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Clare Short: I agree that it would be desirable for the legal opinions to be published, but we get new information in Butler that it was not the Attorney-General who decided that there was legal authority for war. He required the Prime Minister to give an unequivocal finding of fact that there was no way other than war to pursue 1441. Given what Blix was achieving in the Security Council, and the destruction of, for example, 70 ballistic missiles, is that not extraordinary? Does it not come back to the Prime Minister, rather than to the Attorney-General?
Mr. Kennedy: That is extraordinary. The right hon. Lady underlines the point that I have just made. It might appear less extraordinary if we had the evidence and those legal opinions in front of us, but we cannot know. It would be in the best interests of the Prime Minister, let alone the rest of us, to put the lot into the public domain, and the sooner the better.
Hugh Bayley (City of York) (Lab) rose—
Mr. Clive Soley (Ealing, Acton and Shepherd's Bush) (Lab) rose—
The dossier—the crucial case of a direct threat to the United Kingdom from Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, which came to underpin the subsequent case for the war—was subject to undue political input. A description was placed before the public to maximise the persuasiveness of the later argument mounted by the Government to pursue that war. At the time of the debate and the vote here in the House of Commons, we were not aware of that entire background. Today, given what we know now, surely it becomes increasingly likely that the Government would have been hard pushed, or would have found it mission impossible, to persuade a majority in the House for war at that time and on the basis of the argument that was advanced.
Mr. Kennedy: I have made it clear that I am not giving way. I am sorry.
The overwhelming mood would surely have been to allow the authorised weapons inspectors the further period of time that they had sought via the United Nations. There was one other casualty at that point, and my goodness, it would have been a welcome one at the time, given the benefit of hindsight today. I do not believe the House would have acquiesced in endorsing the Bush-led new doctrine, the policy of pre-emptive strike, in quite the way it happened.
Despite what he said last week and this afternoon, and despite the fact that I welcome the practical implications that he acknowledged flow from all this, the Prime Minister should listen and understand—I still honestly believe that he does not quite get it—what people in the country think about the matter. He must demonstrate a genuine contrition for the misjudgments that have undoubtedly taken place. Public confidence must be restored in the process of government generally and in the lessons to be learned from the sequence of events. The people of Iraq need ongoing reassurance, given the volatile and violent situation there.
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Not least, the Government should announce the carefully planned and phased withdrawal of our troops from Iraq as a democratically elected Government become established. Other countries, including those in the region, should contribute resources and troops as necessary. Given what the Prime Minister said in his remarks, the existing coalition should account fully for the expenditures of the development fund for Iraq, particularly the unaudited Iraqi oil revenues. The clinching paragraph of the March motion in the House of Commons and the great prize that the Government held up for backing the Bush Administration have not been mentioned today. We must have some meaningful re-engagement with the road map and the wider middle east peace process, which has been an appalling victim of events.
Hugh Bayley: Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?
Mr. Kennedy: No. I have reached the end of my remarks.
In his statement last week, the Prime Minister spoke of his pride in what had been achieved in Iraq. We can all feel pride in the courage and professionalism of our armed forces, particularly when they are asked by Parliament to carry out such a difficult and dangerous task. But we certainly do not feel pride in what they were instructed to do at the behest of the Government and, increasingly, not in the name of our country. In fact, we feel ashamed. I hope that in the years to come, in his most private moments as he reflects on these events and the well-documented litany of failures and political misjudgments that went with them, the Prime Minister might acknowledge a sense of personal shame.
Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Michael Lord): Order. I remind the House that Mr. Speaker has placed a limit of eight minutes on all Back-Bench speeches and that that applies from now on.
3.55 pm
Mr. Bruce George (Walsall, South) (Lab): Perhaps I could help the leader of the Liberal party. When the Defence Committee visited the United Nations on the day before Dr. Blix's speech, we asked a very senior person how long Dr. Blix's group would need properly to evaluate whether there were weapons of mass destruction. He replied, "Twelve months if there is full compliance by Saddam Hussein's regime." When he was asked how long it would take if there was obstruction, he said, "For ever." I therefore have some reservations about the idea that Dr. Blix's view was necessarily sacrosanct. Having listened to the two Opposition party leaders, I remain as convinced and supportive as I was when I heard the speeches that the Prime Minister made at the time and subsequently.
