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Chris Bryant: I am deeply grateful to the right hon. and learned Gentleman for giving way. On every occasion that there has been any discussion about the constitution, he has used the argument that the Government tabled lots of amendments and only some were successful. The truth is that his party tabled more than 400 amendments to the Communications Bill, but ended up voting for it—does that mean that the Conservatives flip-flopped, or is it true that amendments are sometimes also tabled by others, and theirs get through?
Mr. Ancram: I wish that the Prime Minister would give the hon. Gentleman a job and put him out of his misery, because he tries so hard on behalf of his party. Even he cannot believe that an amendment to an existing provision that the Government themselves call the worst of all worlds is trivial and, once you fail in that amendment, it suddenly does not matter any more. The Government were defeated on serious amendments and, having been defeated, they caved in. Now we have the constitution, which will do so much damage to this country.
We opposed the constitution in principle and in practice. Let us consider the constitution and what it will mean in terms of the economy and jobs, and the way that we have traditionally regulated ourselves. It has provision for more regulations. We have already talked about the meddlesome charter of fundamental rights, but there will be more EU powers over social security and co-ordination of employment policy. There will be more powers on competition policy, and to co-ordinate our economic policy. There will be more powers in trade policy, more powers over energy and greater EU control over asylum and immigration and criminal justice.
Under article I-15 the constitution seeks to enshrine the principle of a common foreign and security policy, including
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"the progressive framing of a common defence policy, which might lead to a common defence."
The breach of that policy will be justiciable, whatever the Foreign Secretary says. These are some of the practical reasons why we oppose the constitution. In doing so, we are looking for a better Europe—one that is more suited to the challenges of the 21st century.
Mr. Straw: Does the right hon. and learned Gentleman accept that in every material particular, the articles relating to common foreign and security policy in the new treaty are a replication of those in Maastricht?
Mr. Ancram: Can I refer the Foreign Secretary—[Interruption.]
Mr. Ancram: I will. I refer the right hon. Gentleman to the written evidence from Professor Arnull's submission to the Lords Constitution Committee in October 2003.
Mr. Ancram: This is the answer. The professor points out the differences between those two clauses and says:
"The power of the Court of Justice to review compliance by Member States with the second subparagraph of that provision is particularly significant. It may lead the Court to be called upon to consider whether action by a Member State complies with an act adopted by the Union in this area or is contrary to the Union's interests or likely to impair its effectiveness. The Court would be likely to regard at least some of these issues as justiciable."
That is a significant point. It could allow the ECJ to impose penalties on a member state for its foreign policy actions. A similar passage in the Maastricht treaty was not under the ECJ's remit—the professor mentions it and shows why that is so. If the right hon. Gentleman wants to challenge that opinion, I would like him to do so on that basis.
Mr. Straw: It is palpable nonsense for whoever that person was to claim that, because the right of the ECJ to have any power over operations and policies determined under the European foreign and security policy is specifically excluded by the draft treaty.
Mr. Ancram: The right hon. Gentleman should read this serious opinion given by a serious academic.
Mr. Heathcoat-Amory: Perhaps I can assist my right hon. and learned Friend. What he said was right. The Foreign Secretary is wrong, yet again, because article III-282, which purports to rule out the jurisdiction of the ECJ over foreign policy, does not cover article I-15, which says clearly:
"Member States shall actively and unreservedly support the Union's common foreign and security policy in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity".
Therefore, if we deviate from that part in any respect, that would be justiciable by the European Court of Justice under the final text.
Mr. Ancram:
I am grateful to my right hon. Friend, who supports what Professor Arnull said. The Foreign
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Secretary can continue to make claims from the Dispatch Box, but he really should check his facts before he makes that type of statement.
Mr. Straw: An old saw has been running around, saying that because article III-282 does not specifically refer to article I-15, the whole common foreign and security policy is justiciable. It is not. There is nothing about that in article I-15.
Mr. Straw: No. That is not just my opinion. It is also the opinion of the head of the Council legal secretariat, which whom we have discussed the matter on many occasions. Article III-282 spells out that the European Court of Justice shall not have jurisdiction with respect to articles I-39 and I-40 and the provisions of chapter 2 of title V concerning common foreign and security policy, and article III-194 in so far as it concerns common foreign and security policy.
Mr. Lilley: What about article I-15?
Mr. Straw: The court does not have jurisdiction over common foreign and security policy; it is not necessary because the operational articles are I-39 and I-40 and those referred to in part III. It is a canard—[Interruption.]
Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. I am getting rather confused about who is addressing the House. I think that it is probably Michael Ancram.
Mr. Ancram: I am grateful, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I was wondering whether the Foreign Secretary was trying to make a second speech. This is an important point, and I hope that he will go back and check it, because although he has told us what articles are not justiciable, the one to which I referred was I-15. That is the one that Professor Arnull talks about, saying:
"It could allow"—
"the ECJ to impose penalties on a member state for its foreign policy actions."
That is a very serious assertion that flies in the face of what we have been told again and again is one of the triumphs of this Government's negotiation—a claim that is, at best, highly questionable.
As I was saying, we are looking for a better Europe, one which is more suited to the challenges of the 21st century. It will not happen of its own accord. It will take a no vote in any of the forthcoming referendums to send the leaders of Europe back to the drawing board—what in the White Paper is described as
"a meeting of the Council of Ministers for further discussions."
A no vote will allow them, I hope, to return to the sidelined principles of the Laeken declaration of 2001, which actually recognised some of the real problems that the EU faces and asked some of the right questions. That declaration recognised that the EU was too distant from its peoples. It rightly said that the EU should not intervene too much in the details of national lives. It said that the EU was too bureaucratic. It asked both whether
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some powers currently held by the EU should be returned to the nation states and whether some powers still held by member states should be given to the EU. Sadly, the only suggestion that the constitution took up was that more power should be given to the EU.
This time, there will be a real chance—in many ways, the first chance for a generation—to move towards a healthier, more flexible, more decentralising Europe. The EU needs real reform. Europe's member states need to recognise that not all countries want the same things from the EU or want to go in the same direction. Some member states want deeper integration; some do not. Our view is that we should let those who want to pool ever more sovereignty do so. We should not stand in their way. But in return, they should not expect those who do not want to follow them to do so either. Schengen and the euro are good examples of how this can be achieved without breaking the European Union. Experience tells us that there are powers that are currently held by the European Union that would be better exercised by national Governments. We want to see the current ratchet reversed and powers returned from Brussels to Britain.
Of course there are some powers that all countries must sign up to—the single market being the most obvious. The single market was intended by Britain to be a vehicle for liberalisation that would benefit business. It has brought real benefits to countries across Europe, but it has also been used to justify unnecessary rules and regulations. This is partly what has caused the recent steep decline in support for the EU among British business.
So we need to look closely at how the single market is working in practice. We need a simple set of rules that will facilitate and stimulate trade within the European Union. A reformed single market must be the bedrock of a transformed EU. It would deliver the great gains in productivity and growth that Europe so desperately needs. It would end the steady creep of bureaucratic power. Perhaps most important, it would re-engage public support for the European Union.
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