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The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Transport (Mr. David Jamieson): Terrible as this subject is, I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Leigh (Andy Burnham) on his handling of it and on securing this debate. He has helped the House by raising some important issues, and since the incident occurred, he has represented his constituents' interests tirelessly. On behalf of Her Majesty's Government, I convey my deepest sympathy to Mrs. Pauline Ridley, who lost her
 
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husband, Shaun, and her two sons, Steven, aged 15, and Michael, aged 12, in that terrible accident on Loch Ryan. I also offer my condolences to the two survivors—Mr. Brian Ridley, who lost his only son and two grandsons, and Mr. Harry Houghton, a family friend. There is no heavier burden that a parent has to bear than the loss of a child, especially those so young and in such tragic circumstances

The marine accident investigation branch is an independent body that reports directly to the Secretary of State. Following a technical investigation into the circumstances and the causes of an accident, it makes recommendations based on its findings. The sole purpose of an investigation by the marine accident investigation branch is to make recommendations that will improve the safety of life at sea and help to prevent future accidents. It does not seek to attribute blame. To maintain its reputation, it relies on its investigations being fair, comprehensive and balanced. Indeed, it has a high reputation, not just in this country but internationally, and has been emulated by investigators in other countries. Since it was established in 1989, the marine accident investigation branch has inevitably gained a great deal of experience investigating a wide range of marine accidents. During the course of a single year, it typically conducts about 40 investigations.

In 2003 alone, the marine accident investigation branch investigated 27 deaths resulting from marine accidents. That was 27 too many, and in hindsight most of them were avoidable. Three of those deaths happened, as we have heard, on 12 July 2003, when Shaun Ridley's boat became swamped. Investigations are greatly assisted by eye witness accounts, but accident inspectors have to collect and analyse a large amount of evidence from many sources to compile a report that reflects the sequence of events as completely as possible. Six inspectors and a human-factors expert collectively spent many hundreds of hours collecting and analysing evidence before the final report was produced.

In conducting his investigation into the tragedy on Loch Ryan, the chief inspector appreciated the assistance and co-operation of Mr. Brian Ridley and Mr. Harry Houghton. I have been asked to comment on progress implementing the recommendations arising from the investigation, and I can report that recommendations to the Maritime and Coastguard Agency, the Royal National Lifeboat Institution and the ferry operators have all been accepted and implemented, or are due to be implemented this summer. Following recommendations, the Maritime and Coastguard Agency has conducted a review of similar but less severe marine accidents, and is improving links and the exchange of information with the National Federation of Sea Anglers by establishing a sea angling liaison officer.

The Maritime and Coastguard Agency is writing to all United Kingdom port authorities to highlight the potential danger to small craft from the wakes of both conventional and high speed ferries. It has also reviewed and revised its incident management course to concentrate more specifically on the watch manager's role as the search and rescue mission co-ordinator. It has changed its training courses to reinforce communication protocols.
 
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I shall deal with some of the criticisms that have been made about the particular investigation, beginning with the location and timing of the incident. Establishing the precise location and time of an accident at sea can be a difficult task, even though that is fundamental to an investigation. In this case, in addition to the information provided by the survivors, the marine accident investigation branch was able to analyse information taken from the voyage data recorders—the VDRs—provided by Stena Line Ltd. and P&O Irish Sea, which operated vessels through Loch Ryan on the day of the accident. The ferries that operate to and from Loch Ryan all have VDRs fitted.

VDRs record certain key information, including conversations that take place on the bridge and radar information, which allows the marine accident investigation branch to recreate a picture of vessel movements. Such devices can tell us a great deal about when and where an accident occurred.

On its outbound voyage the Stena Caledonia passed the Ridley's boat at 16.38 hours and the Superstar Express passed it inbound at 16.45. The officer on watch on the Stena Caledonia saw a boat and commented on its presence to his helmsman. The officer was later shown Shaun Ridley's boat and was able to confirm that it was the boat that he had seen. The radar recordings from both ferries show the position and relative movement of the Ridleys' boat between 16.32 and 16.46. The recordings show the point in time when the Ridleys' boat became static after it had been swamped and its engine had cut out.

