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Mr. Greenway: My hon. Friend mentioned Tuesday. On Tuesday this week the North York Moors national park committee received a letter from an official at the Ministry of Defence saying that there were no plans whatever to use RAF Fylingdales for any purpose other than as an early warning radar station. I visited the station a few weeks ago and I can tell my hon. Friend that the work to upgrade the existing radar, which the Secretary of State knows that I support, is well under way. What was in the Sunday press will have come as a surprise to the committee.

Does my hon. Friend not think that, given the Government's record on Fylingdales, people are bound to be suspicious? We have heard what the Secretary of State has said today, but does my hon. Friend agree that the Government should go much further?

Mr. Soames: I most certainly do. My hon. Friend is right. It is an important test of trust and credibility. It is wrong on such an important issue for the Secretary of State not to make his view clear to the House. All of us can hope that the Minister of State will wish to do so in the wind-up.

In December 2002, the Secretary of State told the House:

"I believe that this represents an important industrial and technological opportunity for the UK".—[Official Report, 17 December 2002; Vol. 396, c. 46–47WS.]

In that context, what is the significance of the memorandum of understanding that he has recently placed in the Library? Our view is clear. The British
 
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people remain unprotected from missile attack. There are rogue states developing such missiles. We therefore believe that the UK should work closely with the United States to enable us to share in that protection. What is the Secretary of State's view?

Mr. Keetch: The shadow Secretary of State is rightly asking the Government a number of important questions and I, too, hope that we will get some answers. Perhaps he could state the Conservative party's position. Would he accept the stationing of US interceptors on British soil in Mid-Sussex or anywhere else, assuming that those interceptors were designed to prevent an attack on the American homeland but would not cover the British homeland?

Mr. Soames: There would clearly be no question of their going to Mid-Sussex, not least because we have a major international airport just outside and it might not be a desperately good idea for time-keeping. This is a serious matter. Our view—my hon. Friend the Member for Ryedale (Mr. Greenway) has made it plain—is that we need to know what the options are. We are not party to these things any more than the hon. Gentleman is. These are important decisions. Quite apart from the knockaround of party politics, these are fundamental decisions, as are the onerous decisions that the Secretary of State will shortly have to take on Trident. We are entitled to know, and certainly the constituents of my hon. Friend are entitled to know, what is the Government's intention, what is involved in the MOU and how the Secretary of State intends to move it forward.

Mr. Greenway: My hon. Friend is right to say that it is an important matter. He refers to party political knockaround. I can tell him that the Liberal Democrats on North Yorkshire county council have tabled a motion for their meeting next week, and doubtless the matter will be discussed. That is why we want to get as much information as we can ahead of that meeting. People are genuinely concerned across all parties.

Does my hon. Friend agree personally that it would be sheer lunacy to locate missiles and radar on the same base? Ought we not to consider, if we need antiballistic missiles, siting them at sea rather than on the mainland?

Mr. Soames: I have always subscribed to the saying that one should not put all one's baskets in one egg. It is unlikely that that would be a sensible view. My view of the Liberal Democrats is that they are always tabling motions. If I were my hon. Friend, I would not tangle with the people on the North York Moors national park committee. I think they know what they are talking about. The stand that my hon. Friend is taking is correct. People are entitled to know what is involved, what decisions need to be taken and what the implications are for them.

I shall turn to NATO and the European Union and then I will stop banging on; I apologise for taking so long. I have often expressed in the House my concerns about NATO and our anxieties for it. We attach huge importance to it, as does the Secretary of State. It is an alliance that needs revitalising in the face of threats to all the democracies, but for the life of me I cannot see how the political, material and intellectual effort being put
 
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into separate defence structures within the European Union and outside NATO contributes to that process. Furthermore, the EU is now preparing to take over the main military responsibilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina from NATO by the end of 2004. That will create no additional or different military capabilities.

Indeed, some forces in Bosnia will remain under NATO command. The overall commander of the EU mission is NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe; the over-the-horizon back-up forces will be NATO's. NATO retains the responsibility for Kosovo. What added value do complicated military arrangements, which are designed purely to involve the EU, bring to the situation? Do not they further deeply complicate an already difficult problem?

In Brussels, the EU has established its military staff with a developing operational planning capability. That has led to the creation of NATO liaison arrangements in the EU military staff and a complementary EU presence at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe. That is a circular and, in our view, inadvisable and unnecessary process. What is the justification for the institutional tangle? After all, all soldiers and anyone to do with military operations know that simplicity must be the key. NATO struggled to find extra troops to provide security in the recent elections in Afghanistan and eventually fell short of its target.

Six months ago, NATO seriously contemplated taking overall responsibility for military operations in Iraq but it has ended up sending a small number of soldiers on a training mission. Are not the Government truly concerned that, while the EU defence project gathers momentum, many European allies remain unwilling to enhance their defence capabilities? They show reluctance to engage in robust military operations and appear to have diminishing enthusiasm for the NATO alliance.

Mr. Hoon: I believe that the hon. Gentleman was a Minister when his Prime Minister, John Major, signed the Maastricht treaty, which contained a specific provision that called for the development of an EU defence policy. Did he support the policy at the time or did he have his fingers crossed?