However, I am not here to discuss Butler. Others will do that again and again until they eventually get the result that they require—if they ever do, and I suspect that it will take a long time. I want to talk about the report of the Defence Committee that is relevant to the motion.
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In 1991, the Defence Committee produced an excellent report on the war. We visited Iraq before and after that war, which was termed Operation Granby. Following Operation Desert Fox, we spent a great deal of time examining the no-fly zones, into which we conducted an inquiry in 2000. We were very much involved in observing the events leading up to the war that we are discussing. We visited Kuwait beforehand. We held an inquiry that resulted in three volumes and 130 conclusions and recommendations. We held 19 public sessions. When British troops returned, we visited them all over the country and in Germany. We went twice to the United States. I believe that our report is well worth reading, and I hope that the Ministry of Defence reads it carefully.
We say in our report that we recognise how much we ask of our soldiers, sailors and airmen. For them, Operation Telic followed deployments to Afghanistan, the Balkans and Sierra Leone. Some of those who fought in the combat phase had already returned as part of the continuing stabilisation operation. We should remember that in Operation Fresco, 19,000 service personnel were committed to firefighting operations. One unit from the Army—16 Air Assault Brigade—was engaged in those responsibilities throughout December 2002, handed them over on 6 January, and began pre-deployment training on 8 January.
That cycle of excess stretch cannot be maintained indefinitely. When the Chief of the Defence Staff appeared before us in March, he said that it would be impossible to mount an operation of a similar scale to Operation Telic until 2008–09. I therefore look forward with great interest to tomorrow's Treasury-inspired Ministry of Defence response on the future size, shape and equipment of our armed forces. We must realise that when British forces go off to fight wars, be they popular or unpopular, they must be provided with the equipment that they need, when they need it. Too often in Operation Telic, equipment arrived late or was lost in theatre.
Those problems are well publicised in our report. However, having considered the deficiencies and strengths of our military effort, we felt on balance that the operation was well conducted by very well motivated personnel.
Iraq demonstrated that winning a war is relatively easy in comparison to what happens afterwards. Clearly, the planning in Iraq was inadequate. That was partly due to differences in the US Administration, but we would be deluding ourselves if we argued that things went wrong solely because the Department of Defence and the State Department fell out. There were many other reasons. First, enough troops to win the war might not be enough to win the peace. Secondly, failures of intelligence meant that we did not identify who our friends or our enemies were. We recall that the person chosen to lead the civilian Administration in Basra turned out to be a former brigadier in the Iraqi army and a Ba'athist, and that his successor was accused of being a confidant of Uday Hussein. Thirdly, language and cultural differences proved harder to overcome than was foreseen. If we contemplate more expeditionary operations further afield, those issues will be essential to the effectiveness of our forces.
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The full Defence Committee went to Iraq last July, after the war, and six of its members went out last May. They visited the temporary divisional detention facilities, where those who had been interned by British forces under powers provided to occupying powers by the fourth Geneva convention were held. I am informed that those being held there were generally well treated. Many have now been released but some remain. The Committee is aware of the allegations of misconduct against a number of British personnel, and where there is evidence to support them, they are being investigated. I am confident that, if wrongdoing is found, the guilty will be punished. Some recent answers to parliamentary questions were very helpful in that regard.
A number of cases have already been referred to the prosecuting authorities. These incidents are serious and, if proven, would be a blot on the reputation of our forces, but they must not be allowed to overshadow the vast amount of good work that has been done and is being done. The Committee has requested a memorandum from the Ministry of Defence, and we will inquire into the allegations of misconduct of British forces. I can assure hon. Members and those outside the House that this will be a thorough inquiry.
The war has gone and, yes, there have been recriminations. However, I spoke yesterday to a fellow Defence Committee Chairman—of a NATO country that did not participate in the military action in Iraq. I said, "Now the war is over. There is a UN-endorsed programme to establish a democratic constitution and a properly elected and representative Government of Iraq. We may have had our differences before and during the war, but the situation has now changed." I just hope that those countries will follow UN Security Council resolution 1546, which requests member states to send military forces to assist in Iraq.
I encourage all colleagues to urge those countries that are being intimidated to remove their troops, as well as those that might be thinking of going and those that might not, to understand that our fight is now against the remnants of the Saddam regime, against al-Qaeda, and against all sorts of people who want to do harm to the new Government of Iraq. I very much hope that people will be prepared to—
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