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Harry Cohen: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what assessment he has made of whether (a) UN and (b) NATO military personnel have been involved in Kosovo in illegal activities relating to sex trafficking; and if he will make a statement. [172301]
Mr. Ingram: The Government condemn the exploitation of vulnerable people, and expect United Kingdom military personnel to adhere to the rules for conduct on operations. Military personnel breaking these rules are dealt with under the relevant disciplinary procedures and, depending on the offence, UK criminal law. No UK personnel in Kosovo have been court marshalled for offences relating to sex trafficking, and no investigations are outstanding, though one individual was returned to the UK from Kosovo in 1999, and subsequently court marshalled, after visiting a brothel. We cannot comment on personnel from other states.
Angus Robertson: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence when the last transfer of nuclear material between the United States and the UK under the Mutual Defence Agreement took place; and if he will make a statement. [179691]
Mr. Ingram: The 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement makes provision for the transfer of special nuclear materials. Such transfers are in connection with nuclear warhead assurance and stockpile stewardship matters. I am withholding precise details of such transfers under Exemption 1 of the Code of Practice on Access to Government Information.
Mr. Kidney: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence when he expects to reply to the question tabled by the hon. Member for Stafford on 21 April, ref. 168467. [179219]
Mr. Caplin: I replied to my hon. Friend today.
Mr. Flight: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how often since 1997 (a) his Department and (b) its associated public sector organisations have undergone portable appliance testing of IT equipment; and what the cost was of portable appliance testing in each year since 1997. [176573]
Mr. Ingram: Appliance Testing of IT equipment is a site responsibility. Information is not held centrally on the timings and the costs incurred for the testing of IT equipment could therefore be provided only at disproportionate cost.
Norman Baker: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make a statement on the instruction in R2I technologies at Ashford, Kent. [174788]
Mr. Ingram [holding answer 20 May 2004]: Resistance to Interrogation (R2I) training is now conducted in the UK by the Joint Services Intelligence Organisation (JSIO).
In order to give those military forces who are designated 'prone to capture' an indication of the stresses and pressures that they may face if they are
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captured by an enemy, JSIO are authorised to conduct R2I training. During the course of such training, certain activities proscribed by the Geneva Conventions (GC) are employed. This is in order to give the best possible preparation to personnel likely to be deployed on operations where they will be most at risk from interrogation methods falling outside of the GC. Such activities only occur on designated exercises in a controlled and properly supervised environment by professionally trained personnel from JSIO supported by other appropriately trained staff. Those proscribed activities under the GC which 'prone to capture' British forces receive exposure to, include hooding, white noise and stress positions. It should be clearly understood that activities conducted under R2I training which are proscribed in the GC are neither taught nor reflected in UK interrogation training and practices, which are always conducted in accordance with the GC.
Mr. Hoyle: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many army regiments are not using Commonwealth troops to fill recruitment shortfalls. [180056]
Mr. Caplin: Commonwealth citizens who enlist into the British Army are not recruited only to fill vacancies in specific regiments. They are eligible to serve in the Army providing they meet the relevant qualifying criteria, and are currently given the same choice of Career Employment Group as any other recruit.
Angus Robertson: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence (1) if he will make a statement on the functions of the (a) Mk98 MOD 5 Fire Control System and (b) SLBM Retargeting System; [179692]
(2) when the Mk 98 MOD 5 Fire Control system for Trident is due to enter service; and if he will make a statement; [179685]
(3) what the total cost of acquiring the (a) hardware and (b) software for (i) the MK98 MOD 5 Fire Control System and (ii) modifications to the Trident system under the SLBM Retargeting System was; and if he will make a statement. [179684]
Mr. Ingram:
The Mk 98 Fire Control System is an important part of the equipment fitted on board a Vanguard class submarine. It draws together all the information needed to calculate the flight data required by a Trident missile prior to launch. The MK98 MOD 2 Fire Control System was installed on the submarines at build. The MK98 MOD 5 programme was undertaken to update hardware to overcome obsolescence and is now complete. Initial Operating Capability was achieved in September 2002 and all SSBNs had been modified by February 2003. The update programme, for hardware only, cost $39.810 million (including the costs of fitting) and $6.987 million for initial spares. Information on the
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costs of the related software modifications is not held separately from that relating to other software costs in this area. The UK has no requirement for a SLBM Retargeting System on Trident submarines, and has no plans to acquire that capability.
Angus Robertson: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how much his Department has spent per annum since 1993 on modifications to the shore- based target planning system for Trident; and if he will make a statement on the functions of these modifications. [179686]
Mr. Ingram: The shore-based target planning system for Trident has not changed significantly since 1993. The purpose of the modifications has been to update hardware and operating system software in accordance with good industry practice. In broad terms we spend around £250,000 per year (at current prices) on hardware updates, although this did peak at £584,000 in financial year 200102 when a more significant investment was made.
Angus Robertson: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what plans his Department has drawn up for the use of satellites for EHF communications with Trident nuclear submarines; which satellites his Department plans to use for EHF communications with Trident nuclear submarines; and if he will make a statement on his Department's assessment of the importance of EHF communications with Trident nuclear submarines. [179687]
Mr. Ingram: Maintaining the effectiveness of Trident submarine communications is vital and these are kept under constant review to ensure that they support national deterrent policy.
Trident submarines use, and will continue to use, as many different systems as is required to assure reliable communications.
EHF is one of many technical solutions. It will continue to be considered as one choice available for submarine communications capability.
Miss McIntosh: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make a statement on the date of entry into service of the Typhoon aircraft. [180336]
Mr. Ingram: I refer the hon. Member to the answer I gave on 10 June 2004, Official Report, column 598W, to the hon. Member for Aldershot (Mr. Howarth).
Norman Baker: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether US aircraft armed with nuclear weapons seek permission from his Department for each flight they wish to make within UK airspace. [178708]
Mr. Hoon
[holding answer 14 June 2004]: The use of facilities on United Kingdom territory by the United States is a matter for joint decision by the two Governments in the light of the circumstances prevailing at the time.
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