The marine accident investigation branch supplemented its information about the location of the boat close to the time of the accident by a visual sighting made by the crew of a passing fishing vessel at about 16.41. Given the degree of confidence that the marine accident investigation branch places in the radar information, it is completely satisfied that the location of the accident was as stated in its report.

Questions have been raised about the cause of the accident and, in particular, about the role played by the wash of an outbound ferry. In constructing the probable accident scenario, the marine accident investigation branch took account of the evidence provided by the survivors. The inspectors also considered other relevant evidence, including the VDR data, meteorological data, evidence from inspection of the hull—which showed that it had a leak—and the sea trials, which indicated that the boat was vulnerable to swamping from waves approaching from the stern.

In its report the marine accident investigation branch acknowledges that some of the evidence is conflicting. However, it regards the VDR evidence as being compelling, and it is confident that in its published report it has accurately reconstructed the events in the final few minutes before the boat sank.

It is not disputed that the ferry Stena Caledonia was passing through Loch Ryan on an outbound voyage at about the time of the accident. The marine accident investigation branch has the data from its voyage data recorder and the radar image that shows the position of Mr. Ridley's boat between 16.32 and 16.38. At that time the Stena Caledonia was making 17.4 knots over the
 
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ground as it passed about 600 m from the Ridleys' boat. Given the tidal conditions at the time, the speed of the ferry through the water would have been about 16.8 knots, which is just below the speed that is needed to generate a critical wash, taking proper account of the depth of the water.

A passing distance of 600 m is not considered close, and the marine accident investigation branch is fully convinced that on the basis of the evidence, including the survivors' accounts, the boat successfully rode the wash waves from Stena Caledonia at about 16.38. However, the branch cannot be certain of the source of the waves that came over the starboard quarter of the boat at, or about, 16.42 causing the boat to be swamped and to sink within just a couple of minutes. The branch concluded that the waves could not have come from either the Stena Caledonia or the Superstar Express, which had yet to enter the loch on her inbound voyage.

The marine accident investigation branch believes that there is a possibility—I put it no higher than that—that there could have been wash waves from the Seacat Rapide, the high-speed ferry operating on the route from Belfast to Troon, which passed nine or 10 miles away some 25 minutes before the accident. At a speed of 35 knots, the branch says that she would have been operating within the terms of her risk assessment passage plan, but still fast enough to produce the powerful sub-critical waves that my hon. Friend mentioned, which might have contributed to the swamping of the heavily loaded and, by then, partially flooded boat. The branch holds that wash propagation from high-speed ferries is not yet fully understood. Although other experts may disagree, the branch gives credence to the evidence of a witness, who has observed the wash effects from such ferries in and around Loch Ryan over many years, because of his scientific background and his comprehensive description of the phenomena he had observed. I accept my hon. Friend's point that we do not want to give overdue credence to that witness, but we certainly cannot rule out the careful examination of such evidence in future.

The marine accident investigation branch reports on the sad and regrettable fact that no one on board the three ferries, which passed the survivors a total of seven times, saw the problem. Those ferries were passing somewhere between 400 m and 800 m away from the casualties, and each ferry had a dedicated lookout as well as collectively several hundred passengers on board. Those on board other smaller and slower vessels also failed to see the people in the water. However, taking account of the prevailing choppy sea conditions and the blue and white colours of the bow of the boat, which was the only part of the boat remaining above the surface, the branch considers that it would have been difficult to spot. Furthermore, despite having inflated two life jackets, the casualties would have been difficult to see in the water. The fact that the problem was not spotted is a matter of concern to the branch; that is why its report contains a recommendation addressing that aspect of the tragedy.

