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Mr. Lammy: The Government are insisting on the provision because we want to stamp out delay. We should remember that 70 per cent. of people who arrive in this country—Europol's figure, not the Government's—are trafficked by criminal gangs. Why do they come here? Because they are exploiting parts of the system. What is the central part of the system that they are exploiting? Delay.

It is right for us to go back to basics, to consider what is necessary to lodge an appeal, and to look at the evidence before us. The evidence suggested that six hours were required, and, if the use of counsel was needed, one and a half working days. It was on that basis that we arrived at five days. It was not because the Government had not thought about the issue in depth.

Mr. Heath: Had the Minister been an applicant, he would probably have used one working day with that
 
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intervention. I hear what he says, but let me say this to him: if he wants to speed up the process, let him start with the Home Office. Let him get the Home Office working correctly, making proper assessments and presenting cases appropriately. That is how to speed up the process, not denying people the opportunity to make a case that can be made only on grounds of merit, as in the Minister's belt-and-braces proposal. We are talking about meritorious cases, not about people who are exercising some sort of delaying tactic.

I despair of this Minister, above all, because he never seems to listen to what people say in debates. He pointed out that new section 103A(4) would permit an application outside the specified period. That is true, but the grounds are very limited, involving reasonable practicability. An appeal cannot be made in the interests of justice. I happen to believe that the interests of justice ought to be paramount, but the amendment makes no reference to them. Appeals can be made only in the event of a specific practical problem that cannot be overcome.

Vera Baird (Redcar) (Lab): I understand the hon. Gentleman's concern, but surely reasonable practicality is what Opposition Members have been talking about. If there is a change of lawyer, for instance, the question of whether it is reasonably practical for the new lawyer to submit the appeal on time is exactly what we should consider. The amendment hits the nail on the head.

Mr. Heath: All I can say is that I hope so, but I envisage circumstances in which it will not. We should bear in mind that we are dealing, potentially, with matters of life and death. I believe that we have a responsibility to ensure that the interests of justice are upheld in any circumstances on that basis.

Let me deal briefly with conditionality. All that I heard this evening about fees sounded very much like a conditional system by another name. There are some deeply imponderable proposals. There is, for example, the concept of the near miss. What if the client secures the right result—leave to remain—but by the wrong means? The lawyer, presumably, will be considered to have failed entirely, although he or she will have done the preparatory work, because the client no longer wishes to test the point of law on which an appeal would be held. The client now considers that he or she has secured his or her objective, which is to remain in the country safe from harm or persecution. Is that a near miss? It may not be a miss at all. The matter may not even come to court.

6.15 pm

There is serious anxiety about the possibility that people will not be able to obtain the legal support that they need. I hold no brief for bad practitioners, but how many filters must the Government introduce before they can do the job of weeding out the bad practitioners, leaving those who are genuinely concerned for their clients and want to do a good job? We have the quality controls and the devolved powers that are available to the firms involved, but when there are no devolved powers, the Legal Services Commission will decide the merits of the case in the first place. Are we to suppose that the commission is incapable of deciding whether a case is meritorious? Will it be necessary to wait until the
 
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end of the proceedings to find out whether the lawyer contracted, in effect, by the commission will be paid? Who on earth would take a case on that basis? It is unfair to the applicant.

We have heard mention of the report from the Joint Committee on Human Rights, and it was pointed out earlier—from a sedentary position—that the Government had responded to its criticisms. I may be corrected, because I have only the briefest acquaintance with the Government's response, but I felt that they had answered some of the criticisms. In fact, I think that that was said explicitly. There did not, however, appear to be a section on clause 14, which we are discussing now. There were serious criticisms that the Government have not addressed. No doubt we shall have to address them, both here and in another place.

Rob Marris (Wolverhampton, South-West) (Lab): I shall confine my remarks to amendments (a) and (b). I declare an interest: I am a member of the Law Society of England and Wales, although I have not practised law since I was elected three years ago because I do not believe in moonlighting.

Looking around the Chamber, I see a fair smattering of barristers and some solicitors. I would hazard a guess, although I stand to be corrected, that during my many years of practice I have issued and run more civil proceedings than anyone else present; and I must tell the Government that changing 10 working days to five strikes me as extraordinary. It suggests, for example, that a sole practitioner who is a solicitor is not entitled to go on holiday: such people would be deemed negligent, and could be sued for missing the deadline.

Since my election, I have written hundreds, if not thousands, of letters to Ministers. I do not recall ever receiving a written acknowledgement within 10 working days, let alone five. I have never received an answer that looked as if it had taken anything like six hours to draft. Ministers are not able to complete six hours of drafting in five working days, but they want those representing asylum applicants to do it. That seems extraordinary.

I urge both the Government and the Opposition to withdraw their amendments, and stick to the 10 working days proposed by the other place. I think that that is, in any event, a very short time.

Mr. Grieve: I can reassure the hon. Gentleman that I will not take an opportunity to put my amendments to the vote. I tabled them as a sort of tempter, in an attempt to entice the Minister to explain his obsession with five days and suggest an alternative. Clearly, however, if that is unacceptable to the Government, it is unacceptable to the Government.

Rob Marris: I will not comment further on that. Let me end by asking the Minister to assure us that his ministerial correspondence is answered within 10 working days—which is being generous to him—and that all of it is answered within that time.

Annabelle Ewing: As many Members have pointed out, the clause has been greatly improved since Second Reading, Committee and Report, although I still have
 
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some concerns, not least that reconsideration will be handled by the same tribunal and that there is a lack of provision for oral submissions.

On the key outstanding issue, I find it quite incredible that the Government insist on a period of five working days. We are dealing with a right of appeal, which is much more important than mere administrative convenience. The Government have begun by making a series of unsound and unrealistic assumptions. As the hon. Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Rob Marris) pointed out, the provision seems to take no account of the fact that the lawyer concerned might be a sole practitioner who is on holiday; nor does it take account of the practitioner's case load or of the possible complexity of a case. Citing repeatedly an average time of six hours is meaningless in a field such as law, in which each case must be dealt with as it comes and on its merits.

Mr. Lammy: Has the hon. Lady not read proposed new section 103A(4)(b), which allows the judge discretion in the rare circumstances in which the five-day deadline cannot be met?

Annabelle Ewing: I have, but the point is that if one sets a deadline for appeal, it will be the norm; such discretion will, by definition, operate on a discretionary basis. I do not know why the Minister appears not to understand that basic point about our legal system.

This is a very important issue and as has been pointed out, the existing period of 10 working days is already a very short one within which to be required to bring an appeal. The other place will insist on this matter, and we will have to discuss it again. In the light of the clause's history, I expected the Minister to have learned a little humility, but he obviously has not.

I am pleased to note that the Bill's legal aid provisions do not seem to apply to Scotland. That is entirely proper, because the Scottish legal aid system is a matter for the Scottish Parliament. As I understand it, I have received an assurance from the Government that no hidden small print seeks to apply such provisions to Scotland, and I am very pleased that the Scottish Parliament will decide how to administer its legal aid system.

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