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Service Deployment
Mr. Gerald Howarth:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what percentage of (a) Royal Navy and Royal Marines, (b) Army and (c) Royal Air Force trained
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strength was deployed on operations and other military tasks for (i) the final quarter of financial year 2003–04 and (ii) the first two quarters of financial year 2004–05. [188463]
Mr. Ingram: Information on trained strength deployed on Operations and other Military Tasks is produced quarterly, in arrears, as part of the Ministry of Defence's assessment of performance against Spending Review 2002 Public Service Agreement targets. It is published on the MOD website (www.mod.uk) following review by the Defence Management Board, and on the Treasury Public Service Performance Reporting website (http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/performance/MOD.cfm). Quarter 4 data for 2003–04 (January to March 2004) is given in the table (and is available on the MOD and HMT websites):
| 2003–04 | |
|---|---|
| Q4 | |
| Navy/Marines | 17.7 |
| Army | 22.6 |
| RAF | 12.1 |
Note:
Percentages exclude those either preparing for, or recovering from, deployments and are quarterly averages. A list of Military Tasks can be found on the Department's website (http://www.mod.uk).
Quarter 1 data for 2004–05 (April to June 2004) is currently being collected, and will be published at the end of September. We expect to publish Quarter 2 data for 2004–05 (July to September 2004) at the end of November.
Territorial Army Personnel
Ann Winterton: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what pension provision is made for Territorial Army personnel who are away from their civilian work for periods of six months or longer. [188801]
Mr. Caplin: The Ministry of Defence has arrangements in place to ensure that reservists who are called-out for active service with the armed forces, including those called out for periods of six months or longer, are not disadvantaged in pension terms. Individuals may have a number of pension options dependent on their personal circumstances:
those individuals who wish to remain in their civilian pension scheme during their period of called-out service can do so and the MOD will meet the cost of the employer contribution to that scheme; or
individuals may opt to have their period of called-out service covered by MOD's Full Time Reserve Service pension arrangements; or
they can opt to be contracted-in to the state pension arrangements (State Second Pension).
Those individuals who have previous service that gave them pension rights from the Armed Forces Pension Scheme (AFPS) may alternatively opt for an enhancement to their AFPS pension rights.
Trooper David Clarke
Mr. Kidney:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what progress he has made in the investigation of the
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death of Trooper David Clarke; what communications he has had with the family of Trooper David Clarke about the progress of the investigation; and if he will make the results of the investigation public. [188585]
Mr. Caplin: The Royal Military Police Special Investigation Branch (SIB) have completed an investigation into the incident in which Trooper (Tpr) Clarke and his colleague Corporal Allbutt died. An Army Board of Inquiry (BOI) is ongoing.
It is not departmental policy to release publicly copies of either SIB or BOI reports. However, regular contact is being maintained with Tpr Clarke's family, who are informed of all significant developments on the various processes under way. The family will receive a copy of the final BOI report when this becomes available.
Vaccination
Mr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what research his Department (a) commissioned and (b) evaluated on the simultaneous administration of anthrax and pertussis vaccine following the letter from Dr. Metters of 21 December 1990; and if he will make a statement. [174196]
Mr. Caplin: Research into the simultaneous administration of anthrax and pertussis vaccines is being addressed as part of the Ministry of Defence's Vaccines Interactions Research Programme, which is overseen by an independent research panel. The Programme includes a study by the National Institute for Biological Standards and Control (NIBSC) which has specifically attempted to address and extend tests that NIBSC carried out using anthrax and pertussis vaccines in 1990, and which led to the communication from Dr. Metters.
The preliminary results from the NIBSC study have been published and are available on our website at http://www.mod.uk/issues/gulfwar/research/interact.htm. The final results are being submitted for publication in peer reviewed scientific literature.