There has been some criticism of the search and rescue mission, which began some four hours after the accident when a yacht saw the bow of the boat and rescued the two survivors who were clinging on to it. Shaun and the boys, who were wearing life jackets, had drifted away under the influence of the wind.
 
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The United Kingdom is rightly very proud of its maritime search and rescue services. The Maritime and Coastguard Agency handles more than 12,000 incidents annually and renders assistance in more than half those incidents, with the result that some 5,000 people are rescued each year. It is very rare for a mistake to be made. Of course, any error occurring in a search and rescue mission is a matter of regret, but the most important thing is to learn from such errors when they occur. In this case, the marine accident investigation branch discovered that a typing error was made when inputting the position of the casualty that was not noticed during the normal double checks on such information.

The effect was to cause the helicopter to go in the wrong direction even though it had been given the right location when it took off. However, I believe that my hon. Friend accepts that, even if it had gone directly to the reported position of the boat, there is no guarantee that the survivors or bodies would have been spotted immediately, especially as the helicopter is not fitted with forward-looking, infrared equipment.

When the survivors were rescued, Shaun and the boys had been drifting away from the boat for several hours, so their location was uncertain. In an ideal world, the helicopter would have flown directly to where Shaun and Michael Ridley had drifted, spotted them immediately and recovered them. Only in those fortuitous circumstances would they have been recovered 47 minutes earlier.

Indeed, although it is impossible to be certain, expert opinion is that it is unlikely that casualties immersed in those waters and at those temperatures would have survived to the point in time when they might have been rescued.

Although it did not alter the outcome, the vital necessity to undertake double checks on the accuracy of crucial information such as the initial position has been reinforced in all Maritime and Coastguard Agency co-ordination centres and with the rescue units that it co-ordinates. We shall monitor that closely to ensure that that happens. The need for control and planning of radio communications by the Maritime and Coastguard Agency marine rescue co-ordination centres and for radio discipline is being underlined to all MCA operators.

The investigation into the tragedy has been thorough and independent. No assurance about an investigation can be given to the bereaved or to the survivors except that it will be rigorous and without favour. The chief
 
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inspector of marine accidents is satisfied that the report into the tragedy is fair. When the recommendations are implemented, safety of life at sea will be improved.

I have already reported that the recommendations are being implemented. I can add that, already this summer, coastguard officers are being proactive in visiting caravan sites such as that near where the Ridleys were staying. The purpose of the visits is to increase safety awareness among the casual, recreational seafarers and to stress the importance of being properly equipped and prepared.

A fatal accident inquiry may yet be held, but that is a matter for the Procurator Fiscal and the Crown Office in Scotland. It is not a matter that I, as a Minister, can decide. The decision is a matter for the judiciary in Scotland. I am told that such an inquiry would resemble a public inquiry. It would examine all the issues that my hon. Friend would want to be considered. However, I stress again that the decision is a matter for the judiciary in Scotland. Unfortunately, I have no remit to direct them to make such an inspection.

Pending the decision on whether there will be a fatal accident inquiry in Scotland, it would be premature of me to comment on the need or otherwise for that form of public inquiry. However, if such an accident inquiry does not take place in Scotland, I shall review the request for further examination of the issues that my hon. Friend has raised.

This has been an appalling tragedy and, having had a similar one involving some of my own constituents on the south coast 10 years ago, I know that it will bear down heavily on the parents and all those involved. I congratulate my hon. Friend again on the way in which he has tirelessly represented his constituents, not only in the Chamber, but in his correspondence to the Department and his interaction with the marine accident investigation branch. This has been a matter of great sensitivity for him and, of course, for the families and all those who have been affected by this tragedy.

It is most important that we learn from tragic events. Because human beings are as they are, we will never be able to prevent every such incident from happening, but we must learn from these events and reduce the probability of there being casualties in the future, particularly among children and young people. Again, I congratulate my hon. Friend on securing this debate. I am sure that there will be more to say on this issue, and he can be assured that my Department will do everything that it can to facilitate the answers to the questions that his constituents have raised.

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