lords) may be programmed.—[Paul Clark.]
Question agreed to.
PUBLIC AUDIT (WALES) BILL [LORDS] (MONEY)
Queen's recommendation having been signified—
Motion made, and Question put forthwith, pursuant to Standing Order No. 52(1)(a) (Money resolutions and ways and means resolutions in connection with Bills),
That, for the purposes of any Act resulting from the Public Audit (Wales) Bill [Lords] it is expedient to authorise the payment out of money provided by Parliament of—
(a) any increase attributable to that Act in the sums payable, by virtue of any other Act, out of money so provided; and
(b) any expenses of the Secretary of State under that Act.—[Paul Clark.]
Question agreed to.
TRANSPORT
Motion made, and Question put forthwith, pursuant to Standing Order 118(6)(Standing Committees on Delegated Legislation),
That the draft British Transport Police (Transitional and Consequential Provisions) Order 2004, which was laid before this House on 20th May, be approved.—[Paul Clark.]
Question agreed to.
17 Jun 2004 : Column 962
Fishing Boat Sinking (Loch Ryan)
Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Paul Clark.]
3.25 pm
Andy Burnham (Leigh) (Lab): On 12 July 2003, a fishing boat sank in Loch Ryan in west Scotland, claiming the lives of three of my constituents. Shaun Ridley and his two sons, Steven and Michael, were returning to shore with their grandfather, Brian Ridley, and family friend, Harry Houghton, after the five had enjoyed a successful day's fishing. It ended in appalling tragedy when water taken over the bow of the boat submerged it and took it down in a matter of minutes. Shaun and Michael were airlifted from the water after four hours. Despite the efforts of hospital staff, they could not be revived. Steven's body was found six weeks later, miles down the coast.
It is impossible to describe the devastating impact that the events have had on a loving family, the survivors and, more widely, a close-knit community in West Leigh. That community has rallied round and provided great support, with many people travelling to Scotland to help with the search for Steven. The circumstances and causes of the accident have been the subject of a detailed inquiry by the marine accident investigation branch. Its report was published in April and makes eight separate recommendations to prevent such a terrible accident from reoccurring. Port authorities were asked to impose speed limits for fast, conventional ferries when entering and leaving port. Ferry operators were asked to ensure full adherence to the requirements for permanent lookout. Coastguard and rescue services were required to review their practices with a view to eliminating the alarming errors that were made in this case. Those are strong recommendations and nothing short of full implementation will do. I hope that the Minister in his reply will outline the steps that his Department is taking to ensure that that is the case.
In my view, the strength of the recommendations is at odds with the body of the report and its analysis of the accident. It is the firm view of the family and survivors that the report is selective in its use of supporting evidence, does not provide an accurate record of events and lacks balance in its analysis of them. It makes unequivocal criticisms of the fishing party, but seems to be at pains to mute and minimise criticisms of professionals and explain away their failings. As Pauline Ridley, wife of Shaun and mother of Steven and Michael, points out, there is a great difference between the health and safety responsibilities of a major industry and a family out sailing for a day's fishing.
Pauline is here today to witness our proceedings, together with her mother, Joan, and father, Tommy. Brian Ridley is accompanied by his wife, Marie, mother of Shaun, and the boys' grandmother. Harry Houghton is joined by his wife Audrey. Today is yet another difficult day for them, but they are here primarily to stop such a tragedy happening to another family and because they feel that they cannot leave the report unchallenged.
I have read and re-read the report and spoken on many occasions to the family and survivors. I have had to ask myself the difficult question—although the
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answer may be hard to accept—whether the MAIB has reflected the full truth and fairly apportioned responsibility for this terrible accident. I have to say that I do not believe that it has and I will outline detailed concerns and questions that require further investigation.
I want to set out four points of relevant context. First, the House should know that wash from ferries operating in and out of Loch Ryan is a matter of long-standing local concern. In advance of today's debate, I spoke to my right hon. Friend the Member for Carrick, Cumnock and Doon Valley (Mr. Foulkes) whose constituency borders the loch. He confirmed that, on many occasions over the years, he has raised the concerns of local fishermen about wash emanating from ferries operating in the port, with fast conventional ferries often cited as the worst offenders.
