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Richard Younger-Ross: Does the hon. Gentleman believe, however, that perhaps the Prime Minister thought he ought to go down that road because he was being pushed to do so by the official Opposition, who kept accusing the Government and others of being anti-American in any criticism of what George Bush said on the middle east and on Iraq in particular?

Mr. Baron: No, I disagree with that. I think that our Prime Minister, unfortunately, was being pushed by the Americans. That is the centre of the issue. Let us consider the 45-minute claim. That is clear evidence that we as a country were misled by the Prime Minister.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. That is the second time, I think, that the hon. Gentleman has used that word. He should be very careful with the words he uses. We have strict conventions in the House.

Mr. Baron: We all remember that the claim that Saddam Hussein could deploy weapons of mass destruction within 45 minutes was integral, if not
 
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central, to the Prime Minister's case for war. Like other hon. Members, I find it incredible that the Prime Minister did not ask the basic question whether the chemical and biological weapons that he thought Iraq possessed could be fired at targets outside Iraq or just used on the battlefield.

No, the fact of the matter was that the decision to go to war had been made, regardless of the intelligence. The lesson from that must be, as other hon. Members have highlighted during the debate, that in future there must be much closer questioning of the evidence at hand. Partly because the House was not privy to the intelligence reports, which made its task extremely difficult, the assumption was that the Prime Minister knew more than we did, but that was not the case. There was no shortage of evidence with which to contradict the Prime Minister.

For example, we know that Iraq used to possess weapons of mass destruction. We know that because America and the west supplied Saddam Hussein with those weapons. However, the Iraq of 2003 was a shadow of its 1991 standing. It had been the most watched-over country in the world, yet no concrete evidence could be produced that Iraq possessed WMD. All that could be produced was the dodgy dossier, which was essentially a reworked thesis that was more than 10 years old.

Meanwhile, not enough credence was given to the evidence on the ground. Mr. Scott Ritter, one of the most aggressive UN chief weapons inspectors during the 1990s, repeatedly said that Iraq did not possess weapons of mass destruction. Hans Blix and the other UN inspectors in the period leading up to the war wanted a little more time to complete their task because they, too, could not find WMD.

Mr. Wareing: I have been listening intently to what the hon. Gentleman has been saying and agreeing with almost all of it, but did he vote against the war when many of us were saying those things?

Mr. Baron: I can put the hon. Gentleman's mind at rest. I did vote against the war and I resigned from the Front Bench in order to do so.

There was no shortage of evidence from the US Government to contradict the Prime Minister. That has not been touched on much during the debate. For example, Secretary of State Colin Powell said at a press conference in Cairo in February 2001:

"And frankly, economic sanctions have worked. Saddam Hussein has not developed any significant capability with respect to WMD. He is unable to project conventional power against his neighbours."

On 15 May Powell went further and said that Saddam Hussein had not been able to

"build his military back up or to develop WMD for the last 10 years".

As late as July 2001, Condoleezza Rice also publicly described Iraq as weak and militarily defenceless. Yet soon, the Prime Minister was to tell us all just how dangerous Iraq was. The fact is that the situation on the ground had not changed since 2001; only the political priorities of the US Government, who had decided to invade Iraq regardless of the issue of WMD, had changed.
 
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The collective failure identified by the Butler report also involved the intelligence services, for despite the Prime Minister's exaggeration of the threat, the JIC approved the wording of the dossier. In my view, the JIC was at least subconsciously influenced by its knowledge of the Prime Minister's desire to state the case for war—a fact that was at least acknowledged by the Butler report when it recommended that future JIC chairmen should be experienced in dealing with senior Ministers and demonstrably beyond influence. The intelligence services should be the eyes and ears of the Prime Minister, not his mouthpiece. It is tempting to conclude from this whole episode that policy indeed led intelligence rather than intelligence leading policy. That is another lesson that needs to be taken away from this affair.

We have since heard the Prime Minister justify the war by saying that although WMD might not be found, the world is a much better place without Saddam Hussein. To me, that is very dangerous talk. Civilised nations do not go goose-stepping around the world invading countries because they think that they may be a threat, then, when they find that they are not, justifying it by claiming that the world is a better place. That is the law of the jungle. It is illegal, because article 2 of the United Nations emphasises that member states cannot engage in regime change.

The Government may take refuge behind resolution 1441, as they have in the past and probably will again this evening. However, the countries that signed up to that resolution did so believing that it could justify war only if there were no alternatives. Indeed, the US ambassador to the United Nations at the time was at pains to emphasise that there were no hidden trigger points for war in the resolution. That is one reason why the US and the UK could not muster even a moral majority when it came to the second resolution. In truth, all other approaches had not been exhausted. The threat of force, deterrence and containment of Saddam Hussein were working, as was recognised by the US itself as late as 2001, and as is confirmed by post-war evidence. The same policy had worked during the cold war and when dealing with rogue states such as Libya.

Meanwhile, UN weapons inspectors wanted more time but were denied it, despite some progress being made. There was nothing to be lost by giving them a little more time to complete their task—indeed, there was much to be gained—but instead we were rushing to meet an American military timetable that had only one outcome, namely war. I should add that I am not anti-American—quite the reverse—but I believe that good friends need to point out when bad mistakes are being made.

The simple fact is that war was not justified. War must always be the measure of last resort when all other approaches have been exhausted and are futile. Indeed, war can be justified only when there is no other possibility. If we lose sight of that, we lose the moral high ground that is often a source of strength in challenging times. We will be signing up to the law of the jungle, and the world will be a worse place because of it. We all agree that Saddam Hussein's was a revolting regime, but that was not in itself sufficient justification to go to war.
 
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War is the ultimate responsibility and act of politicians, yet in many respects it also illustrates their ultimate failure. The crime here is that the Prime Minister turned qualified judgments into unqualified certainties. As a result, this country sleepwalked into war and the world took a step backwards as a consequence. That mistake must not be made again. Lord Butler is right to say that there was collective failure, but the Prime Minister's responsibility for that failure is paramount. His credibility, as well as that of the country, will continue to suffer as a result.

7.24 pm

Mike Gapes (Ilford, South) (Lab/Co-op): This will be an eight-minute speech delivered in one and a half minutes. I refer hon. Members to my speech on 4 June last year, which sets out some of the arguments that I am about to make.

The situation that we are in today is fundamental to the future of the Iraqi people. Hon. Members who have argued as though this debate is entirely internal should listen to what the Iraqi people are saying. My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary will no doubt respond to the points that they raised. As my hon. Friend the Member for Cynon Valley (Ann Clwyd) made clear, the Iraqi people are glad that they were liberated from Saddam Hussein. When I went to Iraq with the Select Committee on Defence, we flew into Basra in a Puma. Tragically, I fear that some of the people I met there may have been involved in this week's horrific crash.

Our people in Iraq are doing a fantastically important job in rebuilding the infrastructure, supplying clean water, helping with electricity supplies, training the new army and the police, and dealing with many other necessities. We have to finish that job. Let us support them, then help to build a democratic Iraq and self-determination for an Iraqi people who are free from Ba'athist fascism.

7.25 pm

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