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Mr. Wyatt: I confess that I have not read all three reports—I shall get a smack on the hand for that. When my right hon. Friend was taking evidence, was he able to take confidential advice from MI6? Are there surveillance pictures and photographs that show that food is being diverted, and have we ever presented them in the public domain?

Donald Anderson: We did not. We had an ongoing debate with the Government on our access to intelligence, but I suspect that Zimbabwe is not one of the priorities for the intelligence agency.
 
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In our report numbed HC813, we concluded that "Zimbabwe deserves better". On the EU and Zimbabwe, we unanimously said that President Chirac's invitation of President Mugabe to the conference in Paris the day after the EU sanctions expired was "deeply regrettable". We were highly critical of the hard negotiations over the renewal of sanctions in 2003 and said that the UK Government needed to be more robust with France. Fortunately, such horse-trading was not repeated during this year's sanction renewals.

On the Commonwealth and Zimbabwe, we said that our Government were right to call for the suspension of Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth. We said that Zimbabwe should not be readmitted to the Commonwealth

On the future, we said that the United Kingdom Government must continue to act multilaterally with Zimbabwe through the United Nations and our African allies. We should not act unilaterally because of our colonial history and President Mugabe's ability to twist any actions that we might take and use them against us. We said that the United Kingdom must be ready to respond speedily to a change of regime in Harare and, of course, that we cannot assume that President Mugabe will carry on for ever.

We published a report on South Africa and Zimbabwe earlier this year. We said that our Government and the South African Government have not seen eye to eye on the issue for some time. They share the same ambition—a return to democracy in Zimbabwe and its respect for human rights—but the South African Government have pursued a policy of quiet diplomacy that has produced no proper results. They have refused to criticise President Mugabe and have even gone out of their way to support him, as we saw at the Commonwealth conference and from the strong letter that President Mbeki sent afterwards, which led to Zimbabwe's walk out from the Commonwealth.

Tony Baldry: The Foreign Affairs Committee said:

How does the right hon. Gentleman envisage that our Commonwealth colleagues and others might take a policy of non-trade sanctions by neighbours forward? He has not specifically mentioned that powerful recommendation in his speech.

Donald Anderson: It is clear that Zimbabwe's neighbours respond very differently. For example, President Sam Nujoma of Namibia has always acted as a cheerleader for President Mugabe. Indeed, alarming reports suggest that he might want to follow President Mugabe down the path of the expropriation of farms, which would not only damage Namibia, but have a deleterious effect on perceptions of southern Africa as a whole. Of course, the bravest of Zimbabwe's neighbours have been Botswana and Malawi, to an extent. However, there is no consensus among its neighbours on
 
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the use of effective pressure, despite the harm that is being done. The greatest pressure can come only from its neighbours.

Sir Nicholas Winterton: I have put this question to a Foreign Office Minister during Question Time. Does the right hon. Gentleman think that restricting or cutting off electricity supplies from South Africa to Zimbabwe might have an impact on Mr. Mugabe's Administration?

Donald Anderson: It is clear that South Africa and its parastatal are owed much money by Zimbabwe, which is heavily dependent on South Africa for its energy supplies. Turning off the electricity would cause chaos, and the danger for South Africa would be that even more refugees would stream over the border. Perhaps the most powerful argument made by the politicians and others in South Africa to whom we spoke was that we in Europe could be fairly sanguine about the situation, but that they had to live alongside Zimbabwe. If the country imploded further, it would have awful effects on South Africa's economy and the refugee stream, even though up to 3 million refugees from Zimbabwe have already crossed the Limpopo into South Africa.

We were given other reasons in South Africa for the country's continued support of, or failure to deal with, the regime in Zimbabwe. We were told about regional solidarity and that it was the practice of African leaders not to criticise each other. We heard about their shared history of fighting together in a struggle, although ZANU-PF was linked with the Pan Africanist Conference at first, and was not linked with the African National Congress until much later. We were told that, on land reform, Mugabe was seen as the only African leader actively trying to reverse the colonial legacy. We were told that the double standards of the west were tough on Mugabe, but not on such issues as third-world debt. Of course, we must also take note of the popularity of President Mugabe in the ANC. Additionally, we must consider the challenge to Mugabe from Morgan Tsvangirai, a trade union leader, and the possible implications for South Africa of a trade union leader from the Congress of South African Trade Unions challenging the South African Government. However, perhaps the most powerful argument is the domestic implications for South Africa of the implosion of Zimbabwe.

We were also told that South Africa's views might have been shaped by its experience at the end of apartheid when two implacably opposed sides were brought together in private negotiations to build a consensus. Some South Africans honestly believe that the same situation can be brought about in Zimbabwe. There are rumours of secret talks between ZANU-PF and the Movement for Democratic Change being sponsored by the South African Government, but I know of no serious evidence for that. It is true that South Africa possesses many possible levers, but it is reluctant to use them because of the danger of the further collapse of Zimbabwe into anarchy. Additionally, we are told that the west overestimates the influence that South Africa has on Mugabe.

The Committee concluded that South Africa is


 
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change, and that it shares the same goal as the United Kingdom. We urged our Government to work closely with South Africa to achieve a solution for Zimbabwe. We returned with a greater understanding of the South African Government's policies, but we were unconvinced that our interlocutors fully appreciated the damage done by Zimbabwe's actions to perceptions of South Africa, the South African economy and the New Partnership for Africa's Development, which the hon. Member for Banbury mentioned.

The South African Development Community has played a disappointing role on the resolution of the situation in Zimbabwe. It has put no pressure whatsoever on President Mugabe to reform, and could play a more useful role. As has already been said, Zimbabwe's neighbours are not assuming their responsibilities or putting pressure on the country.

The 2003 session of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees saw South Africa co-ordinating an African group of members to block all debate on Zimbabwe. Such misplaced solidarity can only harm Africa as a whole, and it devalues the UNHCR.

The right hon. and learned Member for Devizes effectively chronicled the way in which the situation has deteriorated since we produced our report. There have been greater problems with the economy, government corruption, inflation and unemployment. Direct foreign investment in Zimbabwe has declined by 99 per cent. over the past three years. There is a chronic shortage of foreign exchange and last December, the International Monetary Fund initiated procedures for Zimbabwe's compulsory withdrawal from it.

The human cost is appalling. Life expectancy is 34 for men and 33 for women. Officially, about a third of the adult population is HIV-positive. President Mugabe has forecast a bumper harvest this year, but Mr. James Morris, director general of the World Food Programme, has expressed astonishment at that, saying that an increase from 980,000 tonnes to 2.8 million tonnes would be quite unprecedented. Obviously, the regime is not prepared to admit the crisis, as that would be an acceptance of the total failure of its agricultural policies. Political deterioration has already been mentioned, and there is a danger of the problem spreading to neighbouring countries including, worryingly, Namibia.

The image of Zimbabwe affects South Africa and the region as a whole. I have commented on the UN's role, and there is no serious prospect of the issue being taken up by the Security Council. To argue otherwise would be misleading. The Select Committee urges the Government to work closely with South Africa to achieve a solution, and we are pleased that the Prime Minister has made Africa a key theme not only of our presidency of the European Union in the second half of next year but of our presidency of the G8. In conclusion, it is sometimes said that individuals cannot make a mark in today's societies, but southern Africa disproves that. On one side of the Limpopo, President Mugabe has control, on the other side, President Mandela was once in power. One exalted his people, the other debases his. The people of Zimbabwe, the region and, indeed, Africa as a whole are the losers.
 
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