The second contextual point is the long dependence of the local economy on the ferry industry. The report notes that ferry services started in the area in 1861 and that it is one of the oldest established routes across the Irish sea. It seems that there is local nervousness—understandable to a Member representing a constituency such as mine—about questioning the activities of such major and long-standing local employers, but to what extent has that engendered a dangerous local culture, where people feel unable to speak out on public safety issues?
It has been suggested that other accidents have been kept from the public gaze by out-of-court settlements. Indeed, only hours after the accident, when the family were at the hospital, confronted with media interest, they were advised by a local police officer, "Don't mention the ferries." Media coverage immediately after the accident included quotation of a local spokesman for the coastguard who attributed it to a "freak gust of wind." That theory was dismissed soon afterwards.
The third point of context came as a shock to me. Despite its long history as a ferry port, and the operation of heavy commercial traffic with high-speed craft, there is no statutory harbour authority regulating activity on Loch Ryan. It was unbelievable to discover that that could be the case in Britain in 2004. The fourth background point is that less than two months after the accident, a similar accident involving ferry wash in the loch led to sweeping recommendations, including the establishment of a statutory harbour authority.
I have four specific concerns about the report. The first relates to the circumstances of the accident. On page 41, the MAIB sets out its belief that the events that finally sank the boat
"unfolded between 16.39 and 16.44 . . . The MAIB does not know the source of the wave(s) that impacted on the boat at, or about, 16.42. The survivors strongly believe that the wave(s) had originated from the ferry . . . which had very recently passed them. However, the ferry had passed out of the loch by the time the waves reached the boat and, considering the position of the accident, obtained from VDR radar recordings, and the apparent direction of the wash waves, this theory is not supported by the evidence."
The report later claims that the waves that swamped the boat came from the starboard quarter and from a
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direction of about north-west, and provides the following explanation:
"Seacat Rapide, the Belfast to Troon fast ferry, passed 7 miles from Corsewell Point about 25 minutes before the accident. The MAIB has consulted experts for an opinion on whether wash waves from this vessel could have been significant in the position of the accident. The Branch was told that they would not have been. However, during an investigation into another incident the Branch asked . . . for members of the public to come forward with their experiences of wash from ferries in the Loch Ryan area. One response, from a reliable witness, included the information that over many years of observing the effects of wash in the area, he had noted, among other things, that the wash from the Belfast to Troon ferry could have a noticeable and significant effect on the shoreline . . . Despite the experts' view"—
"the MAIB believe that this observer's evidence is compelling and the coincidence in the timing, and in the fact that waves from the Seacat Rapide would approach the loch from roughly the right direction, should not be ignored."
I find it surprising, to say the least, that the MAIB should promote the views of an unnamed member of the public, even if we are told that they are a "reliable witness", over those of experts and, perhaps more important, the vehement testimony of the survivors. The survivors dispute that version of events, stating that the wave that took the boat down came from the same direction as the one that, moments earlier, had swamped the boat, and they are adamant that it happened earlier in the afternoon—at 3 pm. Harry Houghton's watch stopped at that time when it was submerged in seawater.
The survivors dispute strongly the report's observation that
"a person's memory is fallible, especially when that person has been subjected to a very stressful situation".
In this case, I know the opposite to be true: the events that led to the sinking of the boat will be for ever etched on the minds of the survivors.
The dispute about the origin and direction of the waves that sank the boat brings me to my second area of concern: the fast conventional ferry, the Stena Caledonia, and its speed. Page 9 of the report notes:
"Some conventional ferries can develop sufficient speed in shallow water to move into the critical speed range and produce critical speed wash similar to that of an HSC"—
"In the area where the accident occurred, where the water is about 11 m, a vessel making 17.2 knots through the water is on the margin of the critical speed zone. In this case, the Stena Caledonia was making slightly less speed. Even so, she would have been producing large sub-critical wash waves such as those described by the survivors."
