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Vulnerable Adults

12. Ms Meg Munn (Sheffield, Heeley) (Lab/Co-op): What plans he has to introduce an offence of (a) causing harm to and (b) exploitation of a vulnerable adult. [191201]

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Fiona Mactaggart): In addition to offences that protect any adult from violence, sexual exploitation, theft and fraud, we are introducing further measures, including the familial homicide provisions in
 
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the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Bill, making it an offence to cause or allow the death of a vulnerable adult within the household, and the Mental Capacity Bill, which will make it an offence to ill-treat or neglect an adult who lacks capacity.

Ms Munn: I know that my hon. Friend is very familiar with the Longcare inquiry, which reported in 1998. I pay tribute to her work in that area, but that inquiry recommended that there should be a specific arrestable offence of causing harm to or exploitation of a vulnerable adult, with a maximum penalty of 10 years' imprisonment, to reflect the seriousness of such
 
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offences. May I urge her and the Government to consider again introducing the offence, six years after the report was written?

Fiona Mactaggart: I thank my hon. Friend for her kind remarks. I am glad that she has taken over my former role in the all-party Voice group, which campaigns on these issues. The initiatives that we have taken to date, the new legislation that I described, the response following the consultation on the Mental Capacity Bill of increasing the penalty for such offences and the action that we have taken on care standards all need to bed down. Many of those steps will achieve the result that the Longcare inquiry identified as necessary, but if they do not, the Government will seriously consider introducing a further offence.
 
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UK Forces (Iraq)

3.32 pm

The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. Geoffrey Hoon): With permission, Mr. Speaker, I would like to make a statement about the deployment of UK forces in Iraq.

There has been considerable speculation in the media over the past several days about the United Kingdom deploying forces outside its current area of operations in southern Iraq. The only relevant fact is that the UK military received a request for assistance on 10 October from the US military command in Iraq. Such requests and discussions between allies are routine. There is regular dialogue with our coalition allies and with the Iraqi security forces on all aspects of operations in Iraq. Requests for assistance form part of these exchanges.

The disposition of coalition forces in Iraq has been adjusted regularly since the end of combat operations. The Danish contingent, for example, has taken on a greater share of responsibility within Multi-National Division (South-East), and the Japanese have deployed a 500-strong contingent into the Dutch area of operations.

This request, if agreed, would involve UK land forces operating outside MND(S-E). It is worth bearing it in mind that Royal Air Force personnel have been operating over the whole of Iraq when required to support the coalition, and that some British personnel are based in Baghdad to support coalition operations. Other British land forces have previously operated outside MND(S-E).

Iraqi security forces and coalition forces have recently been involved in intensified operations to restore areas under the control of militants and terrorists to the authority of the Iraqi Interim Government. Recent operations in Najaf, in Samarra and in North Babil have been undertaken as part of this effort. The political process is moving ahead as a result of these actions. This strategy is designed to increase pressure on and deal with those terrorists who are trying to prevent the rebuilding of Iraq, and who threaten the holding of free elections in January.

The US request is for a limited number of UK ground forces to be made available to relieve US forces, to allow them in turn to participate in further operations elsewhere in Iraq, to maintain the continuing pressure on terrorists. The request does not ask for UK troops to be deployed to Baghdad city or to Falluja.

We are obviously considering the request. A number of issues require assessment, including timing, the length of the potential operation, command and control arrangements, logistics and which forces would be the most appropriate to conduct the operation. None of these details has, as yet, been decided, and a UK reconnaissance team will deploy to the area tomorrow to provide further information, which will inform the chiefs of staff. I expect the final recommendation from the Chief of the Defence Staff by the middle of the week. All these factors require careful consideration. Once we have made a decision, I will inform the House in the usual way.

Speculation over the weekend has focused on the suggestion that the request is somehow political, and that its timing is linked to elections. I want to make it
 
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clear that the request is a military request, and although it is linked to elections, it is linked not to the US elections but with efforts to create the best possible security situation in which to hold the Iraqi elections in January.