PRIME MINISTER
Iraq
Adam Price: To ask the Prime Minister whether he authorised British military personnel to commence meetings with US personnel to plan an invasion of Iraq in mid 2002. [188706]
The Prime Minister: As set out in the Butler Report, the UK and US Governments had frequent discussions about Iraq.
However, the decision to resort to military action to ensure that Iraq fulfilled its obligations imposed by successive UN Security Council Resolutions was taken only after other routes to disarm Iraq had failed. I decided to commit UK forces after securing the approval of the House in the vote on 18 March 2003.
Adam Price:
To ask the Prime Minister (1) pursuant to paragraph 404 of the Butler Report, on what (a) operational, (b) security and (c) other basis the Government decided against favouring sources
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regarded as reliable by the intelligence services that tended to present a less worrying view of Iraqi chemical and biological weapons capability; [188622]
(2) at what point he was informed that two thirds of the total amount of intelligence about Iraqi deception and concealment activities came from a single source; [188623]
(3) at what point he was informed that over four fifths of the intelligence about Iraqi deception and concealment activities came from two sources; [188624]
(4) at what point he was informed that human intelligence sources regarding the evidence of Saddam Hussein on weapons of mass destruction were not extensive; [188625]
(5) whether he had been informed prior to September 2002 of the reliability of the sub-sources who provided the information that Iraq could use chemical and biological weapons of some sort within 45 minutes; [188635]
(6) on which parts of the Joint Intelligence Committee assessments from or prior to March 2002 his statement on 3 March 2002 that Iraq was trying to accumulate weapons of mass destruction was based; [188636]
(7) on which parts of the Joint Intelligence Committee assessments from or prior to March 2002 his statement on 11 March 2002 that there was a threat from Saddam Hussein was based; [188637]
(8) on which parts of the Joint Intelligence Committee assessments from or prior to March 2002 his statement on 11 March 2002 that there was no doubt at all that Saddam Hussein had acquired weapons of mass destruction was based; [188638]
(9) on which parts of the Joint Intelligence Committee assessments from or prior to April 2002 his statement on 3 April 2002 that Iraq had stockpiles of major amounts of chemical and biological weapons was based; [188639]
(10) whether Joint Intelligence Committee assessments from March and April 2002 made definitive claims on the (a) existence of stockpiles of weapons and (b) development of weapons with regard to Iraq; [188640]
(11) what assessments were provided to him before or during March 2003 from UNMOVIC which suggested that Iraq had far-reaching plans to weaponise VX after 1991; [188846]
(12) what intelligence assessment was available to him on (a) 30 May 2003 and (b) 2 June 2003 which indicated that trailers found in Iraq were used for the production of biological weapons; [188847]
(13) when he was informed of the content of the overall summary provided by the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC to the Security Council on 7 March 2003 regarding the extent of Iraq's co-operation with the UN inspectors; [188848]
(14) when he was informed that UNMOVIC had been able to obtain information on Iraq's past mycotoxin programme; [188858]
(15) whether the UNMOVIC Clusters document of March 2003 suggested that Iraq had far-reaching plans to weaponise VX in any period after 1991; [188859]
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(16) what assessment was made of the possibility that stocks of growth media which UNSCOM had reported as still unaccounted for in its final substantive report of January 1999 still existed; [188867]
(17) at what point he became aware (a) that the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC had told the Security Council that Iraqi scientists had agreed to be interviewed in private and (b) that the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency had been successful in conducting interviews with Iraqi scientists in private; [188868]
(18) when he became aware of the contents of the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC's briefing to the Security Council of 14 February 2003 which stated that the Government of Iraq had encouraged interviewees not to request the presence of Iraqi officials nor to require interviews to be taped; [188869]
(19) when he became aware that UN weapons inspectors had confirmed that evidence had been provided for the prior destruction of chemical and biological warfare agents in (a) November 2002, (b) December 2002 and (c) February 2003; [188870]