While its role in the accident is a matter of dispute, it would seem beyond doubt that the Stena Caledonia was travelling too fast for a boat leaving Loch Ryan, where other, smaller fishing boats had been spotted and where safety concerns are well known.
"the greater knowledge and understanding of wash emanating from conventional ferries, gained by having a risk assessment passage plan (as required in Dublin) might have given the bridge officers a greater awareness of the effects of wash from their vessels on a small craft."
"The MAIB investigation has discovered an apparent lack of awareness among the conventional ferry crews about the hazards of wash effects. In the vicinity of small boats, there appears to be a lack of concern unless a collision or close-quarters situation in imminent. Interest in the boat appears to diminish once she is past the beam of the ferry. Both high speed and conventional ferries can produce significant wash which can endanger vulnerable craft after the vessel has passed."
Clearly, the MAIB was sufficiently concerned about the speed of the boat to include those words, but I am yet to be convinced that there is not clear evidence in the report to show that the boat was, in fact, travelling in the critical range.
Figure 2, which shows the Stena Caledonia's radar at 16.37, shows a speed-over-the-ground reading of 17.4 knots—well past the 17.2 knots critical speed range for a fast conventional ferry. I have checked that point with the MAIB and have been told that speed over the ground does not relate to the actual speed of the boat. It says that the boat was travelling at 17 knots or just under and that tidal pull led to the radar recording a greater speed over the ground. Although I understand that distinction, it nevertheless seems to take the boat into the critical speed range, with similar effects. I am yet to be convinced that there is clear evidence in the report to show that the boat was not travelling in the critical range while still in the loch, with small vessels close by.
Further questions arise. Is it proven that a speed over the ground of 17.4 knots would not produce critical wash? If so, should the captain of the ferry not have reduced speed, having taken into account the effects of the tidal pull? Was the boat accelerating when the reading was taken? If it was not producing critical wash at the time of the radar reading, when did it reach that critical speed? The 17.4 knots reading was taken when the ferry was level with the fishing boat. What was the weight of the boat? Would its weight have had an effect on the size of the wash produced? Is it true that the loch was dredged very soon after the accident, which might suggest that its shallowness was affecting wash size? Those questions need further investigation and I ask the Minister to consider commissioning that work.
Although the report dismisses the Stena Caledonia's role in the sinking of the boat, it nevertheless makes two recommendations—2004/163 and 2004/162—one of which alerts harbour authorities to the potential of fast conventional ferries to create similar wash to that produced by high-speed craft. The second recommendation asks operators to consider whether any of their boats has the potential to reach critical speeds and, if so, to produce an RAPP, so that crew are fully aware of the dangers. Those strong recommendations about fast conventional ferries seem at odds with the main body of the report, given that the role of the Stena Caledonia has been discounted.
I now turn to lookouts. The survivors and their family have always maintained their disbelief that seven ferries passed the upturned boat through the late afternoon and early evening—sometimes a matter of yards away, and the survivors have spoken of seeing people clearly moving inside the wheelhouses of those boats—yet not one of the lookouts was able to spot the bright life jackets and upturned hull. On that hull,
17 Jun 2004 : Column 966
Harry Houghton was at times waving at the boats, trying to grab the attention of those on them by waving a fluorescent buoy. Figures 8 to 11 in the report confirm the survivors' account that the boat passed very close by. It was a clear summer's day in Scotland. The survivors dispute whether the weather deteriorated in the way the report describes.
The report quotes the international convention on standards of training, certification and watchkeeping for seafarers, which states:
"A proper lookout shall be maintained at all times . . . and shall serve the purpose of: detecting ships or aircraft in distress, shipwrecked persons, wrecks, debris, and other hazards to safe navigation. The lookout must be able to give full attention to the keeping of a proper lookout and no other duties shall be undertaken or assigned which could interfere with that task."
