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Mr. Hoon: Again, I am grateful for the hon. Gentleman's unqualified support, and I hope that our American allies feel the same about the support that he appeared to give them—not least because he was quoted in The Sunday Times this Sunday as saying:
"The concept of peacekeeping is one alien to our American friends."
No doubt that will be read with great enthusiasm in the White House and, indeed, in the Pentagon. Notwithstanding the hon. Gentleman's criticisms of our American allies, this is about a request from a close ally to provide assistance in a very difficult operation in and around the important centres that the Americans have been attacking in recent days. That has been designed to ensure that the terrorists do not have the opportunity of killing more innocent Iraqis and more innocent citizens not only of the UK but of other countries as well. That is why it is so important that, if we accept the request, we take the necessary action. It is a coalition effort—one ally strongly supporting another.
I shall try to deal with each of the hon. Gentleman's questions as best I can, given that a number of the issues necessarily fall to be decided by the chiefs of staff following appropriate information on the reconnaissance, to which I referred. It is important that we bear in mind the importance of assisting allies. To that extent, I agree with the hon. Gentleman. The Black Watch has been heavily engaged, and if we take the decision to move it or other appropriate forces north we should cover the gaps in our capability. We are mindful of that.
The rules of engagement that we provide for British troops are already extremely robust and I do not anticipate any difficulty with them, either in their own right or as far as any possible remote threat from the ICC is concerned. There will be no compromise on those rules of engagement. I was slightly surprised over the weekend to hear the hon. Gentleman apparently calling for their publication. No doubt he has since reflected on that, as no Government—certainly no Conservative Government—have contemplated that in the past. I draw his attention in that respect to his own remarks in Hansard when he was Minister of State for the Armed Forces.
It is right that we do not set out the time limit in detail; it is a matter for military advice. The situation is similar for the scale and input of the UK's contribution. That equally applies to any latest date for deployment. I have set out the strong operational justification for the deployment. I do not believe, however, that it in any way affects our decision to take advantage of the withdrawal of four battalions from Northern Ireland, not least because this is an extra deployment that will require support, as hon. Members will recognise if they consider the decision calmly and rationally. The reason for readjusting our Army numbers to allow more support to logisticians and signallers is to permit this type of extra commitment. There is no shortage of infantry battalions, but there is an acute shortage of those who support the battalions.
Mr. Paul Keetch (Hereford) (LD): I also thank the Secretary of State for notice of his statement and associate Liberal Democrats with the statements of support for United Kingdom forces in Iraq. Their performance in difficult conditions has been outstanding and we offer them our wholehearted support.
The United States has 130,000 military personnel in Iraq. Is the proposed deployment of 650 extra British troops purely for operational reasons? If so, what are those reasons, and why specifically British forces and
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not other United States forces or other coalition forces used to working under US control? Are none of those available?
Will the Secretary of State be specific about whether he has put the Black Watch under a warning to stay inside Iraq? Given that the Black Watch is the reserve force for the south, what other arrangements will be made to ensure that the effective capability of our force in the south will not be affected, especially at a time when the situation could deteriorate? What consideration has been given to the logistics implications, in particular for Warrior vehicles taken away from the south? Will he comment on the morale of the Black Watch, given that it was supposed to return to the UK in two weeks?
We know that American military tactics in Iraq are different from our own. Indeed, General Jackson told the House of Commons Defence Committee just that two weeks ago. Will our forces have to work under a different military doctrine? If the deployment is required for convincing operational reasons, will the Secretary of State assure the House that he will not go against the advice of the chiefs of staff who are going out to Iraq tomorrow to make their assessments?
Mr. Hoon: I assure the House that this is a military request, as I made clear. It is made for clear operational reasons. The House will not be surprised to learn that there is a continuing effort against those parts of Iraq that have been harbouring and sheltering terrorists. It is necessary to deal with those areas, and some have already been dealt with. Samarra was an outstanding military operation and proved very successful. It is necessary to maintain such operations to ensure that free elections take place in January, so there is a clear operational justification.
Incidentally, I cannot think of any other country that has worked more closely with US forces in recent times than Britain has. If the hon. Gentleman's argument is that those countries that have worked closely with the US should step forward, we would be the first in the queue. Attention will be paid to the provision of appropriate reserve forces and to necessary logistics.
I, too, asked about morale in the Black Watch. I emphasise that the Black Watch is toured for six months, as all British Army units are, and it will be back in the UK before the completion of that tour of duty. I was concerned that members of the Black Watch had been told informally that they might expect to return before those six months had elapsed. Having raised the problem of morale, I was left in no doubt that if there was any question about their commitment to participate in such an operation, I could take my criticisms and put them somewhere else—I paraphrase.
I do not accept that the deployment will involve a different military approach from the one that the UK adopts in its area of operations. As I said, if the operation is agreed to, the UK forces will be responsible for a discrete and particular area.
Mr. Frank Cook (Stockton, North) (Lab):
Will my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State call to mind the statements of his counterpart in the United States and indeed the President that the US forces can handle events in Iraq and that there should be no need for UK
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forces to get involved? My right hon. Friend will also have noted reports of American statements that the British attitude is one of institutionalised cowardice. Will he assure the House that he will bear both those elements in mind before coming to a decision—if he has not already done so?
Mr. Hoon: I assure my hon. Friend that no decision has been reached. I have set out the necessary steps before any such decision is made and, as I have already indicated, I will inform the House as soon as possible once the decision has been taken. I will certainly take his observations into account, but I wish to emphasise to him and to the House that we are part of a coalition and it is necessary for the participants to support each other. That is one of the factors that we will have to take into account before reaching any conclusion on that request.
Annabelle Ewing (Perth) (SNP): As the MP for Perth, where the Black Watch has its regimental headquarters, I know that people in my constituency do not understand why it is operationally necessary to deploy the 600-plus battalion in the US zone, where there are already more than 130,000 US soldiers. What does the Secretary of State have to say to my constituents who are anxiously awaiting news about their loved ones, who are currently on their second tour of duty within a year and who are being stabbed in the back at home by the Government's plan to disband their historic regiment? My constituents want to know when the Black Watch will come home.
Mr. Hoon: I thought that I had explained. I recognise that the hon. Lady represents a number of people closely concerned with the Black Watch. The Black Watch would have expected to fulfil a six-month tour of duty, as is consistent with all Army units. However, informally, it might have expected to return after four months. Those expectations may not be satisfied if the request is agreed to on an early basis. I am sure that the Black Watch will have strong views about that and, as I said a few moments ago, I raised the question of morale in the Black Watch, given the efforts that it had made in the past. I am sure that the hon. Lady knows the Black Watch much better than I do, but the message that I got was that it was determined to carry through this operation should it be decided that it should participate.
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