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Bob Russell (Colchester) (LD): May I ask for the third time—twice on the Floor of the House and once in a written question—in how many countries Her Majesty's armed forces have served during the past year?
The threat from massed ranks behind the iron curtain has been curtailed. In its place are the more disparate but equally challenging threats posed by international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and weak and failing states. Those threats have required us to review the way we plan, prepare and conduct our operations with the focus on delivering
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flexible forces that are adaptable, rapidly deployable and able to deliver maximum effect, wherever and whenever they are needed.
Harry Cohen (Leyton and Wanstead) (Lab): The Secretary of State talked about weapons proliferation, so can I ask him about ballistic missile defence? Has the United States asked the Government any favours in that respect—doing something about that for them—and what has been the Government's response?
Mr. Hoon: My hon. Friend knows, as I said earlier, that we have kept the House regularly informed of our discussions with the US and, indeed, of the decisions that we have taken about the provision of radar facilities at Fylingdales. I can assure my hon. Friend—I have to repeat the point to the House—that recent press speculation is completely unfounded.
The strategic defence review provided a solid foundation and last year's defence White Paper called for even more flexible and rapidly deployable armed forces—armed forces that make the most of platforms and people across the full range of military effect from peacekeeping to war fighting, and armed forces that complement the skills of other Government Departments and agencies to tackle more effectively the causes of instability in the world.
Our experience of the types of operation in which we have been engaged since the end of the cold war, together with our assessment of the security environment, show that, on a routine basis, we should plan to support three concurrent operations of small and medium scale, at least one of which is an enduring peace support operation. At those levels, we will maintain a broad spectrum of capabilities to allow our armed forces to conduct limited national operations or, as is more likely to be the case, to enable us to be the lead or framework nation for coalition operations.
We recognise that our armed forces must, of course, retain the ability to reorganise themselves at longer notice for large-scale operations. At that level, however, we do not judge it sensible to replicate the same spectrum of capabilities, given that, in these most demanding of operations, it is inconceivable that the United States will not be involved, either leading a coalition or as part of NATO.
Mr. Crispin Blunt (Reigate) (Con): During the time that the right hon. Gentleman has been Secretary of State for Defence, for how long have UK armed forces sustained that scale of operations? Has it not been rather more than that for most of his time as Defence Secretary?
Mr. Hoon: We have certainly exceeded the anticipated levels of operation that were set out in the strategic defence review. That is why—I hope that the hon. Gentleman will agree—it is necessary to look into the structure of our armed forces, particularly into the way in which our Army is organised, in order more effectively to manage the responsibilities that UK armed forces have taken on. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will agree that changes are needed.
As far as NATO and the European spatial development perspective are concerned, we believe that where military action is used, it is most effective when
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brought to bear through multinational coalitions and alliances. A strong Euro-Atlantic relationship, founded on NATO, remains the basis of the United Kingdom's security policy. The continued strength of the Alliance depends on delivering when and where it matters. NATO must maintain its willingness to react flexibly beyond its borders and to deter and disrupt threats before they reach us. It must keep up the pace of its transformation to ensure that it can provide modern structures and forces that are ready to deliver the right military responses. That means capabilities that harness technology and exploit information to enable us to act quickly, accurately and decisively. It also means improved mechanisms for generating such forces with a strengthened commitment from our allies to providing them.
Against that background, we are working with our EU partners to improve European military capabilities. As the new constitutional treaty makes explicit for the first time, NATO remains "the foundation" of our collective defence. Our aim is to develop European military forces that enhance NATO as well as the EU. The EU battle groups initiative will establish coherent force packages of very rapidly deployable troops, trained and evaluated to agreed standards. Open and transparent liaison will ensure that those battle groups are fully compatible with the NATO response force and by driving the development of the right capabilities by our EU allies, the battle groups concept will be central to our efforts to manage overstretch. European defence will therefore complement NATO. The EU can bring together a range of crisis management responses—diplomatic, military, civilian, judicial and economic. Its new civilian-military cell is an example of that potential. Such capabilities will fill crucial gaps in the mechanisms now available for handling the current complex security environment.
Our approach with the UN is similarly multilateralist.
Mr. John Smith (Vale of Glamorgan) (Lab): On the relationship between NATO and the European rapid reaction force, does my right hon. Friend share my concern that it would be a mistake to duplicate the military headquarters of those forces?
Mr. Hoon: I agree. That is why, in negotiation with our partners and allies, we have sought to avoid any such duplication.
A principal goal for the EU battle groups concept is to provide European forces for a limited duration in support of the UN. We continue our many programmes to train international peacekeepers. We are loaning officers to assist with the current peacekeeping surge. Another, longer-term aim, is to see the African Union assume most of the burden for African peacekeeping.
Changes having been identified in the nature of the security environment in which we find ourselves, it is inevitable, and indeed necessary, that there will be a corresponding impact on the size, shape and capabilities that we require of our armed forces. We have a responsibility to our servicemen and women to ensure that they have the right equipment, organisation and supporting structures to enable them to continue to carry out the demanding tasks that we ask of them.
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To do otherwise—to leave our armed forces equipped and structured to counter threats that passed with the passing of the previous century—would mean that we were failing in our duty, and weakening our nation's defence at the very moment when we most need it to be strong and effective. That is why we are introducing the changes that we outlined in the "Future Capabilities" paper, published in July.
The armed forces themselves, under the direction of the service chiefs, have recognised the need for this change. Our thinking has moved away from assessing military capability only in terms of the numbers of platforms and people towards a new emphasis on the delivery of military effects and outcomes, and the exploitation of the opportunities presented by new technologies such as network-enabled capability. With modern communications and the fusion of intelligence, target acquisition, and precision weaponry, the capability of our armed forces is improving exponentially.
The 2003 defence White Paper made it clear that the shift in investment towards greater deployability, better targeted action and swifter outcomes would involve a reduction in the numbers of some of our older ships, tanks and aircraft. We have again drawn on our experience of operational commitments since the strategic defence review to identify those parts of the armed forces that are in the highest demand, and those that are less well utilised. As a result, we have developed new plans to ensure that our armed forces can continue to be effective.
Mrs. Alice Mahon (Halifax) (Lab): My right hon. Friend mentioned the defence White Paper, but certain old, tried and trusted regiments—such as the Duke of Wellington's Regiment, now serving in Iraq—are threatened with amalgamation. He will understand that I and my hon. Friend the Member for Calder Valley (Chris McCafferty) have been besieged with letters and petitions containing thousands of names on this matter. The Duke of Wellington's is a good regiment, so will he make sure that he does not mess it up by amalgamating it with something else?
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