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Madam Deputy Speaker (Sylvia Heal): Order. The right hon. Gentleman's time is up.
6.37 pm
Mr. Crispin Blunt (Reigate) (Con): It is a pleasure to follow an extremely important and powerful speech by the right hon. Member for Oldham, West and Royton (Mr. Meacher). I agree with him in a number of respects, including on the importance of the meeting in Crawford, Texas, where I think that the course taken by the United Kingdom was set. I also agree with what he said about accountability, as well as about the Prime Minister's sincerity.
I do not think that there was any doubt about the Prime Minister's sincerity when he made the case for war. In the past seven years, this House and the country generally have been treated to one or two rather stomach-churning thespian performances from the Prime Minister, but anyone who saw his performance on 18 March last year will have known that it was of an entirely different quality. On Iraq, he has usually spoken with simple conviction.
My concern is the same as that of the right hon. Member for Oldham, West and Royton—that it is the Prime Minister's judgment and the strategy that has flowed from the depth of his conviction that have proved flawed. As he was so convinced in the virtues of his actions and the United States was so focused on regime change, the necessary focus on post-Saddam Iraq was missing. A number of speakers have referred to the fact that Iraq was on the Bush Government's agenda before 9/11, as we have heard in comments attributed to Condoleezza Rice in her interview with The New Yorker. It was clear to informed observers that, in early 2002, the United States was set on this strategy, which was obviously made explicit to the Prime Minister at that vital meeting in Crawford, Texas. The Defence Committee heard evidence that British officers attached to Centcom were then privy to the planning for the operation in Iraq in early summer 2002. For the United States, Iraq was unfinished business from 1991. For the Prime Minister, it was about weapons of mass destruction—I think that that was his sincere belief—combined with the capacity of the suicide attackers demonstrated on 9/11.
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The results of the coalition strategy have been disastrous in many respects. The collapse of the Prime Minister's credibility means that his ability to persuade Parliament and the country about the need for future war, should it arise, has been fatally undermined. Several Labour Members have called on the Prime Minister to consider his position, but if there is a need for the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom to come to the House of Commons to make a similar case to the one that he made—this was the fifth time that the country had gone to pre-emptive war under the right hon. Gentleman's leadership—he will have a serious problem persuading the House and the country. The leader of the United Kingdom should not carry such a handicap.
A further element of the problem is the demolition of the liberal west's moral authority, which is most graphically seen in the pictures that came out of Abu Ghraib prison. A further cause for Osama bin Laden and his zealots to exploit has been created through the collapse of a country that was diametrically opposed to them. Of course, there is a real risk of civil war in Iraq if a satisfactory federal settlement cannot be found, so we might find that statements about how fewer people are now dying in Iraq than was the case under Saddam Hussein could be completely reversed, with appalling consequences, if it falls into civil war during the months and years to come.
If I knew on 18 March 2003 what I know now, I would not have voted for the motion, but that is not because I would have thought that the resolution was unjustified. I agreed with the analysis of my right hon. Friend the Member for Richmond, Yorks (Mr. Hague), who made his case extremely well. However, the problem is the way in which the policy has been acted out in practice and how the coalition has conducted operations because that has meant that the possible benefits of the operation have been overtaken by the costs.
The mistakes that were made have been rehearsed many times. The Pentagon was in charge, yet was not equipped for the more challenging role of rebuilding a state. Insufficient priority was given to the planning of post-conflict operations. Under the Rumsfeld doctrine, a military operation was conducted on the cheap with a lightening strike to take Baghdad—that was a brilliant operation—but insufficient forces were left on the ground to deal with the collapse of the government of Iraq. The army and other security forces were disbanded and, of course, Iraq was used as an experiment for transformative politics, as envisaged by Paul Wolfowitz.
The core strategic mistake was made because we should have been absolutely clear about the outcome at the outset: to remove the regime and produce a replacement Iraqi Government. The very moment at which we had leverage over people such as Ayatollah Sistani, representatives of the Shi'a community—both those in Iraq and in exile—and the Kurdish leaders, all of whom wanted Saddam Hussein to go and were desperate for the coalition powers to intervene, was before we intervened. We should have ensured that the post-war settlement of Iraq was clear because we now have the problem that we have to rely on the wisdom and leadership of Ayatollah Sistani more than anyone else. We need him to reach an agreement with the Kurdish leaders, in particular, that will meet their desire for a satisfactory element of self-government for that
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part of Iraq, in addition to the desire of the majority of the Iraqi population for proper influence on the whole country's affairs.