On page 59, the MAIB seems to suggest that that was not the case in Loch Ryan. It states:
"Other ferries operate in the entrance to Loch Ryan with the bridge officer or the master performing the role"—
"The latter arrangement would be deemed to be compliant with the rules if the officer can devote his time solely to the task of lookout. However, it is doubtful that, with all the other requirements associated with either setting out on passage, or on arrival, the bridge officer or master can adequately perform the role in the confines of the entrance to Loch Ryan."
The MAIB also noted that two of the ferries had improperly set radars on that day. It concluded that there were "shortfalls" in the lookout arrangements, but seemed to explain them away by saying that it had received assurances that designated lookouts were posted on all ferries operating on that day and that conditions would have made it difficult to spot the boat. It is an undeniable fact that the submerged boat was showing on the radar, so, in my view, a fully engaged lookout would have spotted it. We need more detail on the precise shortfalls of the lookout arrangements. If the arrangements were not up to scratch, as the report says, we should know why, and know the effect that those deficiencies would have on the lookout's ability to spot the boat.
My fourth point is on survival times. The report goes into great detail about the search and rescue operation and the basic mistakes made. Belfast coastguard was below minimum staffing levels and Clyde coastguard was below recommended levels. Such understaffing, coupled with the inadequacy of the procedures, led to the failure to correct a simple mistake in the inputting of the co-ordinates of where the survivors were rescued from, so the rescue helicopter was sent to the wrong location. Furthermore, the inshore lifeboat that located the boat was tasked with towing it from the scene instead of giving first priority to the search for survivors. After taking everything into account, the MAIB concludes:
"It is therefore possible, in a best case scenario, that Shaun and Michael Ridley could have been recovered 47 minutes earlier had the correct position been given."
The MAIB asked Professor Mike Tipton, an expert in cold water immersion survival, what difference that would have made. His analysis was that it would, in all probability, have made no difference. However, the family will have to live with the terrible fact that they will never know for sure. Pauline Ridley points out that clinical staff at the hospital worked on Shaun and
17 Jun 2004 : Column 967
Michael for about two hours, clearly suggesting that they were not dead on arrival. Furthermore, she says that it is possible that Steven was still close by to Shaun at the earlier time when, if things had gone to plan, rescuers would have been on the scene. From all that, we know two facts: first, we will never know for sure whether a properly conducted rescue operation would have made a difference; and, secondly, the search and rescue operation was seriously defective.
The four areas that I have outlined cover issues of major dispute. At the same time as this report was published, the MAIB released another report into a more minor incident involving ferry wash in Loch Ryan on 3 September last year. It recommended that Dumfries and Galloway council should take the lead role in establishing a statutory harbour authority with responsibility for all of Loch Ryan. That major recommendation suggests that arrangements to date have been seriously deficient and have put public safety at risk. I cannot help but conclude that it was less controversial to attach such a major recommendation to a report into a more minor incident. The number of the report into the minor incident is No. 4/2004, while the report about which I have been talking is No. 5/2004. It is almost unbelievable that major commercial ferry operations have been run for years out of an unregulated British port with no harbour authority. It seems to me that the failure to create a statutory harbour authority has placed the public at risk. It would help to know from the MAIB the extent to which the report into the accident that I have described today influenced its decision to make major recommendations in its other report.
In conclusion, I make two requests. First, will the Minister consider the points that I have raised and commission a further investigation into them? Secondly, I ask the authorities in Scotland to order a fatal accident inquiry so that all the issues that I have mentioned can be thoroughly investigated.
Although the circumstances surrounding the tragedy are difficult to ascertain with absolute certainty, three things about that day are beyond doubt: wash from ferries affected the boat, lookouts had shortcomings and the search and rescue operation was seriously defective. One can only conclude that the lack of a permanent harbour authority contributed to that unsatisfactory state of affairs.
We are grateful to you, Mr. Deputy Speaker, and to Mr. Speaker, for granting this debate today so that I, on behalf of the family, can place the facts on record. Shaun Ridley would never have knowingly placed his family at risk, but, like the rest of the public, he could not have known just how dangerous the unregulated Loch Ryan was to small vessels.
3.44 pm
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