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It being Six o'clock, the motion for the Adjournment of the House lapsed, without Question put.
Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Jim Fitzpatrick.]
Sir John Stanley: First, the tape recording is incomplete; there is at least one crucial sentence missing. Secondly, the closed-circuit television evidence is unsatisfactory because the cameras are activated only by vehicle movements, not by pedestrian movements. There is therefore no CCTV evidence of Mr. Stedall walking to the telephone. There is only evidence of him when he comes close to moving his vehicle. So there is a lack of completeness there, too.
The third area of concern is that, on the data that I have seen, there appears to be a material degree of time mis-match between the CCTV material and the timings on the tape-recorded material. This could be a consequence of computer software, but the Minister will understand that if it is not possible to rely on identical timings on the CCTV and the tape recording, it is very difficult to be certain about the time relationship between a particular telephone conversation and the passage of a particular train. Some serious questions have been raised in my mind as to the adequacy of this monitoring equipment, and I think that that will be a matter of concern for the Minister. I hope that it will also be a matter of concern for the Health and Safety Executive.
I turn now to the main parties that have been involved in the investigation so far. My constituent, Mr. Alex Stedall, is in no doubt whatever that he sought permission to cross, using the telephone in the normal way, that he was given that permission, and that when he got on to the line, he faced an oncoming train. I have put all the evidence that my constituents have put to me to the chief executive of Network Rail, Mr. John Armitt, who wrote to me on 27 May as follows:
"Our conclusions, again shared with HMRI, are that the evidence leads us to believe that no technical or operating failure on behalf of Network Rail occurred."
I have also pursued this issue with the director of rail safety at the Health and Safety Executive, Mr. Allan Sefton, who wrote to me in May to say:
"I am advised that there is no reason to doubt the thoroughness of Network Rail's investigation."
I subsequently received a letter on 25 June, contrasting with those two views, from the deputy director general of the Health and Safety Executive, Mr. Justin McCracken, in which he states:
"Network Rail's report does contain a recording of a user of the crossing (who is believed to be Mr Kennedy's son) asking for permission to cross the line and permission being granted."
That would indeed suggest that there was a serious failure; whether it was of a human nature or of equipment I have no means of knowing. However, that is a significant comment by Mr. McCracken.
Having viewed the CCTV evidence this morning, I believe that it is incontrovertible—this was not denied by the Network Rail people who were there, or the HSE people who were there—that it clearly showed Mr. Stedall opening the gate, going on to the line, going back behind the gate, shutting it, and the train going past a few seconds later. Again, that would seem to me to be clear evidence that he was given permission to cross in front of an oncoming train.
It is not surprising that Mr. Roger Kennedy has been concerned as to whether there has been an element of cover-up by Network Rail. He has made that allegation, and he has contacted the British Transport police. I have put his allegations to the chief constable of the British Transport police, Mr. Ian Johnston, who said to me in his letter of 28 June:
"I have asked Acting Detective Chief Superintendent Mark Smith to address the points raised in your correspondence. I have also asked him to review the case to ascertain whether the allegation of a 'cover up' should be the matter of investigation by BTP."
Whatever the outcome of the current investigations that are still continuing, by Network Rail, the Health and Safety Executive and British Transport police, into the incident on 3 March, I am in no doubt that the present situation at the Medhurst Row rail crossing presents an unacceptable degree of risk, both to those crossing and to passengers on the trains involved, should there be a collision with a vehicle. This is a crossing that has no automatic gates, and no automatic warning lights when a train is approaching. Those using the crossing are totally dependent for their safety on there not being human error at the Ashford signal box, and there not being equipment failure. In life, human errors occur, and equipment failures occur. If either of those should happen, those using the crossing have only one protection: what those in the armed forces are inclined to call the mark one eyeball. That is the only protection available, and it probably saved the life of Mr. Alex Stedall on 3 March.
The mark one eyeball has its limitations: it is not much use at night, it is not much use in fog, and it is not much use in mist. My conclusion from all the material that I have seen so far is that, as it stands, the Medhurst Row railway crossing is a fatal accident waiting to happen, possibly involving multiple fatalities. I hope that when the Minister replies, he will tell me what he will do to try to prevent such a tragedy occurring.
6.8 pm
The Minister of State, Department for Transport (Dr. Kim Howells):
I congratulate the right hon. Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Sir John Stanley) on securing
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this debate. He has raised an issue that is clearly of great concern to him and to his constituents, and which should properly be the concern of anyone who wants to see safety enhanced on and around the railways. He described for us with great clarity reports of a serious incident, which have concerned him a great deal. Were I in his place, I would do exactly the same. It has given me the opportunity to try to reassure him that we are determined to ensure that the country's rail network is operated safely, whether at the Medhurst Row crossing in Edenbridge, or in any other part of the country.
