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Mr. Blunkett: I think that everyone in the House shares entirely the sentiments and emotions that the hon. Gentleman just described, and I thank him for the way in which he has liaised with the families, making it possible for us to work with them and keep them informed to ensure that they knew what was happening and when. While that did not bring comfort, at least it ensured that they had confidence that we were acting properly.
Sir Christopher Kelly has been encouraged to publish his report as quickly as possible. It is important in my view, and that of the Secretary of State for Health and
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the Minister for Children, that we have that report so that we can act on its recommendations in tandem with our work on the Bichard report. The hon. Gentleman asked about Ronnie Flanagan's report, which I am publishing today. It deals with the way in which the initial days were handled, including whether the force should have presumed immediately that it was dealing with an abduction and potential murder rather than missing children, but it also commends the force, when it recognised the enormity of events, on the speed and effectiveness of its action. Again, I concur entirely with the hon. Gentleman in accepting that people in the locality will want to know that Sir Ronnie's recommendations or observations are introduced urgently and implemented.
Mr. Austin Mitchell (Great Grimsby) (Lab): May I welcome the speedy action by my right hon. Friend, particularly the measures that he announced today, which will reassure many people? I emphasise the importance of his comments on a statutory code on intelligence, and about the PLX and Impact systems, all of which are most welcome. However, it is not enough just to dump everything on Chief Constable Westwood, because the report highlights failings in my right hon. Friend's Department. It says, first, that Her Majesty's inspectors failed to identify the computer mess in Humberside, make recommendations, or do anything about the problem until 2003. Secondly, the Home Office failed to set rules and conditions, or to provide a national code of practice on intelligence services, including what was to be added, deleted and so on from records, which was partly responsible for the confusion in Humberside. Thirdly, our national computer system was inadequate, so that forces were unable to access records held by other forces, and the system could not even flag up the fact that information was held by other forces. Those, too, are failings. I hope that they will be investigated with the same thoroughness and that my right hon. Friend can tell us why our police are so much less adequate in respect of national computer records than the police in Scotland.
Mr. Blunkett: I do not demur in any way from the view that responsibility for getting matters right rests across the board. I am seeking not to dump on anyone. I am using powers laid out in the Police Act 1996 and the Police Reform Act 2002 commensurate with the protocol that came into force on 1 June and was agreed with chief constables. If ever there were a case, after a thoroughgoing report and given the language used by Sir Michael Bichard, for the implementation of that protocol, it is now. The authority itself and the subsequent representations of Chief Constable Westwood will be part of that process.
I fully accept that there should have been codes of practice and intervention earlier. That is why, as my hon. Friend will remember, the 2002 Act provided for regulation, codes and directions, which were not available previously. It is also why we set up the national centre for policing excellence, and why I indicated today that the tripartite approach and decentralised autonomy are not acceptable in the context of national information exchange. I have already explained why, in Scotland, the chief constables decided to go ahead
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simultaneously with their national intelligence model and their computer system, whereas in England those taking part in the decision making chose to do the first, and then to follow with the second.
From 2001, when I allocated the £11 million, and from 2003, when we issued the code, and following the steps that we have taken to develop the PLX and the Impact systems, the new £500 million Airwave communication system and the new national database for DNA, and the investment that we have put into the Criminal Records Bureau over the past three years, we have invested more than ever before. That, complemented by the £600 million that we allocated from 2002 to the whole criminal justice information technology system to join up, as Sir Michael recommends, the courts with the policing and social services systems, is something of which I shall be proud.
Mr. Speaker: Order. May I inform the House that I allowed the constituency Member of Parliament to ask several supplementaries for good reason, but from now I expect only one supplementary to be put to the Home Secretary.
Charles Hendry (Wealden) (Con): Does the Home Secretary accept that there is a gap in the existing legislation, in that people coming from abroad to work in schools are not subject to CRB checks? Does he agree that it seems unfair that whereas people of many years' standing in this country cannot take up a position in a school until they have been checked by the CRB, someone coming from abroad about whom we know nothing can start on day one? In the interests of child protection, should not the same checking criteria apply to everybody?
Mr. Blunkett: There is a checking system, including through the agencies and bodies from which the recommendation came. It applies primarily to supply teachers and to the recruitment of teachers on a temporary basis from overseas, but it could apply to others. I accept, and Sir Michael makes the point, that we need to be more thorough in carrying out checks. That challenge has been accepted more generally and it will be possible to meet it by means of the ID card database, where we will have to do a check back as part of the process of checking an individual's true identity. We will therefore be more easily able to check with the police forces and authorities in the country of origin.
Ms Debra Shipley (Stourbridge) (Lab):
I very much welcome the report, which is extremely important, and my right hon. Friend's response to it. It is ludicrous that the police have not been automatically required to share information across forces. Hon. Members on both sides of the House have said that they do not want such a failing to occur ever again, but in my view it will happen again. Since my Protection of Children Act 1999, I have repeatedly drawn to the attention of my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Minister for Children and my hon. Friend the Minister for Crime Reduction, Policing and Community Safety, who are present, the need for the retrospective checking of people who are in position. Prior to the establishment
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of the Criminal Records Bureau, many of them were not required to be checked. They remain in position and some are known paedophiles. There is a vital need for retrospective checking to take place. It needs to be phased in so that it does not overwhelm the system, but it must happen. The responses that I have received so far from Ministers and the Secretary of State suggest to me that it is not in the Government's programme to do so.
Mr. Blunkett: Sir Michael touches on that. I commend my hon. Friend on her tenacity and commitment to that important cause. First, whenever someone changes job, checks are automatically undertaken for the new employer. Secondly—Sir Michael touches on this—we need to consider introducing a review process for those who have not been checked but are working with children. I merely ask—this is not ducking the issue—for time to do that, if we are not to dislocate once again the system for the thoroughgoing checks that are currently being made on anyone who applies for the first time to work with, be with or volunteer to take part in activities alongside children, so that what it is feasible to implement is balanced against the necessity to provide protection through a checking process on a national basis, with the thoroughness that did not exist three years ago.
Mr. Keith Simpson (Mid-Norfolk) (Con): The Home Secretary outlined and acknowledged the failures in the Cambridgeshire police and the Humberside police relating both to systems and to policing, which my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden (David Davis) also emphasised. May I pick up on one point that the hon. Member for Great Grimsby (Mr. Mitchell) made? Going back several years, those police forces were inspected by Her Majesty's inspectorate of constabulary. Did HMIC at any time flag up those weaknesses to the Home Office? If so, what action was taken, and if not, why not?
Mr. Blunkett: I have already acknowledged that that is a fair and sensible point, and it is one that Sir Michael makes with regard to HMIC's capability and the thoroughness of its activity in this area. The shadow Home Secretary made the point succinctly, and I have accepted that HMIC must raise its game in this area and needs expertise to do the job. It had certainly reported on the Humberside and Cambridgeshire forces, because regrettably we know where those forces have lain in all other national assessments, including, in the case of Humberside, the recent baseline assessment. What was not clearly emphasised and therefore not appreciated was the enormity of the failure of information systems. That is something that I want to put right.
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