A number of commentators have voiced concerns about UK forces coming under US command, and about the rules of engagement. If we agree to this request, the arrangements will ensure that UK forces have a specific task; they will be responsible for a particular area. There are no practical difficulties for UK forces operating alongside those from the US. Our forces are fully engaged with all our coalition partners at every level of planning. UK forces work daily alongside forces from Italy, Denmark and other nations, including Poland, the Netherlands and Japan. This is a matter of routine, and it is an effective and practical way of ensuring coherence in our own area and with the areas surrounding it.

UK rules of engagement are more than adequate for tasks of the type envisaged; there is no need to adjust them. They will provide proper protection for UK forces, as they have during operations in volatile areas in our own sector, such as in al-Amarah.

It is worth noting that as the capabilities of the Iraqi security forces develop, they will expand the areas under their independent control. As a result, coalition forces will need to become more able to act flexibly in support of the security forces as they, in turn, take on greater responsibility for the protection of Iraqi civilians and property.

The Government remain totally committed to the holding of free elections in January, and to seeing a Government in Iraq who take their rightful place in the international community and who deliver prosperity and a new future for the Iraqi people. That should unite all parts of the House. It is right that the United Kingdom should do what it can to contribute to this fundamental strategic objective.

Mr. Nicholas Soames (Mid-Sussex) (Con): I thank the Secretary of State for his statement and for providing an advance copy earlier today. I start by saying that the Opposition express again with great pride our highest confidence in, and admiration for, the professionalism, courage and skill of the men and women of the British armed forces serving in Iraq. We fully support the coalition as it seeks to bring democracy, stability and freedom to Iraq, and to preserve her territorial integrity; and we agree with the Secretary of State that we should do what we can to contribute to the fundamental strategic objective.

I note the Secretary of State's assertion that no decisions have yet been finally taken, but may I, on behalf of Her Majesty's loyal Opposition, raise a number of important markers that we hope he will bear in mind? As he moves to a decision on this deployment, will he consider following? Although we of course instinctively wish to assist our American allies, does he not agree that such a deployment would leave a big capability gap in Multi-National Division (South-East)? Will he also confirm that as the British divisional reserve, the Black Watch has itself been heavily engaged in that role since its deployment in MND (S-E)?

Given that the security situation could well deteriorate between now and the Iraqi elections, how does the Secretary of State plan to fill such an important
 
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capability gap, were this deployment to be made? Which Warrior-equipped battle group would undertake the role of the divisional reserve?

I turn to the issue of British troops coming under United States' command. Britain and the United States are, after all, the closest of allies and we have always operated together, but will the Secretary of State spell out how he sees the important detail of the likely command and control arrangements? Such a deployment would represent a fundamental change. Despite the assurances given in his statement, does he not agree that the rules of engagement will need to be extremely robust to cope with the change of area and the possibility of support from the Americans, who may well be using almost entirely different ROE?

Further and vitally, may we have the Secretary of State's absolute assurance that British troops, who are subject to the International Criminal Court—in contrast to their US counterparts, who are not—will not be compromised by any likely changes in the rules of engagement? The Secretary of State must answer that question and give the House an absolute assurance in this respect: what limit in time and manpower do the Government intend to assign to the deployment?

Does the Secretary of State further agree that, if our troops are deployed, they should have the power to influence the decision-making process rather than just the responsibility to execute it? Is he accordingly satisfied as to the general scale and input of British views and expertise in current coalition counter-insurgency planning? What is the latest date on which the US has requested that our troops be deployed, and is it not leaving it all to rather short notice to send out a recce group tomorrow to report back with the Chief of the Defence Staff's decision due on Wednesday? Do not US forces have their own deployable reserves, or are they all already fully engaged? Will the Secretary of State explain to the House what he believes to be the operational justification for this proposed substantial change to our dispositions, and will he also explain the nature of the military advice that he has thus far been given?

In view of what the Secretary of State has said, is he aware that Black Watch was told last Tuesday that it would not be coming home in November and that it would be redeployed? The Secretary of State needs to understand the feelings of the families, who will have watched with disbelief the unfolding shambles of the last few days and the Government's uncertainty and inability to make clear and prompt decisions on such vital matters.

Finally, given recent events and the need to look to the future, does not the Secretary of State now accept that it is fundamentally irresponsible to cut four infantry battalions from the order of battle while the Army is so clearly and obviously under such great pressure?

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