There are more than 8,000 level crossings operated by Network Rail. Had the right hon. Gentleman not initiated the debate, I should not have known that. It is an incredible number of level crossings. Just 1,500 are public vehicular crossings, and 5,400 are private vehicular crossings. The remainder are public footpaths.
Public crossings are found where a public right of way crosses the railway, for instance a public road or footpath. The rail operator has a legal responsibility to ensure safe operation, and Network Rail risk assessors look at all level crossings and try to provide appropriate protection, as we would expect them to. Private crossings are provided by Network Rail for authorised users only—typically, occupiers of adjacent land like the right hon. Gentleman's constituents—who need to cross the line to gain access to their property. Network Rail provides briefings for authorised users on the procedures to be followed, and users are responsible for ensuring that crossings are used safely—in particular by following the procedures advised by Network Rail, and obeying the instructions displayed in crossing signs at each location. The right hon. Gentleman helpfully described in some detail what that entails at the Medhurst Row crossing.
Network Rail published a level crossings strategy in 2003, designed to reduce risks associated with level crossings through—among other things—effective operation and maintenance, a programme of risk assessment leading to risk reduction, and communication with users and external stakeholders to promote safe usage. As the right hon. Gentleman said, the Health and Safety Executive investigates serious incidents on both public and private level crossings, and keeps the safety standards under review. It can require action to improve protective arrangements at level crossings, depending on changes in the level or frequency of risk. It works closely with Network Rail, the Rail Safety and Standards Board and the British Transport police to increase road users' awareness of the risk of misuse at level crossings. I am very glad that the right hon. Gentleman had an opportunity to meet Network Rail and HSE representatives to discuss that problem.
The Medhurst Row crossing is a private crossing restricted to authorised users, namely the occupants of four houses and a farm who need to use it to gain access to their properties. As the right hon. Gentleman said, users in vehicles must telephone the signaller at Ashford to confirm that it is safe to cross. I understand that Railtrack, as it was then—it is now Network Rail—wrote to all users in July 2000 to remind them of the procedures, and that Network Rail sent a further reminder in 2003.
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Let me deal specifically with Mr. Kennedy's complaints. These are serious allegations. I want to reassure the right hon. Gentleman that all the complaints made to the HSE have been thoroughly investigated by it or by Railtrack. I understand that Mr. Kennedy first raised the matter with the HSE in November 2000, complaining that the crossing was unsafe and that he and his family had been given permission to cross in front of oncoming trains. That is about as serious an allegation concerning a crossing as it is possible to make.
There were two earlier incidents, in 1994 and 1998. Mr. Kennedy had been given permission to cross when trains had been on that section of line. Both incidents were dealt with internally by Railtrack at the time. In the case of the latter incident, disciplinary action was taken against the signaller.
The HSE investigated Mr. Kennedy's allegations, along with Railtrack representatives, and met him on the site in January 2001. It asked Railtrack to carry out improvements to the crossing, to re-brief signallers on the correct procedures—a very important move—and to carry out spot-checks, all of which were done. The HSE wrote to Mr. Kennedy about that at that time.
Mr. Kennedy subsequently wrote to the HSE on eight further occasions between January and June 2001, making allegations of three further incidents of permission being given to cross in front of trains. In one case, on 27 January 2001, Railtrack found that the signaller had made a mistake, and it took disciplinary action. In the other cases, investigations failed to provide evidence to substantiate the allegations, and Mr. Kennedy was informed accordingly. Nevertheless, the HSE again reviewed the working of the crossing with Railtrack on 1 June 2001. Mr. Kennedy was invited to this meeting, but did not attend. Written correspondence to Mr. Kennedy seeking his version of events was returned by Royal Mail as "being refused". Further improvements were recommended, including the installation of CCTV, which was put in place in 2002.
The right hon. Gentleman said that Mr. Kennedy's son alleged that he was given permission to cross and was confronted by a train. Network Rail held an internal investigation and the report was passed to the HSE. It shows that Network Rail considered various forms of independent evidence available to it to establish what happened. As the right hon. Gentleman told us, that included tape recordings, CCTV and train monitoring systems, as well as speaking to the staff concerned. Network Rail concluded, on the evidence available, that permission to cross the line was given after two trains that had been approaching had passed. The HSE has reviewed Network Rail's report, and I understand that it has no reason to doubt its conclusions. It has informed the right hon. Gentleman and Mr. Kennedy accordingly.
I am very glad to hear that the right hon. Gentleman met representatives of the HSE and Network Rail today to review the evidence relating to the latest incident. He has told us of doubts concerning some of the detail of the recordings that he has seen and heard. I undertake
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to contact Network Rail and the HSE, and to seek from them specific answers to the questions that he has raised as a result of this morning's meeting.
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