(20) which parts of the Joint Intelligence Committee intelligence assessments led him to state on 10 April 2002, Official Report, column 11, that Iraq posed a threat to the wider world; [188871]
(21) when British intelligence experts investigated the two trailers found in Iraq; [188873]
(22) when intelligence findings were circulated regarding the two trailers found in Iraq; [188874]
(23) when weapons inspectors found live anthrax in Iraq as referred to in his article in the Independent on Sunday of 2 March 2003; and what evidence he had to confirm that discovery; [188875]
(24) when he was informed that the factory at which anthrax had been produced before 1991 to which he refers in his article in the Independent on Sunday of 2 March 2003 had been under UN monitoring since October 1991; [188876]
(25) whether, prior to the war, Iraq's intention to use nuclear, biological and chemical weapons outside its borders, either by the Iraqi armed forces or through the supply of such weapons to non-state actors, prior to any military attack, had been investigated by the British intelligence service; [188902]
(26) what assessment he made of whether to inform Parliament prior to March 2003 of Hans Blix's report to the Security Council of 14 February 2003, on access to Iraqi sites; [188938]
(27) when he became aware of Hans Blix's report to the UN Security Council on 14 February 2003 on access to Iraqi sites; [188939]
(28) pursuant to paragraph 405 of the Butler Report, when he became aware that in July 2003 the Special Intelligence Service had withdrawn two reports from a new source on trial because the source had by then been discredited; [188940]
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(29) when he became aware of UNMOVIC's conclusions on (a) the fate of the castor oil extraction plant at Fallujah III in 1998 and (b) the extent of production of castor oil in July 2001; [188965]
(30) when he became aware of UNMOVIC's conclusions on the operability of the chlorine plant at Fallujah II, following visits between 9 December 2002 and 2 March 2003; [188989]
(31) when he became aware of the extent to which UNMOVIC has visited the Fallujah II plant between 9 December 2002 and 2 March 2003; [188990]
(32) what intelligence material was available to him to cast doubt upon Dr. Blix's statement on the usefulness of the Iraqi declaration of 8 December 2002; [188998]
(33) how many days it took the Defence Intelligence Staff to complete their initial assessment of the 12,000 page Iraqi declaration of 8 December 2002; [188999]
(34) whether he was aware that drafted statements which conveyed that Iraq would only be likely to use chemical and biological weapons during an invasion were removed from the September 2002 dossier; [189001]
(35) on what evidence he based his claims in the September dossier that the production of nitric acid in the al-Sharqat complex was being used for the purification of uranium; [189004]
(36) what assessment he made of the report by the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency to the Security Council on 7 March 2003 on whether there was an indication of resumed nuclear activity in Iraq; [189005]
(37) when he became aware of the views of the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency on the level of nuclear activity in any of the sites inspected as passed to the Security Council on 7 March 2003; [189006]
(38) when he was made aware that the statements in the September dossier on Iraq about mobile biological laboratories were based upon evidence from one defector; [189007]
(39) when he became aware of the results of the findings by UNMOVIC following examination of the sites named in the September dossier, with regard to nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programmes; [189008]
(40) pursuant to paragraph 403 of the Butler Report, when he became aware that the Secret Intelligence Service had raised serious doubts about the reliability of reporting of the sub-source who provided information about Iraqi chemical and biological programmes and intentions; [189009]
(41) on what evidence he based his statement on 2 June 2003 that he stood by the evidence presented to the public on Iraq's weapons programme; [189010]
(42) on what grounds he based his statement to the Liaison Committee on 8 July 2003 that he stood by the evidence put forward in the September dossier; [189011]
(43) on what evidence he based his views, expressed to journalists in his monthly press conference on 30 July 2003, that he believed the intelligence he had received prior to the war regarding Iraq was correct; [189012]
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(44) whether he was aware on 25 January that MI6 had withdrawn key reports on Iraq's weapons; [189013]
(45) on what evidence he based his statement in an interview with The Observer on 25 January that he believed that the intelligence regarding Iraq was correct; [189014]