Mr. Soames: I believe that we all signed up to the policy; the wiring diagram presents the problem. The Secretary of State knows that well because he is at the centre of the matter. He is a good European and he wants to do the right thing by NATO and the EU, as I do. We are not currently doing the right thing by either of them. We must put that right. The complications of confusing EU and NATO operations are serious. There are, of course, honourable exceptions, but are not the Government worried about the EU's diversion of attention from the genuine security problems that it faces?

There is so much to cover. The debate is about defence in the world and we have not covered the whole subject. However, all of us who have anything to do with the armed forces and the happy band who turn up for defence debates know that it is a huge privilege to participate. Hon. Members of all parties derive immense pride from that. I look forward to the day when we hold many more such debates.
 
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As we said earlier, I hope that the deployments that are about to occur will be attended by success and safety. I am sure that hon. Members will again join me in wishing the Black Watch well.

Madam Deputy Speaker (Sylvia Heal): I remind hon. Members that Mr. Speaker has imposed a 10-minute limit on Back-Bench speeches.

3.23 pm

Mr. Bruce George (Walsall, South) (Lab): As a Welshman, I find 10 minutes rather restrictive, especially when I hear Opposition Members' comments. They make me more inclined to be aggressive, but I shall try hard to resist.

I am delighted that the Defence Committee report has been tagged on to the debate. We are discussing defence, which is the responsibility not only of the Ministry of Defence. Joined-up government is supposed to mean, and largely does mean, the involvement of a whole spectrum of Departments, and even policing and the private sector in considering acts of terrorism.

It is inevitable that the debate will be dominated by Iraq. The decision to deploy is clearly important and has excited a great deal of comment. The Defence Committee has invited the Secretary of State to give evidence. I hope that that will happen soon and that he will elucidate the Government's intentions even further. I say in advance that I am persuaded of the argument for deploying troops but I would have been nervous if our troops were to be deployed with the Americans in attacking Falluja.

Many people have argued over the years that the Americans are never prepared to take casualties, yet they have taken more than 1,000. We who say that Britain is prepared to take casualties and that our troops are superior now argue that we should not put our soldiers in harm's way. Perhaps we can try to accept that being in the Army is a dangerous occupation. We must not throw people needlessly into an environment that replicates the Somme; that has not happened. The position in Baghdad clearly will be more complicated and dangerous than Basra province, but the decision was made because it was necessary.

In deploying our forces, we should ensure that they have the proper training and proper support from the United States. I suspect that there is no "A to Z" of Basra, or, indeed, any city in Iraq. Since the soldiers do not know their way around and are in a new environment, they will need support. I want them to be well prepared and politics should not insist that they are projected north immediately. There must be proper preparation because they are not, as some might argue, undertaking the same operation in another area. The operation is different and we must do all that we can—I am sure that the Ministry of Defence and the military leadership will do that—to reduce the risk to our armed forces as far as is humanly, militarily and politically possible.

Like many hon. Members, I have attended the funerals of young men who have been killed and it is not a pleasant experience. The armed forces' support for families is extraordinary. We do not want such funerals but our armed forces have an objective to assist in the evolution of a new and democratic Iraq. Although people objected to the initial deployment—I supported
 
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the Government in that—there is now a new environment. We are now supporting the evolution of a different sort of society.

I do not like people who deprecate the Liberal Democrats because they did not support the war. They want our armed forces to be retained in Basra. I rejoice in the Liberal Democrats' support for British armed forces anywhere in the region. That is a step forward and I am happy with that limited support.

Those who are prepared for our armed forces to be deployed further north in an environment of greater risk will have a nervous few months. It is argued that the decision is a military matter. It is, but we fought hard in this country to secure civilian control over the military and we have done that. The idea that the military make decisions is fantasy. They can advise but, ultimately, a politician—the Secretary of State, the Prime Minister or a Cabinet Committee—rejects or accepts the recommendation. We should be honest and say that it is a political-military decision because the military cannot operate in a political vacuum. Their role is to deliver the military contribution to wider, cross-governmental strategy, to paraphrase the defence White Paper.

It is fair to say that the military advice was strong. We need to send a small force, and the troops chosen are well trained and highly motivated. Members of the Black Watch are among the best troops in the British Army and probably any army. Our best wishes must go to our armed forces, any of the alliance armed forces and the Iraqi people, who are facing appalling dangers in the present environment.

The defence White Paper does not seem lengthy, but it is a good document. The Defence Committee produced a report that has been tagged to the debate, and generally speaking, we agree with most of the White Paper. I like the threat assessment, which is realistic. Perhaps a few things were left out that should have been part of that assessment. The Government are absolutely right in saying how they need to develop our equipment programme. I have one or two comments on procurement to make, perhaps in the next debate on defence. However, the Government are right to try to plan to deal with what warfare will be like in the next decade, rather than thinking about the last war and viewing the next fight as merely an extrapolation of the experienced gained on an earlier occasion, as Governments and the military have tended to do in the past. I am afraid that history reveals that that is not a very sensible way for politicians or the military to proceed.

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