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Dr. Harris: These are difficult areas. It is done successfully in Belgium, in respect of both providing more organs and meeting public acceptability. Surveys of relatives show that they are pleased to be relieved of the responsibility of taking a difficult decision at the height of their grief. That is how it would be done here. Clearly, the relatives are distressed as it is, and the current system expects them to take a decision, to second-guess the wishes of the deceased at the peak of their grief when brain stem death will just have been declared after what is normally a short illness following a traumatic injury. In those circumstances, the distress of relatives is already present.

This system proposes that relatives are approached to ascertain whether there were any unregistered objections and it gives them the opportunity to volunteer the view that they do not wish the transplant to go ahead. The difference is that they will not be asked for their view, because the view of the deceased will predominate, whether it be expressed or presumed. Nevertheless, if the relatives have a view, after they know that the organs will otherwise be used, they can state that they would suffer distress and the judgment would be made in the same sensitive way as at present.

I hope that the hon. Member for Spelthorne will accept that these are difficult decisions, but that they have to be made. He must remember that there is another set of distressed relatives—those of patients who are literally dying without the transplants. We have to ensure that we weigh up those two interests as sensitively as we can. Other countries have managed it successfully—by the Belgian method, for example, which has been carefully appraised and incorporates taking into account the views of relatives afterwards.

Mr. Wilshire: I am grateful for that response and if I catch your eye later, Mr. Deputy Speaker, I may comment on the views of other people and third parties. However, would the hon. Gentleman accept that one definition of hell would be to be already deeply upset and passionately opposed to what is about to happen to
 
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one's deceased relative and then to be told by someone, "I am sorry, but you are simply not upset enough"? That, for me, is a definition of hell.

Dr. Harris: As I say, the problem that the hon. Gentleman seeks to identify is a problem that occurs now in respect of organ donation where the deceased has a donor card, but relatives may well oppose it. Doctors have a very difficult problem when someone has said in life that they wish to donate, but another group of people are dying and their relatives are deeply concerned about it, and a third party—the bereaved relative whose interests must also be respected—expresses another view. These are difficult decisions to take now—they certainly had to be taken by my colleagues when I worked in acute medicine—and those difficulties will always be with us. We have to set out a framework to ensure that due respect is given to the strongly held views of bereaved relatives. The veto outlined in the provision does precisely that and it does so reasonably.

Mr. Kevan Jones rose—

Mr. Dalyell rose—

Dr. Harris: I am keen to make progress, but I will take these interventions.

Mr. Jones: I appreciate that the hon. Gentleman is attempting to give relatives some input or a veto. However, what happens when relatives are not present and the decision to transplant organs has to be taken, but relatives subsequently come forward to dissent? Would that not put doctors in the terrible position of having done something to which relatives subsequently take strong exception?

Dr. Harris: The hon. Gentleman will be relieved to know that that problem is far more likely to arise under the current arrangements because the Human Tissue Act 1961, which deals with circumstances when a donor card or the organ donor register has been used, does not require doctors to delay transplantation, because people can be kept ventilated after brain stem death only for so long while relatives are found. That is the first problem, and that already happens now when there is an indication of the deceased's wish but relatives are not present. I hope that the hon. Gentleman recognises that. In many such cases, if not in the vast majority, the deaths take place in intensive care following an illness where there is a process of diagnosis of death by brain stem injury, and relatives are invariably there, where they exist. It is not a rapid decision. There are some circumstances, however, in which rapid decisions need to be taken, and clause 44 presumes consent for cold perfusion in those cases. I not believe that the problem identified by the hon. Gentleman would be any greater than in the current circumstances that I described.

Mr. Dalyell: Is there not another definition of hell, which is the agony of the relatives of those desperately in need of a transplant and who see matching tissue going up in crematorium incinerators, when it is likely that the relatives of the deceased would have been only too happy to help someone else?
 
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4.45 pm

Dr. Harris: I share that view and I hope that the hon. Gentleman has a chance to catch your eye later, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I know that he has a long history of campaigning on the issue and would be able to develop those points further.

The differences in the current system and the opt-out system reside mainly in the way relatives are approached. It is not that relatives are approached under one system and not approached under the other. In the current system, relatives are asked to make a decision, usually based on guessing their loved one's wishes or on their own feelings. Under a system of presumed consent with opt-out, the absence of an objection is taken as the basis of a presumption of consent by a potential donor who is ordinarily resident, has capacity and is an adult. Relatives are approached only to seek evidence of unregistered objection or opt-out by the deceased, not to make a decision themselves.

Why do the proposers of the new clause want to change the present system? As I have said, if the present system were working well, improving, doing well enough or offered advantages compared to the one proposed, I would not propose a change. However, it is clear that the present system is not working well enough for prospective recipients, prospective donors or the relatives of the deceased. All those who support change support the current system while we have it, and I hope that it is acknowledged that I and others who support change have worked hard to promote the organ donor register and donor cards. However, we have to recognise that the present system is not working effectively for any of the people involved.

In terms of the effect on potential recipients, the number of cadaveric organ donors is falling year on year despite efforts made under the present system. The Minister may claim that last year there was an increase, but there was not an increase in the number of cadaveric organ donors in 2003 compared with 2002, nor in 2002 compared with 2001. That is what we are measuring. At the same time, the number in need of a transplant rises every year. That means, tragically, that more and more people are dying while on a waiting list for a transplant or before even making it to the formal waiting list. Many people do not make it to a waiting list because the criteria are tight—because the prospects for transplantation are so limited.

Potential donors—the deceased whose organs would be used—do not do well out of the present system either. Surveys have shown that 80 to 90 per cent. of people would in principle wish their organs to be used for transplantation after their death, if possible. However, under the present system, only 50 per cent. have their organs used, because of high rates of refusal by relatives. That means that many organs whose owners would have wanted them to be used to save lives are being buried or cremated with the deceased in direct contravention of their wishes—although I accept that those wishes are often unexpressed.

Nor are relatives of the deceased well served by the present system. They are put under pressure to make a decision, often at the height of their grief. There is now research to suggest that half of them make a decision that they later regret. Every time they see the story of a successful transplant in the media, they feel that their
 
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decision—at a time of heightened grief—was not the one that they would have made if they had known then what they know now.

Nor is the present system fair on medical staff. Doctors and nurses are asked to approach relatives to make a decision at a very difficult time. Nor does the NHS do well out of the present system. That is not a major consideration, but it has been mentioned by the media. Maintaining thousands of kidney patients on dialysis, instead of treating them with the far more cost-effective option of transplantation, uses up millions of pounds of NHS cash that could be spent on saving or prolonging the lives of others. That is not a key point and it is more ethical than financial, but even the financial arguments are in favour.

The second point is that presumed consent with opt-out works; it saves lives. Many other countries in Europe and the rest of the world use that system successfully. The average donation rate, in donors per million of population, is 25 per cent. higher in countries with opt-out than in countries that have an opt-in system. Scientific evidence and research backs that up. Several analyses published in scientific journals have looked at the effect of changing to presumed consent with opt-out on rates of organ donation and at other outcomes, such as public satisfaction and relatives' views. They all showed that such a change was successful.

Some analyses examined the factors that could be judged to account for a higher rate of organ donation in one country than another. All those studies cited presumed consent with opt-out as one such factor and often the only one that could realistically be changed; for example, the rate of road traffic accidents is a factor but it would be hard to change that—one would certainly not want to. Another factor is the proportion of people with a particular religious view; in Europe, Roman Catholicism is associated with a higher rate of donation. Those factors are hard to change, but the one thing that countries can change—the one thing Parliament can change—is the law.


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