We are now engaged in the difficult process of moving towards democracy in Iraq. Iraqi experts agree that the moderate middle in Iraq is weak and that political parties with appeal to the intelligentsia have neither organisation nor a significant democratic base. Given the way in which the United Nations elections are being set up, it is likely that individuals will be encouraged to run for elections on the basis of not party support, but personality. There is a danger that that process will by default lead to the mass support of demagogues who will attack the whole parliamentary and governmental system and try to sweep away such parties, as has happened all too often in modern Iraqi history.
Our real problem as a coalition is that we will not know what to do if Iraq begins to descend into civil war. If the security situation deteriorates and the interim Government cannot maintain the minimum level of legitimacy and control, what are British and American forces supposed to do? I do not know, and I am not sure that the Government do either.
6.45 pm
Mr. Peter Kilfoyle (Liverpool, Walton) (Lab): Two contemporaneous debates are being conducted as we speak. One is going on in the rather esoteric environment of the House of Commons, but to people inside the House, let alone those outside, it is riddled with pedantry and hyperbole and it often seems futile. A more important debate is going on outside the House in the minds and hearts of the British people and people throughout the world about the extent to which a decision taken long ago was right. I often wonder what people make of these debates—they are bad enough for the British public, so God knows what the international public think.
During today's debate, we heard a lucid and cogent speech from the leader of the Liberal Democrats, who has the added merit of maintaining a consistent position over time. The Leader of the Opposition displayed tautological contortions as he tried increasingly to justify the rather bizarre ambivalence of his position on the war. The Prime Minister's contribution contained elements of defensive sophistry, but it did not really add to the total knowledge of people outside the House, although the same problems keep reoccurring and members of the Government repeatedly maintain things that they know not to be true.
For example, two outstanding arguments were made in the run-up to the war, and they have been rehearsed consistently since. The first argument was about the legality of the war, although I am prepared to accept that a case for a legal war could be made under UN Security Council resolution 1441—I know that hon. Members could have a big argument about that.
Secondly, a political case was made and, to defer to the Foreign Secretary, I shall not claim that it was said that there was an "imminent" threat, but that a clear and present threat emanated from Saddam Hussein. The political argument won over many people in the political class and many outside the House. It was repeated ad
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nauseam in the newspapers—of course, it was promoted on behalf of the Government because that is what Governments do. Nevertheless, it has been shown that the argument was wholly untrue. There was no threat and there were no weapons of mass destruction. I am not someone such as Lord Butler who cautiously says, "Don't close down the possibility", because we know a threat when a threat exists and know a weapon of mass destruction when it exists. Curiously, when Lord Butler wrote about the background to the weapons of mass destruction, he did not mention where they actually came from. He made a cursory mention of what Iraq had before 1990, but he did not refer to the countries, including the United Kingdom and the United States, that provided the very weapons of mass destruction that would later become politically problematic.
People outside the House realise where we are today. They know that there was no threat, nor any weapons of mass destruction. It would be easy for those of us who voted against the war to say, "We told you so. We were right"—we were right, actually. However, the truth of the matter is that on 18 March 2003, we voted for the simple premise that the case for war was not proven. It is wrong and misleading to suggest that the people who voted for that were somehow condoning Saddam or, as the hon. Member for South Staffordshire (Sir Patrick Cormack) implied, that we were all pacifists, or that we took the view that would not resort to military action when that was appropriate. However, we found the case unconvincing on that occasion. We were able to argue that without the merits of Butler and Hutton because many of us thought that it was evident at the time that the Government's case did not stack up. Nothing has happened to change our view since then, although I hear people who took a different view trying to reconcile their consciences with what they now know. If they did vote for war on the basis of weapons of mass destruction, they did so because of a fallacious argument that should never have been made, but I can say that with hindsight.
People out there will still have a view on whether we should pursue this argument. I have a view on that. My right hon. Friend the Member for Swansea, East (Donald Anderson) again implied that we should draw a line under this and hope that the whole thing goes away. It may be an embarrassment to him and his Committee, the Government and the official Opposition, but the fact remains that many thousands of people have lost their lives, as we heard today, in an illegal and immoral war.
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