(46) when he became aware that Hussein Kamel had claimed in 1995 that there were no remaining stockpiles of agents in Iraq; [189015]
(47) at what point he became aware that the interim report of the Iraqi Survey Group published on 2 October 2003 had not come to a conclusion regarding the purpose of the clandestine laboratories and safe houses within the Iraqi Intelligence Service; [189016]
(48) when he became aware that an e-mail had been sent from the then chair of the Joint Intelligence Committee to the head of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), with suggestions for the ISG report; [189017]
(49) pursuant to Joint Intelligence Committee assessments, when he became aware that British Intelligence assessments prior to March 2003 stated that a collapse of the Iraqi regime would increase the risk of chemical and biological warfare technology or agents finding their way into the hands of terrorists; [189018]
(50) whether there was an assessment of the validity of the material in the dossier of September 2002 between November 2002 and March 2003; [189019]
(51) pursuant to the inter-departmental advice available to Ministers in early March 2002, what intelligence assessments were available to him in (a) April 2002 and (b) September 2002 that showed that Iraq posed a threat not just to its neighbours but to the wider world; [189020]
(52) whether intelligence assessments relating to Iraq in 2002 and 2003 made reference to an intention by Iraq to use nuclear, biological and chemical weapons outside its borders (a) by the Iraqi armed forces and (b) through the supply of such weapons to non-state actors even if Iraq itself was not attacked; [189021]
(53) whether, prior to the war on Iraq, intelligence assessments confirming Iraq's intention to use nuclear, biological and chemical weapons existed that did not relate to Iraq's likely response if it were invaded; [189022]
(54) whether any Joint Intelligence Committee assessments prior to March 2003 asserted that Iraq had the intention to use nuclear, biological and chemical weapons outside its borders, with the exception of the circumstance of a US-led attack; [189023]
(55) prior to March 2003 and pursuant to the Joint Intelligence Committee assessment of 9 September 2002, what assessment the British intelligence service
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made of the possibility of Iraq threatening to use weapons of mass destruction against other states other than in the context of a US-led invasion; [189024]
(56) what assessments were made by the British intelligence services of whether Iraq sought nuclear, biological and chemical weapons for the purpose of external aggression; [189025]
(57) pursuant to his statement at the TUC conference on 10 September 2002, whether assessments had been made of the possibility that stocks of growth media that UNSCOM had reported as still unaccounted for in its final substantive report of January 1999 no longer existed in usable form; [189026]
(58) pursuant to his speech at the Azores summit on 16 March 2003, when he was informed that UN weapons inspectors had confirmed that evidence had been provided for the prior destruction of chemical and biological warfare agents in (a) November 2002, (b) December 2002, (c) February 2003 and (d) March 2003; [189027]
(59) when he was informed that assessments were available before March 2003 which demonstrated that there was a distinction between the materials that UNMOVIC found to be unaccounted for and what was known to exist in Iraq; [189028]
(60) what part of the Joint Intelligence Committee intelligence assessments led him to state on 3 September 2002 that Iraq posed a threat to the security of the world; [189029]
(61) on what evidence it was stated in the September dossier that Iraq was conducting an illicit chemical weapons programme at the Fallujah II plant; [189030]
(62) pursuant to his statement of 18 March 2003, Official Report, columns 760–74, on Iraq, with particular reference to the Iraqi declaration of 8 December 2002, whether he made an assessment of the merits of requesting that Defence Intelligence staff make a full assessment on the Iraqi declaration before making further comment upon it; [189041]
(63) whether the new sub-source referred to in paragraph 403 of the Butler Report was the source for the claim made in the September 2002 dossier that Iraq's weapons of mass destruction could be deployed in 45 minutes. [189296]
The Prime Minister: These matters have been examined during the course of the Butler Review and other inquiries, and covered during debates and statements on Iraq and in briefings by my Official Spokesman. All relevant information has been placed in the public domain insofar as that could be done without prejudicing national security.